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Abstract 
This cross cultural study compares the fairness perceptions of New 
Zealand and Malaysian individual taxpayers of their respective income tax 
systems, and investigates the consequences of those perceptions, together 
with other important variables, on their compliance behaviour. A 
theoretical framework was developed based on Equity Theory and the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour. The study‟s hypotheses were tested using 
the responses to questionnaire surveys (which included two scenarios) and 
in-depth telephone interviews, which were conducted sequentially in both 
countries. Partial Least Squares and thematic analysis were used to analyse 
the surveys and interviews data, respectively.  
The results suggest that Malaysian taxpayers have significantly better 
perceptions of fairness of their income tax systems than their New Zealand 
counterparts, yet New Zealand taxpayers are more compliant. The most 
consistently important factor in explaining taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour across the two countries is their attitude towards compliance, 
followed by subjective norms. Fairness perceptions, which are highly 
influenced by their tax knowledge and perceived complexity of the tax 
system, are also influential, particularly in the understating other incomes 
scenario. This cross-cultural study demonstrates that regardless of the 
differences between the two countries under study (in relation to 
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economies, cultures and ethnicities), taxpayers generally respond in quite 
similar ways when it comes to meeting their tax obligations.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview of the Thesis 
The issue of tax fairness has received great attention around the world. Tax 
fairness is essential because tax systems should be perceived as fair in 
order to obtain a high degree of voluntary tax compliance. In other words, 
a good understanding of taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions is important for 
the tax authority to improve the tax system and consequently encourage 
taxpayers‟ compliance. Thus, this cross-cultural study on fairness 
perceptions between New Zealand and Malaysia is undertaken to provide 
such an understanding in two relatively rarely examined jurisdictions, both 
of which rely on self assessment.  
 
It is worth conducting this comparative study of Malaysia against the New 
Zealand benchmark for several reasons. First, New Zealand, a developed 
country, is an early implementer of the self assessment system while 
Malaysia, a developing country has experienced a more recent move to the 
self assessment system. Comparing these two countries (of different years 
of experience with the system) would be interesting to discover any 
differences in fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour among their 
individual taxpayers.  Second, the fact that New Zealand tax system is seen 
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to be one of the most efficient tax systems internationally (OECD, 2007), 
and the second highest compliance nation after Singapore (Belkaoui, 2004) 
further justifies the need to undertake this cross-cultural study. In that 
review of thirty countries, Malaysia was ranked eighth, after the United 
States (US). It is interesting to investigate whether the two nations of 
different level of compliance behaviour (as suggested by Belkaoui, 2004) 
have similarities or differences in their fairness perceptions on their 
respective income tax systems; and whether such fairness perceptions are 
consistent with their compliance behaviour.  
 
Third, the concerning level of non-compliance behaviour in these two 
countries, especially in Malaysia provides rationale to investigate taxpayers 
fairness perceptions and their effects on compliance behaviour. This 
information is important especially for the tax authorities in their effort to 
improve the current income tax systems.  
 
Fourth, the economic and cultural differences between the two countries 
may provide interesting perspective to the cross-cultural studies. New 
Zealand, which is an example of a developed nation, is highly populated 
with European (68%), Maori (15%) and Asian (9%). While Malaysia, 
which represents a developing country, consists of five major ethnic groups 
namely Malays, Chinese, Indians, Kadazans and Ibans. These differences 
have led to national cultural differences between the countries as suggested 
3 
 
by Hofstede (2001). Referring to his model on cultural dimensions, New 
Zealand is regarded as an individualistic society, which emphasises on 
individuality and individual rights. Malaysia, on the other hand, is 
characterised as a collective society where closer ties between individuals 
are apparent. Another distinct feature between the two nations, as identified 
by Hofstede (2001) is the power distance dimension, where the society in 
New Zealand stresses in equality and opportunity for everyone. This is not 
the case in the Malaysian society, where inequalities of power and wealth 
have been allowed to grow.
1
 While these cultural differences (which may 
affect societal norms) are not directly tested in this study, they may have an 
impact of fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour.
2
  
 
Finally, the use of New Zealand and Malaysian data would give an 
excellent basis to compare with other Asian countries in the future (for 
example, Hong Kong and Singapore). 
 
This study begins with general overview on the tax fairness issue, tax 
compliance behaviour, as well as the background of the income tax 
systems implemented in New Zealand and Malaysia. These discussions 
provide the path for the researcher to discuss the relevant theories and prior 
                                                 
1 The other two dimensions of national culture are masculinity and uncertainty avoidance. However, the 
differences between the nations in these two dimensions are not apparent. 
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studies. Since fairness and compliance behaviour are the central issue in 
this study, both Equity Theory and the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB)
3
 are discussed in order to provide a comprehensive picture of how 
taxpayers perceived the fairness of the respective income tax systems, 
which consequently affects their compliance behaviour (Bordignon, 1993; 
Loo & McKerchar, 2010; Richardson, 2005; Turman, 1995). The 
integration between Equity Theory and the TPB is appropriate for two 
reasons. First, fairness perceptions are only one factor that may affect 
taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. Second, the TPB has been established as 
a dominant theory in explaining individuals‟ behaviour. Prior studies, 
which have been mainly undertaken not in New Zealand and Malaysia, 
have also been reviewed to develop the relevant hypotheses.  
 
Generally the scope of this study is individual taxpayers in both New 
Zealand and Malaysia. In order to obtain that selected group of taxpayers, a 
different sample selection basis was performed depending on the 
availability and accessibility of the data. In New Zealand the 2008 
Electoral Roll was used to systematically select the potential respondents. 
In Malaysia the sampling frame was carried out through public entities and 
private entities engaging in service industry. Due to the different sampling 
                                                                                                                        
2 Even though the study does not explicitly test the impact of cultural differences on fairness   
perceptions and compliance behaviour, it does take into account subjective norms as one hypothesised 
variable. Thus, indirectly the model captures the cultural differences to a certain degree.  
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frame, it is important to note that the term „taxpayers‟ in this study is 
limited to salary and wage earners in Malaysia and a more diverse group of 
individual taxpayers (including salary and wage earners, self-employed and 
tax beneficiaries) in New Zealand.   
 
The fourteen theoretically derived hypotheses (plus 3 sub-hypotheses)  are 
then tested based on respondents‟ answers to the survey questionnaire, 
using Partial Least Squares (PLS) software. In the survey, individual 
taxpayers were asked about different dimensions of fairness, their 
knowledge on the respective income tax systems and the perceived 
complexity of their income tax systems. Also, an attempt was made to 
identify their compliance motivations (based on the TPB variables) using 
two hypothetical tax scenarios, one related to overstating business 
expenses, and the other on understating other incomes. In addition to the 
quantitative approach, in-depth interviews were also conducted to gather 
more information. This mixed-method approach enabled the researcher to 
provide comprehensive findings to the study.  
 
From the analysis (both surveys and interviews), the results indicate that 
taxpayers in both New Zealand and Malaysia perceived tax fairness to be 
multi-dimensional. While the interview results in both New Zealand and 
                                                                                                                        
3 While there are other behavioural theories available, these two theories were found to be most relevant 
to capture fairness perceptions and taxpayers’ compliance behaviour. 
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Malaysia consider fairness perceptions as an important factor in taxpayers‟ 
compliance decisions, the survey results suggest that such a significant role 
is only apparent in the „understating other incomes‟ scenario. Taxpayers‟ 
attitudes and subjective norms appear to have greater impact on their 
compliance behaviour. Further, the results indicate that both tax knowledge 
and low level of tax complexity positively contribute to fairness 
perceptions. This has important implications for tax authorities in 
educating taxpayers on the importance of tax and the distribution of tax 
revenues collected; and at the same time simplifying their income tax 
systems.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: first, it sets out the 
issues regarding fairness in the tax compliance decisions. This is followed 
by an overview of the implementation of the income tax systems and 
compliance levels in both New Zealand and Malaysia. This discussion is 
followed by a description of the two main approaches in tax compliance 
studies, namely the economic deterrence approach and the behavioural 
approach. Then, the significance of the study is set out. This is followed by 
outlining the objectives of the study. The chapter ends by an overview of 
the research framework, research methodology and methods adopted to 
conduct the study. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement   
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Fairness perceptions are important in individuals‟ private and public lives.  
Equality, justice and social change all have their roots in perceptions of 
fairness. If individuals perceive a system or situation to be fair, they will 
generally support the system and demonstrate this support through their 
actions. The impact of perceived fairness has been established by political 
psychologists who claim that citizens make political evaluations based on 
fairness perceptions (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Rasinski & Tyler, 1988).  
 
In taxation, fairness perceptions have been discussed widely internationally 
and have been seen as a prerequisite for taxpayers‟ compliance. In fact, 
there is ample overseas evidence documenting the role of tax fairness in 
the tax system. Etzioni (1986), for example, concludes that fairness 
perceptions of tax are more important than the tax rate itself in influencing 
compliance behaviour. A study by Bordignon (1993) further documented 
that fairness has an important influence on taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour. 
 
Undeniably tax fairness
4
 is one important element of an efficient tax 
system. The Institute on Taxation & Economic Policy (2005) claims that 
tax fairness is an important goal for state policy makers to encourage tax 
compliance. Furthermore, tax reform was enacted in the United States (US) 
in 1997 (known as the Tax Reform Act (TRA) 1997) to improve a tax 
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system which had been criticised as being complicated, unfair and easily   
manipulated (Bobek, 1997). As part of this reform, the Inland Revenue 
Service (IRS) Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 was enacted (Nellen, 
1999) where various incentives were offered with the intention of reducing 
the burden of low and middle income taxpayers. Other changes in that Act 
included a shift of the burden of proof from taxpayers to the IRS, 
protection for confidential communications between taxpayers and their 
tax agents, an increase in taxpayers‟ rights, particularly during tax audits, 
and taxpayers‟ rights to civil damages if the IRS acts negligently with 
respect to tax compliance (Nellen, 1999). It is interesting to note that the 
focus of this reform was tax simplification embedded within the concept of 
fairness. 
 
Realising the importance of the fairness criterion, the New Zealand 
Government has also continuously given attention to this issue through 
numerous reforms (Tan, 1998; Tax Review, 2001). For instance, between 
1984 and 1990, the New Zealand Government reduced the top marginal tax 
rate from 66 percent to 33 percent, and the number of tax brackets from 
five to three (Stephens, 1993; Tax Review, 2001). In 1986, sales taxes 
were abolished and replaced with a Goods and Services Tax (GST) with a 
uniform tax rate of 10 percent (which was subsequently raised to 12.5 
                                                                                                                        
4 A detailed discussion of tax fairness is offered in Chapter 2.  
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percent in 1989 and 15 percent in 2010) (Brash, 1996; Government of New 
Zealand, 2010; Stephens, 1993).  
 
Domestically, the implementation of a self assessment system (SAS) in 
Malaysia was also embedded with the objective of instilling public 
confidence in the fairness and integrity of the tax system (Palil, 2005). 
Prior to the implementation of the SAS, Malaysian tax authority has 
reduced the top marginal tax rate from 55 percent (1980 to 1984) to 40 
percent (1985 to 1990), with fifteen tax brackets (Singh, 2003). Thereafter, 
a gradual reduction in the top marginal tax rate has taken place over time 
from 35 percent in 1991 (Singh, 2003) to the current rate of 26 percent in 
2010, with twelve tax brackets (Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 2010).  
 
The effort taken by the New Zealand and Malaysian Governments, and 
their respective Revenue Authorities, signals that tax fairness is a central 
issue in taxation. Empirical evidence on the positive association between 
tax fairness and tax compliance in previous studies (for example, Gilligan 
& Richardson, 2005; Roth et al., 1989; Turman, 1995) has also established 
that the lack of fairness in income tax systems may explain non-compliant 
behaviour. Consequently, it is worth conducting a further comparative 
study on tax fairness in income tax systems, bearing in mind the significant 
effect fairness has on compliance decisions.  
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1.3 Overview of the Income Tax Systems and Compliance 
Environment 
This section provides an overview of the income tax system, as well as 
compliance levels, in both New Zealand and Malaysia. This information is 
essential to understand the current implementation of the income tax 
systems in the countries under review. 
 
1.3.1   New Zealand  
The New Zealand income tax legislation was first enacted in 1891 through 
the Land and Income Tax Assessment Act 1891. The applicable tax rates at 
that time were set at sixpence for a pound (two-and-a-half percent) on 
taxable income up to £1,000, after an initial £300 exemption, and one 
shilling for a pound (five percent) for the remaining balance (Committee of 
Tax Experts, 1998). These two-steps tax scale was adopted until 1911, 
when the number of steps were subsequently increased to nine in 1911 
(Vosslamber, 2009). This change was only effective until 1913 when a 
graduated income tax was introduced in 1914. In 1941, the tax system 
returned to the step system of taxation with 39 steps (Vosslamber, 2009). 
The number of steps has changed a number of times (for details, see 
Stephens, 1993; Vosslamber, 2009) to settle to two steps in 1990 with a top 
rate of 33 percent, the lowest in the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) at that time (Stephens, 1993). 
Lowering the income tax rate (from 66 percent to 33 percent) reduced the 
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share of personal income tax from 64 percent of total tax revenue in 1984 
to 49 percent in 1990. To balance with that, fringe benefits tax (FBT), 
goods and services tax (GST)  and resident withholding tax on interest and 
dividend income were introduced in 1985, 1986 and 1989, respectively 
(Brash, 1996). In addition, over time, exemptions for low income earners 
were also abolished, leaving the New Zealand tax system with no tax-free 
threshold. 
 
Recently, the 2010 Budget also focused on achieving a fairer and more 
sustainable tax system. In order to accomplish this objective, lower 
personal income tax rates have been introduced, with a minimum of 10.5 
percent to the maximum of 33 percent (the previous minimum and 
maximum tax rates were 12.5 and 38 percent, respectively). These new tax 
rates take effect from 1 October 2010 (Government of New Zealand, 
2010). In order to fund the tax revenue reduction as a result of lowering the 
income tax rates, the rate for GST is increased from 12.5 percent to 15 
percent. This tax package which aims to broaden the existing tax bases is 
considered the most thorough and beneficial overhaul of the income tax 
system in 25 years (Government of New Zealand, 2010).    
 
The above discussion suggests that numerous reforms have been made to 
improve the tax system and deal with an increasingly complex 
environment (Stephens, 1993; Tan, 1998; Tax Review, 2001). Following 
12 
 
these reforms, the OECD regarded the New Zealand tax system as one of 
the most efficient tax systems internationally (OECD, 2007). New Zealand 
is the country with the second highest level of tax compliance (with a score 
of 5.0) after Singapore (Belkaoui, 2004).
5
 In his study, Belkaoui (2004) 
measures tax compliance using the level of tax compliance index that 
varies from 0 to 6.0, with higher scores indicating higher compliance.  
 
Like many other jurisdictions, New Zealand also relies on a voluntary 
compliance tax system,
6
 where taxpayers are expected to understand and 
comply voluntarily with their tax obligations (Committee of Tax Experts, 
1998). Under this voluntary self-assessment system, some taxpayers are 
prone to non-compliance (both intentional and unintentional). Hence, the 
Inland Revenue Department (IRD) has taken a proactive stance to maintain 
high levels of tax compliance, through its Compliance Model (New 
Zealand Inland Revenue, 2007), as exhibited in Figure 1.1.  
                                                 
5 Malaysia is ranked eight out of 30 countries (Belkaoui, 2004). 
6 A SAS has been formally in place in New Zealand since 1998. 
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Figure 1.1 
The IRD Compliance Model 
 
Source: New Zealand Inland Revenue (2007, p32)  
 
The IRD‟s Compliance Model (based on the Australian Tax Office‟s 
(ATO‟s) Compliance Model) (Inland Revenue Department, 2003), which 
is designed to facilitate compliance amongst the vast majority of taxpayers, 
takes into consideration the external factors (economic, sociological, 
business, industry and psychological) that influence taxpayers‟ attitudes 
and behaviours. Once the determining factors are recognised, the most 
suitable approach is applied to the best way possible to improve 
compliance. The Compliance Model also details the strategies to improve 
compliance according to a variety of compliance attitudes. For example, if 
taxpayers are either “willing to do the right thing” or “try to comply but do 
not always succeed”, the IRD‟s approach is to make compliance easy and 
assist them to comply. This strategy will minimise unintentional non-
compliance among taxpayers. At the „high‟ end of the compliance 
spectrum, where people deliberately do not comply, „suitable‟ sanctions are 
14 
 
required.
7
 In this situation, law enforcement is important to maintain 
overall taxpayers‟ confidence in the tax system and encourage ongoing tax 
compliance (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2007).  
 
Notwithstanding the benefits of the IRD‟s Compliance Model, which 
emphasises on the dynamic partnership between the tax authority and the 
taxpayers towards improving tax compliance, Kornhauser (2007) believes 
that this model poses several problems. First is the possibility of being too 
lenient and too hard which can decrease tax compliance by eroding tax 
morale. The second problem with this flexible system is the tendency to 
undermine a sense of procedural fairness when the tax authority‟s 
discretion creates arbitrary decisions. This has potential to lower tax 
morale and consequently tax compliance. Third is the assumption that  
taxpayers‟ attitudes or motivations are reflected in their behaviour and 
therefore tax authority simply responds according to that behaviour. She 
contends that this assumption may not always hold true as attitudes do not 
necessarily translate into behaviour. Also, the fact that taxpayers with 
different attitudes and motivations may behave in the same manner further 
requires the tax authority to understand taxpayers‟ attitudes and 
motivations rather than actual behaviour per se in their effort to improve 
tax morale and consequently tax compliance.  
 
                                                 
7 This strategy will help to curb deliberate non-compliance behaviour among taxpayers.  
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Burton (2008), on the other hand, criticises the „pyramid model‟ on the 
basis that it is focusing upon taxpayer under-compliance alone while 
ignoring over-compliance. Further, he claims that such a model does not fit 
the non-compliance definition which entails both under-payment and over-
payment of taxes. By ignoring over-compliance, the tax authority has 
actually „enjoyed‟ the advantage of having more revenue collected, as 
reported in the US and Ireland (Burton, 2008). This scenario also exists in 
New Zealand where NZ$73,135,998 of overpaid tax by 50,392 taxpayers 
was reported in 2006 (Stock, 2007).  In 2005, the IRD owed 
NZ$51,035,315 in overpaid tax to 37,201 taxpayers. In total, the IRD has 
collected NZ$700 million in overpaid tax, since the year 2000 to 2006 
(Stock, 2007).
8
 This indicates the unfair treatment to over-compliant 
taxpayers.  
 
In response, Burton (2008) suggests a „diamond model‟ of compliance to 
replace the „pyramid model‟, as exhibited in Figure 1.2. This „diamond 
model‟ serves to tackle both under-compliance (represented by the upper-
half of the diamond) and also over-compliance (represented by the lower-
half of the diamond). While the strategies to encourage compliance among 
the under-compliant taxpayers are similar to the existing compliance 
„pyramid model‟, Burton (2008) suggests a risk assessment analysis to 
determine the category of taxpayers who overpay and the reason for their 
                                                 
8 However, the amounts refunded to taxpayers are not publicly known.  
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overpaying, in order to apply appropriate strategies in inducing correct 
payment of tax among the over-compliant taxpayers. The adoption of a 
„diamond model‟ is believed to enhance taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions 
(particularly on administrative fairness) and consequently improve 
compliance behaviour (Burton, 2008).
9
  
Figure 1.2 
A Compliance Diamond Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Burton (2008, p5)  
 
The success of the Compliance Model is evidenced in part through the tax 
collected for the period 2004-2008 in New Zealand. Tax revenue over this 
period shows a gradual increase from NZ$42 billion in 2004-05 to 
NZ$51.2 billion in 2007-08 (refer Table 1.1). However, it is important to 
note that the increment may also be attributable to other factors like the 
increase in wealth of taxpayers and changes in the tax levels, (through 
                                                 
9 A more complex compliance model introduced by Burton (2008) is a ‘cube model’ which takes into 
account the risk/benefit and individual taxation issues.  
Existing compliance 
pyramid 
Increasing over-
compliance 
Strategies to induce 
correct payment of 
tax 
Law 
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bracket creep), of the New Zealand taxpaying population. For example, it 
is reported that the median annual personal income was NZ$24,400 in 
2006 (Statistics New Zealand, 2006) compared to only  NZ$18,965 in 
2004 (Statistics New Zealand, 2005).
10
 This increase of approximately 25 
percent will have had a positive impact on the amount of tax collected. The 
statistics also highlight the increase in the number of people receiving 
income in the band between NZ$50,000 to NZ$70,000, from six percent in 
2001 to 10 percent in 2006 (Statistics New Zealand, 2006).  
 
Another possible explanation for the increase in tax collected is national 
economic growth. Even though  New Zealand was expected to face a 
difficult year in 2006, the country has seen economic growth of slightly 
more than five percent from 2004 to 2007 (Mussa, 2007). The growth 
would justify the higher collection of tax in addition to the successful 
implementation of the Compliance Model itself.  
Table 1.1 
Composition of Actual Revenue Assessed 
 
Year Direct Taxes 
(NZD Billion) 
Indirect Taxes 
(NZD Billion) 
Total 
(NZD Billion) 
2004-05 32.8 9.2 42.0 
2005-06 37.3 9.5 46.8 
2006-07 38.5 10.1 48.6 
2007-08 41.3 9.9 51.2 
2008-09 38.6 10.4 49.0 
   Source: New Zealand Inland Revenue (2007, 2009)  
                                                 
10 While it would be more appropriate in this thesis to compare the 2004 figure to at least the 2009 
statistics, currently the 2006 year figures are the latest statistics publicly available.  
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In 2008-09, however, there was a decrease in tax collected to NZ$49.0 
billion compared to the previous year of NZ$51.2 billion. Such a decline 
was mainly due to the major changes related to company taxation and other 
indirect taxation (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2009). The global 
financial crisis, which began in 2007 in the US,  may also explain part of 
this decline. For instance, Jensen (2008) claims that the consequences of 
the global recession only began to reveal its major impact in New Zealand 
in 2008, where its Stock Exchange Index had dropped 37 percent since 
May 2007. During the same year, the New Zealand dollar also fell by 35 
percent against the US dollar, and foreign investors and businesses 
withdrew their investments (Jensen, 2008). A survey among New 
Zealanders also revealed that 60 percent were under financial distress due 
to the global financial crisis (Guha, 2010). The crisis resulted in the sudden 
collapse of finance companies, significant loss in wealth among investors 
and a rise in the unemployment rate. These problems have lead to high 
levels of household debt, inadequate savings and an uncertain retirement 
prospect for New Zealanders (Guha, 2010). Referring to the consequences 
of the financial crisis, it was no surprise for the IRD to record a lower tax 
collection in 2008-09 and a rise in tax debt.  
 
In addition to the above, another potential explanation of lower tax 
collection in 2008-09 could be the problem of voluntary tax compliance 
itself. This is partly evidenced by the number of taxpayers who were 
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required to file tax returns but did not submit their return forms in a timely 
manner in the past three years. The IRD‟s Annual Report claims that 18 
percent of individual taxpayers did not submit their tax return forms 
promptly both in the 2004-05 and 2005-6 years (New Zealand Inland 
Revenue, 2006), and the percentage rose to 22 percent in the 2006-07 year 
(New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2007).
11
   
 
One might argue that the figures might be misleading since the possible 
reason for not filing the return forms is that some taxpayers may not have 
had any income with no or insufficient tax deducted at source and hence 
did not need to file a return. This view can be argued based on the research 
undertaken by the IRD in the 2006-07 year (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 
2007). This research, which was carried out on 500,000 filing returns  and 
taxpaying events between 2001-2005 years, showed the following 
preliminary results:  
(1) 83 percent of the returns complied, with the majority completing 
relevant filing and tax paying obligations;  
(2)  nine percent of returns had a moderate level of compliance issues; and  
(3)  eight percent demonstrated poor levels of compliance.  
These findings indicate that at least 17 percent of individual taxpayers in 
New Zealand have not fully complied (to some degree) with their 
                                                 
11 Although the Annual Reports for 2008 and 2009 are currently available, information regarding the non 
submission of return forms is not provided.  
20 
 
obligations under the tax system.
12
 It is important to note that this research 
focuses on taxpayers who have some choice about compliance, and 
excludes taxpayers who are solely employees and have tax deducted at 
source through the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system (New Zealand Inland 
Revenue, 2007).  
 
Undeniably, the IRD‟s compliance strategy, as represented by the IRD 
Compliance Model (and the IRD‟s audit approach), has been particularly 
fruitful in identifying tax discrepancies. For instance, in the 2006-07 year, 
the IRD successfully prosecuted 705 taxpayers for failing to file return 
forms. In addition, assessments worth NZ$716 million were raised by the 
IRD in the absence of returns filed by taxpayers. Another NZ$128 million 
was identified as discrepancies due to tax evasion. In this period, to 
discover such non-compliance behaviour, IRD officers have used their 
powers (under Sections 16 to 19 of the Tax Administration Act 1994)
13
 
632
14
 times to obtain information, including accessing private property, 
requesting accounts and documents, and even carrying out enquiries before 
the District Court (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2007).  
 
                                                 
12 The percentage could be higher since the research results clearly stated that most taxpayers (83 
percent) complied with the majority of their filing and paying obligations but not fully complying. 
13 The use of these sections is subject to restrictions in Section 20 and Sections 20B to 20G of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994.  
14In the 2005-06 year, the IRD has used its information gathering powers 815 times (New Zealand 
Inland Revenue, 2007).  
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Following tax audits in the 2007-08 year, prosecutions were successfully 
made against 563 taxpayers who failed to file their income tax returns 
(New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2008a). Additionally, assessments worth 
NZ$740 million were raised (with a minor increase) compared to NZ$716 
million in the previous year. During the same year, tax discrepancies 
relating to tax avoidance and evasion to the value of NZ$75 million were 
also discovered.
15
  While in the 2007-08 year a huge reduction in tax 
discrepancies in terms of tax evasion was reported, compared to the 
previous year, the most recent data reported in the Annual Report of New 
Zealand Inland Revenue (2009) indicates an increase of more than 60 
percent of discrepancies (NZ$123 million), compared with the prior year 
(NZ$75 million). However, the Annual Report (2009) also indicates a 
decrease in the number of prosecutions (354 individual taxpayers), as well 
as the amount of additional assessments raised (NZ$640 million).  
 
Table 1.2 summarises the key data indicating the „success‟16 of the 
compliance strategy implemented by the IRD for the period of 2004-05 to 
2008-09. The comparison, particularly in respect of tax discrepancies due 
                                                 
15 It is important to note that not all tax avoidance is non-compliance but an aggressive interpretation of 
the Revenue Acts may be non-compliance. The New Zealand tax legislation permits arrangements to 
minimise tax liability but the Commissioner of the Inland Revenue reserves the right to make 
adjustments where necessary, to counteract a tax advantage obtained by the person from the 
arrangement under Sections BG 1 and GA 1(2) of the Income Tax Act 2007, and also for GST under 
Section 76 of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985.  
16 In this instance, the ‘success’ of the compliance strategy is measured based on the gradual increase in 
the amount of additional assessments raised and the amount of tax discrepancies discovered.  
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to tax evasion between the 2007-08 and 2008-09 years, reveals that  the 
non-compliance appears to be slightly higher in the last year.  
 
An interesting question is whether the trend signals that the IRD‟s efforts 
are more fruitful through careful audit selection and targetting, or non-
compliance behaviour is increasing, or is the amount of non-compliance 
increasing but the number of taxpayers involved decreasing?   
Table 1.2 
Statistics on Non-Compliance from 2004-05 to 2008-09 
 
Year Number of 
Prosecutions on 
Individual 
Taxpayers 
Assessments Raised due 
to Absence of Returns  
(NZ$ Million) 
Tax discrepancies 
due to Tax Evasion 
(NZ$ Million) 
Power Used to 
Obtain 
Information 
2004-05 886 564 75.9 506 
2005-06 957 670 72 815 
2006-07 705 716 128 632 
2007-08 563 740 75 Data not available 
2008-09 354 640 123 Data not available 
Source: New Zealand Inland Revenue (2007; 2008a; 2009)  
 
The above discussion indicates that New Zealand is experiencing ongoing 
non-compliance tax behaviour. Despite the high amount of tax collected 
(as indicated in Table 1.1), the amount of discrepancies due to tax evasion 
(refer Table 1.2) revealed by tax audits, is also high. This suggests that the 
use of the Compliance Model contributes to increasing levels of tax 
collection through focussed tax audits, but not to the same level of 
promoting voluntary compliance. For instance, from the 2004-05 to 2007-
08 years, the amount of tax collected has been gradually increasing as well 
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as the number of additional assessments. It is important to note that these 
additional assessments were raised due to the absence of returns made by 
the taxpayers. Also, the statistics extracted from the IRD‟s Annual Reports 
provide support to Caragata (1998), who reported that the estimated tax 
gap has increased substantially from NZ$82 million in 1969 to NZ$3.2 
billion in 1994. In his report, Caragata (1998) estimates the tax gap, being 
the amount of tax that theoretically could be collected from tax evaders 
under the existing law. This figure has increased further to NZ$3.9 billion 
in 2001 (Davidson, 2005). Thus, in the researcher‟s view, this situation 
indicates that the issue of voluntary tax (non)compliance among taxpayers 
in New Zealand is still a very relevant concern.  
 
1.3.2   Malaysia 
Generally, there are two main bodies administering the tax laws in 
Malaysia, that is the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) and the Royal Customs 
and Excise Department (the Customs). The IRB is responsible for the 
enforcement of the tax laws relating to income tax, petroleum income tax, 
real property gains tax (RPGT),
17
 stamp duty and estate duty. In addition to 
this, the IRB is also responsible for collecting withholding tax on payments 
made to non-residents relating to interest, royalties, contract payments, 
special classes of income (such as fees for technical advice) and income in 
                                                 
17 The RPGT was repealed in 2007 but re-enacted in 2010 (MIDA, 2010).  
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respect of services performed by a public entertainer.
18
 The Customs, on 
the other hand, administers customs duties (import and export duty), excise 
duty, service tax and sales tax. These existing service and sales taxes will 
be abolished and replaced by Goods and Services Tax (GST) in 2011 at a 
proposed rate of 4 percent (Kok, 2010).  
 
The income tax system in Malaysia commenced in 1948 while it was under 
British colonisation. It was introduced to legitimise the collection of taxes 
from individuals and corporations. Since its inception, Malaysia had 
adopted an official assessment system (OAS) which requires taxpayers to 
furnish relevant information pertaining to their incomes and expenses to 
the Inland Revenue Board (IRB). Under that system, the duty to compute 
the tax payable was with the IRB, as taxpayers were assumed to have 
limited knowledge on taxation.  
 
However, with effect from 2001,
19
 a SAS was gradually implemented. 
Under the new system, the responsibilities to compute tax payable shifted 
from the IRB to taxpayers. Unlike an OAS, a SAS requires taxpayers to be 
well-versed with the existing tax laws and provisions, since they are 
answerable to the tax authorities in the case of a tax audit. Another 
prominent attribute of the SAS is voluntary compliance, as the tax returns 
                                                 
18 The rate varies from 5 percent to 15 percent depending on the types of income.   
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submitted by taxpayers are deemed to be their notice of assessment. In 
other words, penalty mechanisms will be applied if taxpayers do not 
submit a correct tax return within the stipulated period. The penalty 
includes the initial late payment penalty of 10 percent and a further 5 
percent if failed to pay within sixty days from the date the first penalty is 
imposed (Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 2010).  
 
Subsequent to the full implementation of SAS in 2005, the IRB has 
successfully raised taxes of MYR56.85 billion (NZ$25.82 billion) in direct 
taxes.
20
 This amount is 17.6 percent higher than the Government‟s revised 
estimate of MYR48.35 billion (NZ$21.96 billion) for the year 2005 (refer 
Table 1.3). The IRB Chairman claims that the IRB has never collected 
such a large amount before (Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 2005). At 
a glance, this provides some evidence that the shift from an OAS to a SAS 
made by the IRB is „financially rewarding‟. However, the Chairman 
further noted that the rise in tax collected is also attributable to favourable 
national economic conditions, with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growing by five percent in 2005, which in turn creates a conducive climate 
for all sectors in the Malaysian economy.  
 
                                                                                                                        
19 SAS was implemented in stages, beginning with companies in 2001, followed by non-companies in 
2004, and was fully put into practice in 2005.  
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Furthermore, there was an increase in global crude oil prices from US$41 
per barrel (NZ$65.6) at the beginning of 2005 to US$60 per barrel 
(NZ$95.9) at the end of the year (Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 
2005).
21
 The increment in crude oil prices would have had a positive 
impact on the collection of petroleum income tax, as Malaysia is a major 
crude oil producer. Similarly, 2005 has also recorded an increase in real 
property business, and consequently an increase in the real property gains 
tax compared to 2004.
22
 For example, the sale of residential properties with 
the price of MYR250,000 (NZ$113,523) and above, climbed from 19 
percent in the first six months in 2004, to 32 percent in 2005 for the first 
six months (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2006). The growth is a result of 
a better economic climate, higher household incomes, attractive financial 
packages and favourable interest rates compared to previous years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
20 Direct taxes comprise company income tax, petroleum income tax, individual income tax, cooperative 
income tax, stamp duty, real property gains tax (RPGT), withholding tax, International Offshore 
Financial Centre (IOFC) tax and other taxes.  
21 The conversion rate is based on average annual conversion rate in 2009 obtained from 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/average. 
22 Real Property Gains Tax recorded an increase of nearly 42 percent in tax collection in 2005 compared 
to 2004. 
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Table 1.3 
Contribution of Direct Taxes to the Federal Government’s Revenue 
 
Year Revised Estimates of  
Direct Taxes  
Collection of Direct Taxes*  Percentage 
Variance 
 MYR Billion NZ$ Billion** MYR Billion NZ$ Billion** % 
2001 34.25 15.55 41.79 18.98 +22.01 
2002 46.12 20.94 44.32 20.13 -3.90 
2003 46.48 21.11 42.82 19.44 -7.87 
2004 46.42 21.08 48.63 22.08 +4.76 
2005 48.35 21.96 56.85 25.82 17.58 
2006 62.64 28.44 65.74 29.85 +4.95 
* The amount of direct taxes based on the actual figures collected by the IRB before 
deducting the allocation for the tax refunds. Source: Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia 
(2005; 2006). 
** The conversion rate is based on average annual conversion rate in 2009 obtained from 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/average. 
 
Even though the collection of direct taxes appears to be significant and 
growing in Malaysia, this is only with respect to taxes such as company 
income tax, petroleum income tax and RPGT, but not for individual 
income tax. Individual income tax, which accounts for approximately 
13.74 to 19.47 percent of direct taxes over the periods 2001 to 2004 (refer 
Table 1.4), was at its peak in 2004 with MYR9.47 billion (NZ$4.30 
billion) collected. In 2005, the percentage dropped by two percent from the 
previous year. The percentage dropped further in 2006 to 15.84 percent 
although the amount collected is recorded as the highest. Clearly, the drop 
is not related to the applicable tax rates as they remained unchanged from 
2002 to 2006. 
 
A possible explanation for such a decline may be the tax incentives 
provided for individuals in 2005 and 2006 that may have reduced their 
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taxable income and consequently their tax liabilities. Nonetheless, there 
were few tax incentives offered during these years that would have 
significantly affected taxpayers‟ taxable incomes, except for tax relief on 
the Employee Provident Fund (EPF) and insurance premiums that 
increased from MYR5,000 (NZ$2,270) to MYR6,000 (NZ$2,725).
23
 
Another possible reason would be a drop in the employment rate. 
However, a review of the employment rate between 2004 and 2006 
indicates a growth rate of six percent (Economic Planning Unit Malaysia, 
2007b). Theoretically speaking, a higher employment rate will result in 
higher incomes and consequently tax collection, or amounts at least on par 
with the previous year. However, the reported percentage of individual 
income tax collected in 2005 and 2006 indicates otherwise.  
 
It might be argued that the percentage of individual income tax has 
possibly remained constant. A drop in the percentage of individual incomes 
over the direct taxes is perhaps due to the fact that other direct taxes grew 
more quickly than individual income tax. This view is partially correct as 
the percentage variances for direct taxes in 2005 and 2006 were about 16.9 
percent and 15.6 percent, respectively, while the percentage variances for 
individual income tax in the same years were only eight and nearly two 
                                                 
23Another incentive that changed was the increase from MYR5,000 (NZ$2,270) to MYR6,000 
(NZ$2,725) for personal relief given to disabled persons. In addition, an increment of MYR1,000 
(NZ$454) relief is also given for an individual with a spouse who is disabled. Other than those 
changes, computer and book rebates had small increments of MYR100 (NZ$45) and MYR200 
(NZ$91), respectively (Ministry of Finance Malaysia, 2005, 2006).    
29 
 
percent, respectively. However, it is important to note that the percentage 
variances of individual income tax for the 2003 and 2004 years were 24 
and 25 percent, respectively. These figures are much higher than the 
percentage variances reported in 2005 and 2006.  
Table 1.4 
Individual Income Tax Collection from 2001-2006 
 
Year  Direct Taxes  Individual Income 
Tax   
Individual 
Income Tax 
over Direct 
Taxes  
Variance  
(%) 
 MYR 
Billion 
NZ$ 
Billion* 
MYR 
Billion 
NZ$ 
Billion* 
% Direct 
Taxes 
Individual 
Income Tax 
2001 41.79 18.98 7.63 3.46 18.25 - - 
2002 44.32 20.13 6.09 2.77 13.74 6.05 -20.18 
2003 42.82 19.44 7.57 3.44 17.68 -3.38 24.30 
2004 48.63 22.08 9.47 4.30 19.47 13.57 25.10 
2005 56.85 25.82 10.22 4.64 17.98 16.90 7.92 
2006 65.74 29.85 10.41 4.73 15.84 15.64 1.86 
Source: Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (2005; 2006). 
* The conversion rate is based on average annual conversion rate in 2009 obtained from 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/average. 
 
 
Another potential explanation for the smaller percentage of individual 
income tax collection in 2005 and 2006 is non-compliance behaviour 
(which is of interest to this study) among taxpaying individuals, as 
highlighted in the IRB‟s Annual Reports. The non-compliance behaviour 
can be traced through: 
(1)  the submission of return forms to the IRB;  
(2)  the timeliness of that submission; and  
(3)  the accuracy of the computation of the tax liability.   
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While tax obligations require taxpayers to submit their return forms timely 
and accurately, the IRB Annual Report only documents the number of 
return forms issued and received. A comparison made between 2004 and 
2006 shows that approximately 35 percent (in 2004) and 24 percent (in 
2005 and 2006) of individual taxpayers with employment income did not 
submit their return forms
24
 (refer Table 1.5). While there is possibly 
evidence of an increasing trend in the compliance rate, the data only shows 
completion but not the timeliness and accuracy of the return forms 
submitted. Thus, there is a possibility that the actual non-compliance rate 
could be higher as some taxpayers who submitted returns did not meet the 
timeliness and accuracy criteria. Hence, other means of assessment are 
needed to capture the actual non-compliance rate. One possible way is to 
separate timely-submitted return forms from those which were not 
submitted on time, with close scrutiny of return forms submitted on time to 
check for their accuracy.  
 
One might argue that the 24 percent of non-compliance (in 2005), as 
reported in the IRB Annual Report, does not necessarily reflect the level of 
non-compliance, but is due in part to other reasons such as a different filing 
status. This view can be argued on the basis that individual taxpayers in 
Malaysia are required to file either Return Form B (those with business 
                                                 
24 A higher compliance rate, however, is reported for individuals with business incomes, at rates of 73, 80 
and 70 percent, for the 2004, 2005 and 2006 years, respectively (refer Table 1.5). 
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income and other income) or Return Form BE (those with employment 
income and other income). If a taxpayer has a different filing status, they 
will normally move from either filing Return Form B or Return Form BE, 
but not any other forms. Thus, we should expect high „compliance‟ in one 
type of return form and possibly low „compliance‟ in the other. However, a 
review of submissions of return forms in 2004 and 2005 shows that the 
„compliance‟ rate by individual taxpayers with employment income only 
increases by 11 percent, while those with business income rises minimally 
(7 percent). While the submission of return forms by individual taxpayers 
with employment income in 2006 suggests a very minimal increase at less 
than 1 percent, the „compliance‟ rate among taxpayers with business 
income  dropped by 10 percent.  
 
Further, Table 1.5 indicates incremental growth in the number of return 
forms (both B and BE) issued (and received) in 2005 and 2006, relative to 
2004. The IRB Annual Report suggests that this increment was due to 
separate issuance of tax return forms to husbands and wives, who each 
have sources of income, and the increase in the number of files registered 
(Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 2005, 2006). Theoretically speaking, 
when the number of return forms issued increase, the number of returns 
submitted must increase as well. This assumption holds true when 
comparing the 2004 and 2005 years, where the number of return forms 
issued increased by 16 percent and the rate of submissions increased by 32 
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percent. In 2006, although the number of return forms issued only 
decreased minimally (at less than one percent compared to the previous 
year), the rate of submissions declined by five percent. This ratio does not 
reasonably equate with the decrease of return forms issued in 2006.  
Table 1.5 
Issuance and Receipt of Tax Returns for Individuals  
from 2004 to 2006 
 
Types 
of 
Income 
Return Forms for 
Employment (BE) 
Basic Tax 
Compliance 
(%) 
Return Forms for 
Business (B) 
Basic Tax 
Compliance  
(%) 
 Issued  Received  Issued Received  
2004 1,959,183 1,283,888 65.5 1,061,730 778,181 73.3 
2005 2,198,914 1,683,201 76.5 1,314,006 1,051,672 80.0 
2006 2,105,802 1,621,233 76.9 1,380,648 974,592 70.58 
Source: Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia (2005; 2006).  
 
In addition to basic non-compliance, the IRB‟s report further documented 
the following „alarming‟25 statistics relative to the previous year:26  
(1)  9,954 individuals were banned from leaving the country  in accordance 
with Section 104 of the Income Tax Act 1967
27
 (Malaysia) with 
                                                 
25 This is the author’s own view when comparing with the previous year’s statistics. 
26 The 2005 IRB Annual Report suggests that: (1) 9,066 individuals were banned from leaving the 
country in accordance with Section 104 of the Income Tax Act 1967 (Malaysia) with outstanding tax 
payments of MYR245.09 million (NZ$111.29 million); (2) 466 cases filed in the courts for MYR30.65 
million (NZ$13.92 million) tax; (3) 39 bankruptcies were filed for individuals involving MYR9.85 
million (NZ$4.47 million); and (4) the IRB visited 1,113 individuals’ premises and discovered tax in 
arrears of MYR37.5 million (NZ$17.03 million) (Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 2005). These 
statistics were even lower in the 2004 year (for details, see Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 2004). 
27 This section stipulates that the Director General of the IRB (DGIR) has the right to ban a person 
from leaving Malaysia if he/she did not pay all tax payable by him/her, all sums payable including 
penalties, tax on emoluments or pension, tax on interest or royalties, and special classes of income 
derived from Malaysia (Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 2008).  
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outstanding tax payments of MYR191,209 million (NZ$86,826 
million); 
(2)  6,798 cases of individual taxpayers filed in the courts for non-
compliance for MYR171.94 million (NZ$78.08 million); and 
(3) 219 bankruptcies were filed for individuals involving MYR25.72 
million (NZ$11.68 million) tax (Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 
2006). 
 
The increasing trend of non-compliance indicated in the IRB‟s Annual 
Report may give the impression that either taxpayers‟ negative responses 
to tax compliance is rising gradually, or the concerted  effort of the IRB 
officers (such as an increase in audit work, etc.) has been fruitful in 
discovering non-compliance behaviour. From either perspective, it appears 
that non-compliance behaviour is „alarming‟ in Malaysia.   
 
The discussion above provides a clear indication that the Malaysian 
income tax system under a SAS is not well understood, with unintentional 
or deliberate non-compliance by taxpayers.
28
 However, the reason(s) for 
such non compliance has (have) yet to be explored, but it (they) may be 
                                                 
28 Taxpayers with unintentional non-compliance would feel that they have fully complied with the tax 
law in filing their tax returns but may end up filing incorrectly inadvertently. In other words, they have 
the willingness to comply but possibly their lack of knowledge may lead to them being non-compliant. 
In contrast, taxpayers with deliberate non-compliance have the intention not to comply with the tax 
law. They purposely act against the tax law by either understating their incomes, overstating their 
expenses or even not submitting their tax returns. This intentional non-compliance is of interest in 
this study.   
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associated with the tax fairness perceptions (as indicated by numerous 
overseas studies, for example, Bordignon, 1993; Etzioni, 1986; Gilligan & 
Richardson, 2005; Turman, 1995). 
 
1.4       The Compliance Behaviour Problem 
Regardless of tax jurisdiction, both New Zealand and Malaysia share 
something in common, that is, non-compliant tax behaviour.
29
 Academic 
research suggests that there are two basic approaches to reviewing the 
problem of compliance; that is, the economic deterrence approach and the 
behavioural approach (James & Alley, 2002). The former tends to analyse 
compliance in terms of economic costs and incentives, while the latter 
examines behaviour using approaches drawn from the disciplines of 
psychology and sociology. While the focus of the economic deterrence 
approach is efficiency in resource allocation,  the behavioural approach 
frequently focuses on fairness (James & Alley, 2002). Although no 
approach is clearly superior to the other, it is important to apply an 
appropriate approach to undertaking research, as suggested by James and 
Alley (2002). As the researcher intends to study the fairness issue in depth, 
the behavioural approach is particularly relevant. The differences between 
the two approaches to tax compliance are summarised in Table 1.6.      
 
                                                 
29 Relatively, an overview of the compliance level in both New Zealand and Malaysia indicates that New 
Zealand is experiencing non-compliance behaviour on a much lower scale to Malaysia.  
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Table 1.6  
Approaches to Tax Compliance 
 
Tax 
Compliance 
Economic Deterrence Approach Behavioural Approach 
Concept Tax gap 
(100% compliance less actual 
revenue collected) (James & Alley, 
2002) 
Voluntary willingness to act in 
accordance with the spirit as well 
as the letter of tax law. This is 
one definition suggested by 
James and Alley (2002) but not a 
universal definition of tax 
compliance. Other definitions 
include those suggested by 
Jackson and Milliron (1986) and 
Roth et al. (1989). 
Definition  Narrow Wide  
Tax 
compliance  
Economic rationality Behavioural cooperation 
Exemplified 
by 
Trade off: 
 Expected benefits of evading 
 Risk of detection and application 
of penalties 
Maximise personal income and 
wealth 
Individuals are not simply 
independent, selfish utility 
maximisers. They interact 
according to differing attitudes, 
beliefs, norms and roles. Success 
depends on cooperation. Other 
important variables affecting 
compliance behaviour are 
discussed in Jackson and 
Milliron (1986) and Richardson 
and Sawyer (2001).   
Key issues  Efficiency in resource allocation Equity, fairness and incidence 
Taxpayer 
seen as 
Selfish calculator of pecuniary 
gains and losses 
„Good citizen‟ 
Source: Adapted from James and Alley (2002, p33)  
 
James and Alley (2002, p. 29) suggest that under the economic deterrence 
approach, tax compliance is concerned with the tax gap, which is defined 
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as “the difference between the amount of tax imposed by the tax law and 
the actual amount of tax collected.” This definition has been criticised by 
Mazur and Plumley (2007) as being too narrow and simple.  They propose 
that the tax gap is actually made up of three components, namely: the 
nonfiling gap; the underreporting gap; and the underpayment gap. The 
nonfiling gap refers to the amount of tax not paid on time as a result of 
either filing the return forms after the due date or not filing at all. The 
underreporting gap is the additional tax due on timely filed return forms 
arising from the misreporting of the tax liability on those returns, with the 
underpayment gap being the tax that is reported on timely filed returns, but 
not paid on time (Mazur & Plumley, 2007).  
 
With the behavioural approach, there are several definitions of tax 
compliance including that offered by James and Alley (2002). Other 
definitions include Jackson and Milliron (1986, p. 130) who describe tax 
compliance behaviour as “filing the return forms accurately, timely and 
fully paying the tax amount without IRS [revenue authority] enforcement 
efforts.” This definition is more comprehensive (but not encompassing 
aspects of law) compared to the definition offered by James and Alley 
(2002), but it has also been criticised for not taking into account court 
decisions. Roth et al. (1989, p. 2) proposed that tax compliance behaviour 
will take place when “all required tax returns are filed at the proper time 
and the return forms accurately report tax liability in accordance with the 
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Internal Revenue Code, regulations, and court decisions applicable at the 
time the return is filed.” This definition offers a better understanding of tax 
compliance behaviour (Richardson & Sawyer, 2001) and is adopted in this 
study. 
 
1.5 The Significance of this Study  
Notwithstanding the importance of tax fairness in compliance decisions 
(for example, Gilligan & Richardson, 2005; Hite & Roberts, 1992; Porcano 
& Price, 1992; Song & Yarbrough, 1978), and the concerning level of non-
compliance behaviour (especially in Malaysia), there is limited empirical 
evidence on this issue of fairness in the tax systems in both New Zealand 
and Malaysia. In New Zealand, Hasseldine et al. (1994) reported that New 
Zealanders perceived the system (at that time) as unfair. However, this 
study may be outdated as the New Zealand tax system has developed 
significantly, especially since 2000. On the other hand, Tan (1998), who 
focused on the demographic background of New Zealanders, claims that 
the fairness perception is highly correlated with the level of income earned. 
Her findings may still be relevant even though the study was conducted a 
number of years ago. Nonetheless, there is a need for a more current 
research as the level of income earned by New Zealanders has increased 
substantially (about 56 percent) since then.
30
  
                                                 
30 The annual median income for New Zealanders in 1996 was NZ$15,600 compared to NZ$24,400 in 
2006 (Statistics New Zealand, 2006). 
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Mustafa (1996), in his study in Malaysia, focused on the limited 
dimensions of tax fairness but he does not comment on the determinants of 
such judgments. A more recent study by Azmi and Perumal (2008), on the 
other hand, only explored taxpayer‟s fairness perceptions with no further 
investigation made on their effect on compliance behaviour.  
 
Thus, the findings from this study are expected to provide an update on 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour in both 
countries. For example, the information on the current level of fairness 
perceptions among the taxpayers, particularly on the dimensions that 
require attention from the tax authorities may be helpful in improving the 
income tax systems. In this instance, the findings may suggest that the 
respondents in New Zealand are generally happy with the current income 
tax system except in the case of general fairness. Having this information 
will assist the New Zealand tax authority to focus on possible ways to 
improve this fairness dimensions among taxpayers while maintaining 
positive fairness perceptions on the remaining dimensions. In this regard, 
the approach taken would be problem solving-oriented with the intention to 
resolve the issue identified rather than to overhaul the whole income tax 
system.      
 
The information on the possible influence of fairness perceptions, attitude, 
subjective norms and perceived behavioural control in taxpayers‟ 
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compliance behaviour is undeniably important for the tax authorities to 
plan and develop the relevant and appropriate mechanisms to improve 
compliance. If the findings suggest that fairness perceptions significantly 
influence taxpayers‟ decisions whether or not to comply, the tax authorities 
may need to emphasise on ways to improve fairness perceptions, such as 
by being transparent about how the tax money being spent, allocating fair 
distribution among taxpayers, treating the taxpayers in sensible manner etc. 
On the other hand, if attitudes play an important role in taxpayers‟ 
compliance behaviour, strategies such as incorporating tax education in 
high school curriculum, consistent public campaign through mass media 
and ongoing seminars for the taxpayers may be helpful to encourage 
taxpayers to comply.  
 
In addition to this, the information on taxpayers‟ level of knowledge and 
the perceived complexity of their respective income tax systems may 
benefit the tax authorities to develop their tax education and tax 
simplification programme. For instance, tax authorities may have to focus 
on the technical aspect of the tax knowledge and the content of the tax law 
in their efforts to improve taxpayers knowledge and reduce the complexity 
of the income tax systems.  This is particularly important if tax knowledge 
and tax complexity have an influence on fairness perceptions.  
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In short, the information to be obtained from this study should assist 
policy-makers, particularly tax authorities, in reviewing and modifying 
current tax systems, where necessary, to improve voluntary tax 
compliance.   
 
While a considerable number of studies have been undertaken, they have 
tended to focus on the association between tax fairness and tax compliance, 
rather than on the factors contributing to tax fairness perceptions. It is the 
researcher‟s view that understanding the „root causes‟ of a certain 
phenomenon is equally important to knowing its impact. Only a few 
researchers have addressed this issue by looking at the factors contributing 
to fairness perceptions in their studies (Bobek, 1997; Fallan, 1999; Harris, 
1989). Fallan (1999), who carried out an experimental study and focused 
on the effect of tax knowledge, found that students with tax knowledge 
have higher fairness perceptions of the tax system than those who do not 
possess tax knowledge. A decade earlier, Harris (1989), who also focused 
on tax knowledge, demonstrated that tax knowledge is positively related 
with fairness perceptions and consequently compliance behaviour. 
However, no evidence was found for a direct impact of tax knowledge on 
tax compliance behaviour. In that study, however, the researcher focused 
on overall fairness rather than its multi-dimensional aspects.  In New 
Zealand and Malaysia, as far as the researcher has ascertained, there is no 
empirical evidence documenting the causes of fairness perceptions.   
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 It is interesting to study the cross-cultural effect on tax fairness 
perceptions and compliance behaviour. To date, major cross cultural 
studies on tax fairness have been undertaken in Australia, Singapore and 
the US (Bobek et al., 2007), and Australia and Hong Kong (Gilligan & 
Richardson, 2005). In their study, Bobek et al. (2007) solely focus on the 
effect of social norms on the compliance behaviour. Gilligan and 
Richardson (2005), in their preliminary study on a sample of postgraduate 
students, found that no universal relationships or patterns exist cross-
culturally between tax fairness perceptions and tax compliance behaviour. 
Their results, however, may have been different if the sample had 
considered other members of the taxpaying public because of their 
different education levels, experiences and level of tax knowledge. Thus a 
more comprehensive sample is expected to provide a better explanation of 
the cross-cultural effects.  
 
Although both New Zealand and Malaysia are Commonwealth countries 
and have adopted a SAS for taxation, they have distinct features in respect 
of their economies, ethnicities and cultures. New Zealand is a developed 
country with 4.35 million population and has per capita income of 
NZD42,974 (New Zealand, 2010). Malaysia is a developing country with 
population of 28.3 million. Its per capita income is MYR24,055 
(equivalent to NZD10,929) (MIDA, 2010). In terms of its demographic, 
the majority of New Zealanders are of British descent, complemented with 
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other European cultures including Dutch, Greek, Italian, French, German, 
Scandinavian and Dalmatian (New Zealand, 2010). The largest non-
European group is the indigenous Maori. While in Malaysia, the major 
ethnic groups are Malays, Chinese, Indians, Kadazans and Ibans. The 
different ethnicities that exist in Malaysia have their own unique cultural 
identities. However, they have slightly influenced each other, especially in 
areas such as cuisine and modern music. The differences between these 
two countries may provide an interesting perspective to the cross-cultural 
studies. 
    
Studies on tax fairness worldwide have seen the use of various methods, 
such as ANOVA (Carnes & Cuccia, 1996; Gilligan & Richardson, 2005; 
Maroney et al., 1998), factor analysis (Gerbing, 1988), multivariate 
analysis (Harris, 1989) and logistic regression (Bobek, 1997). While these 
multivariate techniques have provided researchers with powerful tools to 
expand their explanatory abilities of tax compliance behaviour, they can 
only examine a single relationship at a time, either between independent 
variables or between the dependent and independent variables (Hair et al.,  
2006). Structural equation modelling (SEM),
31
 on the other hand, combines 
factor analysis and multiple regression, which enables the researcher to 
simultaneously examine a series of interrelated dependent relationships 
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among the measured variables and latent constructs as well as between 
several latent constructs (Gerbing et al., 1994; Hair et al., 2006). In other 
words, SEM has the power to reveal not only the dimensions of particular 
constructs and the relationship among the constructs, but also their effects 
on the dependent variable under study. In addition, applying SEM also 
enables hypothesised dependent variables to become independent variables 
in a subsequent dependence relationship (Hair et al., 2006).
32
 
Notwithstanding its known benefits,
33
 to the researcher‟s knowledge, only 
a few taxation studies have applied the SEM method  (Braithwaite & 
Ahmed, 2005; Cox & Eger, 2006; Karanta et al, 2000).
34
   
 
In order to complement the quantitative analysis conducted through the 
survey questionnaires, this study also employs an interview approach to 
gain a better understanding on taxpayers‟ perceptions. While the 
quantitative analysis emphasises the statistical significance, the qualitative 
                                                                                                                        
31 At this point, the term SEM is generally used to encompass both the co-variance based and 
component based modelling. However, in Chapter 4 on Research Methodology, the SEM refers to 
the co-variance based modelling.    
32 SEM has become an extremely popular technique in the social sciences based on these key advantages. 
Before the 1990s, SEM was not widely used due to its perceived complexity, but by 2000, more than 
450 articles applying the SEM method were published in the academic social literature (Hair et al., 
2006). Today, SEM is the dominant multivariate technique followed by cluster analysis and 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) (Hair et al., 2006).  
33 Cox and Eger (2006) examine the mediating effect of procedural tax complexity on taxpayers’ 
behaviour to tax non-compliance. Their research, which specifically focuses on the motor fuel tax 
system, found procedural tax complexity fully mediates taxpayer non-compliance. Braithwaite & 
Ahmed (2005), on the other hand, investigate the spill-over effect of government education policy 
(HECS) in Australia on tax morale, and found that those who oppose government education policy 
have lower HECS morale and consequently this weakens the tax morale.   
34 A study by Karanta et al. (2000) on Swedish taxpayers’ perceptions on public sector performance 
proves the flexibility of SEM and the powerful modelling performed based on survey data.  
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approach helps to explain the phenomenon based on the rich data extracted 
during the interviews, thus providing richness to the findings.  
 
1.6       Objectives of the Study   
Generally this study aims to understand how New Zealanders and 
Malaysian taxpayers perceive tax fairness and compliance behaviour 
issues. Specifically, there are five objectives of this study. The first is to 
observe whether New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers have similar views 
with regard to fairness perceptions, tax knowledge, complexity of the 
income tax system and their compliance behaviour. The second objective 
is to confirm whether New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers have multi-
dimensional perceptions on the fairness of the income tax system. The 
third objective is to investigate the role of fairness perceptions, together 
with the TPB elements in taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. The fourth 
objective is to discover the impact of tax knowledge and tax complexity on 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions and perceived behavioural control. The 
final objective is to examine the impact of fairness perceptions on 
taxpayers‟ attitudes towards compliance. These five objectives of the study 
are addressed through several research questions and the relevant 
hypotheses which are discussed in Chapter 3 on Conceptual Framework 
and Hypotheses Development.    
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1.7       Overview of Research Framework, Methodology and Method 
In order to meet the objectives of the study, both positivism and non-
positivism underlying research framework are combined. The positivism 
approach which emphasises on empirical means (or objectivity) to create 
knowledge is used to investigate whether the relationship between the 
factors under study exist, while the non-positivism approach which is more 
subjective in nature is used to provide an in-depth understanding of such 
relationship and enrich the findings from the quantitative approach. In 
other words, the two inquiry paradigms are related in the sense that the 
qualitative approach is used to inform the quantitative approach. This 
mixed methodology approach
35
 is deemed appropriate as the relationships 
under study are regarded as complex and go beyond the depths of 
empirical realism. In particular, this study adopts the stance of critical 
realism which seeks to answer both „how‟ and „why‟ questions 
(McKerchar, 2010).  
 
To be consistent with the critical realism approach (at least) one empirical 
method (in this study, a survey) and one qualitative approach (that is semi-
structured interview) were employed. The methods were carried out 
sequentially with the intention that the interviews will enrich the findings 
in the survey.  
                                                 
35 Among the approaches that lie on the continuum between the positivism and non-positivism are 
critical realism, pragmatism and participatory theory (McKerchar, 2010). 
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1.8       Summary 
This chapter provides an introduction to the issue of fairness in tax 
compliance decision-making. Then the chapter describes the current 
implementation of the income tax systems in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia. This overview leads to an appreciation that both the New 
Zealand and Malaysia are experiencing the problem of non-compliance 
behaviour. In addition, a discussion on possible approaches for dealing 
with noncompliance behaviour is presented, where economic deterrence 
and behavioural approaches are differentiated. A discussion on the 
significance of the study further discusses both the practical and theoretical 
contributions of the study. This is followed by an overview of the 
objectives of the study. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion on 
research framework, research methodology and methods adopted in this 
study. 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
relevant literature and theories that form the foundation for the study. This 
is followed by Chapter 3 which develops the conceptual framework and 
research hypotheses. In Chapter 4 the research methods used are described. 
The results from applying these methods are presented in Chapters 5 and 6, 
for the surveys; and Chapters 7 and 8 for the interviews. A discussion of 
the results and their implications follows in Chapter 9. Finally, the thesis 
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concludes in Chapter 10, with the limitations of the study and future 
directions for research presented.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Relevant Theories 
 
2.1   Introduction  
This chapter begins with a discussion of relevant theories on fairness 
perceptions which include Equity Theory, Distributive Justice Theory 
(DJT) and Procedural Justice Theory (PJT). This is followed by a 
discussion on the two dominant theories of human behaviour, namely  the 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB). These theories form the foundation for the following discussion on 
fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour. This discussion is followed 
by an overview of the relevant literature on tax fairness, tax compliance 
and the variables under investigation.  
 
2.2       Theories on Fairness Perceptions 
2.2.1 Equity Theory 
The first theory addressing fairness perceptions that is relevant for this 
research is Equity Theory. Equity Theory emerged in the 1960s through 
the work of Adams (1965) who was particularly interested to test the 
concept of justice in organisations (Greenberg, 1987). Since then, Equity 
Theory has been extended (Eckhoff, 1974; Leventhal et al., 1980; Thibaut 
& Walker, 1975) and applied in various fields of studies, such as payment 
and job-related rewards (Aryee et al., 2004; Campbell & Pritchard, 1976; 
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Greenberg, 1982; Watson et al., 1996), taxation (Bobek, 1997; Carnes & 
Cuccia, 1996; Gilligan & Richardson, 2005) and information systems 
(Douglas et al., 2007; Joshi, 1989).   
 
Adams (1965) suggests that Equity Theory comprises two dimensions 
namely reciprocation and allocation. Reciprocal equity, or exchange 
fairness, is based on the premise that one would only respond fairly if the 
other party acts fairly to them. Within this exchange framework, equity or 
fairness is achieved when there is an equivalence of the outcome/input 
ratios for all parties involved in the exchange (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983). 
Inequity, on the other hand, is said to exist when these ratios are not equal. 
In other words, a person will perceive a system as fair if the benefit he/she 
receives equals their contribution, and vice versa.  
 
In contrast to reciprocal fairness, which deals with mutual exchange, 
Eckhoff (1974) contends that allocation fairness merely involves a one-
way distribution of resources across a group or circle of recipients. This 
fairness dimension is also known as indirect exchange (Blalock & Wilken, 
1979).  
 
The original Equity Theory of Adams (1965), as expressed in Figure 2.1, 
received a lot of criticism as a result of its simplistic premises (Bobek, 
1997; Leventhal, 1980). Researchers critical of Equity Theory claim that, 
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in a judgment on fairness, a number of other factors need to be addressed 
apart from exchange (either mutual or indirect) fairness.  
Figure 2.1 
Basic Equity Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
               Schematic representation of Equity Theory 
 
 
2.2.2   Distributive Justice Theory 
In order to extend the idea of allocation as suggested in Adam‟s (1965) 
Equity Theory, DJT was introduced. DJT, which represents one part of 
Social Comparison Theory (Lamm & Schwinger, 1980),  postulates that 
individuals not only judge equity in terms of assessing their benefits they 
receive from their tax dollars (exchange fairness), but also by comparing 
themselves with others. In other words, individuals compare their benefits-
received-to-contributions-ratio with that of others in their reference group, 
and if individuals find a disparity, they find their dealings inequitable 
(Walster et al., 1978). Based on this premise, DJT assumes that distribution 
outcomes should be equal among those with similar contributions. 
 
However, in the process of allocating an incentive or reward, the principle 
of exchange fairness is not always maintained. There are circumstances in 
Allocation 
Reciprocation 
Equity 
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which the allocation of rewards violates exchange fairness as indicated in 
previous studies (Greenberg, 1987; Schwinger, 1980). Having this in mind, 
Leventhal (1976) contends that distributive fairness can be achieved by 
applying allocation rules, namely the equity rule, equality rule or needs 
rule, depending on the situation.
36
 In achieving fairness, the equity rule 
suggests that there must be relative equality between an individual‟s 
contribution and benefits. Simply stated, the equity rule requires 
individuals to be compensated with the same ratio to their effort, as stated 
in exchange fairness. In contrast, the equality rule calls for equal 
distribution of rewards regardless of individual contribution. The equality 
rule suggests that everyone deserves to be treated equally irrespective of 
his or her contribution. With the needs rule, Leventhal (1976) proposes that 
the allocation decision should be made after taking into account the 
recipients‟ needs. Based on this rule, individuals with a low or a zero 
contribution may be allocated more benefits (to fulfill their needs), as 
compared to those with a higher contribution.   
 
Eckhoff (1974), on the other hand, incorporates five principles that form 
DJT, of which three of them are similar to Leventhal (1976). The 
principles are relative equality (the equity rule), objective equality (the 
equality rule), subjective equality (the needs rule), rank order equality and 
                                                 
36 For instance, the equality rule is more appropriate if the main concern is to preserve social harmony 
among group members (Deutsch, 1975). 
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equal opportunity. The rank order equality criterion postulates that, if 
investments of the members of one group are higher than those of another, 
their rewards should be higher too (Homans, 1958). This principle suggests 
that, even though the effort/reward is not necessarily equivalent, yet those 
with higher contributions should be allocated more benefits than other 
groups. The remaining principle is equal opportunity, which is normally 
discussed in relation to racial integration policies (Cook & Hegtvedt, 
1983).  
 
The above discussion tends to focus on the positive side of DJT, that is, the 
allocation of benefits. However, DJT is also concerned with the fairness of 
allocation of punishments, known as retributive fairness (Cook & 
Hegtvedt, 1983). Under retributive fairness the social system is considered 
fair if the penalty imposed matches the committed crime. Similarly, the 
social system will also be perceived as fair if the compensation received is 
equivalent to any loss incurred in the social system.  
 
DJT has been widely applied in social science studies (Deutsch, 1975; 
Lamm & Schwinger, 1980; Leventhal, 1976; Mikula & Schwinger, 1978). 
A review of previous studies by Lamm and Schwinger (1980) provides 
evidence that the equity principle (relative equality), the equality principle 
(objective equality) and the needs principle (subjective equality), are the 
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salient principles of DJT. The features of DJT are diagrammatically 
expressed in Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2 
Distributive Justice Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Schematic representation of Distributive Justice Theory 
 
2.2.3 Procedural Justice Theory  
PJT, an extension of Equity Theory, was originally inspired by the 
contention in the legal context that a community‟s acceptance of judicial 
decisions is highly influenced by the procedures employed to formulate 
them (Fuller, 1961). Applying that foundation, Thibaut and Walker (1975) 
embark on a study of dispute resolution procedures and report two 
interesting findings. First, the disputants with process control perceive 
verdicts fairer than those without process control. Second, disputants that 
are involved in the decision-making process are more likely to accept the 
decisions even in the case of adverse outcomes. These findings conclude 
that procedural fairness is important as it enhances the acceptance level of 
the outcomes received.  
Equity 
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Allocation 
Retributive 
Equity 
Equality 
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Based on the pioneering effort of Thibaut and Walker (1975), Leventhal 
(1980) extends the notion of procedural justice into organisational settings 
contexts. Leventhal (1980) identifies six principles against which fairness 
of procedures may be evaluated, namely: consistency, bias suppression, 
accuracy, correctability, representativeness and ethicality.  
 
A consistency criterion requires the allocative procedures be applied 
consistently among different individuals at all times. No one should be 
given privileges over another. In addition the consistency criterion also 
demands the allocative procedures remain constant without frequent 
change. Regular alterations made to the procedures may lead to a violation 
of the consistency rule. When the consistency rule is violated perceptions 
of procedural fairness will decline.  
 
A bias suppression criterion posits that prejudice should be avoided in 
allocative procedures. Everyone should be treated fairly without any 
discrimination or misconception. Allocative procedures which promote 
preferential treatment, or personal self-interest, will violate a bias 
suppression rule, and consequently procedural fairness will be perceived as 
unfair. 
 
The accuracy criterion states that allocative decisions must be based on 
accurate information. This is essential since failure to collect and process 
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accurate information will result in incorrect decision-making and 
jeopardise an individual‟s confidence in the fairness of the procedures 
adopted. Thus the accuracy criteria should be sustained to increase a 
positive perception of procedural fairness.  
 
Correctability deals with the opportunity to revise incorrect decisions 
made. This criteria requires a legitimate channel to modify decisions must 
exist as a prerequisite for allocative procedures to be perceived as fair.  
 
Representativeness is defined as the opportunity given to persons in the 
decision-making process. The rule postulates that the allocation process 
must represent the concerns of all recipients to ensure greater acceptance of 
the procedures. 
 
The final criterion is ethics, which contends that allocation procedures 
must be based on prevailing moral and ethical standards. In the absence of 
the ethics rule, individuals may perceive that procedural fairness is violated 
and thus their fairness perceptions will be reduced.  
 
Previous studies adopting the six principles of Leventhal (1980) suggest 
consistency (Barret & Tyler, 1986; Fry & Cheney, 1981) and 
representativeness (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1996), as the most important 
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criteria in evaluating procedural fairness. The features of PJT are 
summarised in Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.3 
Procedural Justice Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schematic representation of Procedural Justice Theory 
 
 
Based on the above discussion, the extension of Equity Theory (embedded 
within DJT and PJT) is presented schematically in Figure 2.4. 
Figure 2.4 
Extended Equity Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Schematic representation of Extended Equity Theory 
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2.3       Theories on Human Behaviour 
The Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB) are the dominant theoretical frameworks used in 
explaining human behaviour (Ajzen, 1988) that are relevant in this study. 
While both theories have been very successful in predicting behaviours, 
they have to be applied in appropriate situations to reflect the various 
determinants of certain behaviours.  
 
2.3.1   Theory of Reasoned Action 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) developed the TRA to understand behaviours 
that are engaged in voluntarily by the individual. The theory assumes 
performance of such behaviours is dependent only on the individual‟s 
motivation to perform (or not to perform). In other words, the TRA 
suggests that individuals have complete volitional control over their 
behaviour, and their choice is simply according to the individual‟s will or 
intention. In turn, that behavioural intention is determined by attitude 
towards behaviour and subjective norms.  
 
Attitude towards behaviour is defined as an individual‟s evaluation of 
performing the behaviour (Manstead, 2004), which often contains two 
independent components, namely affective and instrumental attitudes 
(Ajzen, 2006). Affective attitude deals with emotions such as feeling 
happy, sad or guilty, if performing certain behaviour while instrumental 
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attitude refers to a more cognitive consideration to which performing 
certain behaviour would be advantageous (Ajzen, 2006; Breckler & 
Wiggins, 1989). In addition, the TRA suggests that attitudes towards 
behaviour are formed with reference to the behavioural beliefs about the 
consequences of performing the behaviour and the outcome evaluations 
(Manstead, 2004).  
 
Subjective norms refer to a person‟s perceptions of the expectations of the 
people who are important to him or her, whether he or she should or should 
not perform certain behaviour (Ajzen, 2006; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
Manstead, 2004). To assess such perceptions both injunctive and 
descriptive qualities are equally important. An injunctive quality, as 
described under the concept of subjective norms, deals with an individual‟s 
perceptions on what the important referents think if he or she performs (or 
does not perform) certain behaviour. The descriptive quality component 
relates to an individual‟s perceptions of whether others important to them 
would perform (or not perform) such behaviour (Ajzen, 2006). Similar to 
attitude towards behaviour, subjective norms are also determined by 
beliefs, known as normative beliefs. Normative beliefs comprise the 
person‟s beliefs that important „others‟ would expect him or her to act in 
certain way, and his/her inclination to conform to their expectations 
(Manstead, 2004). The features of the TRA are graphically presented in 
Figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.5 
Theory of Reasoned Action 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Adapted from Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, p84) 
 
The success of the TRA in predicting human behaviour and behavioural 
intentions was documented by Sheppard et al. (1988). In that study, a meta-
analysis on 87 separate studies applying the TRA documented weighted 
average correlations of 0.66 for the relationships between attitude towards 
behaviour and intention, and also between subjective norms and intention. 
In addition to this a weighted average correlation of 0.53 was reported for 
the intention and behaviour relationship. Among the behaviours that have 
been successfully predicted by the TRA, and included in the study, are the 
decisions to smoke marijuana, purchase particular brands, and resign from 
jobs and so on. Apart from that, the TRA has also been used in studies 
which involve decision-making relating to quitting smoking, engaging in 
regular exercise, driving within the speed limit (Manstead, 2004), and 
choosing a future career (Felton et al., 1995).  
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Despite the ability to predict and explain human behaviour and behavioural 
intention, the TRA had been criticised for being limited to volitional 
behaviours only. In other words, the TRA was found to be unsuitable for 
predicting or explaining behaviours that require skills or resources to 
perform (Liska, 1984). Such criticisms led to the extension to the TRA, and 
the emergence of the new model, the Theory of Planned Behaviour.  
 
2.3.2   Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Realizing the fact that not all behaviours are under complete volitional 
control, Ajzen (1985) came up with an extended model of the TRA, that is 
the TPB. In the TPB, he proposed a new construct to measure the 
individual‟s perception of how easy or difficult it is to perform the 
behaviour, known as perceived behavioural control. Such perceptions are 
the results of both internal (such as knowledge and skills) and external 
factors (for example, time, opportunity and resources), available to an 
individual (Kraft et al., 2005). The construct stipulates that a behaviour that 
is easy to perform is high in perceived behavioural control, while one that 
is difficult to perform is low in perceived behavioural control (Manstead, 
2004). The author further argues that an individual with high perceived 
behavioural control will be more likely to form the intention to perform the 
behaviour in context than an individual with lower perceived behavioural 
control. In short, the TPB suggests that one‟s motivation to perform a 
particular behaviour is also influenced by the individual‟s perception of 
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how easy or difficult it is to perform such behaviour, in addition to 
attitudes towards behaviour and subjective norms.  
 
The TPB also suggests that perceived behavioural control, together with 
behavioural intention, will directly affect actual behaviour. Such a 
relationship suggests that a person with a high perceived behavioural 
control and who has formed his or her intention to perform certain 
behaviour, will be more likely to engage in that behaviour than one with 
low perceived behavioural control. Another interpretation of such a 
relationship is that the failure to perform certain behaviour (when one 
already had the intention to perform) could be due to the lack of perceived 
behavioural control (Manstead, 2004). The TPB model is presented 
schematically in Figure 2.6.    
                                                     Figure 2.6 
  Theory of Planned Behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Ajzen (2005, p118) 
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The TPB also indicates that perceived behavioural control is dependent on 
beliefs (as for attitudes towards behaviour and subjective norms); that is, 
control beliefs. Control beliefs are defined as the perceptions of the 
availability of skills, resources and opportunities; and the perceptions on 
how important those resources are in achieving the outcomes (Mathieson, 
1991). With regard to the wide use of the TPB in empirical research, Ajzen 
(1991) and Godin and Kok (1996), in their reviews of prior studies, 
recognised the good predictive power of the TPB in explaining human 
intentions and or behaviour. Some examples of studies that have 
successfully applied the TPB in predicting behaviours include speeding 
(Paris & Broucke, 2008), cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) 
involvement (Dwyer & Williams, 2002), and adolescent smoking (Guo et 
al., 2007). 
 
2.4       Application of the Theories in this Study 
2.4.1 Equity Theory and Tax Fairness 
Equity Theory predicts that individuals judge fairness on the basis of 
outcomes, and they believe that incentives and punishments should be 
distributed accordingly, with reference to the inputs or contributions 
(Bobek, 1997). In addition, Equity Theory posits that individuals are more 
likely to comply with the rules if they perceive that they are being treated 
fairly under the system. In simple terms, Equity Theory is concerned with 
exchange fairness.  
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In the context of taxation, the „exchange parties‟ are individuals 
(taxpayers) and the government. Theoretically, individuals will perceive 
the tax system as fair if the benefits received from the government for the 
amount of tax paid is an equitable ratio. If the ratio is not equitable (but is 
adverse to the taxpayers), then the exchange is deemed unfair and 
individuals are likely to seek to restore equity, through non-compliance. 
However, in practical terms, exchange fairness in taxation may not be 
achieved due to different needs or requirements of taxpayers. For example, 
a high income earner will probably receive less benefits from the 
government, despite their contribution, compared to the low income earner.  
        
2.4.2   Distributive Justice Theory and Tax Fairness  
The essence of DJT is that individuals evaluate the fairness of the 
distribution outcomes by comparing the benefits-received-to-their 
contributions-ratio with that of others in their reference group. Individuals 
will find their interactions as equitable if the distribution outcomes are 
equal among those with similar contributions (Walster, et al., 1978); this is 
known as horizontal fairness. 
 
In the context of taxation, horizontal fairness (equity) suggests that equals 
before tax should be equal after tax (Gravelle & Gravelle, 2006). In other 
words, it requires individuals in similar economic positions to be taxed at 
similar rates regardless of their welfare. This is based on the equality rule 
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suggested by Leventhal (1976). However, in taxation, horizontal fairness 
should least be permitted to stand on its own. Notwithstanding a similar 
amount of income, two persons might have different commitments, such as 
the number of dependents. A single person having tax deducted of $2,000 
from a gross salary of $10,000 would consider the tax deducted as not so 
burdensome compared to another person with the same income (and tax 
withheld) but with four dependents. Thus, this dimension of fairness 
should be complemented with the other dimensions of distributive fairness 
to ensure an overall fairness perception.  
 
Leventhal (1976) suggests that distributive fairness should be made after 
taking into account the recipients‟ necessities. The idea of this principle is 
that the ratio of inputs and outputs need not necessarily be equivalent to 
achieve fairness, but rather it depends on individuals‟ needs. This is known 
as vertical fairness (equity). In the case of taxation, vertical fairness is 
usually concerned with the ability to pay (Kirchler et al., 2006). In other 
words, vertical fairness suggests that those with a higher incomes should 
pay more tax (at a higher rate) than those with a lower incomes. 
Alternatively, vertical fairness can also be linked to benefits received by 
the low-income earners. In relation to this, the low-income earners do not 
only pay less tax but they are also entitled to receive more benefits from 
the government. Thus, unlike horizontal fairness, vertical fairness takes 
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into account the „welfare‟ of individuals before determining their 
contribution to tax and entitlement to receive government benefits.  
 
DJT is also concerned with the fair allocation of punishments, which is 
known as retributive fairness (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1983). A punishment is 
considered fair if the penalty imposed „matches‟ the crime. In taxation, 
various punishments are available to serve as penalties for non-compliance 
behaviour. In order to be perceived as fair, the tax system should match the 
penalty with the non-compliance behaviour appropriately.
37
  
 
2.4.3   Procedural Justice Theory and Tax Fairness  
Procedural Justice Theory (PJT) predicts that procedural fairness may have 
influential effects because fairness in procedures may lead to fairness in 
outcomes (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). In other words, PJT suggests that the 
employment of fair procedures is likely to lead to more equitable outcomes 
than when unfair procedures are employed. In addition, Leventhal (1980) 
asserts that there are six principles against which fairness of procedures 
may be evaluated, namely: consistency; bias suppression; accuracy; 
correctability; representativeness; and ethicality.  
 
                                                 
37 There are other forms of fairness/equity which are not covered in this study such as intergenerational 
equity and intra-generational equity. Intergenerational equity suggests that taxpayers of each 
generation should contribute to public expenditures from which they derive benefits, without either 
subsidising or being subsidised by taxpayers in other time periods. Intra-generational equity on the 
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In the context of taxation, procedural fairness employed by the tax system 
may influence the fairness perceptions of taxpayers. If taxpayers perceive 
that procedures applied in assessing their tax returns are unfair, the 
tendency for taxpayers not to comply is high, and vice versa. In forming 
their fairness judgments, taxpayers will normally evaluate the consistency 
of the procedures applied by the tax system. The procedures applied by the 
tax system should be perceived as consistent throughout time and across all 
taxpayers. In addition to this, bias suppression is also an important feature 
of fairness procedures. The procedures in the tax system should not 
promote preferential treatment or personal self-interest. In other words, all 
taxpayers must be treated in a similar manner. With regard to accuracy, the 
tax system should handle tax matters with great care. Decision-making 
based on the wrong information will lead to perceptions of unfairness by 
taxpayers. For the correctability criteria, this requires taxpayers to be given 
an opportunity to revise and amend any incorrect decisions made by them.  
 
To ensure greater acceptance of the tax system, the procedures employed 
must be representative of all recipients. Thibaut and Walker (1975) provide 
evidence that disputants who are involved in the decision-making process 
are more likely to accept the decisions even in the case of adverse 
outcomes.  
                                                                                                                        
other hand proposes that all citizens should enjoy some minimum standard well being irrespective of 
their capacity to generate income (Coombs & Dollery, 2002).  
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Finally, the procedures employed must be based on prevailing moral and 
ethical standards.  
 
The presence of the above principles in the tax system is important because 
they form the basis of procedural fairness evaluation. If taxpayers perceive 
procedural fairness is violated, their fairness perceptions will decline and 
consequently this will affect their tax compliance behaviour (Ajzen, 1982; 
Douglas et al., 2007).  
 
2.4.4   Theory of Reasoned Action, Theory of Planned Behaviour and 
Tax Compliance Behaviour  
The TRA predicts that the immediate determinant of the actual behaviour 
is behavioural intention, which in turn depends on attitudes toward 
behaviour and subjective norms. Simply stated, the TRA suggests that an 
individual‟s intention to act in certain way solely depends on his or her 
will.  
 
Applying the TRA to the context of tax compliance behaviour, it appears 
that taxpayers‟ decisions whether or not to comply, depends solely on their 
attitudes toward compliance and subjective norms. If they had favourable 
attitudes toward compliance and subjective norms, they would be more 
likely to comply with their tax obligations.  In contrast, taxpayers will try 
to avoid or evade paying tax if they have unfavourable attitudes toward 
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compliance and subjective norms. In short, the TRA concludes that 
attitudes toward compliance and subjective norms are the only 
determinants of taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. Such an assertion, 
however, may not always hold true.  
 
In practical terms, taxpayers‟ intentions whether or not to comply do not 
simply depend on their will. They may wish to comply but encounter 
difficulties to perform such behaviour, which will subsequently limit their 
volitional control. Based on previous studies, factors such as tax 
complexity, tax knowledge, compliant peers, probability of detection and 
ethics, have been reported to significantly affect tax compliance behaviour 
(Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). This demonstrates that tax compliance 
behaviour is not simply a trivial choice but the decisions made by 
individuals (whether or not to comply) may result from the ease or 
difficulty to perform the behaviour, past experiences, knowledge, 
competencies, resources, opportunities and barriers to perform the task, as 
highlighted by Dwyer and Williams (2002) in the context of health studies. 
Having said that, it appears that tax compliance behaviour is more likely to 
fall under incomplete volitional control. Thus, it is more appropriate in this 
study to use the TPB, rather than the TRA, in predicting tax compliance 
behaviour, as suggested by Ajzen (1985). 
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The rationale between using the TPB rather than the TRA is further 
justified by Chang (1998), who claimed that some researchers agree that 
the TPB is more appropriate in predicting unethical behaviour in the 
context of information technology. Since tax compliance (noncompliance) 
behaviour also deals with ethical behaviour, the use of TPB seems to be 
more appropriate. To sum up, Ajzen (1985, p. 36) suggests:  
 
“TRA and TPB are identical theories when the subjective probability 
of success and the degree of control of internal and external factors 
reach their maximum values. However, when subjective probabilities 
of success and actual control are less than perfect, we enter the 
domain of TPB.” 
 
The call to use behavioural models, such as TRA and TPB in tax 
compliance behaviour, was made by Jackson and Milliron (1986) more 
than two decades ago, when they claimed the importance of such models in 
explaining taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. In their discussion, the 
authors assert that studies examining the link between attitudes, intentions 
and behaviour, either through experiment or survey, would provide 
significant contribution both to the body of knowledge and policy making. 
Notwithstanding their emphasis, to the researcher‟s knowledge, few studies 
have adopted these behavioural models in their study (as opposed to the 
economic models), except for few major studies undertaken in the United 
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States (US) and Canada (Blanthorne & Kaplan, 2008; Bobek, 1997; 
Efebera et al., 2004; Hanno & Violette, 1996; Trivedi et al., 2005). 
Undeniably, there are studies which investigate the impact of non-
economic or fiscal psychology variables (such as demographic 
background, attitude, fairness, culture, and ethics), on the intention to 
comply separately, without integrating those factors in a complete TRA or 
TPB behavioural model. 
 
2.5       A Review of Past Studies  
2.5.1 Studies on Tax Fairness  
Policymakers claim that tax fairness is an important goal for the state in 
order to encourage tax compliance (for example, the tax authority in the 
US (Inland Revenue Service – (IRS)) has put a great emphasis on fairness 
perceptions in an effort to improve tax compliance - Bobek, 1997). Thus it 
is not uncommon for a tax system which violates the basic principles of 
fairness and efficiency to anticipate non-compliance among taxpayers 
(Head, 1992). The question is how to define fairness? According to Adam 
Smith (1776), a tax system is defined as being fair when taxpayers are 
taxed based on their ability to pay (or vertical fairness). Vertical fairness 
asserts that taxpayers with different economic situations should be taxed at 
different rates (Kirchler et al., 2006). This would result in higher income 
earners paying tax at higher rates than the low-income earners.    
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However, this definition does not encompass the comprehensive fairness 
perception since past studies have unanimously agreed that tax fairness is a 
multi-dimensional construct. For example, Jackson and Milliron (1986) 
suggest another component to fairness, horizontal fairness. Horizontal 
fairness is defined as the equal treatment of equally circumstanced 
individuals (Michael, 1978). In other words, horizontal fairness 
recommends that taxpayers of similar economic positions should pay the 
same amount of tax. However, such equal treatment sometimes conflicts 
with other economic objectives of taxation, which therefore need to be 
compromised (Holmes, 2001). Holmes (2001) further claims that, in 
practice, all income tax systems have breached the horizontal fairness 
premise to meet either economic, social or political objectives.  
 
Other dimensions of fairness are further documented in the following 
studies. The first study is a major study on fairness perceptions, which was 
undertaken in the US after the (then) latest Tax Reform Act of 1986 by 
Gerbing (1988), through a mail survey of 225 taxpayers in the Dallas/Ft. 
Worth metropolitan area. Using a factor analysis on the self-developed 
measures of fairness,  Gerbing (1988) identified four underlying 
dimensions of fairness which include: 
(1)  general fairness and distribution of the tax burden;  
(2)  exchange with the government;  
(3)  attitude towards taxation of the wealthy; and  
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(4)  preferred tax rate structure.  
 
Using a refined version of the survey instrument of Gerbing (1988), 
Christensen et al. (1994), who studied the impact of education on fairness 
perceptions among 296 university students in the US, report consistent 
underlying dimensions of fairness, as found in Gerbing (1988), with an 
additional dimension known as self-interest. Similar findings were 
documented when a survey instrument was administered among tax 
professionals and tax educators in the US (Christensen & Weihrich, 1996), 
providing evidence of the robustness of the instrument (Richardson, 
2005b). 
 
Another study on the US income tax system was conducted by Bobek 
(1997) which was concerned with distributive fairness, procedural fairness 
and policy fairness. While distributive fairness deals with horizontal and 
vertical equity, procedural fairness relates to the process employed to reach 
distribution outcomes. Procedural fairness is argued to be important since it 
may lead to greater acceptance of the distribution outcomes (Thibaut & 
Walker, 1975). Similarly, Bobek (1997) argues that the content of the tax 
law (policy) is also important since it is the antecedent for the distribution 
outcomes. Bobek (1997) concludes that policy fairness is important for the 
distribution outcomes to be perceived as fair. In her study, Bobek (1997) 
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selected three groups of respondents consisting 108 university students, 19 
elementary school parents and 51 residents of Florida and Georgia.   
 
While agreeing that fairness perceptions are multi-dimensional, Turman 
(1995), on the other hand, focuses on one dimension of fairness, that is, 
preference for either progressive or proportional taxation. In Turman‟s 
(1995) study, an experiment involving several tax tasks was conducted 
with 58 community college students, revealing an overall preference for 
progressive tax rates.  
 
The above-mentioned literature on various dimensions of fairness 
perceptions has been widely discussed overseas, especially in the US, 
while a growing concern over this issue can be seen in Australia and Hong 
Kong. In Australia, for instance, a survey (also using a modified version of 
the Gerbing‟s (1988) instrument) was conducted on postgraduate business 
students to evaluate their fairness perceptions and the relationship with 
their tax compliance behaviour (Richardson, 2005a). That study reveals 
five underlying dimensions of fairness perceptions including: general 
fairness, exchange with government, special provision, tax rate structure 
and self-interest.  In Hong Kong, six dimensions of fairness were reported 
in a survey among postgraduate students (Richardson, 2006b). The 
dimensions are: general fairness; tax rate structure; middle income earners‟ 
tax burden; exchange with the government; self-interest; and special 
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provisions for high income earners. In his extension to the research, 
Richardson (2005b) and Gilligan and Richardson (2005) made a cross-
cultural comparison between the findings from Australia and Hong Kong, 
where several significant differences of opinion regarding the fairness 
perceptions were reported. Such differences were expected due to 
markedly different tax systems between the two countries, where Hong 
Kong applies a flat tax rate structure, no withholding tax, no self 
assessment system, and no tax on dividend and interest incomes 
(Richardson, 2005b). 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of fairness in tax compliance behaviour, in 
New Zealand little research has been conducted in this area. To date, there 
have been two major studies on fairness perceptions undertaken in New 
Zealand (Hasseldine et al., 1994; Tan, 1998), but they were both conducted 
prior to the formal implementation of the current self assessment system. 
In their study on the association between fairness perceptions and tax 
evasion, Hasseldine et al. (1994) who surveyed individual taxpayers in 
Christchurch (through the use of Electroral Roll in the area) claim that 
taxpayers generally perceived the tax system to be unfair. In this study, 
fairness perceptions were measured by two items, that is, fairness on the 
overall income tax system and fairness of tax amnesty. The latter study by 
Tan (1998), focused on three dimensions of fairness perceptions labelled 
as: personal fairness; fairness of the tax burden; and fairness of the tax rate 
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structure. That study, which involved both full-time and part-time 
university students, further documented personal fairness to be the most 
important dimension in forming fairness perceptions.  
 
Similar to New Zealand, there is also limited literature on fairness 
perceptions in Malaysia with the exception of studies undertaken by Azmi 
and Perumal (2008) and Mustafa (1996). A study by Mustafa (1996) which 
compares the fairness perceptions between city-taxpayers and non-city 
taxpayers indicates that non-city taxpayers had better fairness perceptions 
than the city-taxpayers. However, this study was conducted during the 
official assessment system (OAS). A more recent study on fairness 
perceptions was undertaken by Azmi and Perumal (2008), who attempted 
to identify the fairness dimensions among Malaysian taxpayers by 
replicating Gerbing‟s (1988) questionnaire. Their study which is limited to 
registered individual taxpayers in four Inland Revenue offices in Kuala 
Lumpur suggests that Malaysian taxpayers perceive the fairness of the 
income tax system in terms of general fairness, tax structure and self-
interest. These dimensions of fairness, which are identified through a factor 
analysis, are slightly different from those documented in the US (Gerbing, 
1988), and Australia and Hong Kong (Gilligan & Richardson, 2005; and 
Richardson, 2005b).  
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The multi-dimensional perceptions of fairness are not limited to the direct 
tax only but also extended to the area of indirect tax. This is empirically 
established by  Takenishi and Takenishi (1990) who revealed that fairness 
judgment is multi-dimensional. By using multiple regression analysis, the 
researchers found that procedural fairness, outcome evaluation and 
affective responses,
38
 made up the fairness judgment of the consumption 
tax among Japanese citizens (Takenishi & Takenishi, 1990).  
 
With regard to the level of fairness perceptions, a comparative fairness 
perception study (which is not related to tax), undertaken in Singapore and 
China to observe how people across different regions form their fairness 
judgments, found that people in a more developed region and living in a 
more competitive society will be more tolerant of social unfairness 
(Zhiyong & Qingyang, 2007). Assuming a similar association exists in the 
context of taxation, arguably, taxpayers in New Zealand (which is a 
developed country) as opposed to Malaysia (a developing country), might 
be more tolerant in their fairness perceptions compared to the Malaysian 
taxpayers. However, the researchers also suggest that, in the case of an 
environment filled with reward and punishment (where the income tax 
system can be considered as one of the legalised environments, with 
various penalties), such fairness perceptions remain approximately the 
                                                 
38 This refers to emotion-based attitude, which is the opposite of cognitive attitude (value-based).  
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same, irrespective of the regions and economic backgrounds (Zhiyong & 
Qingyang, 2007).  
 
While such a contention is yet to be tested in this study, empirical findings 
from previous studies indicate that taxpayers from different countries have 
dissimilar levels of fairness perceptions towards their respective income 
tax system. For instance, a comparative study conducted in Hong Kong 
and Australia by Gilligan and Richardson (2005) and Richardson (2005b), 
revealed that there were several significant differences of fairness 
perceptions on their income tax system, particularly in terms of general 
fairness, special provisions, tax rate structure and self-interest. It was 
argued that such differences were due to the different nature of the income 
tax systems implemented between the two countries. While Richardson 
(2005a; 2005b; 2006b) investigate perceptions on various dimensions of 
fairness, McKerchar (2003) measures personal taxpayers fairness 
perceptions based on their ratings on the Australian income tax system. 
From the survey, it is indicated that more than 60 percent of the personal 
taxpayers who completed their own return forms perceived that tax system 
to be unfair.  
 
In the US, Etzioni (1986), who measured fairness perceptions in terms of 
the tax rate over 14 years (from 1961 to 1980), found that the American 
taxpayers had increasingly perceived the tax system as unfair. Meanwhile, 
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a study on Dutch taxpayers (who were selected using marketing bureau, 
and surveyed either through internet or face-to-face interview) on 
distributive  fairness (which is measured by one item) suggests that they 
perceived the tax system as moderately fair (Verboon & Dijke, 2007). 
However, when another survey was undertaken using five items to 
measure distributive fairness, the taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions of the 
income tax system declined (Verboon & Dijke, 2007). Apart from the 
different measures used, the contradicting results may also due to the 
different sample selection used in this study where it was concentrated on 
Dutch employees who worked for at least eight hours a week.   
 
In New Zealand Tan (1998) concludes that the taxpayers perceived the 
income tax system as quite fair to them personally. This result partly 
indicates that there is an improvement to the income tax system, as 
previously Hasseldine et al. (1994) suggest that taxpayers completely 
perceived the system as unfair. However, Tan (1998) also claims that 
taxpayers were not happy with the unfairly distributed tax burden, a 
relatively flat tax rate structure, and unfair treatment between the wealthy 
and middle income earners.
39
 A survey of Malaysian taxpayers, on the 
other hand, indicates that taxpayers perceived the income tax system as 
moderately fair (Azmi & Perumal, 2008). While previous studies indicate 
                                                 
39 In this study, taxpayers claimed that the wealthy are able to enjoy special deductions while middle 
income earners have to pay more than their fair share. 
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the difference in fairness perceptions between the countries, it is difficult to 
directly compare the fairness perceptions due to differences in tax 
jurisdictions, time period, methods adopted, sample selection and measures 
used in each study.  
 
2.5.2 Studies on Tax Compliance Behaviour 
According to James and Alley (2002, p. 32), tax compliance refers to the 
willingness of individuals to act in accordance within both the „spirit‟ and 
the „letter‟ of the tax law and administration without the application of 
enforcement activity. In this study, tax compliance is assumed to take place 
when the taxpayer files all required tax returns at the proper time and that 
returns accurately report tax liability in accordance with the tax law 
applicable at the time the return is filed. This definition is adopted from 
Roth et al. (1989), as it provides a better definition when compared to the 
definition used by Jackson and Milliron (1986) (Richardson & Sawyer, 
2001).  
 
As there are various definitions of noncompliance, previous studies have 
also developed different measures of noncompliance behaviour. For 
example, Yankelovich et al. (1984) develop the 15-item tax non-
compliance scale  which include a number of possible ways of taxpayers to 
under-report incomes and overstate deductions in calculating their tax 
liabilities. This scale was adopted in Richardson (2005b) on the cross 
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cultural study between Hong Kong and Australia, where the findings 
indicate that Australian taxpayers are generally more compliant that the 
Hong Kong taxpayers. Bobek et al. (2007), on the other hand, use a 
hypothetical tax scenario in their experimental study to investigate the 
taxpayers‟ noncompliance behaviour in the US, Australia and Singapore. 
Results indicate that Singaporean taxpayers had the lowest noncompliance 
rate at almost 26 percent, while Australian taxpayers had the highest at 45 
percent. The findings further suggest that complete compliance was highest 
in Singapore (54 percent) and lowest in Australia (30 percent). The US is 
in the middle in terms of both the compliance and noncompliance rates.  
 
Belkaoui (2004), in his study on thirty countries, measures the level of tax 
compliance using the index that varies from 0 to 6, where higher scores 
indicate higher compliance. In this study, New Zealand was ranked the 
second most compliant after Singapore. This is followed by Australia, the 
United Kingdom (UK) and Hong Kong. Malaysia was ranked eighth, after 
the US, while Italy was considered to be the least compliant. A review of 
the above-mentioned studies provides useful information to the researcher 
on the level of compliance behaviour across countries. However, studies on 
compliance behaviour would be less meaningful without investigating the 
potential factors leading to such a behaviour. This is shown from previous 
studies where various attempts have been made by the researchers to 
unfold the phenomenon of noncompliance behaviour among taxpayers.  
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The motivation to understand why taxpayers do or do not comply led to 
numerous further research in this area, cutting across various disciplines 
such as accounting, economics, political science, public administration and 
psychology (Kasipillai & Jabbar, 2003). Such an understanding is vital in 
order to obtain greater levels of tax compliance and bridge the tax gap 
effectively (Department of the Treasury, 2007). Jackson and Milliron 
(1986), in their earlier review of 43 tax compliance studies undertaken 
from 1974 to 1985, identify fourteen key variables of compliance 
behaviour, which include: age; gender; education; income level; income 
source; occupation; peer influence; ethics; fairness; complexity; tax 
authority contact; sanctions; probability of detection; and tax rates. In 
relation to the identified variables, the authors further suggest that more 
research on the impact of ethics, fairness, complexity, probability of 
detection and tax rates on compliance behaviour is needed in the future. 
Thereafter, following Jackson and Milliron‟s (1986) recommendations, 
these variables have received significantly greater attention since 1985 
(Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). 
 
To extend the work of Jackson and Milliron (1986), Richardson and 
Sawyer (2001) continued with the review of past studies beginning from 
1986 to 1997 where they emphasise that while studies on the relationship 
between fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour have been 
growing, they fail to provide conclusive results. They point out that while 
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some studies prove a significant positive relationship between fairness 
perceptions and compliance behaviour, others find no evidence of such 
effects.  A positive relationship between tax fairness and tax compliance is 
demonstrated through survey data from 1960-1980 by Etzioni (1986), who 
documented that the fairness perception is more likely to affect tax 
compliance rather than tax rates. Other studies also confirmed that fairness 
perceptions influence tax compliance behaviour (for example, Efebera et 
al., 2004; Roth et al., 1989; Turman, 1995). Similarly, Harris (1989), Hite 
and Roberts (1992), Porcano and Price (1992), Roberts (1994), and Song 
and Yarbrough (1978), found tax compliance to be significantly associated 
with perceptions of an improved tax system.  
 
A recent cross-cultural study by Richardson (2005b) on tax fairness 
perceptions and tax compliance behaviour in Australia and Hong Kong 
documented that tax fairness perceptions about general fairness have a 
significant impact on tax compliance behaviour in both countries. 
Additionally, in Australia, it was found that tax fairness perceptions about 
special provisions, tax rate structure and self interest have some significant 
relationships with tax compliance behaviour. In his preliminary study in 
Australia, Richardson (2005a) concludes that tax fairness is multi-
dimensional and has varying effects on compliance behaviour. In 
Malaysia, an exploratory study by Loo and McKerchar (2010), using sixty 
individual taxpayers, also provides preliminary evidence of a positive 
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relationship between fairness perceptions (particularly vertical fairness) 
and compliance behaviour.  
 
As noted earlier, Richardson and Sawyer (2001) also highlighted some 
studies which found no evidence of any association between fairness 
perceptions and compliance (for example, Coleman, 1997; Porcano, 1988; 
Roberts & Hite, 1994). In addition to this, Bobek‟s (1997) study, 
investigating the role of fairness perceptions, also failed to establish the 
direct link between fairness and compliance behaviour. The results, 
however, do not indicate there is little importance in fairness perceptions 
because such perceptions had an effect on moral obligations and subjective 
norms which consequently affect compliance behaviour. Similarly, 
Hasseldine et al. (1994), in their study on New Zealand taxpayers, also 
found no significant association between taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions 
and non-compliance behaviour, notwithstanding the subjects‟ unfavourable 
perceptions of the tax system. Interestingly, there are also several studies 
which provide evidence of a negative association between fairness 
perceptions and compliance behaviour (for details, see Richardson & 
Sawyer, 2001). This is probably due to the non-compliant taxpayers‟ 
perceptions that the tax system appears to be fair as a result of their non-
complying behaviour (Lempert, 1992).     
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2.5.3   Studies on Tax Knowledge 
Tax knowledge is an essential element in a voluntary compliance tax 
system (Kasipillai, 2000), particularly in determining an accurate tax 
liability (Palil, 2005; Saad et al., 2003). More recent studies undertaken in 
Malaysia (Loo, 2006; Loo et al., 2008; 2009) also suggest tax knowledge 
to be the most influential factor to determine taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour under the self-assessment system. This is empirically established 
by several other studies (for example, Kasipillai et al., 2003; Kirchler et al., 
2006), which document that possessing tax knowledge will lead to higher 
compliance rates.  
 
On the contrary, the absence of tax knowledge may lead to non-compliance 
behaviour among taxpayers, either intentionally or unintentionally. This is 
postulated by McKerchar (1995) who studied small business taxpayers in 
Australia. She suggests that small business taxpayers are not even aware of 
their tax knowledge shortfall and this may lead to unintentional non-
compliance behaviour. Such evidence was also documented among 
individual taxpayers in Malaysia who unintentionally committed mistakes 
in their tax return forms (Loo et al., 2008). In this study, a mixed method 
design was used by conducting mail survey, quasi-experiment and case 
study concurrently between November 2005 and July 2005.  
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The abovementioned studies, which indicate a positive relationship 
between tax knowledge and compliance behaviour, however, are not 
consistent with an earlier study by Harris (1989), who claimed that tax 
knowledge has no direct significant effect on taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour. One possible explanation for such inconsistent results is the 
difference in tax jurisdictions. The studies mentioned above were either 
conducted in Malaysia or Australia, while this study was conducted in the 
US. Another potential reason may be that the different measures were used 
in the studies.     
 
Harris (1989) further claims that tax knowledge had an indirect effect on 
compliance behaviour through fairness perceptions. In that study, Harris 
(1989) separated tax knowledge into fiscal awareness and technical 
knowledge, and observed the impact of each type of knowledge on fairness 
perceptions. The findings show that the types of tax knowledge impact on 
fairness perceptions and consequently compliance behaviour.  
 
The influence of tax knowledge on fairness perceptions was further 
documented by Schisler (1995) who carried out a study comparing tax 
preparers and taxpayers. Taxpayers were selected amongst MBA students 
with at least five years working experience while tax preparers comprised 
of tax practitioners from certified public accountant (CPA) firms in the US. 
Based on the analysis, he found that taxpayers have significantly lower 
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fairness perceptions compared to tax preparers. The result might be due to 
the absence of tax knowledge among taxpayers compared to tax preparers. 
Fallan (1999) later confirmed these findings that tax knowledge 
significantly changed attitudes towards the fairness of the tax system. In 
that experimental study, the author measured tax knowledge through an 
additive index of 12 questions concerning tax allowances and tax 
liabilities.  
 
Consistent with the findings of Schisler (1995) and Fallan (1999), some 
other studies  also indicate that an increase in tax knowledge strengthens 
taxpayers‟ perceptions about the fairness of the income tax system (see 
Christensen et al., 2000; Eriksen & Fallan, 1996; Maroney et al., 2002). 
However, Loo et al. (2008), who conducted a study in a Malaysian 
environment, reveal a contradictory finding to the general contention, 
where they documented that increases in taxpayers‟ knowledge would have 
a negative impact on their perceptions on exchange fairness. In this respect, 
individual taxpayers with good knowledge of tax felt that they are not 
receiving their fair share of benefits funded by tax revenue. While the 
benefits have been provided in terms of public facilities such as free 
education and subsidised health system, the fact that the detailed 
information on the source of expenditure are not publicly available may 
have created this negative perceptions on the fairness of the income tax 
system in Malaysia.  
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In New Zealand environment, inconsistent results with the previous studies 
on the relationship between tax knowledge and fairness perceptions were 
documented by Tan and Chin-Fatt (2000). The study which involved 
tertiary students who enrolled in an introductory taxation course revealed 
no significant impact of increased tax knowledge on fairness perceptions. 
In this study, the researcher believes that the use of university students as a 
proxy for actual taxpayers may to certain extent explain such contradictory 
findings.      
 
To extend the studies on tax knowledge and fairness perceptions, 
researchers have investigated possible ways to improve tax knowledge 
among taxpayers, and consequently their fairness perceptions. For instance, 
White et al. (1990), in their experimental study on tax students, suggested 
that a formal class in taxation would enhance their knowledge about the 
law and appreciation of fiscal policy goals, thus increasing perceived 
fairness. This study is supported by Wartick (1994), who claimed that 
exposure of information during a tax law change will improve taxpayers‟ 
knowledge, and subsequently mitigate their perceptions that the tax system 
is unfair.    
 
Apart from the impact of tax knowledge and fairness perceptions, a review 
of previous studies also provides overall picture of taxpayers‟ level of 
knowledge in several countries. While it is not appropriate to compare the 
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findings (due to different measures used, different times, different tax 
jurisdictions and nature of the study), the information would be useful for 
the researcher to have a general understanding of taxpayers‟ knowledge of 
taxation as a whole. For instance, a study in Malaysian environment 
conducted by Loo and Ho (2005) suggests that a large majority of 
taxpayers possess relatively low knowledge of taxation, notwithstanding 
their tax filing experiences. This finding is, however, not supported by 
Kamaluddin and Madi (2005) and Madi et al. (2010) who claim that 
Malaysian taxpayers are generally tax literate. One possible explanation for 
the contrasting results could be the different items used to measure tax 
knowledge between studies.    
 
In relation to this finding, Ahmad et al. (2006) conducted an experimental 
study in Malaysia and documented that taxpayers receiving formal tax 
education have significantly better tax knowledge compared to those 
without such education. In that study, Ahmad et al. (2006) use 
postgraduate students who are also taxpayers to form the experimental and 
the control group. The difference between the groups is that the control 
group did not take the taxation course in their study, while the 
experimental group did. The findings are consistent and therefore provide 
support to Fallan (1999) who carried out a similar experimental study 
overseas.   
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Instead of focusing on taxpayers, Coetzee and Oberholzer (2009) studied 
the tax practitioners in South Africa to gauge their perceptions on the 
trainees‟ tax knowledge. The results reveal that majority of tax 
practitioners (about 85 percent) believed that trainees mainly have general 
knowledge and also a working knowledge of individual income tax. It is 
not surprising that they possess such a good tax knowledge as the trainees 
are the future tax professionals who will be assisting less specialist 
taxpayers. It is expected of such trainees to possess such a high level of 
knowledge, as suggested by tax practitioners and educators (Tan & Veal, 
2005).    
 
2.5.4   Studies on Tax Complexity 
Tax complexity arises due to the increased sophisticatication in the tax law 
(Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). Tax complexity can take many forms such 
as computational complexity, forms complexity (American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants, 1992), compliance complexity, rule 
complexity (Carnes & Cuccia, 1996), procedural complexity (Cox & Eger, 
2006) and the low level of readability (Pau et al., 2007; Richardson & 
Sawyer, 1998; Saw & Sawyer, 2010; Tan & Tower, 1992).  
 
A review on tax complexity in a comparative study of seven countries by 
Strader and Fogliasso (1989) suggests that Japan, the UK, France, Italy and 
the US, all have highly complex tax systems. Only Sweden and 
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Netherlands are considered to have a  moderately complex tax system. In 
New Zealand, various tax reforms have been made since the mid 1980s to 
overcome the complexity of the tax system (for details, see Hasseldine & 
Bebbington, 1991).  However, Tan and Tower (1992) claim that the efforts 
made by the tax authority at that time to simplify the tax law failed. In their 
study, the authors applied the Flesch Reading Ease Index to measure the 
readability level of New Zealand tax legislation, Tax Information Bulletins 
(TIBs) and Tax Return Guides. The Flesch Reading Ease Index measures 
the difficulty ranging from zero (most difficult) to 100 (least difficult). 
Their findings indicated that there was no progress with simplification at 
that time, except for the Tax Return Guides. Tan and Tower (1992) 
recommend that  shorter sentences and an active style of writing will help 
improve the readability of tax legislation and consequently reduce the 
complexity of the tax law.   
 
A more recent study by Pau et al. (2007), however, provides contrary 
evidence on tax simplification in New Zealand. The researchers test the 
effectiveness of the newly written Income Tax Act 2004,
40
 TIBs and 
binding rulings using readability measures, namely the Flesch Reading 
Ease Index, Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Index, average sentence length 
and percentage of passive sentences. They found significant improvements 
                                                 
40 This new legislation contains further changes made to Parts A and B, the rewritten sections of Parts C, 
D and E with re-enactment of the other parts (Pau et al., 2007).  
91 
 
in respect of tax simplicity through these measures. Sawyer (2007) agrees 
that there have been some improvements in tax simplification but continual 
change to the legislation has to a certain extent delayed the rewrite 
programme (and also delayed the benefits).
41
 
 
As an extension to the previous studies (Pau et al., 2007; Richardson & 
Sawyer, 1998; Tan & Tower, 1992), Saw and Sawyer (2010) recently 
examine the readability of a sample of the selected sections of the Income 
Tax Act 2007, TIBs and binding rulings using similar measures as in Pau 
et al. (2007). Overall the results suggest further significant success to the 
rewrite project, undertaken by the New Zealand government in its tax 
simplicity goals in the context of improved readability. Interestingly, the 
Income Tax Act 2007 appears to be more readable compared to either 
binding rulings or TIBs, although these tax-related materials are supposed 
to be the explanatory materials. Following this rewrite project, the results 
of this study also indicate that the percentage of people with an education 
level of Years 11-13 to understand the Income Tax Act 2007 has 
significantly increased. 
 
In Malaysia, Mustafa (1996), who studied taxpayers‟ perceptions towards 
the self-assessment system which was to be introduced (at that time), 
                                                 
41 The rewrite programme started in 1993 and the final stage was completed when legislation was passed 
by the New Zealand Parliament on October 25, 2007 (Sawyer, 2007).  
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suggests the presence of tax complexity in Malaysia, particularly in terms 
of record-keeping, too much detail in the tax law and ambiguity. The 
findings are partly consistent with the six potential causes of complexity 
labelled as: ambiguity, calculations, changes, details, forms and record 
keeping, identified by Long and Swingen (1987). Such complexity is also 
present in Australia where it forces taxpayers to engage tax agents to deal 
with their tax matters (McKerchar, 2001; 2003). McKerchar (2003) further 
identified the most common problem faced by taxpayers is to understand 
the instructions in the Taxpack 2000. This is followed by the problems of 
understanding the rules, the tax return forms and other relevant written 
information provided by the tax authority.  
 
Richardson (2006a), in his research on 45 countries, finds that complexity 
is the most important determinant of non-compliance, apart from 
education, income source, fairness and tax morale.  His findings are 
consistent with Cox and Eger (2006) who focus on the State Road Funds in 
the US State of Kentucky. The authors found that procedural tax 
complexity contributes to an increase in tax non-compliance. In Australia, 
McKerchar (2005), who carried out a survey among tax agents, notes that 
tax agents are not happy with the increasing complexity of the tax law. She 
further claims  that the tax agents desire a much simpler tax law, with less 
regulatory material and ad-hoc change. Similar findings were documented 
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by Kirchler et al. (2006) who found that taxpayers were more likely to 
comply when the tax law was perceived as less complex.  
 
With regard to fairness, some researchers agree that a certain degree of 
complexity in the income tax system is necessary to ensure the system is 
fair (for example, Forest & Sheffrin, 2002). This particularly represents the 
perceptions of the tax authority and tax professionals, as suggested by 
White (1990). Applying four scenarios of tax complexity,
42
 White (1990) 
asserts that both the tax authority and tax professionals (tax lawyers and tax 
accountants) prefer complexity in the tax law but at different levels. The 
tax authority prefers tax complexity that will increase their probability of 
winning cases in disputes, while tax lawyers, on the other hand, are in 
favour of tax complexity that gives rise to a higher probability that the 
taxpayers will win the case.
43
 Similarly, tax accountants‟ preferences are 
also towards a high level of tax complexity as it will increase the demand 
for their tax services. Despite these differing levels of desired complexity, 
the ultimate goal of the tax authority and tax professionals is to earn as 
much fee income as possible from taxpayers. Thus, undoubtedly, taxpayers 
do not support tax law complexity.  
 
                                                 
42 In these scenarios, the tax authority’s probability of winning from the perspective of the taxpayer and 
tax authority is represented by a line intersection.    
43 Tax lawyers prefer to go to trial while the tax authority favours settlement at the stage of audit.  
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In addition to the four scenarios of complexity, Sawyer (1996b) claims that 
there are another two models of change in tax complexity that are worth 
discussing; that is, the eventual divergence of probabilities and eventual 
convergence of probabilities. Based on the models, Sawyer (1996b) found 
contradicting evidence with regard to tax authority‟s preferences. His 
analysis shows that while one scenario suggests that the tax authority 
prefers a lower level of tax complexity than indicated in White (1990), 
another scenario indicates that the tax authority will benefit most when the 
level of complexity is close to zero.    
 
Notwithstanding preferences by the tax authority and tax professionals, tax 
complexity actually causes disappointment and consequently negative 
perceptions of fairness among taxpayers (Carrol, 1987; Cialdini, 1989). 
Milliron (1985) claims, in a study of jurors, that the participants viewed 
complexity and fairness as distinct but incompatible features of the income 
tax system. In their study on Australian taxpayers and tax officers, Kirchler 
et al. (2006) claim that complexity in tax law results in a negative 
perception of the tax system and consequently encourages an 
unwillingness to comply.  
 
Carnes and Cuccia (1996), and Kirchler et al. (2006), also share similar 
views on the inverse relationship between complexity and fairness 
perceptions. In that respect, however,  Carnes and Cuccia (1996) further 
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argued that such association might be perfectly true in the case of 
„unnecessary complexity‟, but not on „justified complexity‟, where the 
perceived justification may moderate the effect of „justified complexity‟ on 
fairness perceptions. In Carnes and Cuccia (1996), the authors provide 
evidence of the weakening effect of complexity on fairness perceptions 
when the perceived justification increases. 
 
2.5.5   Attitudes towards Compliance 
Attitudes toward behaviour is one important element of the TPB. In the 
context of tax compliance studies, atttitudes towards behaviour are 
normally refer to attitudes toward compliance with tax obligations. The 
importance of attitudes in determining tax compliance is evident in a 
review of three apporaches
44
 to taxpayers‟ decision-making, whether or not 
to comply, by Cullis and Lewis (1997). In their study, the authors conclude 
that the values, attitudes, perceptions and morals of the taxpayers are of 
paramount importance. They particularly state that tax compliance will be 
relatively high when attitudes towards compliance are favourable. This is 
consistent with Hanno and Violette (1996) who empirically establish the 
positive link between attitude toward tax compliance and compliance 
behaviour. Adopting the TRA the authors conducted an experimental 
                                                 
44 The three approaches are the conventional economic approach, psychology approach and a mix of 
economic and psychology, termed as the economic psychology approach. 
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design among 73 College students who have experience in filing tax 
returns.  
 
In Canada, Trivedi et al. (2005) use the TPB model to investigate the 
suitability of the model in explaining tax compliance behaviour. Utilising 
both survey and experimental design among University students, they 
found attitude has a significant impact to taxpayers‟ decision-making. In 
that study, the authors investigate the role of attitude in both compliance 
and non-compliance behaviour decisions and results suggest that attitude is 
important in both situations. The findings provide support to Elffers et al.‟s 
(1987) work that exhibits a positive relationship between attitude towards 
compliance and intention to comply. In Malaysia, Kasipillai and Jabbar 
(2003) claim that, in relation to income reporting behaviour, attitude 
towards compliance was statistically significant. A more recent study, 
adopting mixed method designs of survey, experiment and case study 
generally found that taxpayers with favourable attitudes would be more 
compliant (Loo et al., 2008; 2009). Interestingly, the study further 
diffentiates taxpayers‟ attitudes into two aspects and they have 
contradicting effects on compliance behaviour. While taxpayers‟ attitude in 
respect of their  confidence in handling the tax matters have a positive 
association with compliance behaviour, taxpayers‟ attitude toward the 
administration of the tax system, on the other hand, has a negative impact 
on compliance behaviour.        
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Apart from investigating the impact on compliance behaviour, there are 
some other studies which, on the other hand, examine the factors forming 
taxpayers‟ attitude, which, among others, include trust, pride (Torgler & 
Schneider, 2005), culture (Torgler & Schneider, 2004), education 
(Hasseldine & Bebbington, 1991), and fairness (Devos, 2009; Feld & Frey, 
2007; Roberts, 1994; Taylor, 2001). While those factors are undeniably 
important, this present study is interested on focusing on the impact of 
fairness perceptions on attitudes toward compliance. In this respect, Taylor 
(2001) asserts that negative perceptions on the income tax system 
(particularly, in terms of procedural fairness) will consequently result in 
taxpayers‟ negative attitudes towards compliance.  A more recent work by 
Devos (2009) in Australia, through both survey and interviews, strongly 
supports the notion that perceptions of fairness of the income tax system is 
an influential factor in determining attitudes towards compliance.  
 
Using an experimental approach, Roberts (1994) demonstrates how public 
service announcements will improve fairness perceptions on the income 
tax system and consequently improve attitudes towards compliance. In 
addition, the study suggests that the cognitive public service announcement 
is significantly more effective than the affective approach in influencing 
fairness perceptions.     
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2.5.6   Subjective Norms 
Subjective norms are said to be an important factor that result in different 
compliance behaviour across countries (Alm et al., 1995). Meanwhile, 
Cialdini and Trost (1998) consider subjective norms as one aspect of social 
norms, in addition to the other three categories, namely: descriptive norms; 
injunctive norms; and personal norms. Descriptive norms are defined as 
standards developed based on observations of actual behaviours of others, 
while injuctive norms, on the other hand, specify what should be done. 
Subjective norms relate specifically to the expectation of others and 
personal norms are one‟s own self-based standards (Bobek et al., 2007). 
Although by definition,  they are different, Bobek et al. (2007) found that 
these four dimensions are actually correlated. 
 
Contrary to Cialdini and Trost (1998), Ajzen (2006) defines subjective 
norms as including injunctive and descriptive. In his argument, Ajzen 
(2006) posits that in order to capture the domain of subjective norms, the 
research instrument needs to measure both injunctive and descriptive 
aspects. Notwithstanding different opinions on subjective norms, Bobek 
(1997), Elffers et al. (1987), and Hanno and Violette (1996), documented a 
positive relationship between subjective norms and compliance behaviour. 
Such a relationship was also documented in Canada by Trivedi et al. 
(2005) in the case of compliance behaviour but not in the non-compliance 
situation. In a cross-cultural study in Australia, Singapore and the US, 
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Bobek et al. (2007) conclude that personal norms and subjective norms are 
the most influential factor of compliance behaviour. The results, 
particularly with regard to Australia, however, are inconsistent with 
Kirchler et al. (2006), who failed to establish such a significant 
relationship. This is probably due to the limited items used to measure 
subjective norms in this study, compared to the one used in Bobek et al. 
(2007).  
 
2.5.7   Perceived Behavioural Control  
Perceived behavioural control is another element of TPB. As indicated 
earlier, perceived behavioural control can either directly affect actual 
behaviour, or through behavioural intention and consequently actual 
behaviour. Perceived behavioural control is not widely tested in tax 
compliance behaviour studies either as an independent variable or in a full 
compliance model. This does make sense because not many studies adopt 
TPB to explain tax compliance behaviour. From the few studies 
investigating the role of perceived behavioural control in tax compliance 
behaviour, both Trivedi et al. (2005) and Bobek (1997) found that no 
significant relationship exists. However, Bobek (1997) notes that perceived 
behavioural control does interact with subjective norms, to significantly 
influence intention to comply.    
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In addition to the limited study on the effect of perceived behavioural 
control in tax compliance behaviour, to the researcher‟s knowledge, there 
is also no study to date that investigates the role of tax knowledge and tax 
complexity on perceived behavioural control. However, Liska (1984) 
generally posits that an individual‟s unvolitional behaviour depends on 
perceived behavioural control, which in turn is determined by the 
resources, skills, and obstacles. This contention, in other words, suggests 
that tax knowledge (resources and skills) and tax complexity (obstacles), 
may influence perceived behavioural control of taxpayers, which in turn 
affects their decision whether to comply or not.  
 
2.6      Summary 
This chapter describes the relevant theories, including Equity Theory, 
Distributive Justice Theory (DJT), Procedural Justice Theory (PJT), the 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB) that form the background of this study. Based on the discussion, the 
extension to Equity Theory and the TPB are considered appropriate to 
explain the tax compliance behaviour in New Zealand and Malaysia. 
Briefly, the extended Equity Theory (which embedded DJT and PJT) 
asserts that individuals normally form their overall fairness judgments on 
any particular system by referring to their views on reciprocal fairness, 
distributive fairness and procedural fairness. When they have positive 
perceptions on these dimensions of fairness, the likelihood to have a fair 
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judgment on the system in context will be high, and vice versa. 
Accordingly, judgment so formed will then influence their behavioural 
intentions.  
 
In relation to the TPB, this behavioural theory is also used to predict an 
individual‟s behavioural intention. The TPB proposes attitude towards 
behaviour, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control as 
antecedents to behavioural intention, and consequently actual behaviour. 
The decision to adopt the TPB over the TRA (which disregards the 
perceived behavioural control factor) is mainly due to the nature of tax 
compliance behaviour, which is not fully volitional.  
 
A review of past studies on tax fairness, tax compliance behaviour, tax 
knowledge, tax complexity, and variables under the TPB indicate mixed 
but interesting findings. For instance, while the proposition under the 
Equity Theory that fairness perceptions have positive association with 
compliance behaviour are mainly supported by empirical work, there are a 
few studies which document contrary evidence. Such inconsistent findings 
might be partly attributable to the different definitions of fairness adopted 
in these studies. This encourages the researcher to consider various 
dimensions of fairness possible to capture a more comprehensive definition 
of fairness. In sum, a review of the empirical literature provides an avenue 
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for the researcher to present the conceptual framework of the study as well 
as formulate the relevant hypotheses in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
 
3.1      Introduction 
This chapter presents the detailed development of the conceptual 
framework of this study. This is followed by a discussion on the 
development of the hypotheses, where two categories of hypotheses, 
namely preliminary hypotheses and primary hypotheses, are presented.  
 
3.2       The Proposed Conceptual Framework 
This research  develops a conceptual framework to investigate the 
relationship between fairness perceptions, together with other external 
factors, and compliance behaviour. While there are a substantial number of 
compliance studies undertaken to date, this study attempts to identify the 
role of fairness perceptions in taxpayers‟ decision-making whether or not 
to comply with their tax obligations. For that purpose, a review of 
literature of Equity Theory (incorporating the Distributive Justice Theory 
(DJT) and Procedural Justice Theory (PJT)) was made. The two important 
premises drawn from Equity Theory are: (1) fairness perceptions are multi-
dimensional; and (2) fairness perceptions have a positive relationship with 
behavioural intention and consequently actual behaviour. Although these 
contentions are well supported by previous empirical findings (for 
example, Bordignon, 1993; Etzioni, 1986; Gilligan & Richardson, 2005) it 
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is important to note that fairness perceptions is only one of the various 
factors affecting an individual‟s behaviour (Ajzen, 1982).  
 
The researcher considers a review of the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB), which is one of the established behavioural models, to further 
investigate taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. Drawing from the past 
literature, the TPB has clearly been successful in explaining ethical and 
unethical behaviours across various disciplines. The TPB posits that 
attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control are the 
antecedents for behavioural intention, and consequently actual behaviour. 
Additionally, the TPB also suggests that perceived behavioural control 
also has a direct link to actual behaviour. 
 
In short, a review of Equity Theory and TPB indicates that both lead to 
establishing the antecedents of behavioural intention and consequently 
actual behaviour. Based on that understanding, the premises utilised in 
both theories are combined in order to investigate the effect of fairness 
perceptions, attitudes towards compliance, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control, on compliance behaviour. Due to the difficulty in 
obtaining information on actual tax compliance behaviour (which is 
regarded as a sensitive issue to taxpayers), this study adopts the intention 
to comply as a proxy for actual compliance. Such a practice is not 
uncommon in application of the TPB (for example, Blanchard et al., 2008; 
105 
 
French et al., 2005; Paris & Broucke, 2008; Simsekoglu & Lajunen, 2008; 
Warner & Aberg, 2008), and in fact, previous  studies have empirically 
demonstrated a strong link between behavioural intention and actual 
behaviour (for example, Kraft et al., 2005; Rhodes et al., 2007; Sheppard 
et al., 1988).  
 
In addition to the elements in Equity Theory and the TPB, the model 
developed and utilised in this study includes two other variables that are 
considered important: tax knowledge, and tax complexity. These two 
factors are believed to play a significant role in taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions of the income tax system and consequently their compliance 
behaviour. Several overseas studies had empirically established such an 
influence to a degree (see, for example, Fallan, 1999; Harris, 1989; 
Kirchler et al., 2006). Similarly, the earlier discussion on the TPB in 
Chapter 2 also indicates that an individual‟s perceived behavioural control 
is closely related to skills, knowledge, obstacles and assistance from 
others. Having said that, it is essential to investigate the effect of tax 
knowledge (which is the source of a person‟s skills and knowledge) and 
tax complexity (obstacles or difficulty) on perceived behavioural control.  
 
Although the factors mentioned above have been investigated in previous 
studies, this study is different in several ways. First, while most studies on 
fairness perceptions have been exploratory in nature, this study attempts to 
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confirm the various dimensions of fairness that are important to taxpayers‟ 
judgments. It is believed that there is a need to apply such a confirmatory 
analysis of fairness perceptions, when empirical findings have suggested a 
number of possible dimensions, through exploratory factor analysis. 
Specifically, it is believed that confirmatory factor analysis, and not 
exploratory analysis, is appropriate to this study, given that:  
(1)  This is not the first study on fairness perceptions to use New Zealand 
and Malaysian taxpayers. Although previous studies in both New 
Zealand and Malaysia did not encompass every dimension of fairness 
as described in the present study, at least they provide preliminary 
evidence of the multi-dimensional nature of fairness perceptions (refer 
to Azmi & Perumal, 2008; Tan, 1998). 
(2)  The questionnaires used in this study are carefully developed based on 
the review from the established theories and past studies. 
(3)  A usable sample size requirement of at least 200 was achieved so as to 
be able to use structural equation modelling (SEM), which is a 
confirmatory technique.   
 
Second, notwithstanding the various dimensions of fairness perceptions, 
previous studies have dealt with only a limited number of dimensions. 
Specifically, in those studies, the researchers were interested in 
investigating the impact of  horizontal fairnesss, vertical fairness, exchange 
fairness and tax rate structure on taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. Little 
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attention is given to other dimensions of fairness, such as retributive 
fairness, even though it is actually considered to be a branch of DJT. Thus, 
drawing from Equity Theory and empirical findings, the researcher 
extends previous studies (for example, Christensen et al., 1994; Gerbing, 
1988; Hasseldine et al., 1994; Kirchler et al., 2006; Richardson, 2005a; 
2005b; 2006b; Tan, 1998; Turman, 1995) by considering seven important 
dimensions of fairness in the first order factor model, in order to confirm 
that taxpayers form their fairness perceptions based on these dimensions. 
Thereafter, the second order factor model is adopted where all dimensions 
are combined to form the overall fairness perceptions, and the effect of 
such perceptions on tax compliance behaviour are examined. Details of the 
first order factor model and the second order factor model are discussed in 
Chapter 4 which addresses research methodology.  
 
Third, in relation to the measurement of the constructs, this study uses 
several measures to represent every construct in the model, which are 
regarded as complex concepts. This is important to ensure that the 
definitions of each construct are well represented by its measures, which 
consequently give a full picture of the constructs. For instance, if the 
concepts of attitude, subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and 
intention to comply, which relate to human judgment, are merely measured 
by an individual measure, it is unlikely that a single measure will 
encompass the whole domain of the constructs.  
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Fourth, previous studies (for example, Bobek, 1997; Etzioni, 1986; 
Hasseldine et al. 1994; Loo & McKerchar, 2010; Richardson, 2005a; 
2005b; 2006b; Roberts, 1994; Roth et al., 1989; Turman, 1995) on the 
association between fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour, more 
often than not, use a single approach to explain such a relationship. 
Undeniably, such a mono-method (either through survey or experiment) 
has been fruitful. However, the call for the use of a mixed method 
approach in the tax compliance studies (for example, McKerchar, 2003; 
2008) has been growing as it enables the researcher to either validate the 
findings or to provide more explanations to the phenomenon under study 
(McKerchar, 2003). With that in mind, this study integrates the 
quantitative (survey) and qualitative (in-depth interview) approaches 
sequentially in order to provide more explanations to the role of fairness 
perceptions in compliance behaviour. In other words, the in-depth 
interview approach is specifically intended to inform the findings from the 
survey approach, as indicated earlier in Chapter 1 (Section 1.7).  
 
Fifth, the important role of tax knowledge and tax complexity on tax 
compliance behaviour has been shown in numerous studies (for example, 
Carnes & Cuccia, 1996; Cox & Eger, 2006; Kasipillai, 2000; Kasipillai et 
al., 2003; Long & Swingen, 1987; McKerchar, 1995; 2003; 2005; Mustafa, 
1996; Palil, 2005; Richardson, 2006a). Rather than reinvestigating such a 
proven relationship, this study examines how tax knowledge and tax 
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complexity affect fairness perceptions and consequently compliance 
behaviour. In other words, the present study considers the fairness 
perceptions as moderating factors of tax knowledge and tax complexity 
with respect to intention to comply.  
 
Sixth, while noting the fact that the variables under study have previously 
been independently tested, to the researcher‟s knowledge, this is the first 
study that develops a full conceptual model of compliance behaviour 
integrating Equity Theory, the TPB, tax knowledge and tax complexity 
variables. Bobek (1997), who previously combined Equity Theory (which 
specifically focuses on distributive fairness, procedural fairness and policy 
fairness)  and the TPB to investigate taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour in 
the United States (US), considered moral obligation as an external variable 
to her tax compliance model. Other studies (Blanthorne & Kaplan, 2008; 
Hanno & Violette, 1996; Trivedi et al., 2005), adopted either the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) or the TPB, and other external factors, to explain 
taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour with no attention given to fairness 
perceptions.  Last, but by no means least, this study compares fairness 
perceptions and compliance behaviour of individual taxpayers in New 
Zealand and Malaysia. To the researcher‟s knowledge, this is the first 
comparative study conducted in these two relatively rarely examined 
jurisdictions.  
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In short, the integration of Equity Theory, the TPB and the variables under 
review, as diagrammatically expressed in Figure 3.1, is expected to 
provide a richer understanding of the taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour, 
particularly in New Zealand and Malaysia. 
Figure 3.1 
Conceptual Framework of Fairness Perceptions  
and Compliance Behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
  Hypothesis path 
  Path not tested  
 
Notes:  
               Hypothesis path 
               Path not tested 
 
Overall, this conceptual framework proposes that: (1) taxpayers‟ intention 
to comply depends on fairness perceptions, attitude towards compliance, 
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fairness perceptions and perceived behavioural control are influenced by 
their levels of tax knowledge and the complexity of the tax system. Based 
on this conceptual framework, the research hypotheses are developed as 
discussed in the next section.  
 
3.3  Hypotheses Development 
Having developed the conceptual framework of taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour (as set out in Figure 3.1), it is essential to test the model in the 
„real world‟. To accomplish this objective, ten primary hypotheses (with 
two sub-hypotheses) were devised to investigate the validity of the model 
and the strength of the proposed relationships. The hypotheses were 
developed with reference to the findings from the review of the prior 
literature (as detailed out in Chapter 2). Prior to testing the primary 
hypotheses, it is equally important to develop and test the preliminary 
hypotheses that provide the foundation for the researcher to interpret the 
overall findings. As this is a comparative study, these preliminary 
hypotheses are used to compare the levels of fairness perceptions, tax 
knowledge, tax complexity and the elements in the TPB, in both New 
Zealand and Malaysia. These two categories of hypotheses are discussed in 
Subsections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2.  
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3.3.1   Preliminary Hypotheses 
As indicated earlier, the preliminary hypotheses are developed mainly to 
investigate similarities or differences in opinion between taxpayers in New 
Zealand and Malaysia. While a few researchers have independently 
explored taxpayers‟ perceptions in New Zealand and Malaysia regarding 
fairness perceptions, tax knowledge and tax complexity, these findings do 
not provide the basis for comparison due to differences in time periods, 
measures used and methods of each study. Thus, using a similar research 
instrument, timeframe
45
 and methods of analysis, this study is expected to 
provide valuable information to both countries as well as to the growing 
cross-cultural tax compliance literature.  
 
For the purpose of this study, both the research questions and hypotheses 
are presented to enable readers to clearly understand the scope of the 
study. While preliminary hypotheses are developed in order to answer the 
research questions, the research questions are developed with reference to 
the research objectives set out in Chapter 1. In other words, the research 
objectives, research questions and hypotheses are interrelated. The four 
research questions and the relevant preliminary hypotheses are as follows: 
 
                                                 
45 The survey in New Zealand and Malaysia was conducted between September and November 2008, 
and February to May 2009, respectively.  
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Research Question 1: Do taxpayers in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia have the same levels of fairness perceptions of their current 
income tax systems? 
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference in fairness 
perceptions between New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers of  their 
current income tax systems. 
 
Research Question 2: Do taxpayers in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia have the same levels of tax knowledge of their current 
income tax systems? 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference in the levels of 
knowledge between New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers of their 
current income tax systems. 
 
Research Question 3: Do taxpayers in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia have the same levels of perceptions of the complexity of 
their current income tax systems? 
Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference in the levels of 
perceptions of the complexity between New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers of their current income tax systems. 
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Research Question 4: Do taxpayers in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia have the same levels of perceptions in relation to the TPB 
elements?  
Hypothesis 4a: There is no significant difference in the levels of 
intention to comply, affective attitude, instrumental attitude, 
subjective norms and perceived behavioural control, between New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers, in the „overstating business 
expenses‟ scenario.  
Hypothesis 4b: There is no significant difference in the levels of 
intention to comply, affective attitude, instrumental attitude, 
subjective norms and perceived behavioural control, between New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers, in the „understating other 
incomes‟ scenario. 
 
All these hypotheses are expressed in null form as there is a limited or 
complete absence of literature available to conclude that taxpayers‟ 
perceptions differ between New Zealand and Malaysia. For instance, in the 
case of fairness perceptions, while both New Zealand and Malaysia have 
implemented a broadly similar income tax system in respect of the 
implementation of the self assessment system and progressive tax rates,
46
 
                                                 
46 There are several differences in terms of the technical details of the implementation of the system. 
Also, the progressive tax rates in Malaysia are much lower than that of New Zealand. In 2010, 
Malaysia has twelve tax brackets for resident individual with the lowest rate of 1 percent and the 
highest rate being 26 percent.  
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taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions may be different because taxpayers come 
from different economic and cultural environments. Purely applying the 
findings documented in Zhiyong and Qingyang (2007), for example, that 
people in a developed economy will tolerate social unfairness, it is 
reasonable to anticipate better perceptions of fairness in New Zealand 
compared to Malaysia. However, on the basis that perceptions may be 
influenced by various factors, and with little evidence of fairness 
perceptions documented in these two jurisdictions, it is preferable to 
express the hypotheses in the null form. Similar issues apply with respect 
to other preliminary hypotheses. These hypotheses are tested using t-test 
analysis, and are described further in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, regarding 
research methodology, and exploratory data analysis and results, 
respectively.  
 
3.3.2   Primary Hypotheses 
The primary hypotheses are discussed with reference to the conceptual 
framework set out in Figure 3.1. Similar to the preliminary hypotheses, the 
primary hypotheses are coupled with relevant research questions to enable 
readers to relate them to the research objectives of the study. To avoid 
confusion, the numbering of the hypotheses continues from the 
preliminary hypotheses. It is important to note that in this study the TPB 
elements are measured using two scenarios, namely overstating business 
expenses and understating other incomes. Thus, Hypotheses 6 to 14 will be 
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tested twice using the two scenarios in order to examine whether any 
differences exist between the scenarios.  
 
3.3.2.1  Fairness Perceptions and Compliance Behaviour 
The earlier review of various theories and studies of fairness suggests 
approximately ten dimensions of fairness (for example, Azmi & Perumal, 
2008; Gerbing, 1988; Richardson, 2005a; 2005b; 2006b; Tan, 1998). 
However, in this study, seven dimensions are identified to be important in 
assessing the fairness of the income tax system. The dimensions are:  
general fairness; exchange fairness; horizontal fairness; vertical fairness 
(measured by ability to pay); retributive fairness; personal fairness; and 
administrative fairness.  
 
General fairness relates to an overall fairness evaluation of the income tax 
system. Exchange fairness is concerned with reciprocal exchange between 
taxpayers and the government, while horizontal fairness deals with equal 
tax  treatment among taxpayers in similar economic positions. Vertical 
fairness will be assessed based on the ability to pay principle and 
preference for tax rate structure, either a flat rate or progressive rates. 
Retributive fairness is concerned with the fairness of punishments imposed 
while personal fairness leads to individuals‟ judgments about whether the 
income tax system is favourable to them. Finally, administrative fairness 
relates to the content of the tax law (policy fairness) and procedures 
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employed by the tax authority (procedural fairness). A review of the 
literature also suggests that the multi-dimension of fairness perceptions is 
not limited to income tax (as indicated in the above-mentioned studies), 
but also applies to property taxes (Sirmans et al., 1995; Vlassenko, 2001) 
and indirect taxes (Takenishi & Takenishi, 1990).  
 
While the research conducted to date has provided useful insights into 
various fairness dimensions, this study aims to extend the tax fairness 
literature by looking at both the New Zealand and Malaysian 
environments. In New Zealand, little research has been undertaken (Tan & 
Sawyer, 2003).
47
 Such paucity of research is also demonstrated in 
Malaysia where only two studies on fairness perceptions have been 
undertaken so far.
48
 Thus, this study proposes the following:  
 
Research Question 5: Do New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers 
perceive the fairness of their income tax systems as being multi-
dimensional? 
                                                 
47 Tan (1998) carried out the main study of fairness in New Zealand. The author investigates the 
influence of demographic variables on fairness perceptions among university students and found that 
those with filing experience and older people perceive the progressive tax rate structure as fair. 
Notwithstanding the various dimensions of fairness, this study only concentrates on three dimensions 
of fairness namely personal fairness, tax rate structure and attitude towards taxes of the wealthy. Prior 
to that, Hasseldine et al. (1994) found that overall fairness perceptions have no significant association 
with taxpayers’ non-compliance behaviour. 
48 Mustafa’s study (1996) was conducted before the implementation of self assessment system and 
focused on limited elements of tax fairness. Azmi and Perumal (2008), on the other hand, replicated 
the work of Gerbing (1988) to explore the fairness perceptions of Malaysian taxpayers by 
administering a modified survey among personal taxpayers.  
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Hypothesis 5: New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers perceive 
fairness of their income tax systems as being multi-dimensional. 
 
Numerous studies have been undertaken since the 1970s to observe the 
role of fairness perceptions in taxpayers‟ decision-making of whether or 
not to comply. However, these studies provide mixed and inconclusive 
findings. While some researchers found a positive association between the 
variables, others could not support such findings. In fact, some studies 
indicate a negative relationship between fairness perceptions and 
compliance behaviour. Richardson and Sawyer (2001) contend that such 
mixed findings were probably due to different definitions of fairness 
perceptions used in the studies. Other researchers, have argued that such 
inconsistent results may be due to the tendency of the studies to observe 
fairness perceptions and (non)compliance behaviour as a cause and effect,  
rather than as a method of rationalisation of their behaviour. In this 
instance, these researchers (Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Lempert, 1992) 
argued that the taxpayers‟ acts of not complying are not due only to their 
negative perceptions on the income tax system. Rather, these negative 
perceptions of the income tax system are used as an excuse to justify their 
non-compliance behaviour.   
 
In the case of the New Zealand and Malaysian environments, there is little 
evidence to consider regarding such a relationship due to the minimal level 
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of research currently available. To the researcher‟s knowledge, there is 
only one study conducted in each of New Zealand and Malaysia that 
examines the effect of fairness perceptions on (non)compliance behaviour 
(Hasseldine et al., 1994; Mustafa, 1996), and both were conducted some 
time ago. Thus, it is worth investigating whether fairness perceptions affect 
compliance behaviour in New Zealand and Malaysia. The mixed findings 
documented overseas suggest that this relationship can be hypothesised as 
follows: 
 
Research Question 6: Do fairness perceptions influence taxpayers‟ 
compliance behaviour in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 6: Fairness perceptions of the income tax system by New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers significantly influence their tax 
compliance behaviour.           
 
3.3.2.2 Attitude towards Compliance and Compliance Behaviour 
Attitude towards compliance simply refers to a person‟s evaluation of 
whether they will comply or not with their tax obligations. This evaluation 
is made based on the outcomes of whether performing such a behaviour 
would be advantageous and improve one‟s emotions with respect to 
taxation. The evaluation of the advantages or disadvantages of 
(non)complying with their tax obligations is described as „instrumental 
attitude‟, while the evaluation on feelings of happiness and guilt in 
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(non)complying is labelled „affective attitude‟. These two separate 
components of attitude are empirically regarded as important in measuring 
a person‟s attitude. Having said that, this study considers attitude towards 
compliance as both affective attitude and instrumental attitude, in an effort 
to further investigate the influence of attitude towards compliance on 
compliance behaviour.  
 
Previous overseas studies (for example, Cullis & Lewis, 1997; Hanno & 
Violette, 1996; Kasipillai & Jabbar, 2003; Loo et al., 2008; 2009; Trivedi 
et al., 2005) on the association between attitude towards compliance and 
compliance behaviour, either through survey or experimental design, have 
established a positive link between the two variables.
49
 This is consistent 
with the premise under the TPB that favourable attitude towards behaviour 
will be more likely to affect behaviour in a positive way. In New Zealand 
and Malaysia, however, little has been done to investigate this relationship. 
While Loo et al. (2008; 2009) have investigated such a relationship in 
Malaysia via a mixed method approach, inconsistent findings were 
documented, thus requiring more studies to be conducted in the country. 
This study, therefore, proposes that: 
 
                                                 
49Previous studies (for example, Bobek, 1997; Hanno & Violette, 1996; Trivedi et al., 2005), however, 
tended to measure attitude towards compliance as an overall evaluation, rather than as two separable 
components as intended in this study.   
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Research Question 7: Does attitude towards compliance influence 
taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 7a: Affective attitude towards compliance of New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers significantly influences  their tax 
compliance behaviour.           
Hypothesis 7b: Instrumental attitude towards compliance of New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers significantly influences  their tax 
compliance behaviour.           
 
3.3.2.3 Subjective Norms and Compliance Behaviour 
Subjective norms are described as an individual‟s perception of the 
expectations of the referent groups, whether he or she should, or should 
not, comply with their tax obligations. Referent groups refer to individuals 
of whom taxpayers normally compare or refer to, which may include 
family members, friends and colleagues. Previous studies claim that 
subjective norms contribute to different compliance behaviours across 
countries. This is because subjective norms are normally associated with a 
taxpayer‟s identity, culture and societal norms. Also, studies have 
introduced various definitions of subjective norms. For instance, some 
studies consider subjective norms to include injunctive and descriptive 
norms, while others claim that subjective norms are independent of those 
two types of norms, although they are all categories of social norms.  In 
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this study the first view was adopted where subjective norms are measured 
using both injunctive and descriptive components.  
 
In terms of the effect of subjective norms on compliance behaviour, mixed 
findings have been documented. Some studies (for example, Bobek, 1997; 
Bobek et al., 2007; Elffers et al., 1987; Hanno & Violette, 1996) have 
found a positive relationship between the two variables while others 
(Kirchler et al., 2006) have failed to establish a significant relationship. In 
New Zealand and Malaysia, to the researcher‟s knowledge, no prior 
evidence is available. To investigate such a relationship, this study 
proposes:  
 
Research Question 8: Do subjective norms influence taxpayers‟ 
compliance behaviour in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 8: Subjective norms of New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers significantly influence  their tax compliance behaviour.           
 
3.3.2.4 Perceived Behavioural Control and Compliance Behaviour 
Perceived behavioural control reflects an individual‟s perception of the 
ease or difficulty in performing a particular behaviour. Ajzen (1991) 
stipulates that a behaviour that is easy to perform is high in perceived 
behavioural control, while one that is difficult to perform is low in 
perceived behavioural control. Furthermore, Ajzen (1991) suggests that an 
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individual with high perceived behavioural control will be more likely to 
perform the behaviour in context than an individual with lower perceived 
behavioural control.  
 
In tax compliance behavioural research, when a taxpayer believes that he 
or she can successfully complete and file the tax return forms with Inland 
Revenue without any mistakes, the person appears to have a high 
perceived behavioural control and is more likely to comply with their tax 
obligations. Likewise, if a taxpayer believes that he or she can avoid or 
evade paying tax without being caught by a tax audit, the person also 
appears to have a high perceived behavioural control over non-complying, 
and thus, is more likely to avoid or evade paying tax. 
 
In this study, the researcher is interested in respondents‟ perceived 
behavioural control over non-complying with tax obligations. In particular, 
it is anticipated that the higher the perceived behavioural control, the more 
likely that taxpayers will avoid being compliant. It is therefore proposed: 
 
Research Question 9: Does perceived behavioural control influence 
taxpayers‟ noncompliance behaviour in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 9: Perceived behavioural control of New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers significantly influences  their tax 
noncompliance behaviour.           
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3.3.2.5 Tax Knowledge and Fairness Perceptions 
A review of the literature on the effect of tax knowledge on fairness 
perceptions provides strong support to the argument that possessing 
adequate knowledge of the income tax system will improve taxpayers‟ 
fairness perceptions. In line with this argument, some researchers have 
enhanced their studies by investigating the possible ways to improve 
taxpayers‟ knowledge and consequently fairness perceptions. They 
(Wartick, 1994; White et al., 1990) found that a formal class in taxation 
and exposure to information, especially during tax law changes, will be 
helpful to improve taxpayers‟ knowledge and fairness perceptions.   
 
Contradictory evidence, however, is documented in Malaysia where an 
increase in taxpayers‟ knowledge has impacted negatively on fairness 
perceptions (Loo et al., 2008). In particular, their findings suggest that 
taxpayers who have adequate knowledge of government expenditure for 
public benefits view the income tax system to be unfair as they are not 
receiving sufficient benefits in return for their tax paid. In New Zealand, 
on the other hand, no evidence of the impact  of tax knowledge on fairness 
perceptions is documented to date.  
 
Considering the fact that inconsistent findings are reported in Malaysia and 
New Zealand, compared to previous studies overseas, may be attributable 
to the different measures used, this study covers three aspects of tax 
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knowledge, namely general knowledge, technical knowledge and 
knowledge of legal sanctions. General knowledge relates to a broad idea of 
the income tax system such as its purpose and the tax structure. Legal 
knowledge emphasises taxpayers‟ knowledge on the regulation aspects of 
the income tax system, such as responsibility to submit their tax return 
forms timely and the penalty for non-compliance. Technical knowledge 
concerns with taxpayers‟ ability to fill and file their tax return forms 
themselves. These dimensions of tax knowledge are evaluated to form the 
overall knowledge of taxpayers on the income tax system, where the 
impact on fairness perceptions is consequently investigated as follows:  
 
Research Question 10: Does knowledge of the income tax system 
influence taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 10: Knowledge of the income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. 
 
3.3.2.6 Tax Complexity and Fairness Perceptions 
Although the issue of complexity of an income tax system has been widely 
discussed in the tax compliance literature (see for example, Long & 
Swingen, 1987; McKerchar, 2003; 2005; Mustafa, 1996; Pau et al., 2007; 
Sawyer, 1996b; Saw & Sawyer, 2010; White, 1990), there are a few 
126 
 
studies (Carnes & Cuccia, 1996; Carroll, 1987; Cialdini, 1989; Kirchler et 
al., 2006; Milliron, 1985) investigating the relationship between tax 
complexity and fairness perceptions. These studies, which document an 
inverse relationship between tax complexity and fairness perceptions, were 
conducted mainly in the United States and none of them was carried out in 
either New Zealand or Malaysia. In the absence of such empirical 
evidence, the proposition that tax complexity influences fairness 
perceptions will be tested. To do so, this study separates tax complexity 
into compliance complexity and content complexity. Compliance 
complexity is concerned with the process of keeping records, filling and 
filing tax return forms and making tax payments. Content complexity, on 
the other hand, relates to the complexity of the documents and relevant tax 
law. These dimensions of tax complexity are then integrated to investigate 
the proposition as follows:  
 
Research Question 11: Does complexity of the income tax system 
influence taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 11: Complexity of the income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. 
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3.3.2.7 Tax Knowledge and Perceived Behavioural Control 
As indicated earlier, perceived behavioural control of an individual is 
associated with the extent of resources and skills that he or she possesses. 
Theoretically, a person with more knowledge of tax would be considered 
as having high perceived behavioural control than those with little 
knowledge. In this respect, possessing good tax knowledge would enhance 
the resources and skills of taxpayers to deal with their tax obligations (and 
whether or not to comply with them). In order to explore the potential 
relationships, it is proposed that:  
 
Research Question 12: Does knowledge of the income tax system 
influence taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control in New Zealand 
and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 12: Knowledge of the income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control in New Zealand 
and Malaysia. 
 
3.3.2.8 Tax Complexity and Perceived Behavioural Control 
In addition to the association with taxpayers‟ resources and skills, 
perceived behavioural control also depends on the degree of obstacles in 
performing certain behaviours. Theoretically, a simple task can be easily 
completed or performed compared to a complex one. In the case of tax 
compliance, previous studies (for example, Hasseldine & Bebbington, 
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1991; Long & Swingen, 1987; McKerchar, 2001; 2003; Mustafa, 1996; 
Strader & Fogliasso, 1989) have found that taxpayers generally consider 
meeting their tax obligations as not an easy task. They regard complexity 
of the income tax system as one obstacle that taxpayers normally 
encounter in dealing with their tax matters. In other words, these studies 
are suggesting that complexity of the tax system inversely affects their 
perceived behavioural control over (non)complying with the tax law. 
However, to the researcher‟s knowledge, such a relationship has yet to be 
investigated. Thus, this study will test the proposition that: 
 
Research Question 13: Does complexity of the income tax system 
influence taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control in New Zealand 
and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 13: Complexity of the income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control in New Zealand 
and Malaysia. 
 
3.3.2.9 Fairness Perceptions and Attitude towards Compliance 
The effect of fairness perceptions on attitude toward compliance has been 
documented in previous studies (Devos, 2009; Feld & Frey, 2007; Roberts, 
1994; Taylor, 2001). These studies all found that fairness perceptions are 
influential determinants of taxpayers‟ attitudes towards compliance. 
Specifically, Taylor (2001) suggests that unfavourable perceptions of the 
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income tax system lead to taxpayers‟ negative attitudes towards 
compliance. While attitude normally comprises two components, namely 
affective attitude and instrumental attitude, these studies, however, 
investigate the effect of fairness perceptions on overall attitudes. Thus, the 
present study attempts to explore the relationship between fairness 
perceptions and the two components of attitudes (independently), as 
follows:  
 
Research Question 14: Do fairness perceptions on the income tax 
system influence taxpayers‟ attitudes towards compliance in New 
Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 14a: Fairness perceptions on the income tax system 
significantly influence taxpayers‟ affective attitude towards 
compliance in New Zealand and Malaysia. 
Hypothesis 14b: Fairness perceptions on the income tax system 
significantly influence taxpayers‟ instrumental attitude towards 
compliance in New Zealand and Malaysia. 
 
3.4       Summary 
This chapter set out the conceptual framework of the study to investigate 
the role of fairness perceptions and other relevant factors in taxpayers‟ 
compliance decision-making. This conceptual model contributes to the 
behavioural tax compliance literature in the following ways, as it: 
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(1)  Focuses on the role of fairness perceptions in tax compliance; 
(2) Considers various dimensions of fairness to form the overall fairness 
perceptions; 
(3) Integrates Equity Theory and the TPB to explain compliance 
behaviour; 
(4) Identifies tax knowledge and tax complexity as possible factors 
influencing fairness perceptions and perceived behavioural control; 
and 
(5) Measures attitude in two separable components.  
 
In relation to this conceptual framework, 14 hypotheses (plus 3 sub-
hypotheses), are developed to be tested in this study. The following table 
presents a summary of the research hypotheses to be tested:  
Table 3.1 Summary of Research Questions and Research Hypotheses 
 
Research Question Research Hypotheses 
  
1. Do taxpayers in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia have the same levels of fairness 
perceptions of their current income tax 
systems? 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant 
difference in fairness perceptions 
between New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers of their current income tax 
systems.  
2. Do taxpayers in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia have the same levels of tax 
knowledge of their current income tax 
systems? 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant 
difference in the levels of knowledge 
between New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers of their current income tax 
systems.  
3. Do taxpayers in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia have the same levels of perceptions 
of the complexity of their current income tax 
systems? 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is no significant 
difference in the levels of perceptions of 
the complexity between New Zealand 
and Malaysian taxpayers of their current 
income tax systems.  
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4. Do taxpayers in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia have the same levels of perceptions 
in relation to the TPB elements?  
Hypothesis 4a: There is no significant 
difference in the levels of intention to 
comply, affective attitude, instrumental 
attitude, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control, between New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers, in the 
“overstating business expenses” 
scenario.  
 Hypothesis 4b: There is no significant 
difference in the levels of intention to 
comply, affective attitude, instrumental 
attitude, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control, between New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers, in the 
“understating other incomes” scenario. 
5. Do New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers 
perceive the fairness of their income tax 
systems as being multi-dimensional? 
 
Hypothesis 5: New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers perceive fairness of 
their income tax systems as being multi-
dimensional. 
6. Do fairness perceptions influence 
taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour in New 
Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 6: Fairness perceptions of 
the income tax system by New Zealand 
and Malaysian taxpayers significantly 
influence their tax compliance 
behaviour. 
7. Does attitude towards compliance 
influence taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour 
in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 7a: Affective attitude 
towards compliance of New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers significantly 
influences their tax compliance 
behaviour.  
 Hypothesis 7b: Instrumental attitude 
towards compliance of New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers significantly 
influences their tax compliance 
behaviour. 
8. Do subjective norms influence taxpayers‟ 
compliance behaviour in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
 
Hypothesis 8: Subjective norms of New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers 
significantly influence their tax 
compliance behaviour.  
9. Does perceived behavioural control 
influence taxpayers‟ noncompliance 
behaviour in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 9: Perceived behavioural 
control of New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers significantly influences their 
tax noncompliance behaviour.  
10. Does knowledge of the income tax 
system influence taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
 
Hypothesis 10: Knowledge of the 
income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. 
11. Does complexity of the income tax 
system influence taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 11: Complexity of the 
income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. 
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12. Does knowledge of the income tax 
system influence taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 12: Knowledge of the 
income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. 
13. Does complexity of the income tax 
system influence taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 13: Complexity of the 
income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. 
14. Do fairness perceptions on the income 
tax system influence taxpayers‟ attitude 
towards compliance in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 14a: Fairness perceptions on 
the income tax system significantly 
influence taxpayers‟ affective attitude 
towards compliance in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. 
 Hypothesis 14b: Fairness perceptions on 
the income tax system significantly 
influence taxpayers‟ instrumental 
attitude towards compliance in New 
Zealand and Malaysia. 
 
The following chapter will discuss the methods and analysis to be 
conducted in order to answer these research questions and hypotheses. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Methodology  
 
4.1       Introduction 
The inquiry paradigm used in research is generally influenced by a 
researcher‟s ontological and epistemological beliefs. These beliefs 
represent how the researcher views and seeks to understand the world. The 
two extremely contradicting paradigms are positivism and constructivism. 
The positivism approach views the world as objective realism and 
therefore suggests that knowledge is created by deductive reasoning 
whereby  a precise and systematic process is adopted (McKerchar, 2010). 
Thus, positivist researchers normally adopt quantitative methods such as 
surveys and experiments in designing their research. The constructivism 
approach, on the other hand, views the world based on researcher‟s 
interpretation, which may be  influenced by his or her own views, beliefs, 
experiences and existing knowledge (McKerchar, 2010). In this respect, 
constructivist researchers assume that knowledge is created by inductive 
reasoning and typically adopt qualitative methods in their research, such as 
interviews.  
 
There are other inquiry paradigms that lie between positivism and 
constructivism, known as critical realism and pragmatism. These two 
paradigms generally combine both orientations of positivism and 
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constructivism. Researchers adopting these paradigms view the world as 
complex and therefore cannot be simply understood through empirical 
realism (McKerchar, 2003). Thus, a mixed methodology is normally 
adopted in their research.      
 
A gradual development of studies incorporating both quantitative and 
qualitative orientations indicate not only moves toward an end of paradigm 
wars (between positivist and constructivist) with respect to taxation, but 
also the compatibility of the two approaches. This development is clearly 
expressed by Brewer and Hunter (1989) (pp. 16-17) in the following quote: 
 
“Social science methods should not be treated as mutually 
exclusive alternatives among which we must choose….our 
individual methods may be flawed, but fortunately the 
flaws are not identical. A diversity of imperfections allow 
us to combine methods….to compensate for their 
particular faults and imperfections”. 
 
In her article, McKerchar (2008) also expresses a similar view regarding 
the blend of approaches in conducting research, particularly in taxation. 
McKerchar (2008, p. 20) argues that “each strategy has its strength and 
weaknesses and the drive for mixed method research….is to use one 
strategy to either inform, validate or compensate for the weaknessess of 
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another”.  In other words, McKerchar (2008) suggests that a combination 
of both quantitative and qualitative methods is a more pragmatic approach 
to gain a better understanding of the phenomenon under study.
50
  
 
While acknowledging an important contribution of a mixed method 
approach in taxation studies, McKerchar (2010) also highlights several  
reasons behind the use of such an approach. The first is the need to address 
different objectives of the study which cannot be achieved by a single 
method. The second reason is to enable one approach to inform another 
approach, either in design or interpretation, as illustrated in McKerchar 
(2003). In her study, McKerchar (2003) adopted a large-scale survey 
followed by a case study. The third reason is to triangulate the findings of 
different approaches (either performed concurrently or sequentially) in an 
effort to provide greater confidence to the study. Based on her 
recommendations, it appears that the main reason for the researcher to 
adopt a mixed method approach is to enable one approach to inform 
another approach in the interpretation of the overall results. To be 
consistent with this strategy, a similar sampling frame is used to draw the 
potential respondents for both approaches.  
 
                                                 
50 Examples of the taxation studies that adopted mixed method approach are Loo (2006) and 
McKerchar (2003).  
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Having said that, a sequential mixed method approach, combining survey 
questionnaires and in-depth interviews, is utilised to answer the research 
objectives as set out in Chapter 3. The current chapter begins with the 
discussion of the process involved in the survey method in a step-by-step 
manner. This is followed by an overview of the procedures undertaken for 
the interview approach.  
 
4.2       Survey  
This section describes the detailed process of conducting surveys, 
beginning with considerations to use a postal mail or electronic survey 
form, followed by the questionnaire design and sample selection. Then 
discussion on ethical considerations, pilot testing, and data collection 
procedures are presented. Finally, the measurement and analysis  of the 
data gathered through the survey questionnaires is considered. 
 
4.2.1   Postal vs. Electronic Survey 
Hair et al. (2007) suggest two available approaches to ensure 
questionnaires reach the targeted respondents, a traditional approach 
(through the post or fax
51
) and electronic delivery.  Each approach has its 
own advantages and disadvantages. Mail surveys, for instance, have the 
capacity to reach a large number of geographically dispersed respondents 
                                                 
51 The fax survey approach seems inappropriate as only a few individuals have fax machines in their 
home. If the targeted respondents are businesses, the use of a fax survey will not be such a problem.  
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at relatively low cost, but they have the disadvantages of a low response 
rate (see for example, Harzing, 1997; Slemrod & Venkatesh, 2002) and 
difficulty in administering follow-ups. Notwithstanding these features, mail 
surveys are the only feasible data collection instrument for research in 
more than one nation (Harzing, 1997). With the advance of information 
technology, this view may no longer be accurate, as there are other 
alternatives to the traditional mail survey, such as an electronic survey 
administered through e-mail or web-hosted provider. While this approach 
would provide a global reach and faster data collection, it is limited to 
computer users with internet access.
52
 After taking into consideration the 
strengths and limitations of each approach, this study utilises mail survey 
questionnaires, providing wider access and better coverage of the relevant 
populations. 
 
4.2.2   Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaires were initially prepared in English and then translated 
into the Malay language to cater for the respondents in Malaysia. There are 
four parts to the questionnaire. Part 1 is concerned with taxpayers‟ 
perceptions of tax fairness, while Part 2 consists of questions focusing on 
the determinants of tax fairness perceptions. In Part 3, hypothetical tax 
scenarios are developed to gauge perceptions of compliance behaviour. 
                                                 
52 In future with increase in computers at home and penetration of internet, electronic surveys may be 
viable. Currently, electronic surveys may therefore be more suited for businesses. 
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Similar hypothetical tax  scenarios  were used to capture the elements of 
the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). Finally, Part 4 is designed to 
obtain demographic background information such as age, gender, ethnicity, 
marital status, education level, occupation, income level, employment 
sector, number of dependents, and geographic area. All parts, with the 
exception of Part 4, use a Seven-Point Likert scale to measure the items. 
Additionally, scope for individual participant comments were provided 
through several open-ended questions.  
 
4.2.3   Sample Selection 
This section provides a description of the sample selection in both New 
Zealand and Malaysia. While the targeted group is individual taxpayers, 
there are differences in the sample group chosen between the two countries  
due to the different tax environments and also the availability of data. 
Notwithstanding this approach, these differences do not defeat the purpose 
of this study because the samples are still drawn from the relevant 
(sub)population of individual taxpayers in both countries. Furthermore, a 
study of perceptions is relevant to all the taxpaying public regardless of 
their  sources of income. 
 
4.2.3.1 New Zealand 
In 2006, New Zealand had approximately 2.43 million individual taxpayers 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2006a) who paid a total direct income taxes of 
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NZ$24.6 billion (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2006). The amount 
represents 64 percent of total direct taxes (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 
2006). Based on these statistics, we can conclude that individual taxpayers 
are the major contributor to direct income taxes collected in New Zealand. 
Thus, it is appropriate to investigate their perceptions of fairness and 
compliance behaviour.  
 
In order to obtain a sample of individual taxpayers, the researcher believes 
it is appropriate to use the latest (2008) Electoral Roll. The Electoral Roll is 
a list of all New Zealand voters over the age of 18 years and will include 
most New Zealand individual taxpayers. The use of the Electoral Roll in 
tax studies has been previously undertaken in New Zealand, including 
Hasseldine et al. (1994). The advantage of using the Electoral Roll is that it 
has potential to incorporate a more diverse group of individual taxpayers, 
including the salaried and wage earners, self-employed individuals and 
also tax beneficiaries.  
 
It may be argued that the self-employed individuals are considered the 
most appropriate target group to capture compliance behaviour,
53
 
compared to other groups of individual taxpayers, based on the fact that 
they are required to file income tax return forms annually (since their 
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incomes are not normally fully taxed at source).
54
 However, this assertion 
can be disputed for the reason that every taxpayer, whether salaried, self-
employed or even beneficiaries, should potentially be given the 
opportunity to express their opinions on the fairness of the current income 
tax system. They are all taxpaying individuals, thus the fact whether they 
are obliged to file tax return forms or not is likely to be irrelevant. This is 
particularly justifiable when it is reported that the IRD has collected 
hundreds of millions of dollars in overpaid taxes from PAYE taxpayers 
(Stock, 2007). 
  
4.2.3.2 Malaysia 
Notwithstanding the availability of the 2008 Electoral Roll in Malaysia, it 
may not be appropriate source to draw the sample of individual taxpayers 
due to the following reasons. The first reason is the fact that Electoral Roll 
consists of all voters from various economic backgrounds, from those not 
in paid employment (e.g. full time housewife and the elderly) to salaried 
and self-employed persons.  Since paying tax is practically relevant to 
                                                                                                                        
53 In this study, tax compliance is assumed to take place when the taxpayer files all required tax returns at 
the proper time and that returns accurately report tax liability in accordance with the tax law (Roth et 
al., 1989). 
54 In New Zealand, most salaried individuals are not obliged to file tax return forms as their incomes are 
taxed at source through the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system and may be reviewed via a Personal Tax 
Summary (PTS). If the PTS shows insufficient tax paid, taxpayers will have to make an additional tax 
payment. In the case of an overpayment of tax, taxpayers will be entitled to tax refund and need to 
apply for it from Inland Revenue. However, individuals are required to file an IR3 tax return form 
when they earn income that has not had tax deducted, such as rental income or income from self-
employment (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2008b).  
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those with monthly incomes of at least MYR2,500 (NZ$1,190), there is the 
possibility for the researcher to systematically select a sample from the 
Electoral Roll who may not meet this criteria. Consequently, this would 
result either in a low response rate or out of frame responses. This scenario 
is different from New Zealand where all income earners are subject to tax 
regardless of the amount earned, thus suggesting the appropriate use of the 
Electroral Roll in New Zealand. The second reason is its bigger population 
of 11.08 million registered voters (from 222 electorates) (Election 
Commission Malaysia, 2010) in the Electoral Roll which may make it 
difficult for the researcher to manage. The third reason is that the addresses 
are sometimes not updated and therefore do not reflect the current 
residential addresses of the registered voters. Thus, there is a high 
possibility that the intended recipient will not receive the letter. Having 
considered the limitation of using the Electoral Roll in Malaysia, the 
researcher decided to focus on the salary and wage earners who are subject 
to tax.  
 
The focus on salaried individuals is appropriate since they form the 
majority of taxpayers (54 percent) in the country (Inland Revenue Board of 
Malaysia, 2004).  In addition, the statistics show that about 23 percent of 
salaried individuals failed to comply with their tax filing obligations 
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(Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 2005).
55
 The sampling frame was 
carried out through public entities (inclusive of statutory bodies) and 
private entities engaging in the service industry, as summarised in Table 
4.1. These sectors were selected to further test if there is any significant 
difference with respect to fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour 
among public servants and their counterparts in the private sector. Since 
government agencies only engage in service delivery, it is inappropriate to 
obtain other industries in the private sectors (such as manufacturing or 
trading) to compare results. Hence entities in the private sector engaging in 
service delivery were  identified as the target.  
 
This study applied cluster sampling based on geographical area. There are 
thirteen states and three Federal Territories in Malaysia. However, for the 
purposes of this study, only  eleven states and one federal territory in 
Peninsular Malaysia were considered.
56
 A list of twelve government 
agencies selected from eight ministries
57
 was developed, based on the 
availability of departments in all of the states under this study, the number 
                                                 
55 Even though salaried individuals are subject to monthly Schedular Tax Deduction (STD), they are still 
required to submit their tax return forms. If, at the end of the year, the sum of  STD paid is lower 
than the tax liability, an additional amount of tax must be paid. In the opposite situation, a tax refund 
will be made by the Inland Revenue Board (IRB). 
56 A sample of taxpayers in Peninsular Malaysia is normally representative of the total population in 
Malaysia. Only a quarter of the total populations reside in Sabah, Sarawak and Labuan. Extending the 
sample selection to those states and a federal territory will incur more cost with respect to postage as 
they are physically separated from Peninsular Malaysia. Further, the main ethnicities in Malaysia are 
concentrated in Peninsular Malaysia.  
57 Malaysia has twenty five ministries. In this study, the agencies selected are representatives of eight 
ministries.    
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of staff in the departments and the possibility they will respond.
58
 Six 
private entities were then selected to closely match the government 
agencies as far as possible.
59
 These entities are also available in all states 
under this study.  
Table 4.1 
Sampling Frame 
 
Ministry and Government Agencies Private Agencies 
1. Prime Minister‟s Department 
a. Department of Statistics 
b. Pilgrimage Fund Board 
1. Banks 
2. Ministry of Agriculture and Agro-Based 
Industry 
a. Department of Veterinary Services 
2. Hotels 
3. Ministry of Entrepreneur and Cooperative 
Development 
a. Council of Trust for the Indigenous  
     People 
3. Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
4. Ministry of Finance 
a. Royal Customs Department of  
     Malaysia 
b. Accountant General Department    
c. Employees Provident Fund 
4. Telekom Malaysia Berhad 
5. Ministry of Health  
a. General Hospitals 
5. Private Hospitals 
6. Ministry of Higher Education  
a. Public Higher Learning Institutions 
6. Private Higher Learning 
Institutions  
7. Ministry of Works 
a. Public Works Department 
 
8. Ministry of Home Affairs 
a. National Registration Department  
b. Immigration Department 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 For example, the Royal Police Department has branches all over Malaysia but their heavy workloads 
might hinder them from providing responses to the survey.   
59 Even though the number of entities selected is skewed to the public sector, an equivalent number of 
potential respondents were selected from both public and private sectors. The reason being is that the 
number of individuals who are subject to pay tax in each public sector is generally lower than in the 
private sector. In addition to this, banks, hotels, private hospitals and private higher learning 
institutions could involve more than one organisation in each state.    
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4.2.4   Sample Size 
It is a common practice in research to use sample in order to make 
generalisations about populations. Ideally, samples are selected, usually by 
some random process, so that they represent the population of interest 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The choice of sample size is normally made 
after considering statistical precision, practical issues and available 
resources (e.g. cost and time). While there are various ways of determining 
the appropriate sample size (e.g. Alreck & Settle, 1995; Roscoe, 1975; 
Weisberg & Bowen, 1977), a formula provided by Yamane (1967) is 
expressed as: 
 
In this formula, „n‟ represents the sample size to be calculated, while „N‟ is 
the relevant population. The value of „e‟ (standard error) depends on the 
required confidence level set by the researcher. If the confidence level is 95 
percent, then the „e‟ value would be 0.05.60 Applying this formula in this 
study to obtain the sample size for New Zealand individual taxpayers of 
2.43 million would result in a recommended sample size of 400. When the 
formula was applied to the population of salaried and wage earners in 
Malaysia of 2.59 million, the recommended sample size was also 400.  
 
n = N/[1 + N(e)
2
] 
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Another reference for determining the sample size is offered by Krejcie 
and Morgan (1970). The authors provide a table for reference of the 
appropriate sample size (n) based on the number of population (N) as 
reproduced below.  
Table 4.2 
Population and Sample Size 
N n N n N n N n N n 
10 10 100 80 280 162 800 260 2800 338 
15 14 110 86 290 165 850 265 3000 341 
20 19 120 92 300 169 900 269 3500 346 
25 24 130 97 320 175 950 274 4000 351 
30 28 140 103 340 181 1000 278 4500 354 
35 32 150 108 360 186 1100 285 5000 357 
40 36 160 113 380 191 1200 291 6000 361 
45 40 170 118 400 196 1300 297 7000 364 
50 44 180 123 420 201 1400 302 8000 367 
55 48 190 127 440 205 1500 306 9000 368 
60 52 200 132 460 210 1600 310 10000 370 
65 56 210 136 480 241 1700 313 15000 375 
70 59 220 140 500 217 1800 317 20000 377 
75 63 230 144 550 226 1900 320 30000 379 
80 66 240 148 600 234 2000 322 40000 380 
85 70 250 152 650 242 2200 327 50000 381 
90 73 260 155 700 248 2400 331 75000 382 
95 76 270 159 750 254 2600 335 100000 384 
      Source: Krejcie and Morgan (1970, p608)    
The authors further stated that as the population increases (over 100,000), 
the sample increases at a diminishing rate and the sample size eventually 
remain constant at slightly more than 380. While the previous studies 
suggest to use the appropriate sample size of 400, the researcher decided to 
consider a larger sample size (of 2,500 in each country) considering the 
                                                                                                                        
60 A significance level of 0.05 has been established as a generally accepted level of confidence in most 
behavioural sciences (Hill, 1998). 
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possibility of the low response rates reported in mail surveys (Slemrod & 
Venkatesh, 2002; Tran-Nam & Karlinsky, 2008). 
   
4.2.5   Ethical Considerations 
Since this study involved human participation, approval from the 
University of Canterbury‟s Human Ethics Committee was sought prior to 
the distribution of the questionnaires. It was essential to obtain Human 
Ethics approval to confirm that the content of the questionnaires conforms 
to the relevant ethical standards and cultural values. This approval was 
mentioned in the covering letter sent to respondents. In addition to this, 
approval from Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister‟s Department of 
Malaysia, was also obtained to enable data to be collected in Malaysia. 
This approval was clearly stated in the covering letter sent to Malaysian 
respondents to encourage them to respond. A copy of the approval letter 
from the University of Canterbury‟s Human Ethics Committee and from 
the Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister‟s Department, are attached as 
Appendices 1 and 2, respectively.  
 
4.2.6   Pilot Testing 
Pilot testing, sometimes known as pre-testing, is viewed as an iterative 
process aimed at improving a survey instrument. In the process, the 
questionnaire may have to be restructured and some items may have to be 
rewritten to fit the research objectives.  At this stage, the emphasis is 
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placed on the appropriate wording in questions, clarity of instructions, and 
the like rather than to report results (Synodinos, 2003). Based on this 
understanding, the survey questionnaire was pretested in three-stages.  In 
stage one, experts in the field of taxation and research methodology in both 
New Zealand and Malaysia were asked to review and comment on the 
initial questionnaire. The questionnaire was then improved after 
incorporating their comments and suggestions. In stage two, the 
questionnaires were sent out to a small group of taxpayers, postgraduate 
students and high-school students for pilot testing in New Zealand.
61
 The 
involvement of high school students were considered vital particularly with 
regard to their opinions on terms or language used in the questionnaire 
since they were proxies for the actual taxpayers who mainly were high-
school leavers.
62
 Based on the feedback from the pilot testing, the wording 
of a few items was changed.  
 
Finally, in stage three, the survey instrument was translated from English 
language to the Malay language for the Malaysian sample. This translation 
process was performed with the assistance of both tax experts and language 
experts to ensure the wording and concepts used were equivalent to the 
                                                 
61 Taxpayers include academic and non-academic staff at the University of Canterbury, factory workers 
and professionals. Postgraduate students involved those with accounting and non-accounting 
backgrounds.  
62 I would like to thank the members of the Department of Accountancy, Finance and Information 
Systems (now known as the Department of Accounting and Information Systems) for their 
suggestion to include high school students in the pilot test.  
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New Zealand questionnaire and meaningful.
63
 In addition to this the 
reliability of the translated instrument was validated by pretesting the 
Malay version questionnaire among potential respondents (Synodinos, 
2003).  In doing so, the questionnaires were distributed to thirty salaried 
taxpayers in Malaysia for their feedback. Based on their recommendations, 
some of the items were rewritten. Copies of the final survey questionnaires 
in both the English language (New Zealand) and Malay language 
(Malaysia) are included as Appendices 3 and 4, respectively. 
 
4.2.7   Data Collection Procedures  
This section describes the procedures undertaken to gather data in New 
Zealand and Malaysia.  
 
4.2.7.1  New Zealand 
In New Zealand, the questionnaires were posted along with an 
accompanying letter and a postage-paid return envelope. The 
accompanying letter emphasised the research purpose, the guarantee of 
respondent anonymity, and the response deadline. A five-week return date 
was requested. Follow-up reminders (together with questionnaires) were 
subsequently sent with another four weeks for potential respondents to 
complete the questionnaires. To increase the response rate, strategies such 
                                                 
63 Tax lecturers and the officers from the National Institute of Translation, Malaysia, were given both the 
English and Malay versions of the questionnaires. Their feedback was then compared by the 
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as  attractive envelopes, well-written cover letters and reasonable length 
questionnaires, were adopted as suggested by Hair et al. (2007).  
 
4.2.7.2  Malaysia 
Unlike New Zealand, the distribution of questionnaires in Malaysia was 
made in person rather than by mail. This method was chosen not only to 
improve the response rate but also due to the lack of an appropriate source 
from which to obtain the contact details (that is, mailing addresses) of the 
targeted sample. The options to reach this targeted group are through the 
IRB database or via employers. The difficulty in obtaining access to the 
IRB database left the researcher with one option, that is to approach the 
employers and seek their assistance with distributing the questionnaires.  
 
The questionnaires were distributed to the potential respondents with the 
help of Human Resource Personnel or the Head of Department in the 
respective organisations. Prior to that, the researcher personally met up 
with the organisations‟ representatives to describe the nature of the study 
and discuss the number of potential respondents required.
64
 Similar to New 
Zealand, potential respondents were also provided with questionnaires and 
an accompanying letter emphasising the research purpose, the guarantee of 
                                                                                                                        
researcher.  
64 The representatives were requested to distribute about six to fifteen questionnaires to the employees in 
their organisations depending on the number of employees available and who met the criterion of tax 
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respondent anonymity and the response deadline. Follow-up reminders 
(with questionnaires), however, were not sent to the potential respondents 
as the representatives were hesitant to do so due to their busy schedules. 
Alternatively, telephone call reminders were made to the representatives 
requesting them to remind the potential respondents to return the 
questionnaires.
65
 In addition, potential respondents were given a University 
of Canterbury bookmark to encourage them to complete the questionnaires 
and subsequently increase the response rate (Dillman, 2007). The 
completed questionnaires were passed to the organisations‟ representatives 
who subsequently posted them to the researcher in a pre-paid return 
envelope. 
 
Different modes of conducting surveys among two different populations 
have been recognised in Dillman (2007) as a possible approach to 
collecting data. However, Dillman (2007) cautions researchers about the 
unintended consequence of measurement differences, especially when 
using mixed-mode surveys consisting of one survey which involves face-
to-face meetings between the researcher and the participants, while another 
survey  is carried out through use of the postal system or the internet.  In 
this study, such consequences may not be apparent as the researcher did 
not have direct contact with the sample population. In other words, the 
                                                                                                                        
filing experience. The approval from the Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister’s Office, was 
highlighted during the meeting to convince the representatives of the significance of the study. 
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surveys in both New Zealand and Malaysia are similar in the sense that 
there is no face-to-face meeting between researcher and the sample.  
 
4.2.8   Measurement 
This study incorporates Equity Theory into the well-established TPB to 
explain the influence of fairness perceptions on taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour. The proposed conceptual model also includes two additional 
constructs, that is, tax knowledge and tax complexity. To adequately 
measure these constructs, multiple items were developed using information 
from both theoretical and empirical literature in both taxation and studies 
on human behaviour. Before discussing the specific measurement of these 
constructs, this section explores the differences between formative and 
reflective measures, and discusses the second order factor, which becomes 
particularly important when constructs are defined at a more abstract level.  
 
4.2.8.1  Formative versus Reflective Measures  
Formative measures are measures that form or cause the creation or change 
in the underlying construct (Blalock, 1964). This is illustrated in Figure 4.1 
where the measures jointly influence the construct and the full meaning of 
the construct is actually derived from its measures. In other words, this 
suggests that the measures are not determined by the construct and thus the 
measures are not expected to correlate with each other. Hence internal 
                                                                                                                        
65 As a token of appreciation, all representatives were given New Zealand key-chains for their support.  
152 
 
consistency reliability is not relevant to validate the formative measures. 
Another attribute of formative measures is that they capture the conceptual 
domain as a group. Specifically, this suggests that formative measures are 
not redundant as they tap different aspects of the conceptual domain. The 
implication of this is that dropping one formative indicator from a 
measurement model could be damaging as the model may omit a unique 
element of the conceptual domain (MacKenzie et al., 2005).  
 
The opposite to formative measures are reflective measures which are 
commonly known as effect indicators. The measures are called „effect 
indicators‟ because they are reflecting the underlying construct they 
represent (MacKenzie et al., 2005). Figure 4.2 illustrates the reflective 
measures where the direction of causality flows from the construct to the 
measures. Unlike formative measures, these reflective measures are 
expected to highly correlate due to the fact that they all reflect the same 
underlying construct. Hence they should demonstrate high levels of 
internal consistency reliability. In addition, reflective measures are 
assumed to be unidimensional where the measures are in fact individually 
tapping the entire conceptual domain. This attribute suggests that the 
consequences of dropping a reflective indicator is less damaging than the 
consequences of dropping a formative indicator because they do not alter 
the meaning of the construct.  
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Figure 4.1 Formative Measures  
 
 
 
 
                            
                      Source: Adapted from Bollen and Lennox (1991, p306) 
 
Figure 4.2 Reflective Measures 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Source: Adapted from Bollen and Lennox (1991, p306) 
 
To help researchers distinguish between the formative and reflective 
measures, Jarvis et al. (2003) provide some guidelines which are 
reproduced in Table 4.3. The guidelines basically suggest that formative 
and reflective measures can be identified with reference to four criteria: (1) 
direction of causality between the constructs and its measures; (2) 
interchangeability of the measures; (3) covariation among the measures; 
and (4) similarity in antecedents and consequences.  
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Table 4.3 Decision Rules to Differentiate between Formative and Reflective 
Construct  
    
  Formative Reflective 
1 Direction of causality 
from construct to 
measure implied by the 
conceptual definition  
 
Direction of causality is 
from items to construct 
Direction of causality 
from construct to items 
2 Interchangeability of 
the indicators 
Indicators need not be 
interchangeable 
Indicators should be 
interchangeable 
 
3 Covariation among the 
indicators 
Not necessary for indicators 
to covary with each other 
 
Indicators are expected to 
covary with each other 
 
4 Are the indicators 
expected to have the 
same antecedents and 
consequences? 
Indicators are not required 
to have the same 
antecedents and 
consequences 
Indicators are required to 
have the same 
antecedents and 
consequences 
    
Source: Jarvis et al. (2003, p203)  
 
To illustrate the difference betweeen formative and reflective measures, 
Chin (1998a) provides the example of mental inebriation as a construct. In 
his example, the formative measures of mental inebriation would be the 
amount of beer, wine and hard liquor consumed, whereas the potential 
reflective measures might be blood alcohol level, driving ability, MRI 
brain scan and performance on mental calculations. For reflective 
measures, an improvement in the blood alcohol level measure would also 
imply an improvement in the MRI activity and other measures, since they 
are all meant to tap into the same concept. On the contrary, a change in the 
formative measures, for instance, an increase in beer consumption, does 
not indicate an increase in wine or hard liquor consumption (Chin, 1998a). 
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4.2.8.2  Second Order Factor 
More often than not, conceptual definitions of constructs are specified at a 
more abstract level, requiring researchers to present the model at the 
second order factor (Jarvis et al., 2003). At this stage, higher order 
constructs are modelled as causally impacting a number of first order 
constructs, which are measured by multiple indicators (Chin, 1998a). In 
other words, the constructs in the second order factor are not directly 
connected to any measured indicators.  
 
Based on the facts that a first order construct can be measured either with 
formative or reflective indicators, and those first order constructs can be 
either formative or reflective indicators of the second order factor, Jarvis et 
al. (2003) describes four possible options (as illustrated in Figure 4.3) in 
modelling the second order factor. In the Type I Model, it is assumed that 
both first order and second order constructs are measured in reflective 
forms. The Type II Model is one where the first order constructs have 
reflective indicators while they themselves are formative indicators of the 
underlying second order constructs. The Type III Model is the complete  
reversal of the Type II Model, where the first order constructs have 
formative indicators and they themselves are reflective indicators of the 
second order constructs. Another type of the second order factor is the 
Type IV Model, which has formative indicators for both first and and 
second order constructs. In addition Jarvis et al. (2003) also acknowledge 
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the mixed models contain a mixture of reflective and formative indicators 
at either the first order or the second order construct, as exhibited in Figure 
4.4. 
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Figure 4.3 Four Options of Modelling the Second Order Factor 
 
Type I  
Reflective First Order, Reflective Second Order  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type II  
Reflective First Order, Formative Second Order  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type III  
Formative First Order, Reflective Second Order  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type IV 
Formative First Order, Formative Second Order  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Jarvis et al. (2003, p205) 
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Figure 4.4 Mixed Models 
 
Type A  
Reflective First Order, Mixed Second Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type B 
Mixed First Order, Formative Second Order 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Schematic representation based on Jarvis et al. (2003, p204) 
 
While Jarvis et al. (2003) consider the possible combinations of the models 
(both at first and second order), Chin and Gopal (1995) consider two 
possible approaches in modelling the second order factor; that is, molar 
and molecular. The choice to model either as molar or molecular depends 
whether the the first order constructs are treated as formative or reflective 
indicators of the underlying second order constructs. If the indicators are 
formative the model is said to be a molar model. On the other hand  the 
molecular model is considered when indicators are reflective rather than 
formative (see Figure 4.5). One example of a molar model is  presented by 
a mother‟s ability to interact with, and monitor, any given child, where it is 
measured by the number of children in a family, illness of the mother, and 
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hours of maternal employment (Cohen et al., 1990). On the other hand, a 
molecular model is observed through an example posited by Chin and 
Gopal (1995), where the overall perception of an individual‟s health is 
measured by perceptions of pain severity and persistence, energy level and 
activity limitation.  
Figure 4.5 Molar and Molecular Models 
 
Molar Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Molecular Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Adapted from Chin and Gopal (1995, pp. 49-50) 
 
Based on the conceptual and theoretical framework, and the review of 
literature, the first order constructs in this study were developed to contain 
a mixture of both formative and reflective indicators. For example, out of 
seven dimensions (components) of fairness perceptions, three were 
measured with formative indicators while the remaining four dimensions 
were measured with reflective indicators. The second order constructs were 
all measured by formative components. For instance, fairness perceptions 
are set as the second order factor with underlying first order constructs of 
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general fairness, exchange fairness, horizontal fairness, vertical fairness, 
retributive fairness, personal fairness and administrative fairness. In view 
of the models set out by previous researchers (as described above), this 
study adopts the „mixed first order with formative second order‟ model 
(Figure 4.4, Type B) or a molar model.  
 
4.2.8.3  Model Constructs and Measures  
As discussed in Chapter 3, the proposed model of compliance behaviour 
has eight main constructs. These are fairness perceptions, tax knowledge, 
tax complexity, affective attitude, instrumental attitude, subjective norms, 
perceived behavioural control and intention to comply. These constructs 
are broad and complex, thus requiring a large number of items to 
adequately measure each of them. Appendix 5 sets out the name and code 
for the constructs, the component measures and the seventy item measures 
used in the questionnaire. The following section contains a discussion on 
the model constructs and the multiple indicators used to measure these 
constructs.  
 
a.  Fairness Perceptions 
The construct fairness perceptions is operationalised as a second-order 
factor measured with seven first-order components. The components are 
general fairness, exchange fairness, horizontal fairness, vertical fairness, 
retributive fairness, personal fairness and administrative fairness. These 
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components are further measured with three items each, with the exception 
of administrative fairness with only two items. Figure 4.6 provides the 
example of the first and second order measures of fairness perceptions 
construct. This two-factor approach was adopted to develop the conceptual 
model at a higher level of abstraction (Chin, 1998a) and at the same time 
focusing on the sub-elements or the details of the main construct. 
Figure 4.6 First and Second Order Measures of Fairness Perceptions 
Construct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  *GF1, GF2 and GF3R represent general fairness items. 
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were adapted from Gilligan and Richardson (2005). None of these items 
define the term „fair‟ to the respondents, leaving them to use their own 
interpretation of fairness. Thus, some respondents will develop perceptions 
differently from their counterparts due to their different understanding of 
fairness. However, the main purpose of this study is to gauge taxpayers‟ 
perceptions of fairness. If a definition of fairness is provided, respondents 
will utilise the definition in answering the questionnaires, which would 
defeat the purpose of this study.  
 
Since the fairness perceptions construct is multi-dimensional (see Bobek, 
1997; Gerbing, 1988; Gilligan & Richardson, 2005) and these dimensions 
do not tap into the same aspect, this construct is treated as formative 
following the recommendation by Petter et al. (2007). In addition to this, 
Petter et al. (2007) suggest that it is possible for a multi-dimensional 
construct to have a formative relationship with subsconstructs, where the 
subsconstructs consist of the mix of formative and reflective items. Having 
said that, this study measured three dimensions as formative and the 
remaining four dimensions as reflective. The formative dimensions consist 
of general fairness, retributive fairness and administrative fairness where 
the items used to capture each of them do not highly correlate with each 
other. For example, in measuring administrative fairness, taxpayers were 
asked about opportunity to correct errors in their calculation of tax liability 
and Inland Revenue consistency in the administration of the income tax 
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system. These two items capture different aspects of administrative 
fairness of the income tax system. Similar logic applies to general fairness 
and retributive fairness, which are subsequently measured as formative 
indicators. 
 
On the contrary, the remaining four dimensions, namely: exchange 
fairness, horizontal fairness, vertical fairness and personal fairness, were 
measured using unidimensional items that were expected to correlate with 
each other. For example, all three items used to capture horizontal fairness 
were related to the equivalent amount of tax for taxpayers with similar 
economic positions. In other words, these items are reflecting each other 
and thus measuring the same aspect of horizontal fairness. For this reason, 
the multiple item measures of exchange fairness, horizontal fairness, 
vertical fairness and personal fairness were regarded as reflective 
indicators. 
 
b. Tax Knowledge 
The tax knowledge construct is also operationalised as a second order 
factor and measured with three first-order components: general knowledge, 
legal knowledge and technical knowledge. As shown in Appendix 5, each 
component is again measured with two, three and four items, respectively, 
which makes up to a total of nine items. Similar to fairness perceptions, the 
tax knowledge construct is also considered multi-dimensional and thus 
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measured as being formative. At the item level, measures of legal 
knowledge are likely to covary and are thus measured as reflective. The 
other two dimensions, that is, general knowledge and technical knowledge, 
are regarded as measured with formative indicators. 
 
c.  Tax Complexity 
Another construct that is operationalised as a second order factor is tax 
complexity, which was measured with two first order components, namely 
compliance complexity and content complexity.  These components were 
in turn measured with four and three items, respectively. Since the 
component level measures of tax complexity are expected to not highly 
correlate with each other, the tax complexity construct is therefore 
considered to be formative. At the item level, the compliance complexity 
component is deemed to be measured with reflective indicators where all 
of its three items are expected to have high positive correlations. On the 
contrary, the content complexity component was considered formative 
since all measured items adequately encompass the different domains of 
the component.  
 
d. The Theory of Planned Behaviour 
The measures for the constructs of intention to comply, affective attitude, 
instrumental attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control, 
as stipulated under the TPB, are captured with reference to the two 
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hypothetical scenarios developed in this study. The scenarios are 
concerned with overstating business expenses and understating other 
income.  An example of the second scenario is given below:  
 
Sally is a full-time teacher with taxable income of $50,000 a 
year. As a hobby, she likes to make handicraft items during her 
leisure time. Her friends learnt about the attractive souvenirs 
and asked Sally to make some items for them. In return, they 
paid Sally $500 in total. Since then, she has received a lot of 
orders from her colleagues and other neighbours. As a full-time 
teacher, she did not have enough time to meet the orders on her 
own and asked assistance from her two sisters. She paid each 
of them 10 percent of the amount received. During that year, 
she made a net total amount of $10,500 out of her activity. 
Although she should declare all her income, she could really 
use the money by not declaring the $10,500. She is confident 
that the Inland Revenue Department would not detect this 
amount if she omits it from her tax return form since there is no 
record of the cash received. What would you do if you faced a 
similar situation in the future? 
 
Following the two scenarios, a few statements relating to all elements of 
the TPB were provided where respondents were requested to express their 
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opinions on the statements, based on a seven-point Likert scale. In 
addition, all statements were designed as the „direct‟ measures of the TPB 
where respondents were asked to indicate their overall attitude, subjective 
norms and perceived behavioural control in relation to the scenario in 
context. The use of „direct‟ measures was empirically shown to be more 
appropriate than the „indirect‟ measures (where respondents were asked to 
indicate their specific beliefs) if the study is about predicting intention 
(Ajzen, 2006; Francis et al., 2008). The use of multiple items to evaluate  
the TPB elements was also expected to produce a more valid and reliable 
index and consequently strong correlations among the variables (Manstead, 
2004).  
 
i.   Intention to comply 
The measurement of intention to comply as a dependent variable is 
described as the willingness to file the return form at the proper time and 
accurately report tax liability in accordance with tax law applicable at the 
time the return is filed (Roth et al., 1989).  
 
To measure intention to comply, three items were developed which 
objectively are confined to the intention to comply with the scenarios under 
study. Thus the items are all expected to measure the same thing and 
therefore are likely to co-vary with each other. For example, in the above 
scenario, the measured items for intention to comply simply focus on 
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whether the respondents will declare or omit the cash received. Even 
though intention to comply can be measured by only a statement, a mix of 
a few related statements will reinforce taxpayers‟ intentions to comply. 
Based on that  reasoning, the construct of intention to comply is deemed to 
be measured with reflective indicators.  
 
ii.    Affective attitude 
Affective attitude, which relates to emotional drives (such as happy, sad, 
guilty) of performing certain behaviour, is measured with three items. 
These three items are reflective in nature as they solely focus on 
respondents‟ attitudes towards compliance behaviour  prescribed in the 
hypothetical scenarios under study.  For example, in the understating other 
income scenario, the items asked were concerned with respondents‟ 
affective attitude whether they feel pleased or guilty to not declare other 
income received in their tax return forms.  
 
iii.  Instrumental attitude 
Unlike affective attitude, instrumental attitude is concerned with the 
cognitive consideration of whether performing a behaviour would be 
advantageous. In other words, instrumental attitude focuses on the benefits 
or drawbacks of complying (or not complying) with the tax obligations as 
described in the scenarios. To measure this construct, two reflective items 
for each scenario were developed and these are set out in Appendix 5. 
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iv.   Subjective norms 
The term subjective norms refer to a person‟s motivation to act in 
accordance to a referent‟s opinion when performing his or her own 
behaviour. For example, in this case of tax compliance, taxpayers might be 
motivated to comply (or not to comply) with tax obligations if their family 
or friends have complied (or not complied). To measure this construct, four 
items were developed for each scenario. These items are likely to co-vary 
with each other and therefore deemed to be reflective indicators (see 
Appendix 5).  
 
v.    Perceived behavioural control 
Perceived behavioural control suggests that a taxpayer‟s inclination to 
perform certain behaviour depends on the degree of control that he or she 
has in performing that behaviour. The construct was measured with five 
reflective items for each scenario. As would be expected for reflective 
constructs, these items should have high positive inter-correlations (see 
Appendix 5).  
 
e.  Demographic Background Variables 
The demographic details captured in this study include: age; gender; 
ethnicity; relationship status; education level; occupation; income level; 
source of income (employment sector in Malaysia); number of dependents; 
and geographic area. 
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Respondents‟ ages were measured in years. To obtain their age 
information, respondents were asked to indicate their age by choosing the 
age range that was applicable to them, namely: (a) under 20; (b) 20-29; (c) 
30-39; (d) 40-49; (e) 50-59; and (f) 60 or over. Gender was assigned a 
dummy variable of 1 for male and 0 for female. To capture the ethnic 
group, respondents were asked to tick the appropriate group that they 
belong to. In New Zealand, the respondents could be identified as: (a) New 
Zealand European; (b) Maori; (c) Polynesian; (d) Indian; (e) Chinese; (f) 
Non-Chinese Asian; (g) Other. In Malaysia, ethnic groups were either: (a) 
Malay; (b) Chinese; (c) Indian; (d) Other.  
 
For marital status, in New Zealand, the respondents were asked about their 
relationship status; either (a) married; (b) de facto; (c) civil union; (d) 
single; (e) other. Their status were transformed into dummy variables of 0 
for married, 1 for de facto, 2 for civil union, 3 for single and 4 for other. In 
Malaysia, a dummy variable of 1 was assigned for married respondents, 
and 0 otherwise.  
 
To measure respondents‟ education level, respondents were asked to 
specify their education level. In New Zealand, the level of education ranges 
from: (a) no formal education; (b) NZ School Certificate Year 11 or NCEA 
Level 1; (c) NZ Sixth Form Certificate Year 12 or NCEA Level 2; (d) NZ 
University Entrance Qualification Year 13 or NCEA Level 3; (e) Diploma 
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or Degree; (f) Honours Degree; and (g) Masters or PhD, following 
previous studies (Birch et al., 2003; Devos, 2006). In Malaysia, 
respondents were given three options, as either: (a) secondary level and 
below; (b) diploma or degree level; and (c) Masters or PhD. In both cases, 
the education level was transformed into dummy variables. 
  
Another demographic background detail that was requested from the 
respondents was their occupation. The respondents were asked to specify 
their occupation, such as teacher, doctor, and so on. 
  
Income level refers to the annual income earned by the respondents. In 
New Zealand, respondents were asked to tick the income range to which 
they belong, as either: (a) less than $20,000; (b) $20,001 - $30,000; (c) 
$30,001 - $40,000; (d) $40,001 - $50,000; (e) $50,001 - $60,000; (f) 
$60,001 - $70,000; (g) $70,001 or more. The income range is based on 
previous studies by Devos (2006) and Birch et al. (2003). In Malaysia, 
slight modification was made to the income range to suit the respondents‟ 
characteristics.
66
 The income range to which the respondents were asked to 
indicate is: (a) MYR30,000 - MYR40,000; (b) MYR40,001 - MYR50,000; 
(c) MYR50,001 - MYR60,000; (d) MYR60,001 - MYR70,000; (e) 
MYR70,001 - MYR80,000; (f) MYR80,001 or more.  
171 
 
In New Zealand, the respondents were asked to specify their main source 
of income as either: (a) salary/wages; (b) interest/dividends; (c) rent; (d) 
royalties; (e) self-employed; (f) government benefits; (g) other. In 
Malaysia, instead of asking about   their source of income, respondents 
were requested to state the employment sector (either government or 
private sector) they belong to. Because all respondents were from a 
salaried group, asking about their source of income would be of little value. 
In addition to this, both New Zealand and Malaysian respondents were also 
asked about their work experience. To capture this item respondents were 
requested to tick the appropriate box that matched their experience.  
 
Another demographic background variable is the number of dependents. In 
New Zealand, the number of dependents includes: partner, children, 
parents and grandparents. In Malaysia, the number of dependents includes: 
„legitimate‟ partner, and children of whom the respondents are financially 
responsible for. In both environments, respondents were asked to specify 
the number of dependents they have.  
 
To capture geographic area, respondents were asked to tick the region that 
they live in. In New Zealand, geographical area were divided into five 
groups: (a) Auckland, Wellington and Canterbury; (b) Waikato, Bay of 
                                                                                                                        
66 As indicated earlier, the sample which are relevant to this study are those with the monthly income of 
at least MYR2,500. Thus, setting the annual minimum income range of below MYR30,000 would be 
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Plenty, Hawke‟s Bay and Otago; (c) Northland, Gisborne, Taranaki, 
Manawatu-Wanganui, Nelson and Southland; (d) West Coast, Tasman and  
Marlborough; and (e) other. In Malaysia, all 11 states and a federal 
territory in West Malaysia were classified into four main groups: (a) 
northern region; (b) central region; (c) southern region; and (d) eastern 
region.  
 
In addition to the above details forming the respondents‟ demographic 
backgrounds, three questions relating to their tax filing history were asked. 
The respondents were asked about the number of times they have filed tax 
return forms, the most recent year that they filed tax return forms, and their 
experience dealing with the revenue authority.  Finally, the questionnaire 
contained four open-ended questions, giving respondents the opportunity to 
express their opinions relating to: fairness of the income tax system; tax 
knowledge; tax complexity; as well as their perceptions of compliance 
behaviour.   
 
4.2.9   Data Analysis 
This section sets out the proposed analysis to evaluate the survey data 
beginning with the non-response bias test and response representativeness. 
Next is a brief discussion of the descriptive analysis and the t-test analysis. 
This is followed by an introduction to the structural equation modelling 
                                                                                                                        
of little value to the respondents.  
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(SEM) and Partial Least Squares (PLS) analysis, together with their 
measures to evaluate the models.   
 
4.2.9.1  Non-Response Bias 
A non-response bias test was performed to ensure that there is no bias on 
the samples.  Benke and Street (1992) highlight that the popular approach 
to prove non-response bias is by comparing early responses to later 
responses or first responses to responses generated after follow-ups. If 
there are no significant differences between the two groups of responses, it 
can be assumed that there is no problem of non-response bias.
67
   
 
4.2.9.2  Response Representativeness 
One method of proving response representativeness is by comparing the 
demographic background of the responses with the entire population 
(McInnis, 2006). In this study, the responses in New Zealand and Malaysia 
were considered representative of an entire population if they reflected a 
similar distribution in terms of three criteria: gender, annual median 
income, and source of income for New Zealand  or work sector for 
Malaysia. 
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4.2.9.3  Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis provides preliminary ideas on how taxpayers in both 
New Zealand and Malaysia perceive their income tax systems, in relation 
to: tax fairness; tax knowledge; tax complexity; and tax compliance 
behaviour. In this analysis, basic features of the survey data are presented 
where the mean, standard deviation, variance, and minimum and maximum 
value for each item and construct are calculated. In addition, the frequency 
distribution is also determined. All these measures are obtained from the 
descriptive statistics available in the SPSS software.  
 
4.2.9.4  t-test Analysis 
Subsequent to the descriptive analysis, t-test analysis is carried out to check 
whether there is any significant difference in perceptions between the New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers. For this purpose, an independent 
samples t-test is performed using the SPSS program Version 18, where the 
p-values are generated. With reference to the p-values obtained, the degree 
of differences (whether significant or not) are determined, and 
subsequently a conclusion can be drawn whether to accept or reject the 
hypotheses in the study.  
 
 
                                                                                                                        
67 It is important to note that this test only provides an indication of a non-response bias (and not 
completely reliable) as there are other ways of proving non-response bias such as by comparing survey 
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4.2.9.5  Introduction to Structural Equation Modelling and Partial 
Least Squares Methods 
a.  Structural Equation Modelling 
SEM has now become very popular among social scientists due to its 
ability to perform path analytic modelling with latent variables (Chin & 
Newsted, 1999). Hair et al. (2006) claim that this relatively new statistical 
tool, which combines the multivariate tools such as multiple regression, 
path analysis, factor analysis and principal component analysis, actually 
originated in the first half of the twentieth century but only became widely 
used in the 1990s. Apparently one reason why the use of SEM is preferred 
among researchers is its greater flexibility to interact between theory and 
data (Chin & Marcolin, 1995; Chin & Newsted, 1999). In addition to this, 
greater use of SEM may be attributable to the four key characteristics of 
SEM itself, that is:  
(1)   the estimation of multiple and interrelated dependence relationships; 
(2) an ability to represent unobserved concepts and correct for     
measurement error in the estimation process; 
(3)   a focus on explaining the covariance among the measured items; and 
(4)  a theory-based approach, where strong theory is needed to specify 
relationships in the models, that is, confirmatory analysis  (Hair et al., 
2006).  
                                                                                                                        
results to known population parameters and double-sampling (Groves & Couper, 1998). 
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SEM consists of two components: a measurement model linking a set of 
observed indicators to a smaller set of latent constructs; and a structural 
model linking the hypothesised model‟s latent constructs (Hair et al., 
2006). Latent constructs are described as unobserved variables which are to 
be measured indirectly by two or more observed indicators. In the 
measurement model, the validity and reliability of these observed 
indicators in measuring the latent constructs are addressed. Once the 
validity and reliability of the measures in the measurement model are 
established, the relationship between the latent constructs can be assessed 
by path analysis to test the research hypotheses. The distinction between 
the measurement model and structural model can be depicted in Figure 4.7.  
Figure 4.7 Measurement Model and Structural Model in SEM 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Adapted from Vatanasakdakul (2007, p115) 
  
Notwithstanding the benefits of SEM,
68
 there are also constraints in the 
approach, particularly with the covariance-based SEM (demonstrated by its 
software such as LISREL, EQS, AMOS, SEPATH and RAMONA) that 
                                                 
68 There are two types of SEM, namely covariance-based and component-based. 
Construct 
A 
C3 
C1 
C2 
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Measurement 
Model 
Construct 
B 
Construct 
C 
A3 
A1 
A2 
B3 
B1 
B2 
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need to be considered (Chin, 1998a). The first constraint is the parametric 
assumptions where the observed variables are expected to be normally 
distributed and that observations are independent of one another (Chin & 
Newsted, 1999).  
 
Secondly, there is a sample size requirement. An inadequate sample size 
may result not only in poor parameter estimates and model test statistics 
(Chou & Bentler, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 1995), but also in the tendency to 
over-reject models, especially when the latent variables are dependent (Hu 
& Bentler, 1995).
69
  
 
The third constraint is due to the model‟s complexity where Mulaik et al. 
(1989) suggest that various model fit indices tend to be favourably biased 
towards simpler models. From a practical point of view, a complex model 
with a number of indicators approaching 50 or even 100 may slow down 
the software packages program (Chin & Newsted, 1999).
70
  
 
The fourth problem is the identification problem.  In a covariance-based 
SEM, the measured items of a latent variable should always be reflective in 
nature. An attempt to include the formative measures will be problematic 
because the covariance-based SEM attempts to account for all the 
                                                 
69 Hu and Bentler (1995) regard 250 or less as a small sample size. 
70 This constraint might be of less concern now with a faster technology available. 
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covariances among its measures. Likewise, if the researcher attempts to 
include measures that are in fact formative in the SEM and treat the 
measure as reflective, the resulting estimates will be invalid (Chin, 1998a), 
which in turn results in a misleading research conclusion (Cohen et al., 
1990). Similarly, MacCallum  and Browne (1993) clearly demonstrate that 
attempts to explicitly model formative indicators in an SEM analysis can 
lead to identification problems with efforts to modify them generally 
unrewarding.  Another problem with the covariance-based SEM is factor 
indeterminacy of which the case values for the latent variables cannot be 
obtained in the process (Chin & Newsted, 1999). As a result of this 
situation, the scores for the latent variables cannot be estimated to predict 
the observed indicators. Thus covariance-based SEM may not be suitable 
for studies with a predictive orientation.  
 
A final issue relating to covariance-based SEM is that it places great 
emphasis on having a strong theoretical foundation. Under covariance-
based SEM, it is expected that the analyses are performed using a strong 
theory with well-developed measures that have gone through a series of 
exploratory analyses (Chin & Newsted, 1999). This requirement under 
covariance-based SEM suggests that it might not be an appropriate 
technique when the theory is relatively tentative or when the measures are 
newly developed. In this instance the emphasis should be placed more on 
the data than the theory. 
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b.  Partial Least Squares  
Having considered the constraints under covariance-based SEM, a 
component-based SEM was developed. This approach originated in the 
1960s and 1970s by Herman Wold who proposed the solution to the 
multicollinearity problem, using the PLS regression (Rouse & Corbitt, 
2008). Unlike covariance-based SEM, which is concerned with model 
testing, PLS was introduced with the main objective being prediction 
(Chin, 1998b; Chin et al., 2003; Chin & Newsted, 1999). Under this 
approach, the PLS algorithm attempts to obtain the best weight estimates 
for each block of indicators corresponding to each latent construct. As 
such, it avoids the indeterminacy problem and provides a precise definition 
of component scores (Chin et al., 2003). The component score generated 
for each latent construct will then maximise the variance to explain the 
dependent variables. Also indicators can be modelled either in a formative 
or reflective mode (Chin, 1998b). 
 
PLS has also been gaining interest, not only due to its ability to model 
latent constructs under non-normality conditions (Chin et al., 2003), but 
also with its minimal demands on measurement scales, where it allows the 
use of categorical to ratio level indicators in the same model (Chin & 
Newsted, 1999). In addition to these attributes, sample size is not a 
constraint in PLS, where it has been proven to perform successfully with a 
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sample size of as low as 30, to a more complex model with 672 indicators, 
21 latent variables and 200 cases (Chin et al., 2003).  
 
To sum up, Chin and Newsted (1999) summarise the key differences 
between the covariance-based SEM and PLS, as reproduced in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4 Comparison between Covariance-based SEM and PLS   
 
    
 Criteria Covariance-based SEM PLS 
1 Objective 
 
Parameter oriented Prediction oriented 
2 Approach  
 
Covariance-based Component-based 
3 Assumptions  Typically multivariate 
normal distribution and 
independent observations 
(parametric) 
Predictor specification 
(nonparametric) 
4 Parameter 
estimates 
 
Consistent  Consistent as indicators 
and sample size increase 
5 Latent variable 
score 
 
Indeterminate  Explicitly estimated 
6 Epistemic 
relationship 
between a latent 
variable and its 
measures 
 
Typically only with 
reflective indicators 
Can be modelled in either 
formative or reflective 
mode 
7 Implications  
 
Optimal for parameter 
accuracy 
Optimal for prediction 
accuracy 
8 Model complexity Small to moderate 
complexity (e.g. less than 
100 indicators) 
Large complexity (e.g. 
100 constructs and 1,000 
indicators) 
9 Sample size Minimal recommendations 
range from 200 to 800 
Minimal recommendations 
from 30 to 100 cases 
    
  Source: Chin and Newsted (1999, p314)  
 
4.2.9.6  Justification for using PLS 
The discussion above provides the basis for justifying the use of PLS in 
this study. PLS was favoured over covariance-based SEM for several 
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reasons. First, PLS provides better prediction capability, which suits the 
objective of this study; that  is, to predict the tax compliance behaviour. 
Second, the data distribution in this study does not follow a multivariate 
normal distribution, which is required under covariance-based SEM, but 
not under PLS. Third, several constructs in this study are measured in the 
formative mode, which can fit in the PLS model but not in the covariance-
based SEM.  Finally, the use of PLS seems more appropriate in this study 
where most of the measures used are newly developed. The PLS software 
used in this study is PLS-Graph Version 3.00, Build 1126. The next section 
describes model evaluation under PLS.  
 
4.2.9.7  PLS Model Evaluation 
As PLS does not make any distributional assumptions other than predictor 
specification, traditional-based techniques (with parametric assumptions) 
would not be appropriate for significance evaluation. Alternatively, Wold 
(1980) argues that to be consistent, the PLS approach should apply 
prediction-oriented measures that are also nonparametric. For that purpose, 
several techniques were implemented to evaluate both the measurement 
model and the structural model. The measurement model assessment is 
crucial to establish the validity and reliability of the model, while the 
structural model assessment is important for the models predictive 
capability. The details on the techniques employed are discussed in the 
following sections.      
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a.  Assessing the Measurement Model  
Several statistical measures were adopted in order to confirm the validity 
and reliability of the Measurement Model. For simplicity purposes, the 
techniques are discussed in two subsections, entitled construct validity and 
construct reliability.  
  
i.     Construct validity  
Construct validity for the formative constructs can generally be determined 
with reference to the weight score and its corresponding significance level 
obtained from the bootstrapping procedure in the PLS. These measures 
indicate the extent to which each indicator contributes to the development 
of the associated construct. By contrast, for reflective constructs to be 
valid, they are required to meet the convergent and discriminant validity 
conditions. The constructs are said to be converged when the indicators 
loadings reach 0.707 (Chin, 1998b) and the t-statistics are 1.96 and above 
(Gefen & Straub, 2005). This rule of thumb, however, should not be rigid 
at the early stages of scale development, especially when there are 
additional indicators for that construct (Chin, 1998b). Average variance 
extracted (AVE) is another measure of examining convergent validity 
(Dibbern & Chin, 2005), with an acceptable threshold of 0.5 and above 
(Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). AVEs are automatically 
generated via the bootstrapping procedure in the PLS based on the 
following formula: 
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              ∑λi
2 
 
AVE = 
       _____________________ 
                                   ∑λi
2 
+ ∑(1- λi
2
) 
where λ is the loading of each measurement item on its corresponding 
construct. The AVEs of each construct shows the ratio of the sum of its 
measurement item variance as extracted by the construct relative to the 
measurement error attributed to its items (Chin, 1998b; Gefen & Straub, 
2005). 
 
To achieve discriminant validity, the constructs are assessed by examining 
the item cross-loadings and the square root of AVE (Gefen & Straub, 
2005). Item cross-loadings were computed in the SPSS program by 
correlating the latent variable component scores and other indicators 
besides its own block. To be valid, each block of indicators is expected to 
have higher loadings in its respective latent variables than indicators for 
other latent variables. Failure to meet this condition indicates inappropriate 
measures of the constructs and therefore requires the researcher to 
reconsider the measures. A comparison between the square root of AVEs 
and the correlations among the constructs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981) is also 
used as a means of determining the discriminant validity of the measures.  
In this case, the constructs are assumed to partly establish the discriminant 
validity when the square root of the AVE of each construct is larger than 
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the correlations of the specific construct with any of the other constructs in 
the model (Chin, 1998a; Gefen & Straub, 2005; Gefen et al., 2000).
71
  
 
ii.    Construct reliability  
As for construct validity, the reliability of the formative and reflective 
constructs should also not be assessed in the same manner, given their 
differences. As mentioned earlier, indicators of formative constructs 
measure different aspects of the conceptual domain and therefore do not 
expect to correlate. Thus, unlike reflective constructs which require high 
internal consistency among their indicators, such traditional consistency 
reliability measures are not applicable to validate the formative measures.  
 
Alternatively, formative constructs‟ reliability is normally  measured with 
reference to their multicollinearity status, where excessive multicollinearity 
implies an unstable model (Petter et al., 2007). In other words 
multicollinearity among formative construct items is not desirable. To test 
for the presence of multicollinearity, variance inflation factors (VIFs), 
condition index statistics and tolerance values are used. A VIF and 
condition index of lower than 3.3 and 30, respectively (Diamantopolous & 
Siguaw, 2006), and tolerance values of above 0.3 (Hair et al., 2006), 
suggest no multicollinearity problem, and hence imply a stable model. 
                                                 
71 There are no guidelines about how much larger the square root of AVE should be (Gefen & Straub, 
2005).  
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For reflective constructs, the reliability of the measures are normally 
demonstrated by high Cronbach alpha or internal consistency scores (Petter 
et al., 2007). However, this study adopts internal consistency scores, also 
known as composite reliability generated by the PLS bootstrapping 
analysis, using the following formula: 
    (∑λi)
2 
 
CR = 
       _____________________ 
                             (∑λi)
2 
+ ∑i(1- λi
2
) 
where λ is the loading of each measurement item on its corresponding 
construct. This measure of reliability is considered to be more accurate 
(Brown & Chin, 2004) because it is not influenced by the number of 
indicators (Hanlon, 2001). Another measure of reliability for reflective 
constructs is the AVE scales. The scales should exceed 0.5 (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981) indicating, “50 percent or more variance of the indicators 
should be accounted for” (Chin, 1998b, p. 321). 
 
b. Assessing the Structural Model 
Prediction-oriented measures, such as the R-squares (R
2
), path coefficients 
and the bootstrapping techniques, are used in this study to evaluate the 
structural model. All these tests which are nonparametric are used to be 
consistent with the distribution-free approach of PLS.  
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i.    R-squares 
The magnitude of the R
2
 for each dependent variable is one important 
measure to assess the predictive ability of the structural model in the PLS 
(Chin, 1998b; Dibbern & Chin, 2005). These values indicate the 
percentage of total variation of the dependent variable explained by the 
number of independent variables in the model. The interpretation of the R
2
 
in the PLS is similar to the traditional regression (Vatanasakdakul, 2007), 
where a higher values of R
2
 are desirable. In addition to the ability to 
predict the overall model, the R
2
 can also be explored to examine the 
impact of a particular independent variable on a dependent variable, known 
as effect size. The effect size (f
2
) values can be obtained based on the 
following formula: 
f
2
 = R
2
included – R
2
excluded 
   1 – R2included 
where R
2
included is the R
2
 of the dependent construct when the particular 
independent construct is used in the model; and R
2
excluded is the R
2
 of the 
dependent construct when the same independent construct is removed from 
the model (Chin, 1998b). Thus R
2
included is always the same, while R
2
excluded 
is generated by creating sub-models. Each sub-model is created by 
removing each path of the independent construct to the dependent 
construct one at a time. Once the f
2
 is obtained, the degree of effect can be 
determined with reference to criteria set out by Cohen (1992), where an f
2 
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= 0.02 indicates a small effect; an f
2
 = 0.15 indicates medium effect and an 
f
2 
= 0.35 indicates large effect.  
 
ii.    Path coefficients  
The path coefficient values indicate the strength of relationships among 
independent and dependent variables. To be considered meaningful  the 
path coefficients should be around 0.20 and ideally above 0.30 (Chin, 
1998a). However, a lower path coefficient does not necessarily indicate 
that the relationship is unimportant (Brown & Chin, 2004; Dibbern & 
Chin, 2005; Duarte & Raposo, 2010; Taylor & Todd, 1995). The 
significance of the path coefficients are checked by performing 
bootstrapping which is one of the resampling techniques.  
 
iii.   Bootstrapping 
Bootstrapping and jacknifing are two well-known nonparametric 
approaches to examine the precision of the PLS estimates. This study 
employs a bootstrapping technique because it is viewed as more efficient 
than the jacknife technique, which is an approximation to the bootstrap 
(Chin, 1998b).  Chin (1998b) further describes that in the bootstrapping 
technique, “N samples set are created in order to obtain N estimates for 
each parameter in the PLS model. Each sample is obtained by sampling 
with replacement from the original data set.” In this study, a set of 200 
subsamples were created for the bootstrapping procedure as suggested by 
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Chin et al. (2003). The bootstrapping procedure will then generate the t-
values which were used to assess the significance level of the coefficients.  
 
4.3       Interviews 
In addition to the survey instrument, this study involved interviews to 
provide more information to the data obtained through the survey 
questionnaires. The use of interviews is appropriate in obtaining either 
multifaceted or sensitive information, as well as understanding concepts 
which require elaboration (Hair et al., 2007). Since fairness perceptions 
and compliance behaviour are considered to be sensitive issues this 
approach appears to be suitable. In relation to the interview method, 
research in the social sciences has seen a range of interview approaches, 
including structured interviews, semi-structured interviews and 
unstructured interviews. In her book, Roulston (2010) provides the 
underlying criteria of each type of interview as shown in Table 4.5. With 
reference to the guidelines this study adopts semi-structured interviews to 
collect qualitative data. It is anticipated that this approach will provide 
richer and more accurate data to enhance the findings for this study.  
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Table 4.5 Range of Interviews   
 
   
Structured Interviews  Semi-structured Interviews Unstructured Interviews 
The interviewer follows 
scripted questions in a 
particular sequence. 
Interview protocol is used as 
a guide and questions may 
not always be asked in the 
same order; the interviewer 
initiates questions and poses 
follow up „probes‟ in 
response to the interviewee‟s 
descriptions and accounts.   
 
Both interviewer and 
interviewee initiate 
questions and discuss 
topics. 
The interviewee chooses 
responses from a range 
of fixed options that are 
coded quantitatively; 
responses are provided 
by the interviewer. 
 
The interviewee select own 
terms to formulate answers 
to questions; responses are 
guided by the interviewer‟s 
questions. 
The interviewee selects 
own terms to participate 
in free-flowing 
conversation. 
Asymmetrical structure. Asymmetrical structure. Possibly less 
asymmetrical structure. 
 
Data analysed via 
deductive analysis for 
hypothesis testing in 
multivariate studies. 
Data analysed via inductive 
analytic methods for 
descriptions and 
interpretations in interpretive 
studies. 
Data analysed via 
inductive analytic 
methods for descriptions 
and interpretations in 
interpretive studies. 
   
Source: Roulston (2010, pp. 14-15) 
 
4.3.1   Interview Guide Development 
Twelve questions were developed as a guide for the semi-structured 
interview sessions. These questions were formulated with reference to the 
topics under study, that is: fairness perceptions; tax knowledge; tax 
complexity; and compliance behaviour. In addition to this taxpayers‟ 
responses in the open-ended question part in the survey were gathered and 
examined to help the researcher with formulating questions. A copy of the 
interview questions is included in Appendix 6.  
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4.3.2   Sample Selection  
The participants comprise respondents who have voluntarily expressed 
their willingness to participate by filling in the consent form attached to the 
questionnaire package. They were expected to provide their particulars, 
such as name, address and telephone number in the consent forms, and to 
post these details with their completed questionnaires. Upon receipt, the 
consent forms were separated from the completed questionnaires to ensure 
anonymity of the respondents.  
 
4.3.3   Data Collection Procedures  
Interviews were conducted upon completion of the survey method. The 
potential participants who were identified from the consent forms were 
subsequently contacted  and appointments for the telephone interviews 
were made. Prior to the interview sessions, the confidentiality and 
anonymity of the respondents  was reiterated to encourage their openness 
during the interviews. In this study, the telephone interviews were 
conducted to enable the researcher to interview a number of participants 
across the two countries in a limited time and at reasonable cost. In 
addition, it was expected that the participants would be more transparent in 
the telephone interview sessions compared to the face to face interviews 
(Synodinos, 2003). The interviews took approximately fifteen to twenty 
five minutes per session to conduct - following the recommendations of 
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previous researchers (Lake & Harper, 1987; Synodinos, 2003).
72
 The 
conversations were recorded with the participants‟ permission to enable the 
researcher to transcribe them and analyse the data in the later stages of this 
study. 
 
4.3.4   Data Analysis 
Data gathered from interviews were analysed using thematic analysis, a 
method that identifies, analyses and reports patterns within data. This 
thematic analysis was performed in six phases following the step-by-step 
guide by Braun and Clarke (2006). The details of the phases are 
reproduced in Table 4.6.  
Table 4.6 Phases of Thematic Analysis  
  
   
 Phase Description of the Process 
1 Data familiarisation Transcribe data, read and re-read the data, note 
down initial ideas. 
 
2 Initial code generation Code interesting features of the data in a 
systematic fashion across the entire data set; 
collate data relevant to each code. 
 
3 Search for themes Collate codes into potential themes; gather all data 
relevant to each potential theme. 
 
4 Review of themes Check if the themes work in relation to the coded 
extracts (Phase 1) and the entire data set (Phase 2); 
generate a thematic map of the analysis. 
 
5 Defining and naming 
themes 
Ongoing analysis to refine the specifics of each 
theme, and the overall story the analysis tells; 
generate clear definitions and names for each 
theme. 
 
                                                 
72 According to Synodinos (2003), practitioners advocate the view that telephone interviews should be 
conducted within an estimated time frame of ten to fifteen minutes. While Lake and Harper (1987) 
comment that within the general population, a telephone survey can be longer but should not exceed 
forty five minutes.  
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6 Producing the report The final opportunity for analysis. Selection of 
vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis 
of selected extracts; relate back the analysis to the 
research question and literature; produce a 
scholarly report of the analysis. 
   
  Source: Braun and Clarke (2006, p87)  
 
All these phases were manually conducted by the researcher beginning 
with initial code generation. At this stage the transcribed data was divided 
into relevant codes that the researcher thought appropriate. This process is 
much easier since the researcher has familiarised herself with the data 
while independently conducting the interview and transcribing the data. 
Subsequent to this, main interview themes were captured, named and 
analysed to produce a report.  
 
The decision to employ thematic analysis in this study is not merely 
motivated by its simplicity and wide use in research (Boyatzis, 1998; 
Braun & Clarke, 2006; Roulston, 2001), but also the benefits the analysis 
can offer. For instance, Braun and Clarke (2006) had highlighted some 
advantages of thematic analysis, such as:  
(1)  flexibility of the method, which allows for a broad range of analytic 
options; 
(2)  accessibility of the results to the educated general public;  
(3)  possibility to emphasise similarities and differences across the data set; 
and  
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(4) ability to producing qualitative analyses suited to informing policy 
development.
73
  
 
4.4       Summary 
This methodology chapter describes the process employed to achieve the 
objectives set out in this study. The discussion was broadly divided into the 
two approaches of data collection employed, namely survey questionnaires 
and interviews. Detailed discussion on each approach, encompassing the 
instrument design, sample selection and procedures, was presented. In 
addition, the methodology associated with SEM and PLS for survey data 
analysis was also presented. In the final section, thematic analysis was 
discussed to justify the use of such analysis on the interview data. In the 
next two chapters, the results of the survey questionnaire data are discussed 
and analysed. 
                                                 
73 See Braun and Clarke (2006) for further advantages of thematic analysis. 
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Chapter 5 
Exploratory Analysis and Results of Survey Data 
 
5.1       Introduction 
As indicated earlier, an analysis and the results of the survey data are 
discussed and analysed in two separate chapters, namely Chapters 5 and 6. 
In this chapter, the emphasis is given to the exploratory analysis of the 
data, while Chapter 6 focuses on the regression analysis using Partial Least 
Squares (PLS). The exploratory analysis includes the response analysis and 
preliminary analysis of the data. This is followed by a t-test analysis to 
analyse the preliminary hypotheses developed in Chapter 3. Finally, the 
comments offered in the open-ended questions are presented.   
 
5.2      Response Analysis 
In this section, discussions on response rate, response demographic, 
response bias and response representativeness in New Zealand and 
Malaysia are presented.  
 
5.2.1   Response Rate 
5.2.1.1  New Zealand 
In New Zealand, the survey was conducted between September and 
November 2008. A total of 2,433 mail questionnaires were sent to New 
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Zealanders listed in the 2008 Preliminary Electoral Roll.
74
 The 
questionnaires were sent along with an accompanying letter and a postage- 
paid return envelope. The accompanying letter (see Appendix 7) 
emphasised the research purpose, the guarantee of respondent anonymity 
and the response deadline.
75
 A five-week return date was requested. To 
increase the response rate, follow-up reminders (together with 
questionnaires) were subsequently sent to an updated sample of 2,350 with 
another four weeks given to complete the questionnaires.
76
 Out of this 
sample, 71 questionnaires were returned non-delivered and 12 were 
returned as the addressees were no longer at the address, leaving the actual 
number of questionnaires received by potential respondents being 2,267. 
Over a nine week period, 234 responses were received, giving a response 
rate of 10.32 percent. The summary of the response rate is presented in 
Table 5.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 Even though the targeted sample size was 2,500, sixty-seven cases were found to have incomplete 
addresses.  
75 The questionnaires were sent to University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee for approval 
prior to their distribution. Their approval was mentioned in the covering letter sent to respondents.  
Copies of the approval letter and questionnaires are set out in Appendices 1 and 3, respectively. 
76 This figure is derived after taking into account the non-delivered questionnaires during the initial mail 
out.   
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Table 5.1 Mail Survey Response Rate 
New Zealand 
 
  Description  
Initial survey sample size 2,433 
Non-delivered after initial mail-out (83) 
Follow-up reminder 2,350 
Non-delivered after follow-up reminder (71) 
Total questionnaires delivered 2,279 
Delivered but the addressee is no longer at the address (12) 
Questionnaires received by the respondents  2,267 
Number of responses  234 
Response rate 10.32% 
  
 
Even though the response rate is considered low compared to the response 
rates reported in Evans et al. (1997) and Niemirowski and Wearing (2003) 
of more than 30 percent, it is still between the range of 6 to 16 percent as 
reported in the literature for global mail surveys (Harzing, 1997).
77
 In a 
review on various tax studies in taxation operation costs across the world, 
Evans (2003) suggests that the response rate for postal survey varies 
considerably from the lowest of 2 percent to the highest of 67 percent. 
Also, the response rate compares favourably with the response rate of 9 
percent reported by Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) who studied income 
tax compliance costs. A more recent study by Tran-Nam and Karlinsky 
(2008), who conducted an electronic survey among tax practitioners in 
Australia, also reported a lower response rate of 8.6 percent.
78
 
Furthermore, the absolute number of 234 is sufficient to provide the basis 
for thorough analysis. 
                                                 
77 It is important to note that these are the surveys which are sent from one country to the other country. 
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One possible reason for not completing the questionnaires is the subject of 
research itself (taxation) which is considered a difficult subject. This is 
based on the comments given by the sample in the blank response section 
of the questionnaire: 
 
“…unable to supply answers as I have little knowledge of taxes.” 
 
“…the questions are outside the scope of my expertise…” 
 
“…I do not have much knowledge on taxation, etc.” 
 
Another potential explanation for the non-response is the hesitancy of 
senior citizens to participate in the survey. As the sample was selected 
from the Electoral Roll (of which no age information is available), there 
are chances that the sample would include senior citizens.
79
 On the positive 
side, senior citizens would have more time to respond. However, the 
possibility of this group not responding is also high due to their age, as 
noted below:  
 
“…I am 86!! And wish to decline…” 
                                                                                                                        
78 In this study, the survey was sent through electronic mail to 1,998 tax practitioners with the help of 
CPA Australia. 
79 Although these senior citizens may have retired, their opinions of the income tax system are still 
relevant as they have other incomes such as interest, rental and dividend from their investments.   
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“…at 75 years, I am not up on this type of thing…” 
 
“…I am not going to participate as I consider I am too old to give relevant 
answers.” 
 
“…regretfully, owing to my age (87.4 years), I am too old to help with 
your survey…” 
 
Furthermore, the difficulty in obtaining responses may have been due to 
the lack of interest in the subject. This is particularly true when the request 
to participate in questionnaires and surveys has grown enormously 
(Harzing, 1997).  
 
5.2.1.2  Malaysia 
In Malaysia, the survey was conducted between February and May 2009. 
To be consistent with New Zealand, 2,267 questionnaires were distributed 
to the sample with the help of Human Resource Personnel or the Head of 
Department in the respective organisations (see Chapter 4, section 4.1.3 for 
details on sample selection).
80
 Prior to that, the researcher personally met 
with the organisations‟ representatives to describe the nature of the study 
                                                 
80 These 18 organisations were selected from various ministries and private sectors in Malaysia. 
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and discuss the number of potential respondents required.
81
 A letter of 
support from the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister‟s Office 
was supplied to the representatives to encourage them with respect to the 
significance of the study. 
 
Similar to New Zealand, potential respondents were also provided with 
questionnaires and an accompanying letter (see Appendix 8), emphasising 
the research purpose, the guarantee of respondent anonymity and the 
response deadline of a five week period. Follow-up reminders (with 
questionnaires), however, were not sent to the potential respondents as the 
representatives were hesitant to do so due to their busy schedules. 
Alternatively, telephone call reminders were made to the representatives 
requesting them to remind the potential respondents to return the 
questionnaires.
82
 As an effort to further increase the response rate, the 
potential respondents were given a University of Canterbury bookmark to 
encourage them to complete the questionnaires as suggested by Dillman 
(2007). Overall, 926 responses were received, giving a response rate of 
40.85 percent.  
 
                                                 
81 The representatives were requested to distribute about six to 15 questionnaires to the employees in 
their organisations depending on the number of employees available and meet the criterion of tax 
filing experience.  
82 As a token of appreciation, all representatives were given New Zealand key-chains for their support.  
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As anticipated, the response rate in Malaysia is significantly higher than 
the response rate in New Zealand due in part to the different approach in 
administering the survey.
83
 As described earlier, a mail survey was used in 
New Zealand, while in Malaysia, a personal delivery approach was 
adopted. Previous studies suggest the response rates for personal delivery 
surveys range from 28 to 50 percent (Dillman, 2007), as opposed to 6 to 16 
percent in global mail surveys (Harzing, 1997).  
Table 5.2 Survey Response Rate 
Malaysia 
 
  Description  
Survey sample size 2,267 
Number of responses 926 
Response rate 40.85% 
  
 
5.2.2   Response Demographics 
Tables 5.3 to 5.15 set out the profile of the samples in both New Zealand 
and Malaysia in relation to age, gender, ethnicity, relationship status, 
number of dependents, education, annual income, source of income or 
work sector, work experience, geographical location, filing experience, the 
most recent filing year and experience dealing with the Inland Revenue 
authority.  
 
 
 
                                                 
83 See data collection procedures section in Chapter 4 for details. 
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5.2.2.1  Age 
In New Zealand about 60 percent of the respondents are in the 30-59 age 
bracket (Table 5.3). Another 30 percent are senior citizens while the 
remaining 9 percent are below 30 years of age. Similarly, in Malaysia, the 
majority of respondents (84.7 percent) are in the 30-59 age bracket. It 
comes as no surprise that only one respondent is in the group of 60 or over 
as the mandatory retirement age for Malaysians is 58.
84
   
Table 5.3 Survey Respondents by Age 
 
     New Zealand  Malaysia 
Age  Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Under 20 3 1.3  na na 
20-29 18 7.7  132 14.3 
30-39 41 17.5  292 31.5 
40-49 51 21.8  320 34.6 
50-59 49 20.9  172 18.6 
60 or over 70 29.9  1 0.01 
Total 232 99.1  917 99.0 
Missing 2 0.9  9 1.0 
Total 234 100.0  926 100.0 
      
 
5.2.2.2  Gender 
Table 5.4 shows that male and female respondents are almost equally 
represented in both countries, although more so in Malaysia.  
 
 
 
                                                 
84 This mandatory retirement age is only applicable to public servants. However, they can continue to 
work within either the public or private sector on a contract basis. There is no specific retirement age 
for those employed in the private sectors. 
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Table 5.4 Survey Respondents by Gender 
 
    
 New Zealand  Malaysia 
Gender Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Male 109 46.6  458 49.5 
Female 122 52.1  459 49.6 
Total 231 98.7  917 99.0 
Missing 3 1.3  9 1.0 
Total 234 100.0  926 100.0 
      
 
 
5.2.2.3  Ethnicity 
The majority of the respondents (83 percent) in New Zealand were New 
Zealand European while Maori accounted for less than four percent (Table 
5.5). This might be due to the use of General Electoral Roll only and not 
the separate Maori Roll in the sample selection process. As anticipated, the 
majority of respondents (93 percent) in Malaysia are Malays as they form a 
substantial proportion of employees in the service delivery sector 
(particularly in the public sector). In contrast, Chinese and Indians engage 
more in businesses or professional firms, but those organisations are not 
covered in this study.   
Table 5.5 Survey Respondents by Ethnicity 
 
        New Zealand   Malaysia 
Ethnicity Frequency Percent  Ethnicity Frequency Percent 
NZ European 193 82.5  Malay 860 92.9 
Maori 8 3.4  Chinese 29 3.1 
Polynesian 1 0.4  Indian 23 2.5 
Indian 1 0.4  Others 7 0.8 
Chinese 5 2.1  Total 919 99.2 
Non-Chinese Asian 3 1.3  Missing 7 0.8 
Other 20 8.5  Total 926 100.0 
Total 231 98.7     
Missing 3 1.3     
Total 234 100.0     
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5.2.2.4  Relationship Status 
In New Zealand, 21 percent of the respondents are single while the 
majority have partners (either through marriage, defacto or civil union 
relationships). A similar pattern can be seen in Malaysia with 86 percent 
married and 13 percent single (Table 5.6). 
Table 5.6 Survey Respondents by Relationship Status 
 
       
 New Zealand   Malaysia 
Status Frequency Percent  Status Frequency Percent 
Married 143 61.1  Married 794 85.7 
Single 48 20.5  Single 124 13.4 
Defacto 28 12.0  Total 918 99.1 
Civil union 1 0.4  Missing 8 0.9 
Other 10 4.3  Total 926 100.0 
Total 230 98.3     
Missing 4 1.7     
Total 234 100.0     
       
 
5.2.2.5  Number of Dependents 
While the majority (60 percent) of respondents in New Zealand have no 
dependents, the equivalent in Malaysia is 11 percent; with about 30 percent 
of Malaysian respondents have three to four people under their care (Table 
5.7). This suggests that financial responsibility is much higher for 
Malaysian respondents than their New Zealand counterparts.   
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Table 5.7 Survey Respondents by Number of Dependents 
 
      
 New Zealand  Malaysia 
No. of Dependents Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
zero  140 59.8  99 10.7 
1 39 16.7  57 6.2 
2 34 14.5  114 12.3 
3 10 4.3  136 14.7 
4 3 1.3  133 14.4 
5 2 0.9  115 12.4 
More than 5 1 0.4  95 10.2 
Total 229 97.9  749 80.9 
Missing 5 2.1  177 19.1 
Total 234 100.0  926 100.0 
      
 
5.2.2.6  Education 
The majority of respondents in New Zealand and Malaysia are at least 
holders of a Diploma or Degree, at 49.6 percent and 64.2 percent, 
respectively (Table 5.8). While about 10 percent of respondents in New 
Zealand have no formal schooling qualification, such a situation is not seen 
in the Malaysian responses, as the minimal requirement for an individual to 
work in either the public or private sector is to obtain the Malaysian 
Certificate of Education.  
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 Table 5.8 Survey Respondents by Education 
 
       
 New Zealand   Malaysia 
Level of Education Frequency Percent  Level of Education Frequency Percent 
No formal schooling 23 9.8  SPM/MCE* 223 24.1 
Year 11 or NCEA 
level 1 
36 15.4 
 STPM/MHCE** 
99 10.7 
Year 12 or NCEA 
level 2 
22 9.4 
 Diploma or Degree 
453 48.9 
Year 13 or NCEA 
level 3 
31 13.2 
 Masters or PhD 
142 15.3 
Diploma or degree 77 32.9  Total 917 99.0 
Honours degree 13 5.6  Missing 9 1.0 
Masters or PhD 26 11.1  Total 926 100.0 
Total 228 97.4     
Missing 6 2.6     
Total 234 100.0     
       
* SPM is the abbreviation for Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia, which is equivalent to Malaysian 
Certificate of Education. 
**STPM is the abbreviation for Sijil Tinggi Pelajaran Malaysia, which is equivalent to 
Malaysian Higher Certificate of Education. 
 
 
 
5.2.2.7  Annual Income 
While a sizeable number of respondents (30 percent) in New Zealand earn 
NZ$30,000 or below, about a quarter earn more than NZ$70,000 a year 
(Table 5.9). In Malaysia, a large minority (46 percent) have an annual 
income bracket of MYR30,001-MYR40,000 (equivalent of NZ$13,622-
NZ$18,163). When compared to New Zealand, only 11 percent of the 
respondents claimed that they receive more than MYR70,000 (equivalent 
of NZ$31,786) a year.   
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Table 5.9 Survey Respondents by Annual Income 
 
       
 New Zealand   Malaysia  Conversion of 
MYR to NZ$85  Annual Income* Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Less than 20,000 45 19.2  na na Less than 9,082 
20,000 – 30,000 25 10.7  na na 9,082-13,622 
30,001 – 40,000 27 11.5  428 46.2 13,623-18,163 
40,001 – 50,000 27 11.5  210 22.7 18,164-22,704 
50,001 – 60,000 29 12.4  94 10.2 22,705-27,245 
60,001 – 70,000 17 7.3  67 7.2 27,246-31,786 
More than 70,000 58 24.8  98 10.9 More than 31,786 
Total 228 97.4  897 96.9  
Missing 6 2.6  29 3.1  
Total 234 100.0  926 100.0  
       
 *Annual income is in respective currency (New Zealand – NZ$; Malaysia – MYR) 
 
 
5.2.2.8  Source of Income/ Work Sector 
In New Zealand, the majority of respondents are salary or wage earners (at 
57 percent), followed by self-employed people at 12 percent (Table 5.10). 
Eleven percent derived interest or dividend income, and another nine 
percent are on government benefits. In Malaysia, respondents were asked 
about their working sector, of which 67 percent and 31 percent are in the 
public and private sectors, respectively.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 The conversion rate is based on average annual conversion rate in 2009 obtained from 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/average. 
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Table 5.10 Survey Respondents by Source of Income/Work Sector 
 
       
 New Zealand   Malaysia 
Source of Income Frequency Percent  Working Sector Frequency Percent 
Salary/wages 134 57.3  Public 619 66.8 
Interest/dividends 27 11.5  Private 290 31.3 
Rent 10 4.3  Total 909 98.2 
Royalties 1 0.4  Missing 17 1.8 
Self-employed 28 12.0  Total 926 100.0 
Benefits 22 9.4     
Other 9 3.8     
Total 231 98.7     
Missing 3 1.3     
Total 234 100.0     
       
 
 
5.2.2.9  Work Experience 
The majority of respondents in both countries have more than 10 years of 
working experience: 84 percent (New Zealand) and 68 percent (Malaysia) 
(Table 5.11). This shows that the respondents of the study have 
considerable work experience and have been contributing by way of 
paying tax for a sizeable number of years (especially in New Zealand).  
Table 5.11 Survey Respondents by Work Experience 
 
      
 New Zealand   Malaysia  
Work Experience Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Less than a year 3 1.3  21 2.3 
1 – 4 years 15 6.4  92 9.9 
5 – 9 years 17 7.3  175 18.9 
10 – 19 years 45 19.2  295 31.9 
20 years or more 152 65.0  334 36.1 
Total 232 99.1  917 99.0 
Missing 2 0.9  9 1.0 
Total 234 100.0  926 100.0 
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5.2.2.10  Geographical Location 
Table 5.12 shows that majority (57 percent) of the New Zealand 
respondents are either from the Auckland, Wellington or Canterbury 
regions. Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Hawke‟s Bay and Otago come second 
with 23 percent. In Malaysia, about 30 percent are from the northern region 
followed by the central region with 25 percent. Southern and East Coast 
regions each provide about 22 percent of responses.   
Table 5.12 Survey Respondents by Geographical Location 
 
       
 New Zealand   Malaysia 
Area Frequency Percent  Area Frequency Percent 
Auckland, Wellington 
and Canterbury 
 
134 57.3 
  
Northern states 275 29.7 
Waikato, Bay of 
Plenty, Hawke‟s Bay 
and Otago 
 
54 23.1 
  
Central states 
234 25.3 
Northland, Gisborne, 
Taranaki, Manawatu 
Wanganui, Nelson 
and Southland 
 
36 15.4 
  
Southern states 
205 22.1 
West Coast, Tasman 
and Marlborough 
 
5 2.1 
  
East Coast states 206 22.2 
Other 4 1.7  Total 920 99.4 
Total 233 99.6  Missing 6 0.6 
Missing 1 0.4  Total 926 100.0 
Total 234 100.0     
       
 
5.2.2.11  Filing Experience 
It can be seen in Table 5.13 that most respondents in both New Zealand 
and Malaysia have filed tax return forms more than five times, at 72 
percent and 54 percent, respectively. This indicates their experience with 
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the tax filing procedures and that their views and perceptions in this study 
should come from a solid base.    
Table 5.13 Survey Respondents by Filing Experience 
 
      
 New Zealand  Malaysia 
Filing Experience Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
Never 18 7.7  146 15.8 
Once 10 4.3  67 7.2 
2 – 5 times 36 15.4  157 17.0 
More than 5 times  169 72.2  501 54.1 
Total 233 99.6  871 94.1 
Missing 1 0.4  55 5.9 
Total 234 100.0  926 100.0 
      
 
5.2.2.12  Filing Year 
In addition to their sizeable filing experience, the largest group of the 
respondents also claim that the most recent year that they have filed tax 
return forms was in 2008 (Table 5.14). This indicates that they should still 
have a fresh memory of their filing experience when completing this 
survey (especially given the surveys were conducted in 2008 and 2009, in 
New Zealand and Malaysia, respectively).   
Table 5.14 Survey Respondents by the Recent Filing Year 
 
      
 New Zealand  Malaysia 
Year Frequency Percent  Frequency Percent 
2008 104 44.4  509 55.0 
2007 43 18.4  179 19.3 
2006 6 2.6  25 2.7 
2005 4 1.7  10 1.1 
Not lodged in last five 
years 
73 31.2 
 
65 8.2 
Total 230 98.3  788 85.1 
Missing 4 1.7  138 14.9 
Total 234 100.0  926 100.0 
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5.2.2.13  Experience with the Inland Revenue Authority 
Respondents were also requested to indicate the number of times they have 
dealt with the tax authority. While a high majority of respondents (66 
percent) in New Zealand have experienced dealing with the Inland 
Revenue at least two times, a slightly higher percentage is seen in Malaysia 
at 70 percent (Table 5.15). On the other hand, approximately 21 percent 
(New Zealand) and 15 percent (Malaysia) of the respondents have no 
experience in dealing with Inland Revenue.  
Table 5.15 Survey Respondents by Experience Dealing with the  
Inland Revenue 
 
      
 New Zealand  Malaysia 
Experience with Inland 
Revenue 
Frequency Percent 
 
Frequency Percent 
Never 48 20.5  136 14.7 
Once 29 12.4  125 13.5 
2 – 5 times 83 35.5  314 33.9 
More than 5 times  71 30.3  337 36.4 
Total 231 98.7  912 98.5 
Missing 3 1.3  14 1.5 
Total 234 100.0  926 100.0 
      
 
 
 
5.2.3   Non-Response Bias 
To test if there is any non-response bias on the samples, a t-test analysis 
was performed comparing the early responses to responses generated after 
follow-ups (Benke & Street, 1992). The late responses are used as proxies 
for non-respondents (Leong, 1980). The samples were compared on their 
perceptions on 20 fairness perception items. Forty samples from each 
group were selected to compute the mean, standard deviation and the two-
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tailed p-value. In order to decide whether the groups were significantly 
different from each other, the two-tailed p-value was examined.  
 
5.2.3.1  New Zealand 
The results from New Zealand sample are presented in Table 5.16, 
illustrating the mean and standard deviation of the early and late responses, 
together with the corresponding two-tailed p-value (full results of the test 
are available in Appendix 9).  The results show that the majority of the 
items have a p-value of more than 0.05, indicating that both groups are not 
significantly different. For two items (EF1 and EF3R), with corresponding 
two-tailed p-value of less than 0.05 but higher than 0.01, the result suggests 
that both groups are similar at 1 percent significance level. While the 
results provide an indication that there is no problem of response bias 
among the early and late responses in the New Zealand sample, it is 
important to note that they do not  guarantee that the sample is completely 
free of non-response bias considering the low response rate achieved.  
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Table 5.16 Mean and Standard Deviation of Early and Late Responses 
New Zealand 
 
      
   
Response N* Mean Std. Deviation 
p-value 
(two-tailed) 
 
 
GF1 early response 40 4.73 1.396 .704 
  late response 40 4.60 1.533  
GF2 early response 39 2.90 1.447 .465 
  late response 40 2.65 1.545  
GF3R early response 40 3.80 2.078 .129 
  late response 40 3.10 1.997  
EF1 early response 40 4.08 1.789 .022 
  late response 40 3.18 1.647  
EF2 early response 40 4.15 1.578 .947 
  late response 40 4.18 1.796  
EF3R early response 39 3.03 1.530 .047 
  late response 39 2.31 1.608  
HF1 early response 40 5.38 1.531 .827 
  late response 40 5.30 1.522  
HF2 early response 40 5.48 1.320 .408 
  late response 40 5.23 1.368  
HF3 early response 40 4.93 1.474 .678 
  late response 39 5.08 1.753  
VF1 early response 40 4.70 1.897 .384 
  late response 40 4.35 1.673  
VF2 early response 40 4.73 1.617 .165 
  late response 40 4.20 1.728  
VF3R early response 40 3.63 1.659 .848 
  late response 40 3.55 1.825  
RF1R early response 40 4.05 2.012 .433 
  late response 40 4.43 2.241  
RF2 early response 40 5.25 1.676 .557 
  late response 40 5.45 1.339  
RF3 early response 40 4.03 1.187 .685 
  late response 40 3.90 1.533  
PF1 early response 40 5.65 1.477 .534 
  late response 40 5.43 1.738  
PF2R early response 39 4.00 1.622 .078 
  late response 40 3.33 1.730  
PF3 early response 40 5.18 1.279 .741 
  late response 39 5.28 1.572  
AF1 early response 40 3.88 1.202 .457 
  late response 40 3.65 1.477  
AF2 early response 40 3.68 1.385 .406 
  late response 40 3.93 1.289  
     . 
    *The sample selected for each group was 40. However, some of the questions were left   
     unanswered, that gave rise to a sample of 39. 
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5.2.3.2  Malaysia   
A similar approach was applied to the Malaysian sample and the results are 
set out in Table 5.17 (refer Appendix 10 for full results). The two-tailed p-
values were utilised to determine the similarity of the groups. Overall, the 
results showed that both groups are not significantly different.
86
 This 
indicates that there is likely to be no bias in the Malaysian sample.    
                                                 
86 The two-tailed p-values for VF3R, RF2 and PF1 are less than 0.05 but higher than 0.01. This means 
that at 1 percent significance level, the claim that both groups are similar is true.  
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Table 5.17 Mean and Standard Deviation of Early and Late Responses 
Malaysia 
       
 
Response N** Mean Std. Deviation 
p-value  
(two-tailed)  
GF1 early response 40 4.33 1.730 .438 
  late response 40 4.60 1.411  
GF2 early response 40 4.53 1.710 .822 
  late response 40 4.60 1.215  
GF3R* early response 40 3.68 1.886 .718 
  late response 39 3.54 1.430  
EF1 early response 40 4.10 1.707 .221 
  late response 40 4.50 1.132  
EF2 early response 38 5.97 1.479 .069 
  late response 38 5.42 1.106  
EF3R* early response 38 3.11 1.573 .383 
  late response 39 3.38 1.184  
HF1 early response 40 3.75 2.157 .746 
  late response 39 3.90 1.861  
HF2 early response 38 3.95 1.859 .084 
  late response 39 4.59 1.292  
HF3 early response 40 4.55 1.694 .052 
  late response 40 3.85 1.477  
VF1 early response 40 5.80 1.305 .122 
  late response 40 5.35 1.272  
VF2 early response 38 5.89 1.448 .551 
  late response 39 5.72 1.123  
VF3R* early response 38 4.74 1.913 .046 
  late response 39 4.03 0.986  
RF1R* early response 37 3.86 1.988 .573 
  late response 39 3.64 1.386  
RF2 early response 38 5.82 1.036 .028 
  late response 39 5.28 1.050  
RF3 early response 38 4.66 1.665 .854 
  late response 39 4.59 1.585  
PF1 early response 40 5.68 1.269 .002 
  late response 40 4.80 1.224  
PF2R* early response 39 3.85 1.710 .484 
  late response 40 3.60 1.392  
PF3 early response 38 5.42 1.553 .425 
  late response 39 5.67 1.084  
AF1 early response 38 4.92 1.343 .802 
  late response 38 4.84 1.386  
AF2 early response 38 4.74 1.571 .208 
  late response 39 4.28 1.572  
      
 * The scores for these items were reversed to reflect the interpretation as indicated in this   
 study. 
 **The sample selected for each group was 40. However, some of the questions were left   
 unanswered, that gave rise to a sample of 39. 
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5.2.4   Response Representativeness  
One method of establishing response representativeness is by comparing 
the demographic background of the responses with the entire population 
(McInnis, 2006). In this study, the responses were compared on three 
criteria: gender; annual median income; and source of income (New 
Zealand) or work sector (Malaysia).  
  
5.2.4.1  New Zealand 
From Table 5.18, the survey responses reflect reasonably well the total 
population of New Zealand. For example, in terms of gender, the 
percentage for male and female respondents is 47 and 53 percent, 
respectively, which is comparable to the total population of 49 (male) and 
and 51 (female) percent (Statistics New Zealand, 2008a). The weekly 
median income bracket of NZ$769-NZ$961 in the survey responses is, 
however, higher than the population‟s median income of NZ$537 a week 
(Statistics New Zealand, 2008b). This deviation might be due to the 
computation of the population‟s median income which includes those with 
no source of income.   
 
With regard to source of income, typically wages and salaries are the most 
common source for the working age population of New Zealand, at 54 
percent. People receiving investment income follows this at 34 percent, 
while self-employed people only account for 12 percent (Statistics New 
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Zealand, 2008b).
87
 The survey responses demonstrate a similar pattern 
with 58 percent being salary and wage earners, followed by people 
receiving investment income at 17 percent, and another 12 percent self-
employed.  
 
In sum, comparing the survey responses with the total population on three 
criteria signifies no major differences. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
responses are representative of the total New Zealand population.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 The working age population in this study includes those of 15 years and above.   
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Table 5.18 Comparison between Population and Survey Responses   
New Zealand 
 
      Population Survey Response* 
Criteria Number Percent  Number  Percent 
Total number in 2008
a
 4,271,100 100 231 100.0 
Gender
a
     
Male  2,093,300 49.0 109 47.2 
Female 2,177,800 51.0 122 52.8 
Weekly income 
(NZD) 
    
 Median 537  769-961  
Source of income
b
     
Salary/wages 178,739,31
0 
54.3 134 58.0 
Investment 
incomes
c
 
112,576,14
0 
34.2 38 16.5 
Self-employed 38,512,890 11.7 28 12.1 
Others
d
  110,930,29
0 
33.7 31 13.4 
     
* Exclude sample with missing data.  
a
  The reported number for population is extracted from Statistics New Zealand (2008a). 
b
 It is possible for a person (from the population) to receive more than one source of 
income and so these percentages sum to more than 100 percent.
88
 While in the survey 
response, the percentages merely represent respondents‟ main source of income. Thus, it 
comes to no surprise that the percentages for the total population receiving incomes 
from investments and other sources were much higher than the percentages reported 
among the survey responses. To illustrate, a person who receives salary and also 
dividend as his/her secondary income will be considered as both receiving salary and 
investment incomes in calculating the percentage for the population. However, for the 
survey response, the researcher is only interested in the main source of income, which 
is, in this case, income from salary.  
c 
Includes income from interests, dividends, rental property and royalties. 
d
 Includes government transfers, other transfers, benefits, etc.  
 
 
5.2.4.2  Malaysia  
Table 5.19 sets out the comparison between the survey responses and the 
total population in Malaysia. In terms of gender, it appears that the survey 
responses (equally represented by male and female of 50 percent each) are 
comparable to the percentage reported for the population (51 percent and 
49 percent for male and female, respectively). The average monthly 
income bracket of MYR3,334-4,167 (equivalent to NZ$1,514-NZ$1,892) 
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is also in comparison with MYR3,686 (equivalent to NZ$1,674) in the 
population (Economic Planning Unit Malaysia, 2007a).
89
 In terms of 
working sector, however, the percentage of the survey responses is not 
comparable to the total population. The public sector was over represented 
and the private sector was under represented.  This is not surprising, given 
the method of distribution. However, a major concern of mail surveys is 
representativeness of the sample (Tran-Nam et al., 2000). Notwithstanding 
this, the samples can still be considered representative with one or two 
minor and unimportant exceptions (Evans et al., 1996, pp. 103-105).  
Hence, based on these three criteria, the results indicate that the survey 
responses are to a reasonable degree representative of the total population.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
88 The population number is calculated based on the total population (3,291,700) aged 15 years and 
above (Statistics New Zealand, 2008b). 
89 The conversion rate is based on average annual conversion rate of 0.45409 in 2009 obtained from 
http://www.oanda.com/currency/average. 
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Table 5.19 Comparison between Population and Survey Responses   
Malaysia 
 
      Population Survey Response* 
Criteria Number Percent  Number  Percent 
Total number in 2008a 27,728,700 100.0 917 100.0 
Genderb     
Male  14,141,637 51.0 458 50.0 
Female 13,587,063 49.0 459 50.0 
Average monthly income 
(MYR) 
3,686c 
(NZ$1,674)  
 3,334-4,167 
(NZ$1,514-NZ$1,892) 
 
Working Sector   909 100.0 
Public 1,244,365d 47.9 619 68.1 
Private 1,353,400e 52.1 290 31.9 
     
* Exclude sample with missing data.  
a
  The reported number for the population is extracted from the (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, 2008a).  
b
 This figure is derived based on the ratio of 104 males for every 100 females. 
c 
This is the mean household income for the year 2007, obtained from the Distribution 
Section, Economic Planning Unit, Malaysia (Economic Planning Unit Malaysia, 2007a). 
d 
The reported number for the population is extracted from the Annual Report of the Public 
Service Department Malaysia (2008). 
e 
This figure is derived by adding the number of employees in the services sector, such as 
hotels and restaurants, transportation and communication, financial institutions, 
education and health and social works. This 2008 data is obtained from Manpower and 
Social Statistics Division, Department of Statistics Malaysia (Department of Statistics 
Malaysia, 2008b). 
 
To conclude, the examination on the response characteristics demonstrates 
that not only do the samples in New Zealand and Malaysia have no 
observable problem of non-response bias, but also they are largely 
representative of the total populations. These rich and diverse samples 
should therefore provide sufficient variance for testing the proposed model 
and increase the generalisability of the study findings.  
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5.3       Preliminary Analysis 
The preliminary analysis involves two phases; that is, missing value 
analysis and descriptive analysis.  
 
5.3.1   Missing Value Analysis 
A preliminary analysis on missing data was carried out to produce clean 
data for the proposed model analysis. This is essential in order to eliminate 
any outlying responses that may generate invalid results (Alreck & Settle, 
1995).  
 
5.3.1.1  New Zealand 
Upon reviewing the New Zealand data, five responses were identified with 
missing values of more than 10 percent and thus deleted as suggested by 
Hair et al. (2006). Further Cohen (1992) recommend that cases with 
missing data for the dependent variable should be deleted from the 
regression analysis. This is to avoid any artificial increase in relationships 
with independent variables (Hair et al., 2006). Applying this suggested 
approach in the structural equation modelling (SEM), which involves 
multiple dependent constructs, (with each construct usually measured with 
several indicators), cases that have missing values for all indicators of one 
or more constructs in the model were deleted (Venaik, 1999). Based on this 
criterion, another 10 responses were deleted, leaving the final sample of 
219 for further analysis.  
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5.3.1.2  Malaysia  
A similar approach was carried out on the Malaysian responses, resulting 
in the deletion of: (1) 65 cases due to missing data of more than 10 percent; 
(2) five cases of suspected duplicated copies; and (3) another four cases, 
following the recommendations of Cohen (1992) and Hair et al. (2006). 
Subsequent to the data examination, 852 responses were finally used for 
the analysis.  
 
After this initial screening, leaving 219 and 852 responses in New Zealand 
and Malaysia, respectively, and with 70 indicators for each case, 
approximately two to four percent had missing values. The Expected 
Maximisation (EM) approach was selected to replace these missing values. 
This approach uses the estimation of the means, the covariance matrix and 
the correlation of quantitative variables with missing values, using an 
iterative process. According to Pallant (2005), this method is generally 
superior to listwise, pairwise and mean substitution approaches, 
particularly with  small sample sizes (less than 250) and large amounts of 
missing data (Hair et al., 2006).  
 
5.3.2   Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive statistics are normally used to describe the basic features of the 
data. Thus, the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value 
for each indicator were obtained through descriptive statistics in SPSS. The 
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same measures for each construct were also checked. Tables 5.20 to 5.27 
outline the statistics by each construct showing sufficient range and 
variance. The column labelled “measures” includes the name of the 
construct (in bold) and the respective indicators as per questionnaire. The 
revealed scores span across the entire 7-point Likert scale.  
 
5.3.2.1  New Zealand 
a. Fairness Perceptions 
Table 5.20 presents the descriptive statistics on fairness perceptions. The 
higher the mean reflects the fairer perceptions on the tax system, and vice 
versa. From Table 5.20, it indicates that horizontal fairness was the only 
fairness dimension with a mean of more than 5.0 for all its indicators, 
which consequently results in higher mean for the construct „horizontal 
fairness‟ itself, at 5.39. This suggests that the respondents overwhelmingly 
agreed that the current tax system has equally treated the taxpayers with 
similar levels of income. Administrative fairness had mean values for both 
indicators of below 4.0 (which results in low mean value of 3.86 for the 
construct), suggesting that the respondents perceived the administration of 
the tax system currently as unfair. For general fairness and exchange 
fairness, the perceptions on fairness indicators were mixed but leaning 
towards negative judgments, as opposed to vertical fairness, retributive 
fairness and personal fairness, which were more inclined to positive 
judgments. These observations were confirmed with the mean values of the 
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constructs, which indicate similar results. For example, the mean values of 
the constructs general fairness and exchange fairness were 3.60 and 3.65, 
respectively, indicating respondents‟ negative perceptions of fairness.  
Table 5.20 Descriptive Statistics on Fairness Perceptions 
New Zealand 
 
       
Measures  Code N Min Max Mean Std.  
Dev. 
General fairness  GF 219 1 7 3.60 1.134 
I believe the government utilizes a 
reasonable amount of tax revenue to 
achieve social goals, such as the provision 
of benefits for low income families. 
 
GF1 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.59 
 
1.505 
I believe everyone pays their fair share of 
income tax under the current income tax 
system 
GF2 219 1 7 3.03 1.617 
I think the government spends too much 
tax revenue on unnecessary welfare 
assistance.* 
GF3R 219 1 7 3.23 1.943 
Exchange fairness EF 219 1 7 3.65 1.194 
I receive fair value from the government 
in return for my income tax paid (e.g. 
benefits)  
EF1 219 1 7 3.70 1.737 
It is fair that low-income earners receive 
more benefits from the government 
compared to high-income earners. 
 
EF2 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.44 
 
1.643 
The income taxes that I have to pay are 
high considering the benefits I receive 
from the government.* 
EF3R 219 1 7 2.86 1.595 
Horizontal fairness HF 219 1 7 5.39 1.162 
It is fair for individuals with similar 
amounts of income to pay a similar 
amount of income tax. 
HF1 219 1 7 5.51 1.469 
I believe it is fair for me to pay a similar 
share of income tax compared with other 
taxpayers earning an equivalent amount 
of income. 
 
HF2 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
5.54 
 
1.257 
It is fair that „equals before tax are equals 
after tax‟. For example, if a person 
earning $100,000 before tax pays $20,000 
tax, everyone earning $100,000 income 
before tax should be left with $80,000 
after tax. 
 
HF3 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
5.16 
 
1.632 
Vertical fairness  VF 219 1 7 4.38 1.318 
It is fair that high-income earners are 
subject to tax at progressively higher tax 
rates than low-income earners. 
VF1 219 1 7 4.72 1.769 
It is fair that low-income earners are 
taxed at a lower rate than middle-income 
earners. 
VF2 219 1 7 4.71 1.590 
The share of the total income taxes paid 
by high-income earners is much too 
high.*  
 
VF3R 219 1 7 3.77 1.666 
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Retributive fairness RF 219 1 7 4.58 1.033 
It is fair that individuals who deliberately 
evade paying their taxes should be 
penalised with the same amount of 
penalty regardless of the amount of tax 
evaded.*  
 
RF1R 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.24 
 
2.130 
To be fair, the degree of punishment for 
evading tax should depend on the degree 
of non-compliance.  
RF2 219 1 7 5.53 1.319 
I believe the initial late payment penalty 
on the unpaid tax, imposed on non-
compliant taxpayers under the current tax 
system, is fair.  
 
RF3 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.03 
 
1.387 
Personal fairness  PF 219 1 7 4.71 1.059 
I believe that I pay my fair share of the 
tax burden under the current income tax 
system. 
PF1 219 1 7 5.32 1.747 
Compared to other taxpayers, I pay more 
than my fair share of income tax.*  
PF2R 219 1 7 3.64 1.596 
Middle-income earners pay their fair 
share of income tax. 
PF3 219 1 7 5.27 1.401 
Administrative fairness  AF 219 1 7 3.86 1.104 
There are a number of ways available to 
me to correct errors in the calculation of 
my tax liability, if necessary, at no 
additional cost.  
 
AF1 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.84 
 
1.356 
The administration of the income tax 
system by the Inland Revenue 
Department is consistent across years and 
taxpayers. 
 
AF2 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.95 
 
1.350 
       
* The scores for these items were reversed to reflect the interpretation as indicated in this 
study. 
 
b. Tax Knowledge and Tax Complexity 
Descriptive statistics with regard to perceptions on taxpayers‟ tax 
knowledge and complexity of the tax system are presented in Table 5.21. 
To interpret the data, a higher mean value indicates better knowledge of tax 
but less complexity in the tax system. Overall, respondents perceived 
themselves as having good knowledge of tax except in one technical 
knowledge item, which had a slightly lower mean value. In relation to 
complexity of the tax system the perceptions on indicators for both 
complexity dimensions were mixed. For content complexity, mean values 
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for each indicator (and the construct) of 4.0 and below showed that 
generally respondents perceived the content of the tax system as complex. 
With regard to compliance complexity, two of the three indicators had 
mean values below 4.0, suggesting negative perceptions on compliance 
complexity. However, observing the mean value of the construct (of 4.12) 
indicates better perceptions. These results suggest that even though 
respondents claimed that much effort was needed to understand and 
maintain relevant records to comply with their tax obligations, they seemed 
to have no problems with completing and filing their tax return forms.   
Table 5.21 Descriptive Statistics on Tax Knowledge and Tax Complexity 
New Zealand 
 
       
Measures  Code N Min Max Mean Std.  
Dev. 
General knowledge GK 219 1 7 5.71 1.069 
The income tax system is a legitimate 
way for the government to collect 
revenue to manage an economy. 
GK1 219 2 7 5.80 1.190 
To my knowledge, individuals are 
subject to a single flat rate of income tax 
under the current tax system.*  
GK2R 219 1 7 5.66 1.650 
Legal knowledge LK 219 1 7 5.62 0.911 
As far as I am aware, non-compliant 
taxpayers can be imprisoned, if found 
guilty of evading tax. 
LK1 219 1 7 5.14 1.412 
Similar to other criminal offences, I 
believe that individuals can also be 
prosecuted for not complying with the 
Income Tax Act. 
 
LK2 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
5.79 
 
1.299 
I believe that I do not have to abide by 
the deadline for the submission of tax 
return form (s) (in case of having other 
income such as rental and business 
income), as the deadline is only a 
guideline and does not result in 
penalties.* 
 
 
LK3R 
 
 
219 
 
 
1 
 
 
7 
 
 
5.93 
 
 
 
 
1.444 
Technical knowledge TK 219 1 7 4.77 0.811 
As far as I am aware, everyone who 
earns income sourced in this country is 
taxable, regardless of whether that 
person is resident or not. 
 
TK1 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
5.61 
 
1.527 
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I am sure that I am not required to file a 
tax return on interest income that I earn 
from money deposited in a bank account 
in New Zealand as it will be subject to 
income tax at source. 
 
TK2 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.09 
 
2.211 
To my knowledge, I can deduct all 
personal expenses in calculating my tax 
liability.* 
TK3R 219 1 7 5.56 1.689 
I have little idea about the deductions 
that I can claim as a taxpayer in the 
computation of my tax liability.* 
TK4R 219 1 7 3.84 1.943 
Content complexity CT 219 1 7 3.85 1.244 
I think the term used in tax publications 
(eg. IRD guide books) and in tax return 
forms are difficult for people like me to 
understand.* 
 
CT1R 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.00 
 
1.811 
The sentences and wording in the 
Individual Income Tax Return Guide 
(IR3G) are lengthy and not user-
friendly.* 
 
CT2R 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.86 
 
1.579 
The rules related to individual income 
tax are clear. 
CT3  1 7 4.01 1.456 
Most of the time I need to refer to others 
for assistance in dealing with tax 
matters.* 
CT4R 219 1 7 3.57 1.913 
Compliance complexity CM 219 1 7 4.12 1.200 
I do not have a problem with completing 
and filing the tax return form(s), if they 
are required. 
CM1 219 1 7 4.87 1.754 
I find it tedious to maintain all my 
relevant records for the whole year for 
tax purposes (if I have to complete the 
tax return form(s)).* 
 
CM2R 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.76 
 
1.782 
I do not have to make a lot of effort to 
understand the explanations given in 
Inland Revenue Department guide 
books and other similar explanatory 
material. 
 
CM3 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.74 
 
1.598 
       
  *The scores for these items were reversed to reflect the interpretation as indicated in this   
   study. 
 
 
c.  Compliance Behaviour 
Table 5.22 provides an overview of taxpayers‟ compliance based on the 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB). The respondents were asked to 
express their opinion on a non-compliant hypothetical scenario relating to 
overstating business expenses of $2,500 in tax return forms. To interpret 
the data, higher mean values in intention, attitude and subjective norms 
indicate higher compliance. On the contrary, for perceived behavioural 
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control, higher mean values reflect higher control on non-compliance, 
which subsequently results in low compliance. Based on these 
interpretations, the results in Table 5.22 (both at indicator or construct 
level) demonstrate that the respondents were likely to comply with their tax 
obligations, except when the instrumental attitude was involved. This 
suggests that respondents might not comply with their tax obligations when 
cognitive considerations (whether beneficial or not) of complying with tax 
obligations are taken into consideration.  
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Table 5.22 Descriptive Statistics on Theory of Planned Behaviour Items 
New Zealand (Scenario 1) 
 
       
Measures  Code N Min Max Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Intention IND 219 1 7 5.83 1.363 
I would claim the full deduction of $11,500, 
including the amount paid for my family 
trip.* 
IND1R 219 1 7 5.82 1.667 
I would not attempt to overstate the business 
expenses by $2,500. 
IND2 219 1 7 5.74 1.761 
I would only claim a deduction for the 
actual amount spent for business purposes. 
IND3 219 1 7 5.98 1.473 
Affective Attitude AFD 219 1 7 5.61 1.425 
I would be upset if I overstated the business 
expenses by $2,500.  
AFD1 219 1 7 5.31 1.769 
I would feel guilty if I overstated the 
business expenses by $2,500. 
AFD2 219 1 7 5.67 1.631 
I would feel pleased if I overstated the 
business expenses by $2,500.* 
AFD3R 219 1 7 5.96 1.369 
Instrumental attitude ISD 219 1 7 3.43 1.235 
The likelihood of being audited by the 
Inland Revenue Department is low. * 
ISD1R 219 1 7 4.00 1.540 
It would be financially beneficial for me to 
overstate the business expenses by $2,500.* 
ISD2R 219 1 7 2.90 1.765 
Subjective norms SND 219 1 7 5.03 1.360 
My family and peers would think that I 
should overstate the business expenses by 
$2,500.* 
SND1R 219 1 7 4.84 1.801 
My family and peers would think that I 
should only claim the actual business 
expenses. 
SND2 219 1 7 5.26 1.631 
My family and peers would approve of my 
decision to overstate the business expenses 
by $2,500.* 
SND3R 219 1 7 5.15 1.603 
My family and peers would not overstate the 
business expenses if faced with a similar 
situation.  
SND4 219 1 7 4.95 1.635 
Perceived behavioural control  PBD 219 1 7 3.15 1.314 
With my tax knowledge, skills and 
resources, it would be very easy for me to 
overstate the business expenses by $2,500 
successfully. 
 
PBD1 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.40 
 
1.790 
Due to my limited tax knowledge, skills and 
resources, it is hard for me to overstate the 
business expenses by $2,500 successfully.* 
 
PBD2R 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.62 
 
1.812 
I would successfully overstate the business 
expenses in my tax return form if I wanted 
to.  
PBD3 219 1 7 3.16 1.819 
With my tax knowledge, skills and 
resources, I would have no difficulty in 
overstating the business expenses by $2,500 
successfully. 
 
PBD4 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.10 
 
1.742 
There are no barriers that would prevent me 
from overstating the business expenses by 
$2,500 successfully. 
 
PBD5 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
2.48 
 
1.609 
       
*The scores for these items were reversed to reflect the interpretation as indicated in this 
study. 
 
Table 5.23 concerns another hypothetical tax compliance scenario relating 
to understating other income in tax return forms. Using a similar 
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interpretation of the mean values, the results generally reveal a comparable 
trend of compliance behaviour to the previous scenario. However, a closer 
examination suggests that the degree of compliance (based on the mean 
values), was moderately lower in this scenario. For instance, the mean 
values for the items measuring intention to comply were in the range of 
4.64 to 4.74, compared to the mean values of closer to 6.0 in Scenario 1. 
Obviously, mean values of this construct also indicate the difference with 
5.83 and 4.70 in Scenario 1 and 2, respectively. Similar trends were 
documented for the other constructs. Furthermore, for the perceived 
behavioural control, the mean values of the three items were slightly higher 
than 4.0, suggesting higher control over non-compliance, which in turn 
reduced compliance behaviour. The possible explanation for this situation 
was the nature of the scenarios. Scenario 1 deals with overstating business 
expenses, which might be more complicated for respondents to not 
comply, compared with omitting cash receipts, as set out in Scenario 2.   
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Table 5.23 Descriptive Statistics on Theory of Planned Behaviour Items 
New Zealand (Scenario 2) 
 
       Measures  Code N Min Max Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Intention INS 219 1 7 4.70 1.748 
I would report my income fully, including the 
amount of $10,500 from the sales of 
handicrafts. 
INS1 219 1 7 4.64 2.066 
I would not attempt to cheat by omitting to 
report the extra amount of $10,500 in my tax 
return form. 
INS2 219 1 7 4.76 1.994 
I would not declare the $10,500 because that 
amount arises from trading goods with friends 
and neighbours.* 
 
INS3R 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.74 
 
1.928 
Affective Attitude AFS 219 1 7 4.74 1.606 
I would be upset if I did not declare the extra 
amount of $10,500. 
AFS1 219 1 7 4.45 1.923 
I would feel guilty if I did not declare that 
extra amount of $10,500. 
AFS2 219 1 7 4.76 1.984 
I would feel pleased if I did not declare the 
extra amount of $10,500.* 
AFS3R 219 1 7 5.05 1.751 
Instrumental attitude ISS 219 1 7 3.16 1.334 
The likelihood of being audited by the Inland 
Revenue Department is high. 
ISS1 219 1 7 3.67 1.712 
It would be financially beneficial for me not to 
declare the extra amount of $10,500.*  
ISS2R 219 1 7 2.68 1.812 
Subjective norms SNS 219 1 7 4.36 1.422 
My family and peers would think that I should 
not declare the extra $10,500.* 
SNS1R 219 1 7 4.10 1.917 
My family and peers would think that I should 
declare the extra $10,500. 
SNS2 219 1 7 4.52 1.759 
My family and peers would approve of my 
decision to understate my income by 
$10,500.* 
SNS3R 219 1 7 4.53 1.770 
My family and peers would not understate the 
income if faced with a similar situation.  
SNS4 219 1 7 4.33 1.638 
Perceived behavioural control  PBS 219 1 7 3.94 1.413 
Due to my limited knowledge, skills and 
resources, it is hard for me to omit the $10,500 
in my tax return form successfully.* 
 
PBS1R 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.45 
 
1.797 
With my tax knowledge, skills and resources, 
it would be definitely easy for me to not 
declare the extra amount of $10,500 in my tax 
return form successfully. 
 
PBS2 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.14 
 
1.807 
I would successfully omit the extra amount of 
$10,500 in my tax return form if I wanted to.  
PBS3 219 1 7 4.04 1.863 
With my tax knowledge, skills and resources, I 
would have no difficulty to omit the extra 
$10,500 in my tax return form successfully.  
 
PBS4 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.89 
 
1.779 
There are no barriers that would prevent me 
from understating my income by $10,500 
successfully.  
 
PBS5 
 
219 
 
1 
 
7 
3.19 1.867 
       
*The scores for these items were reversed to reflect the interpretation as indicated in this 
study. 
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5.3.2.2  Malaysia  
a.  Fairness Perceptions 
Table 5.24 provides an overview of how Malaysian taxpayers (represented 
by salaried and wage earners) perceived the fairness of the current tax 
system. The mean values of each item suggested that respondents generally 
had positive perceptions of vertical fairness, personal fairness and 
administrative fairness. In other words respondents believed that the 
current tax system has treated individuals with different economic 
positions in a fair manner. In addition respondents were of the opinion that 
they are paying a reasonable amount of tax under the current tax system. 
For the other dimensions of fairness, the views on each item were mixed, 
but leaning towards positive perceptions. Observing the mean values of 
these constructs clearly indicate positive perceptions on all dimensions of 
fairness.  
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Table 5.24 Descriptive Statistics on Fairness Perceptions 
Malaysia 
 
       
Measures  Code N Min Max Mean Std.  
Dev. 
General fairness  GF 852 1 7 4.23 0.968 
I believe the government utilizes a 
reasonable amount of tax revenue to 
achieve social goals, such as the 
provision of benefits for low-income 
families. 
 
GF1 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.34 
 
1.460 
I believe everyone pays their fair share of 
income tax under the current income tax 
system 
GF2 852 1 7 4.66 1.394 
I think the government spends too much 
tax revenue on unnecessary welfare 
assistance.* 
GF3R 852 1 7 3.73 1.572 
Exchange fairness EF 852 1 7 4.42 0.849 
I receive fair value from the government 
in return for my income tax paid (e.g. 
benefits). 
EF1 852 1 7 4.34 1.361 
It is fair that low-income earners receive 
more benefits from the government 
compared to high-income earners. 
 
EF2 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
5.63 
 
1.412 
The income taxes that I have to pay are 
high considering the benefits I receive 
from the government.* 
EF3R 852 1 7 3.33 1.373 
Horizontal fairness HF 852 1 7 4.03 1.450 
It is fair for individuals with similar 
amounts of income to pay a similar 
amount of income tax. 
HF1 852 1 7 3.85 1.993 
I believe it is fair for me to pay a similar 
share of income tax compared with other 
taxpayers earning an equivalent amount 
of income. 
 
HF2 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.21 
 
1.737 
It is fair that „equals before tax are equals 
after tax‟. For example, if a person 
earning MYR100,000 before tax pays 
MYR20,000 tax, everyone earning 
MYR100,000 income before tax should 
be left with MYR80,000 after tax. 
 
HF3 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.12 
 
1.611 
Vertical fairness** VF 852 1 7 5.16 0.965 
It is fair that high-income earners are 
subject to tax at progressively higher tax 
rates than middle-income earners. 
 
VF1 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
5.62 
 
1.318 
It is fair that middle-income earners are 
taxed at a lower rate than high-income 
earners. 
VF2 852 1 7 5.80 1.291 
The share of the total income taxes paid 
by high-income earners is much too 
high.*  
VF3R 852 1 7 4.11 1.492 
Retributive fairness RF 852 1 7 4.60 0.920 
It is fair that individuals who deliberately 
evade paying their taxes should be 
penalised with the same amount of 
penalty regardless of the amount of tax 
evaded.*  
 
 
 
RF1R 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.86 
 
1.876 
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To be fair, the degree of punishment for 
evading tax should depend on the degree 
of non-compliance.  
RF2 852 1 7 5.41 1.330 
I believe the initial late payment penalty 
on the unpaid tax, imposed on non-
compliant taxpayers under the current tax 
system, is fair.  
 
RF3 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.59 
 
1.504 
Personal fairness  PF 852 1 7 4.93 0.866 
I believe that I pay my fair share of the 
tax burden under the current income tax 
system. 
PF1 852 1 7 5.39 1.337 
Compared to other taxpayers, I pay more 
than my fair share of income tax.*  
PF2R 852 1 7 4.08 1.464 
Middle-income earners pay their fair 
share of income tax. 
PF3 852 1 7 5.35 1.288 
Administrative fairness  AF 852 1 7 4.62 1.053 
There are a number of ways available to 
me to correct errors in the calculation of 
my tax liability, if necessary, at no 
additional cost.  
 
AF1 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.71 
 
1.279 
The administration of the income tax 
system by the Inland Revenue Board is 
consistent across years and taxpayers. 
 
AF2 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.58 
 
1.392 
       
 * The scores for these items were reversed to reflect the interpretation as indicated in this  
study. 
 **There are slight differences in items VF1 and VF2 between New Zealand and 
Malaysian counterpart. In Malaysia, the term „middle-income‟ is used (instead of „low-
income‟ as in New Zealand), since low-income earners are not subject to tax in Malaysia.  
 
 
b. Tax Knowledge and Tax Complexity 
Descriptive statistics with regard to perceptions of taxpayers‟ tax 
knowledge and complexity of the tax system (as in Table 5.25), suggest 
that respondents generally perceived themselves as having good 
knowledge of tax except in two knowledge indicators, which had low mean 
values. In relation to complexity of the tax system, the majority of the 
content complexity items had mean values of below 4.0, indicating that 
respondents perceived the content of the income tax system as complex. 
However, observing these items as one construct (content complexity), 
with a mean value of 4.06, showed slightly improved perceptions. Despite 
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these perceptions, they felt that it was relatively less complex to comply 
with the income tax system.  
Table 5.25 Descriptive Statistics on Tax Knowledge and Tax Complexity  
Malaysia 
 
       
Measures  Code N Min Max Mean Std.  
Dev. 
General knowledge GK 852 1 7 4.47 1.101 
The income tax system is a legitimate 
way for the government to collect 
revenue to manage an economy. 
GK1 852 1 7 5.58 1.224 
To my knowledge, individuals are 
subject to a single flat rate of income 
tax under the current tax system.*  
GK2R 852 1 7 3.60 1.566 
Legal knowledge LK 852 1 7 4.99 1.077 
As far as I am aware, non-compliant 
taxpayers can be imprisoned, if found 
guilty of evading tax. 
LK1 852 1 7 4.67 1.594 
Similar to other criminal offences, I 
believe that individuals can also be 
prosecuted for not complying with 
the Income Tax Act. 
 
LK2 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
5.30 
 
1.347 
I believe that I do not have to abide 
by the deadline for the submission of 
tax return form (s) as the deadline is 
only a guideline and does not result in 
penalties.* 
 
LK3R 
 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
5.03 
 
1.715 
Technical knowledge TK 852 1 7 4.54 0.886 
As far as I am aware, everyone who 
earns income sourced in this country 
needs to register with the Inland 
Revenue Board, regardless of 
whether that person is resident or not. 
 
TK1** 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
5.48 
 
1.281 
I am sure that I am not required to file 
a tax return on interest income that I 
earn from money deposited in a bank 
account in Malaysia as it will be 
subject to income tax at source. 
 
TK2 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.77 
 
1.621 
To my knowledge, I can deduct all 
personal expenses in calculating my 
tax liability.* 
TK3R 852 1 7 4.01 1.819 
I have little idea about the deductions 
that I can claim as a taxpayer in the 
computation of my tax liability.* 
TK4R 852 1 7 3.98 1.629 
Content complexity CT 852 1 7 4.06 1.127 
I think the term used in tax 
publications (eg. IRB guide books) 
and in tax return forms are difficult 
for people like me to understand.* 
 
CT1R 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.89 
 
1.491 
The sentences and wording in the 
Individual Income Tax Return Guide 
are lengthy and not user-friendly.* 
CT2R 852 1 7 3.76 
 
1.468 
The rules related to individual income 
tax are clear. 
 
CT3 852 1 7 4.73 1.266 
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Most of the time I need to refer to 
others for assistance in dealing with 
tax matters.* 
CT4R 852 1 7 3.97 1.733 
Compliance complexity CM 852 1 7 4.25 1.124 
I do not have a problem with 
completing and filing the tax return 
form(s). 
CM1 852 1 7 4.84 1.487 
I find it tedious to maintain all my 
relevant records for the whole year 
for tax purposes.* 
CM2R 852 1 7 3.42 1.614 
I do not have to make a lot of effort to 
understand the explanations given in 
Inland Revenue Board guide books 
and other similar explanatory 
material. 
 
CM3 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.53 
 
1.448 
       
*The scores for these items were reversed to reflect the interpretation as indicated in this 
study. 
**There is slight difference in item TK1 between New Zealand and Malaysian 
counterpart. The change was made to Malaysian scenario to accommodate the differences 
between the two environments.  
 
 
c.  Compliance Behaviour 
Similar hypothetical scenarios to those used in the New Zealand survey 
were used in a Malaysian context. The results on Scenario 1 (Table 5.26) 
reveal a comparable outcome to New Zealand, where Malaysian 
respondents also had good intention to comply, high mean values for 
affective attitude and subjective norms, but low mean values for 
instrumental attitude. In relative terms, the values were slightly lower for 
Malaysia than the reported mean values for New Zealand, which suggests a 
lower degree of compliance in Malaysia. Other than that, the perceived 
behavioural control of slightly above 4.0 also reflects that Malaysian 
respondents have less difficulty in avoiding tax, thus resulting in low 
compliance.  
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Table 5.26 Descriptive Statistics on Theory of Planned Behaviour Items 
Malaysia (Scenario 1) 
 
       Measures  Code N Min Max Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Intention IND 852 1 7 4.67 1.293 
I would claim the full deduction of 
MYR11,500, including the amount paid for 
my family trip.* 
IND1R 852 1 7 4.23 1.771 
I would not attempt to overstate the 
business expenses by MYR2,500. 
IND2 852 1 7 4.72 1.657 
I would only claim a deduction for the 
actual amount spent for business purposes. 
IND3 852 1 7 5.12 1.439 
Affective Attitude AFD 852 1 7 4.66 1.265 
I would be upset if I overstated the 
business expenses by MYR2,500.  
AFD1 852 1 7 4.82 1.580 
I would feel guilty if I overstated the 
business expenses by MYR2,500. 
AFD2 852 1 7 4.94 1.530 
I would feel pleased if I overstated the 
business expenses by MYR2,500.* 
AFD3R 852 1 7 4.28 1.689 
Instrumental attitude ISD 852 1 7 3.85 1.203 
The likelihood of being audited by the 
Inland Revenue Department is low.*  
ISD1R 852 1 7 3.89 1.444 
It would be financially beneficial for me to 
overstate the business expenses by 
MYR2,500.* 
ISD2R 852 1 7 3.81 1.550 
Subjective norms SND 852 1 7 4.30 1.038 
My family and peers would think that I 
should overstate the business expenses by 
MYR2,500.* 
SND1R 852 1 7 4.09 1.632 
My family and peers would think that I 
should only claim the actual business 
expenses. 
SND2 852 1 7 4.71 1.487 
My family and peers would approve of my 
decision to overstate the business expenses 
by MYR2,500.* 
SND3R 852 1 7 4.14 1.539 
My family and peers would not overstate 
the business expenses if faced with a 
similar situation.  
SND4 852 1 7 4.30 1.422 
Perceived behavioural control  PBD 852 1 7 4.15 1.091 
With my tax knowledge, skills and 
resources, it would be very easy for me to 
overstate the business expenses by 
MYR2,500 successfully. 
 
PBD1 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.03 
 
1.563 
Due to my limited tax knowledge, skills 
and resources, it is hard for me to overstate 
the business expenses by MYR2,500 
successfully.* 
 
PBD2R 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.90 
 
1.482 
I would successfully overstate the business 
expenses in my tax return form if I wanted 
to.  
PBD3 852 1 7 4.44 1.524 
With my tax knowledge, skills and 
resources, I would have no difficulty in 
overstating the business expenses by 
MYR2,500 successfully. 
 
PBD4 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.26 
 
1.561 
There are no barriers that would prevent 
me from overstating the business expenses 
by MYR2,500 successfully. 
 
PBD5 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.15 
 
1.568 
 
       
*The scores for these items were reversed to reflect the interpretation as indicated in this 
study. 
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Table 5.27 sets out the descriptive statistics on taxpayers‟ behaviour in 
„understating other income‟ scenario. Interestingly, the results were 
dissimilar to the previous scenario, particularly on subjective norms, where 
respondents were found to be less likely to comply. There are two possible 
explanations for such diverse results. First, the large amount (MYR10,500) 
used in this scenario, compared to the MYR2,500 in Scenario 1.
90
 Second, 
the scenario involved a salaried person with extra income, which is more 
relevant to the respondents.
91
 These factors did not seem to be important in 
New Zealand probably because the New Zealand respondents are not 
solely salaried individuals.  
                                                 
90 Even though different amounts were also used in New Zealand scenarios, they did not produce 
significant changes in the New Zealand results.  
91 In Malaysia, the respondents are all salaried persons.  
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Table 5.27 Descriptive Statistics on Theory of Planned Behaviour Items 
Malaysia (Scenario 2) 
 
       Measures  Code N Min Max Mean Std.  
Dev. 
Intention INS 852 1 7 4.23 1.342 
I would report my income fully, including the 
amount of MYR10,500 from the sales of 
handicrafts. 
INS1 852 1 7 4.17 1.701 
I would not attempt to cheat by omitting to 
report the extra amount of MYR10,500 in my 
tax return form. 
INS2 852 1 7 4.63 1.481 
I would not declare the MYR10,500 because 
that amount arises from trading goods with 
friends and neighbours.* 
 
INS3R 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
3.91 
 
1.700 
Affective Attitude AFS 852 1 7 4.23 1.362 
I would be upset if I did not declare the extra 
amount of MYR10,500. 
AFS1 852 1 7 4.29 1.636 
I would feel guilty if I did not declare that extra 
amount of MYR10,500. 
AFS2 852 1 7 4.30 1.644 
I would feel pleased if I did not declare the extra 
amount of MYR10,500.* 
AFS3R 852 1 7 4.12 1.585 
Instrumental attitude ISS 852 1 7 3.80 1.184 
The likelihood of being audited by the Inland 
Revenue Department is high. 
ISS1 852 1 7 4.13 1.539 
It would be financially beneficial for me not to 
declare the extra amount of MYR10,500.*  
ISS2R 852 1 7 3.50 1.540 
Subjective norms SNS 852 1 7 3.91 1.231 
My family and peers would think that I should 
not declare the extra MYR10,500.* 
SNS1R 852 1 7 3.85 1.645 
My family and peers would think that I should 
declare the extra MYR10,500. 
SNS2 852 1 7 4.28 1.536 
My family and peers would approve of my 
decision to understate my income by 
MYR10,500.* 
SNS3R 852 1 7 3.73 1.471 
My family and peers would not declare the extra 
MYR10,500 if faced with a similar situation.*  
SNS4R 852 1 7 3.82 1.483 
Perceived behavioural control  PBS 852 1 7 4.17 1.070 
Due to my limited knowledge, skills and 
resources, it is hard for me to omit the 
MYR10,500 in my tax return form 
successfully.* 
 
PBS1R 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.02 
 
1.474 
With my tax knowledge, skills and resources, it 
would be definitely easy for me to not declare 
the extra amount of MYR10,500 in my tax 
return form successfully. 
 
PBS2 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.13 
 
 
1.482 
I would successfully omit the extra amount of 
MYR10,500 in my tax return form if I wanted 
to.  
PBS3 852 1 7 4.36 1.560 
With my tax knowledge, skills and resources, I 
would have no difficulty to omit the extra 
MYR10,500 in my tax return form successfully.  
 
PBS4 
 
852 
 
1 
 
7 
 
4.23 
 
 
1.518 
There are no barriers that would prevent me 
from understating my income by MYR10,500 
successfully.  
PBS5 852 1 7 4.20 1.521 
       
*The scores for these items were reversed to reflect the interpretation as indicated in this 
study. 
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5.3.3   t-test Analysis  
Descriptive analysis on taxpayers‟ perceptions in New Zealand and 
Malaysia reveal their differing opinions on the issues of fairness, tax 
knowledge, tax complexity and compliance behaviour. To determine 
whether these differences are significant or not, a t-test analysis was 
subsequently performed using the SPSS. Performing this analysis enables 
the researcher to test Preliminary Hypotheses 1 to 4 (4a and 4b), which 
subsequently answers the first four research questions in this study.
92
 A 
summary of the results of the analysis is set out in Tables 5.28 to 5.31 (see 
Appendix 12 for the full results). While these results are interpreted based 
on the analysis performed, it is also important to highlight that the results 
may be influenced by the different tax jurisdictions under study and the 
samples involved.  In New Zealand, various groups of individual taxpayers 
were selected while in Malaysia the focus was on salaried and wage 
earners. Also, the comparison was made on the basis of respondents‟ 
perceptions on their own income tax systems. Having said that, the term 
„taxpayers‟ used in this study should be interpreted with care as it actually 
                                                 
92 A t-test analysis was also performed in Malaysia to investigate whether any significant difference exists 
in relation to taxpayers’ views on fairness perceptions, tax knowledge, tax complexity and compliance 
behaviour between those working in government and private sector. The results reveal that taxpayers 
in the government sector generally have better perceptions on the income tax system, but the 
differences appear to be significant in terms of general fairness, exchange fairness, vertical fairness and 
personal fairness. Results also suggest that taxpayers in the government sector have better knowledge 
on the legal aspects of the income tax system. They also appear to have more positive attitudes 
towards compliance compared to those in private sector. The full results of the analysis are available 
in Appendix 11. 
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denotes the relevant sample in the country under study and not the broader 
population of taxpayers.   
 
5.3.3.1  Fairness Perceptions 
Table 5.28 compares the mean values of fairness perceptions between New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers, together with the corresponding two-
tailed p-values to determine whether or not taxpayers‟ perceptions differ 
significantly. The p-values column shows values of less than 0.01 for all 
dimensions of fairness, with the exception of retributive fairness. Based on 
these statistics, the null form of Hypothesis 1, which states that „There is 
no significant difference in fairness perceptions between New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers of their current income tax systems‟ can therefore be 
rejected at the 1 percent significance level. In other words, the results 
suggest that fairness perceptions of New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers 
are significantly different. The only fairness dimension that taxpayers in 
both New Zealand and Malaysia had similar perceptions was retributive 
fairness.  
 
Apart from providing evidence of significant difference in six dimensions 
of fairness perceptions between the New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers, 
the mean values further suggest that Malaysian taxpayers have better 
fairness perceptions on the income tax system than the New Zealanders. 
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New Zealand taxpayers only have better perceptions than Malaysian 
taxpayers in terms of horizontal fairness.  
Table 5.28 Comparison between New Zealand and Malaysian Taxpayers on 
Fairness Perceptions 
 
      
Measures  N Mean p-value 
(two-
tailed) 
 New Zealand Malaysia New Zealand Malaysia  
General fairness  219 852 3.60 4.23 .000 
Exchange fairness 219 852 3.65 4.42 .000 
Horizontal fairness 219 852 5.39 4.03 .000 
Vertical fairness  219 852 4.38 5.16 .000 
Retributive fairness 219 852 4.58 4.60 .716 
Personal fairness  219 852 4.71 4.93 .005 
Administrative 
fairness  
219 852 3.86 4.62 .000 
      
 
5.3.3.2  Tax Knowledge and Tax Complexity 
Table 5.29 provides the summary of t-test results on New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers‟ perceptions of tax knowledge and tax complexity to 
test the null form of Hypotheses 2 and 3. Based on the p-values of less than 
0.01, Hypothesis 2 can be rejected at the 1 percent significance level. In 
other words, Hypothesis 2 that states „There is no significant difference in 
the levels of knowledge between New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers of 
their current income tax systems‟ is not true. This suggests that taxpayers 
in New Zealand and Malaysia have significantly different levels of tax 
knowledge. In addition to this, mean values indicate that New Zealand 
taxpayers are relatively more knowledgeable than their Malaysian 
counterparts. 
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Hypothesis 3 tests whether there is no significant difference in the levels of 
perceptions of the complexity between New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers of their current income tax system. The results in Table 5.29 
suggest that this hypothesis that states „There is no significant difference in 
the levels of perceptions of the complexity between New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers of their current income tax systems‟ is only true in the 
case of compliance complexity. However, respondents‟ perceptions do 
differ significantly in terms of content complexity. In particular, the p-
values indicate that taxpayers‟ perceptions on content complexity are 
significantly different at the 5 percent significance level. From the mean 
values, it appeared that in both dimensions, New Zealand taxpayers 
perceived the income tax system being more complex compared to 
Malaysian taxpayers.  
Table 5.29 Comparison between New Zealand and Malaysian Taxpayers on 
Tax Knowledge and Tax Complexity 
 
      Measures  N Mean p-value 
(two-
tailed) 
 New Zealand Malaysia New Zealand Malaysia 
General knowledge 219 852 5.71 4.47 .000 
Legal knowledge 219 852 5.62 4.99 .000 
Technical knowledge 219 852 4.77 4.54 .001 
Content complexity 219 852 3.85 4.06 .019 
Compliance complexity 219 852 4.12 4.25 .142 
      
 
5.3.3.3  Compliance Behaviour 
Tables 5.30 and 5.31 present mean values and corresponding p-values of 
New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour to test 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Hypotheses 4a and 4b infer whether taxpayers in 
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both New Zealand and Malaysia have the same levels of perceptions in 
relation to TPB elements, namely intention to comply, affective attitude, 
instrumental attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control 
in the two scenarios investigated. The p-values of less than 0.01 in Table 
5.30 suggest that taxpayers‟ perceptions are significantly different for all 
TPB elements in the „overstating business expense‟ scenario. The results 
provide no support to Hypothesis 4a which states that „There is no 
significant difference in the levels of intention to comply, affective attitude, 
instrumental attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control, 
between New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers, in the overstating 
business expenses scenario.‟ In addition to this, mean values of the groups 
generally indicate more compliance of New Zealand taxpayers compared 
to Malaysian taxpayers. 
Table 5.30 Comparison between New Zealand and Malaysian Taxpayers on 
Compliance Behaviour (Scenario 1) 
 
      
Measures  N Mean p-value 
(two-
tailed) 
 New Zealand Malaysia New Zealand Malaysia 
Intention to comply 219 852 5.83 4.67 .000 
Affective attitude 219 852 5.61 4.66 .000 
Instrumental attitude 219 852 3.43 3.85 .000 
Subjective norms 219 852 5.03 4.30 .000 
Perceived 
behavioural control 
219 852 3.15 4.15 .000 
      
 
Comparable to Scenario 1, the p-values of lower than 0.01 for TPB 
elements (with the exception of perceived behavioural control, which is 
higher than 0.01 but less than 0.05) in Table 5.31 also indicates 
significantly different perceptions between New Zealand and Malaysian 
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taxpayers. The results suggest the rejection of Hypothesis 4b, which states 
that „There is no significant difference in the levels of intention to comply, 
affective attitude, instrumental attitude, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control, between New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers, in 
the understating other incomes scenario.‟ In addition to this, Table 5.31 
shows favourable mean values of New Zealand sample as compared to 
their Malaysian counterparts, indicating higher compliance among New 
Zealand taxpayers.  
Table 5.31 Comparison between New Zealand and Malaysian Taxpayers on 
Compliance Behaviour (Scenario 2) 
 
      
Measures  N Mean p-value 
(two-
tailed) 
 New Zealand Malaysia New Zealand Malaysia  
Intention to comply 219 852 4.70 4.23 .000 
Affective attitude 219 852 4.74 4.23 .000 
Instrumental 
attitude 
219 852 3.16 3.80 .000 
Subjective norms 219 852 4.36 3.91 .000 
Perceived 
behavioural control 
219 852 3.94 4.17 .024 
      
 
 
Overall, the t-test analysis revealed interesting findings with regard to the 
taxpayers‟ perceptions in the two countries. This analysis actually answers 
the first four research questions (refer Table 5.32) in this study; that is, 
whether taxpayers in both countries had the same perceptions in terms of 
fairness, knowledge and complexity of the income tax system as well as 
their compliance behaviour.  
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Table 5.32 Summary of Results of Preliminary Hypotheses Testing  
 
Research 
Question 
Research Hypotheses Results 
  New Zealand Malaysia 
1. Do taxpayers in 
both New Zealand 
and Malaysia have 
the same levels of 
fairness 
perceptions of their 
current income tax 
systems? 
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no 
significant difference in 
fairness perceptions between 
New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers of their current 
income tax systems.  
Reject   Reject 
2. Do taxpayers in 
both New Zealand 
and Malaysia have 
the same levels of 
tax knowledge of 
their current 
income tax 
systems? 
 
Hypothesis 2: There is no 
significant difference in the 
levels of knowledge between 
New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers of their current 
income tax systems.  
Reject Reject 
3. Do taxpayers in 
both New Zealand 
and Malaysia have 
the same levels of 
perceptions of the 
complexity of their 
current income tax 
systems? 
 
Hypothesis 3: There is no 
significant difference in the 
levels of perceptions of the 
complexity between New 
Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers of their current 
income tax systems.  
Accept in the 
case of 
compliance 
complexity. 
Reject in the 
case of content 
complexity 
Accept in 
the case of 
compliance 
complexity. 
Reject in the 
case of 
content 
complexity 
4. Do taxpayers in 
both New Zealand 
and Malaysia have 
the same levels of 
perceptions in 
relation to the TPB 
elements?  
Hypothesis 4a: There is no 
significant difference in the 
levels of intention to comply, 
affective attitude, 
instrumental attitude, 
subjective norms and 
perceived behavioural 
control, between New 
Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers, in the „overstating 
business expenses‟ scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reject Reject 
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 Hypothesis 4b: There is no 
significant difference in the 
levels of intention to comply, 
affective attitude, 
instrumental attitude, 
subjective norms and 
perceived behavioural 
control, between New 
Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers,  in the 
„understating other incomes‟ 
scenario. 
Reject Reject  
 
The findings on fairness perceptions generally suggest that Malaysian 
taxpayers had significantly better perceptions on the current income tax 
system compared to New Zealand taxpayers, except in the case of 
retributive fairness. Specifically, Malaysian taxpayers unanimously agreed 
that the current tax system had achieved all dimensions of fairness. In 
terms of ranking, vertical fairness, personal fairness and administrative 
fairness are the fairness dimensions that taxpayers seemed to be most 
happy with. Unlike Malaysia, in New Zealand, taxpayers believed that 
horizontal fairness was the fairness dimension that is highly maintained 
under the current income tax system. In addition to this, negative 
perceptions were provided on general fairness, exchange fairness and the 
administration of the income tax system.  
  
With regard to tax knowledge, taxpayers in both countries claimed that 
they had good knowledge of the current income tax system implemented in 
their countries, but at different levels. In fact, results further suggest that 
New Zealand taxpayers are more knowledgeable than Malaysian 
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taxpayers. Nevertheless, New Zealand taxpayers still consider the tax 
system as complex. The results give an impression of high complexity of 
the tax system as those with good knowledge of taxation still view the 
system as complex. Similar trends were observed in Malaysia but to a 
lower level. 
 
In terms of the elements of the TPB, taxpayers in the two countries 
demonstrated their willingness to comply with the system, with greater 
compliance displayed among New Zealand taxpayers. Interestingly, 
notwithstanding the better fairness perceptions among Malaysian taxpayers 
compared to New Zealand taxpayers, the New Zealand taxpayers seemed 
to have greater compliance. The possible explanation for this situation is 
the differing level of tax knowledge, tax complexity and the elements of 
TPB (attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control) 
between the two groups. Such possibilities, however, can only be explained 
after performing the regression analysis (to be discussed in Chapter 6) and 
the in-depth interviews (to be discussed in Chapters 7 and 8).   
 
5.3.4   Qualitative Comments from Respondents 
In the survey, the respondents were given the opportunity to express their 
opinions relating to their perceptions on tax fairness, tax knowledge, tax 
complexity and compliance behaviour in the open-ended questions. The 
comments given were analysed using content analysis.  
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5.3.4.1  New Zealand 
a.  Fairness Perceptions 
Figure 5.1 exhibits taxpayers‟ perceptions with regard to fairness. 
Comments revealed that most respondents perceived the tax system as 
unfair and very few considered the tax system to be fair. To understand 
further their frustrations towards the income tax system, respondents‟ 
opinions were classified into the seven dimensions of fairness, as defined 
in this study.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that general fairness, vertical fairness and personal 
fairness were the three main issues of concern. With regard to general 
fairness, respondents had complaints about the high tax rates and 
government spending of tax revenues. Graduated tax rates and the feeling 
that the taxes on high-income earners are not enough, indicate negative 
perceptions of vertical fairness. In relation to personal fairness, 
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respondents, regardless of their economic position, personally felt that the 
current tax system is overburdened and in need of improvement. 
Interestingly, there is no objection against horizontal fairness, indicating 
taxpayers‟ belief that the current tax system fairly treats taxpayers in 
similar economic positions. While some respondents simply perceive the 
tax system as unfair, others view the unfairness of the tax system in various 
ways, as illustrated below:    
 
“[Tax is] not fair, [it] should look at family income, not just individuals”. 
 
“I don‟t agree with taxing for beneficiaries who earn small amounts; e.g. 
delivering junk mail for $70-$80 per month. I‟d like to see up [to] $100 be 
tax free”. 
 
“I don‟t think the current tax is fair to all. I would like to have a system 
where no one is taxed; e.g. PAYE (Pay As You Earn), withholding etc., but 
all tax is collected on purchases, i.e. the more we spend the more we pay”. 
 
“IRD (Inland Revenue Department) seems to always load the employer”. 
 
“The worse thing about the tax system is the ability of self-employed 
people to reduce their personal income, to allow their children to receive 
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student allowances. Often, generally their personal earnings is much higher 
than wage or salary earners whose children are denied support”. 
 
GF=General Fairness                RF=Retributive Fairness        SU=Simply Unfair         
         EF=Exchange Fairness             PF=Personal Fairness             OT=Others     
         VF=Vertical Fairness                AF=Administrative Fairness       
 
     
b. Tax Knowledge 
Figure 5.3 reveals taxpayers‟ perceptions of their knowledge of the current 
tax system. The majority of respondents described their knowledge as 
either minimal or limited, which forced some of them to hire tax 
accountants. Only a few (including former IRD staff) considered 
themselves as having a good or very good knowledge of tax.  
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c.  Tax Complexity 
The comments on the complexity of the income tax system, as illustrated in 
Figure 5.4, suggest that respondents generally viewed the tax system as 
complex. Only a small number considered the tax system as 
uncomplicated. Such claims, however, were expressed by wage and salary 
earners who pay their taxes through the PAYE system and may not file tax 
returns.  
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d. Compliance Behaviour 
Figure 5.5 demonstrates taxpayers‟ opinion regarding tax compliance 
behaviour. Respondents generally felt that most people did not comply 
with their tax obligations while some only complied to a certain degree. 
They further suggested that government spending and high tax rates are 
among the contributing factors to non-compliance behaviours, as noted 
below:   
 
“If the government did not waste so much money lurking around, 
 I wouldn‟t resent to pay”. 
 
“…higher tax rates discourage this [compliance]”. 
 
“If everyone thought tax was a flat, simpler fair rate, they would spend less 
time trying to avoid it” 
 
While there were respondents who believed that most people complied 
with their tax obligations, some of them holding this view were those who 
received wages or salaries and thus could not avoid or evade tax.  
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5.3.4.2  Malaysia 
Comments from the Malaysian respondents revealed that the patterns are 
somewhat dissimilar to their New Zealand counterpart. Such a difference is 
expected, as a result of cultural differences, and also the different sample 
groups under study. The New Zealand sample includes people with various 
sources of income while the Malaysian sample only focused on salaried 
individuals.  
 
a.  Fairness Perceptions 
Figure 5.6 on fairness perceptions reveals that while a majority described 
the tax system as unfair, a number of taxpayers viewed the system as fair. 
This situation differs from New Zealand, with only a few having positive 
fairness perceptions of the tax system.  
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When splitting the comments into the seven dimensions of fairness, as set 
out in Figure 5.7, it appears that Malaysian respondents were more 
concerned with vertical fairness, retributive fairness, general fairness and 
administrative fairness. Respondents particularly had complaints about the 
graduated tax rates and insufficient taxes on the high-income earners, 
implying vertical unfairness. They were also not happy with the 
enforcement action undertaken by the Inland Revenue Board. Respondents 
considered the mechanisms as too loose and not effective in curbing non-
compliant behaviour. This feeling of dissatisfaction led to the negative 
perceptions of retributive fairness. Government spending of tax revenues 
was the core issue raised, implying negative perceptions of general 
fairness. In fact, the respondents blamed the government‟s inefficient 
spending as the catalyst for the non-compliance behaviour. To quote some 
of their comments: 
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“…distribution of tax revenue is not consistent”. 
 
“Government should be transparent with their spending”. 
 
“Taxes are collected, citizens welfare are neglected”. 
 
“The non-transparency of the government [spending] leads taxpayers to 
avoid tax and they want their rights to be fulfilled”. 
 
“The IRB is not transparent, makes people not paying tax”. 
 
Taxpayers under study also had a lack of confidence in the Inland Revenue 
Board‟s administration system. The inconsistent advice among tax officers, 
ambiguity with tax amounts and late refunds were their main concerns. 
Like New Zealand, there is no objection to horizontal fairness. Apart from 
the above issues, there were taxpayers who simply perceived the tax 
system as unfair; while others viewed the unfairness of the tax system in 
various aspects, including replacing the tax system with an Islamic tax 
system for the Muslims, taking into account the inflation factor in revising 
the tax system, etc.  
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GF=General Fairness                RF=Retributive Fairness        SU=Simply Unfair         
         EF=Exchange Fairness             PF=Personal Fairness             OT=Others     
         VF=Vertical Fairness                AF=Administrative Fairness                
 
b. Tax Knowledge 
Figure 5.8 provides taxpayers‟ perceptions of their knowledge of the 
current tax system, the results of which are contrary to New Zealand. The 
majority of taxpayers under study considered themselves as having a 
reasonable to good knowledge of tax, even though quite a number admitted 
to have either “minimal” or “limited” knowledge. The difference could be 
because the Malaysian respondents are salaried taxpayers who completed 
more simplified tax return forms.  
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c.  Tax Complexity 
Parallel with their perceptions on knowledge of the income tax system, 
respondents generally viewed the tax system as not being complex. Only a 
small number considered the tax system as extremely complicated (refer to 
Figure 5.9). Again these comments represent the views of salaried 
taxpayers.  
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d. Compliance Behaviour 
Figure 5.10 suggests that respondents were compliant in Malaysia. 
However, the claim is correct for salaried taxpayers who have little or no 
choice in the decision to avoid or evade tax. In fact they believed that 
everyone has a temptation to avoid tax if there is opportunity to do so. 
While such opportunities are widely available to business people, less 
enforcement further escalates such illegal acts, as noted below:  
 
“If possible, everyone including leaders and policy makers doesn‟t want to 
pay taxes. Many businesspersons avoid taxes. Salaried people have to pay 
taxes because they have the pay slips”.   
 
 “Many avoid taxes”. 
 
 “Try to avoid if there‟s chance”.  
 
“[Compliance is] very low”. 
 
“Less enforcement and no commitment” 
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Overall, the qualitative comments are consistent, to a substantial degree, 
with the descriptive analysis in the earlier section. Some discrepancies, 
however, are expected (especially in Malaysia), since less than 30 percent 
of the respondents offered any comments.  
 
5.4  Summary 
In this chapter, the exploratory analysis of the survey data was performed, 
which involves response analysis, preliminary analysis and t-test analysis. 
From the analysis, the findings suggest that taxpayers under study may 
have different perceptions on each dimension of fairness, which in the end 
assist in formulating their judgments on the fairness of the income tax 
system as a whole. For example, New Zealand respondents viewed the 
income tax system as reasonably fair in terms of horizontal fairness, 
personal fairness and retributive fairness, but at the same time, presented 
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their criticisms on administrative fairness, exchange fairness and general 
fairness of the income tax system. A similar conclusion is applicable to 
Malaysia, where respondents have different perceptions of various 
dimensions of fairness. This information is useful for any changes that may 
be made to the income tax systems in the future.  
 
When comparing the two environments under study in the t-test analysis, 
the results suggest that Malaysian respondents have better fairness 
perceptions of the current tax system compared to the New Zealand 
sample. In relation to knowledge, however, New Zealand respondents are 
in a better position. Interestingly, in terms of complexity of the tax system, 
New Zealand sample viewed the tax system as more complex relative to 
Malaysian respondents. In other words, the results imply that the New 
Zealand income tax system is perceived as very complex, such that even 
those with a good level of knowledge still could not comprehend it. 
Notwithstanding their criticisms of the fairness and the complexity of the 
income tax system, New Zealand respondents still had greater levels of 
compliance compared to the Malaysian sample. At this point, the findings 
indicate that fairness perceptions and complexity of the income system 
may not greatly affect taxpayers‟ decisions (in both countries) towards 
compliance. To further explain this, regression analysis using PLS was 
performed and is discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 6 
Regression Analysis and Results of Survey Data  
 
6.1  Introduction 
This chapter extends the exploratory analysis of the survey data in Chapter 
5 with reference to the extended compliance behaviour model discussed in 
Chapter 4 on methodology. Prior to the analysis, examination of data from 
the model is presented. This is followed by a discussion on the evaluation 
of measurement model. Finally, the primary hypotheses are analysed with 
reference to the structural model developed in Chapter 3.  
 
6.2      Data Examination 
This study developed two behavioural models using two tax compliance 
scenarios. Seventy indicators measuring 22 variables were initially used, 
where each model consists of six exogenous variables (subjective norms, 
three dimensions of tax knowledge and two dimensions of tax complexity), 
and 11 endogenous variables (seven dimensions of fairness, intention to 
comply, perceived behavioural control and two dimensions of attitudes).
93
 
Of these variables, six are formative constructs (with 18 items) and 16 are 
reflective constructs (with 52 items). While formative constructs do not 
measure the same underlying phenomenon and do not expect to correlate, 
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reflective constructs are latent variables that measure “the same underlying 
phenomenon” (Chin, 1998b, p. 305). It is vital to distinguish these two 
types of constructs because they require different methods in evaluating the 
measurement model.
94
 The following section describes the relevant tests 
performed to evaluate the measurement model according to the nature of 
the constructs.  
 
6.3      Evaluation of the Measurement Model – First Order Factor 
Model 
The aim of evaluating the measurement model is to address the validity 
and reliability of the indicators in measuring latent variables. While 
validity is concerned with whether appropriate measures were used to 
reflect the specific concept (Dibbern & Chin, 2005; Pallant, 2005), 
reliability on the other hand refers to the accuracy of the actual measuring 
instrument. To confirm the validity and reliability of the measures, it is 
vital, in a comparative study, to ascertain whether the measures are valid 
and reliable in both environments. In other words, this study requires the 
researcher to evaluate the measurement model simultaneously to establish 
that the measures perform adequately in both data samples. To achieve this 
outcome, the results of measurement analysis were compared.  
                                                                                                                        
93 The same measures on fairness perceptions, tax knowledge and tax complexity were used in both 
scenarios. The difference between the models was the use of different measures on the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB) in the scenarios.    
94 See Chapter 4 on the differences between the formative and reflective constructs. 
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6.3.1   Content Validity 
Content validity evaluates whether the measures used fully capture the 
domain of the construct (Straub et al., 2004). This is imperative to establish 
particularly when the research involves formative constructs (Petter et al., 
2007). The common methods of establishing content validity are reviews 
of the literature (Petter et al., 2007), expert opinions and Q-sorting 
(Boudreau et al., 2001). Based on the recommendations several steps had 
been undertaken in this study to establish the content validity of the survey 
instrument.  
 
First, a review of both New Zealand and Malaysian tax systems was 
performed to identify their uniqueness and distinct features. This is a 
crucial phase as the researcher needs to identify the key factors that are 
common to both countries for comparison purposes. Based on the 
information gained, merged with the relevant literature on tax compliance 
and Equity Theory, questions were subsequently formulated. Second, 
experts in the fields (taxation and research methodology) in both countries 
were asked to review and comment on the initial questionnaire. Based on 
their recommendations, a few items were added, deleted and modified in 
the initial questionnaire. Third, the questionnaires were sent out for pilot 
testing in New Zealand. In Malaysia, the pilot testing was only performed 
after the completion of the translation from the English language to Malay 
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language. Details on the pilot testing are set out in Chapter 4, in section 
4.1.5 on pilot testing. 
 
6.3.2   Construct Validity 
Typically construct validity involves both convergent validity and 
discriminant validity. To meet these validity criteria, indicators are 
assumed to highly correlate with each other in measuring a particular 
construct. It would not be a problem for reflective constructs (with items 
developed to identify a similar underlying phenomenon) to meet this 
condition but it may be unrealistic for formative constructs to achieve this. 
In fact, performing a similar approach to formative constructs would be 
meaningless (Petter et al., 2007), since those constructs do not require the 
indicators to be highly correlated (Rossiter, 2002). Given these differences, 
the discussion on establishing the construct validity is separated based on 
the nature of the constructs.  
 
6.3.2.1 Formative Constructs  
A different approach to the conventional validity tests was used to assess 
the validity of the formative constructs. In this case, indicator weights that 
measure the contribution of each formative indicator were obtained from 
the bootstrapping procedure in the Partial Least Squares (PLS). The 
weights, coupled with the t-values, provided evidence of construct validity 
(Petter et al., 2007), and the extent (whether significant or not) to which a 
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particular indicator explains the variance in the formative construct 
(Roberts & Thatcher, 2009). A review of the results in Table 6.1 for 
Scenario 1 reveals that formative indicators for „general fairness‟ and 
„administrative fairness‟ were generally significant in both countries. On 
the other hand, two items measuring „retributive fairness‟ (RF3) and 
„content complexity‟ (CT1R), were completely insignificant in both New 
Zealand and Malaysian samples. Other non-significant indicators were 
RF1R in Malaysia, and GK2R, TK1, TK2 and TK3R in New Zealand. 
RF1R concerns with the retributive fairness of the income tax system, 
where taxpayers were asked on the fairness of the penalty imposed on tax 
evaders, while GK2R is a general knowledge item, which tested taxpayers‟ 
knowledge on the income tax rate, either flat or progressive. TK1, TK2 and 
TK3R are items measuring technical knowledge, which focus on 
responsibility to pay tax, tax on interest and tax deductions.
95
 In sum, seven 
items were insignificant in this Scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
95 The actual wording of the items are available in Appendix 5 on the model constructs and measures. 
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Table 6.1 Formative Constructs, Indicators and Weights 
Scenario 1 (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Construct  New Zealand Malaysia 
and Items PLS 
Weights 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
PLS 
Weights 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
       
General 
fairness 
      
GF1 0.8652 2.5292 0.005 0.4233 2.7419 0.005 
GF2 -0.3336 1.0615 not sig. 0.7565 5.5654 0.005 
GF3R 0.3918 1.4552 0.100 -0.2278 1.6578 0.050 
       
Retributive 
fairness 
      
RF1R 0.3609 1.6005 0.100 0.0768 0.4492 not sig. 
RF2 0.7203 2.4703 0.010 0.9573 13.7778 0.005 
RF3 -0.4503 0.9565 not sig. 0.1456 1.1087 not sig. 
       
Administrative 
fairness 
      
AF1 0.7662 2.7512 0.005 0.3140 2.7197 0.005 
AF2 0.4911 1.9385 0.050 0.8869 14.8594 0.005 
       
General 
knowledge 
      
GK1 1.0012 8.3676 0.005 0.9315 22.0205 0.005 
GK2R -0.0323 0.0873 not sig. -0.2535 2.4162 0.010 
       
Technical 
knowledge 
      
  TK1 -0.1418 0.4144 not sig. 0.8645 9.1153 0.005 
  TK2 -0.1864 0.5002 not sig. 0.2572 2.7556 0.010 
TK3R 0.1545 0.3269 not sig. -0.1901 1.3137 0.100 
TK4R 0.8631 1.7824 0.050 -0.2120 1.4581 0.100 
       
Content 
complexity 
      
CT1R -0.3144 1.0028 not sig. -0.0817 0.6359 not sig. 
CT2R 0.5059 2.1729 0.025 -0.2681 1.7707 0.050 
CT3 0.7618 4.9935 0.005 1.0483 31.3977 0.005 
CT4R 0.2863 1.9472 0.050 -0.1470 1.7929 0.050 
* Italicised items are candidates for deletion 
 
Table 6.2 for Scenario 2 shows comparable outcomes except, for several 
items, namely RF1R (fairness of the penalty, one item to measure 
retributive fairness) and TK3R (technical knowledge item relating to tax 
deductions), which were not significant in both environments, and TK4R 
(one item to measure technical knowledge), CT2R and CT4R (items 
measuring content complexity), which were not significant for Malaysian 
sample. Similar to TK3R, TK4R is also concerned with taxpayers‟ 
knowledge on tax deductions, while CT2R and CT4R are concerned with 
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the complexity of the content of the income tax law. Specifically, CT2R 
asked taxpayers‟ perceptions of the complexity of the tax guide while 
CT4R measures content complexity in terms of the assistance taxpayers 
need in coping with their tax matters. The results further suggest that three 
indicators (RF1R, TK3R and CT1R, representing retributive fairness, 
technical knowledge and content complexity, respectively), were 
insignificant in both samples.  
 
Table 6.2 Formative Constructs, Indicators and Weights 
Scenario 2 (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Construct and 
Items 
New Zealand Malaysia 
PLS 
Weights 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
PLS 
Weights 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
       
General 
fairness 
      
GF1 0.6156 1.6798 0.050 0.7219 5.8746 0.005 
GF2 -0.5749 1.8589 0.050 0.4878 3.1588 0.005 
GF3R 0.5115 1.3626 0.100 -0.2008 1.4343 0.100 
       
Retributive 
fairness 
      
RF1R 0.2892 0.9603 not sig. -0.1158 0.7226 not sig. 
RF2 0.8615 2.0534 0.025 0.8468 5.0245 0.005 
RF3 -0.1777 0.2927 not sig. 0.3230 1.9857 0.025 
       
Administrative 
fairness 
      
AF1 0.4287 1.5446 0.100 0.3191 2.9465 0.005 
AF2 0.8335 3.2074 0.005 0.8842 14.8294 0.005 
       
General 
knowledge 
      
GK1 0.9787 7.3677 0.005 0.9173 17.1679 0.005 
GK2R -0.2107 0.8736 not sig. -0.2873 2.8055 0.005 
       
Technical 
knowledge 
      
  TK1 -0.0524 0.1282 not sig. 0.8847 11.1842 0.005 
  TK2 0.0765 0.2129 not sig. 0.2653 2.5829 0.005 
TK3R 0.0905 0.1943 not sig. -0.1538 0.8563 not sig. 
TK4R 0.9863 2.5859 0.005 -0.1163 0.8433 not sig. 
       
Content 
complexity 
      
CT1R -0.4136 1.1790 not sig. -0.1079 0.8139 not sig. 
CT2R 0.6231 2.2375 0.025 -0.1318 0.9706 not sig. 
CT3 0.6834 3.1600 0.005 1.0548 44.1376 0.005 
CT4R 0.3142 2.2429 0.025 -0.1275 1.2761 not sig. 
* Italicised items are candidates for deletion 
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Overall combining the results in both Scenarios indicates that 10 indicators 
were not significantly related to the measured constructs. There are 
conflicting views on their appropriate treatment. While Diamontopolous 
and Winklhofer (2001) suggest that it is proper to eliminate any non-
significant items to achieve all significant paths, other researchers (Bollen 
& Lennox, 1991; Cohen et al., 1990; Roberts & Thatcher, 2009) advise to 
retain them so as to preserve content validity. The proponents of this 
recommendation admit that statistical considerations are important but 
their conceptual reasoning holds more influence on the decisions whether 
to drop or retain the items (Cohen et al., 1990; Edwards & Bagozzi, 2000; 
Fornell et al., 1991; Petter et al., 2007). In this study, a compromise was 
made between these two views, of which some non-significant formative 
indicators were retained while others were dropped.  
 
From Tables 6.1 and 6.2, four items representing „retributive fairness‟, „tax 
knowledge‟ and „content complexity‟ (RF1R, RF3, TK3R and CT1R), 
were highlighted as the potential candidates for deletion as they were not 
significant in both data samples. However, only three were deleted, (that is, 
RF1R, TK3R and CT1R), measuring „retributive fairness‟, „technical 
knowledge‟ and „content complexity‟, respectively. This cautious decision 
was made after a thorough review of those items to ensure that the 
construct was still measuring the entire domain and that content validity 
was preserved (Petter et al., 2007). For example, in the case of retributive 
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fairness, from a statistical point of view, two items were possible 
candidates for deletion (RF1R and RF3). However, RF1R was finally 
removed on the ground that this item was found to measure a similar 
underlying phenomenon with RF2 (concerning degree of punishment). 
This follows the suggestion of Petter et al. (2007), to delete all highly 
correlated constructs (reflective constructs) except one, to ensure that the 
construct is purely formative. Furthermore, if RF3 had been deleted, it 
would have affected content validity as the item (late payment penalty) 
contributed conceptually to the „retributive fairness‟ construct.  
 
A similar justification applies to the removal of TK3R and CT1. Apart 
from not being statistically significant, both items seemed to be duplicated 
by other items in the construct.  
 
6.3.2.2 Reflective Constructs  
To establish construct validity of reflective items requires the examination 
of both convergent validity and discriminant validity. Convergent validity 
occurs when each measurement indicator correlates strongly with its 
associated theoretical construct, while discriminant validity takes place 
when each indicator correlates weakly with all other constructs except its 
associated construct (Gefen & Straub, 2005).  
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a. Convergent Validity 
Convergent validity requires the measures of each construct to correlate 
more with one another than with measures of another construct. One way 
of examining this is by observing the construct loadings and the 
corresponding t-statistics obtained in the PLS bootstrapping. While the 
recommended loadings should be greater than 0.7 (Chin, 1998a; 1998b; 
Dibbern & Chin, 2005; Hair et al., 2006), a loading of 0.5 and 0.6 is still 
acceptable for early stage scale development when there are additional 
indicators that exist for that construct (Chin, 1998b). Hair et al. (2006) 
further suggest the acceptable factor loading of 0.4 if the sample size is 200 
or more. With regard to the t-statistics, Gefen and Straub (2005) advocate a 
value above 1.96 as evidence of convergent validity. Based on their 
recommendations, a minimum item loading of 0.6, with t-value of 1.96 and 
above, was adopted since most of the constructs were newly developed. 
Exceptions were granted for exchange fairness and compliance complexity 
constructs which have a minimum loading of 0.4. This approach was taken 
in order to maintain the rule of having at least two items per construct 
(Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994; Rahim et al., 2001). As a result, six items 
(EF3R, VF3R, PF2R, CM2R, SND4, and PBD2R, representing exchange 
fairness, vertical fairness, personal fairness, compliance complexity, 
subjective norms and perceived behavioural control, respectively), were 
deleted to meet the above criteria.  
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For legal knowledge, two items of „legal knowledge‟ (LK2 and LK3R) 
were below 0.4, and by right they should have been deleted to maintain the 
convergent validity. However, removal of both items would impede the 
more important rule of having at least two indicators, as suggested by 
previous studies. Thus a review was made on both sentences to identify 
one measure that deserved deletion. Out of these two items, one is a 
positively worded item and the other is negatively worded. While the 
purpose of mixing these two types of statement is to encourage a careful 
response (Barnette, 2000; Benson & Hocevar, 1985; Nardi, 2003; Nunnally 
& Bernstein, 1994), other research suggests that it might hinder 
respondents‟ ability to answer the questions correctly (Schriesheim & Hill, 
1981). Furthermore, it is generally accepted that positively worded items 
are easier to understand in comparison to negatively worded items (Weems 
et al., 2006). Based on this argument, LK3R, with negative wording, was 
subsequently deleted from the model, resulting in the removal of seven 
items.  
 
Similar logic might explain the low loadings of other deleted items, of 
which all were expressed in negative wording, except for subjective norms 
(SND4). Even though care has been taken in developing these items, the 
limited amount of literature justified addressing their convergence 
problem, and therefore removal of those items is deemed necessary. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that removing individual measures of 
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reflective constructs might improve construct validity without affecting 
content validity (Bollen & Lennox, 1991; Petter et al., 2007).  
 
Another method of examining convergent validity is to examine the 
average variance extracted (AVE) (Dibbern & Chin, 2005). In order to be 
valid, the AVE should achieve the threshold of 0.5 and above (Bagozzi & 
Yi, 1988; Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Table 6.3 reveals that the AVEs of 
five constructs (exchange fairness, vertical fairness, personal fairness, legal 
knowledge, and subjective norms), were originally below 0.4, but the 
values subsequently improved (refer to Table 6.4) when items with low 
loadings were removed. 
Table 6.3 Reflective Constructs, Indicators and Loadings 
Scenario 1 (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Construct 
and Items 
New Zealand Malaysia 
PLS 
Loadings 
t-
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
PLS 
Loadings 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
       
Exchange 
fairness 
AVE = 0.533 AVE = 0.345 
EF1 0.9024 20.9920 0.005 0.5002 1.8216 0.050 
EF2 0.4360 1.9945 0.025 0.8310 7.4464 0.005 
EF3R 0.7715 9.9470 0.005 -0.3069 1.2513 not sig. 
       
Horizontal 
fairness 
AVE = 0.625 AVE = 0.662 
HF1 0.7683 7.2648 0.005 0.8202 33.5986 0.005 
HF2 0.8184 10.4580 0.005 0.8227 28.7036 0.005 
HF3 0.7833 10.7652 0.005 0.7983 24.5437 0.005 
       
Vertical 
fairness  
AVE = 0.588 AVE = 0.462 
VF1 0.8369 7.1147 0.005 0.7971 20.8653 0.005 
VF2 0.8979 4.7173 0.005 0.8437 24.2257 0.005 
VF3R 0.5070 1.7910 0.050 0.1944 1.6365 0.100 
       
Personal 
fairness 
AVE = 0.461  AVE = 0.411 
PF1 0.8229 6.0374 0.005 0.8521 30.4674 0.005 
PF2R -0.2802 0.7088 not sig. 0.0254 0.2119 not sig. 
PF3 0.7924 4.9791 0.005 0.7116 13.5811 0.005 
       
Legal 
knowledge  
AVE = 0.329 AVE = 0.495 
LK1 -0.5396 1.1912 not sig. 0.7330 15.6753 0.005 
LK2 -0.3176 0.6972 not sig. 0.9146 60.0122 0.005 
LK3R 0.7708 1.2276 not sig. 0.3346 3.1343 0.005 
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Compliance 
complexity 
AVE = 0.479 AVE = 0.530 
CM1 0.5232 1.6411 0.050 0.9215 65.1418 0.005 
CM2R 0.6963 2.1492 0.025 0.0899 0.7067 not sig. 
CM3 0.8245 5.5878 0.005 0.8553 28.1493 0.005 
       
Intention AVE = 0.694 AVE = 0.618 
IND1R  0.8356 21.2949 0.005 0.7136 20.4965 0.005 
IND2 0.7931 17.9954 0.005 0.8534 59.0471 0.005 
IND3 0.8695 36.4095 0.005 0.7853 32.6540 0.005 
       
Affective 
attitude 
AVE = 0.740 AVE = 0.631 
AFD1 0.8903 49.8605 0.005 0.8519 41.5851 0.005 
AFD2 0.9103 61.4738 0.005 0.8833 70.5394 0.005 
AFD3R 0.7738 21.3406 0.005 0.6225 14.4519 0.005 
       
Instrumental 
attitude 
AVE = 0.552 AVE = 0.648 
ISD1R 0.8200 3.1389 0.005 0.7869 8.0782 0.005 
ISD2R 0.6575 1.9784 0.025 0.8228 7.4612 0.005 
       
Subjective 
norms 
AVE = 0.660 AVE = 0.460 
SND1R 0.7815 19.1537 0.005 0.6776 15.6683 0.005 
SND2 0.7956 16.7178 0.005 0.7649 28.9798 0.005 
SND3R 0.8701 36.6703 0.005 0.7399 23.3800 0.005 
SND4 0.7989 19.8094 0.005 0.4970 7.9625 0.005 
       
Perceived 
control 
AVE = 0.551 AVE = 0.530 
PBD1 0.7581 7.3978 0.005 0.7732 21.2236 0.005 
PBD2R 0.6212 4.1463 0.005 0.1618 1.7786 0.050 
PBD3 0.8423 18.5455 0.005 0.7529 19.8592 0.005 
PBD4 0.7928 11.5007 0.005 0.8827 72.0830 0.005 
PBD5 0.6761 5.7850 0.005 0.8261 34.6251 0.005 
* Figures in bold indicate loadings or AVE below 0.6 or 0.5, respectively; while italicised 
items represent items to be deleted. 
 
Apart from improved AVEs, the revised model of all 28 remaining items 
also showed higher loadings of at least 0.6, except for one exchange 
fairness item (EF2) with a loading of 0.5839. If EF2 has been deleted only 
one item would have remained as a measure of exchange fairness (Table 
6.4). This would breach the requirement of minimum two items per 
construct (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994; Rahim et al., 2001). Therefore, 
this item has been retained for subsequent analysis.  
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Table 6.4 Reflective Constructs, Indicators and Loadings 
Scenario 1 (Revised model) 
 
Construct and 
Items 
New Zealand Malaysia 
PLS 
Loadings 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
PLS 
Loadings 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
       
Exchange fairness AVE = 0.600 AVE = 0.528 
EF1 0.9269 9.9717 0.005 0.6672 4.7341 0.005 
EF2 0.5839 2.5331 0.005 0.7815 7.1663 0.005 
       
Horizontal 
fairness 
AVE = 0.616 AVE = 0.662 
HF1 0.7077 5.6795 0.005 0.8204 31.6415 0.005 
HF2 0.8087 8.3191 0.005 0.8201 26.4695 0.005 
HF3 0.8324 9.2342 0.005 0.8005 27.0046 0.005 
       
Vertical fairness  AVE = 0.761 AVE = 0.674 
VF1 0.8501 11.1698 0.005 0.7973 23.3311 0.005 
VF2 0.8942 7.5493 0.005 0.8437 31.0847 0.005 
       
Personal fairness AVE = 0.699 AVE = 0.616 
PF1 0.8187 7.7436 0.005 0.8513 36.4591 0.005 
PF3 0.8526 7.8813 0.005 0.7127 18.3457 0.005 
       
Legal knowledge  AVE = 0.640 AVE = 0.713 
LK1 0.8567 10.8130 0.005 0.7624 17.1443 0.005 
LK2 0.7394 6.4629 0.005 0.9193 60.8028 0.005 
       
Compliance 
complexity 
AVE = 0.699 AVE = 0.798 
CM1 0.7081 4.0605 0.005 0.9229 82.2211 0.005 
CM3  0.9473 8.5038 0.005 0.8622 39.0363 0.005 
       
Intention AVE = 0.694 AVE = 0.618 
IND1R 0.8338 18.7353 0.005 0.7176 20.0676 0.005 
IND2 0.7952 21.3835 0.005 0.8523 59.2431 0.005 
IND3 0.8692 30.8218 0.005 0.7832 34.2529 0.005 
       
Affective attitude AVE = 0.740 AVE = 0.631 
AFD1 0.8904 52.1206 0.005 0.8517 38.2859 0.005 
AFD2 0.9103 56.8191 0.005 0.8831 70.5822 0.005 
AFD3R 0.7736 17.6830 0.005 0.6231 14.8012 0.005 
       
Instrumental 
attitude 
AVE = 0.552 AVE = 0.648 
ISD1R 0.8289 4.7396 0.005 0.7930 5.5754 0.005 
ISD2R 0.6456 1.9678 0.100 0.8172 5.1226 0.005 
       
Subjective norms AVE = 0.702 AVE = 0.559 
SND1R 0.8201 22.8035 0.005 0.7152 18.8990 0.005 
SND2 0.8124 20.1660 0.005 0.7563 29.3463 0.005 
SND3R 0.8793 36.3195 0.005 0.7712 24.3040 0.005 
       
Perceived control AVE = 0.596 AVE = 0.658 
PBD1 0.7134 7.6304 0.005 0.7760 24.1612 0.005 
PBD3 0.8491 17.1803 0.005 0.7564 20.7242 0.005 
PBD4 0.7800 10.2843 0.005 0.8833 74.4170 0.005 
PBD5 0.7378 8.1040 0.005 0.8239 31.5255 0.005 
 
A similar approach was conducted on Scenario 2 (relating to understating 
other income), where the analysis produced similar results (Table 6.5). The 
loadings for personal fairness (PF1), legal knowledge (LK2) and 
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instrumental attitude (ISS2R) items were slightly lower, but still above 0.5 
(Chin, 1998a). These items were therefore retained to improve the 
reliability of the construct (personal fairness and legal knowledge), and 
meet the minimum requirement of two items per construct (instrumental 
attitude). Consequently, parallel to Scenario 1, seven items with low 
loadings (EF3R, VF3R, PF2R, LK3R, CM2R, SNS4 and PBS1R, 
representing exchange fairness, vertical fairness, personal fairness, legal 
knowledge, compliance complexity, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control, respectively), were deleted.  
 
In terms of AVE, four constructs (exchange fairness, vertical fairness, 
personal fairness and legal knowledge) had values below the threshold of 
0.5, providing support to remove several items, as suggested by the item 
loadings.  
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Table 6.5 Reflective Constructs, Indicators and Loadings 
Scenario 2 (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Construct  New Zealand Malaysia 
and Items PLS 
Loadings 
t-
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
PLS 
Loadings 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
       
Exchange 
fairness 
AVE = 0.492 AVE = 0.373 
EF1 0.9387 8.7692 0.005 0.8391 4.1319 0.005 
EF2 0.4775 3.0183 0.005 0.5419 1.7733 0.050 
EF3R 0.6045 5.1633 0.005 0.3483 0.8488 not sig. 
       
Horizontal 
fairness 
AVE = 0.592 AVE = 0.661 
HF1 0.6640 3.5971 0.005 0.8130 34.0252 0.005 
HF2 0.7728 4.5972 0.005 0.8154 22.4026 0.005 
HF3 0.8585 4.8514 0.005 0.8115 26.1232 0.005 
       
Vertical 
fairness  
AVE = 0.579 AVE = 0.463 
VF1 0.8643 7.0623 0.005 0.8164 26.3240 0.005 
VF2 0.9199 7.9334 0.005 0.8258 27.7621 0.005 
VF3R 0.3787 1.8073 0.050 0.2034 1.8185 0.050 
       
Personal 
fairness 
AVE = 0.443 AVE = 0.410 
PF1 0.5958 2.9599 0.005 0.8404 26.9001 0.005 
PF2R 0.5011 1.2069 not sig. -0.0506 0.3933 not sig. 
PF3 0.8506 4.4692 0.005 0.7220 17.6894 0.005 
       
Legal 
knowledge  
AVE = 0.381 AVE = 0.494 
LK1 0.8033 3.1726 0.005 0.7127 12.4842 0.005 
LK2 0.5933 2.2404 0.025 0.9223 68.0397 0.005 
LK3R -0.3810 0.6592 not sig. 0.3492 3.1737 0.005 
       
Compliance 
complexity 
AVE = 0.525 AVE = 0.535 
CM1 0.7412 2.7516 0.005 0.9200 68.6230 0.005 
CM2R 0.6174 1.6707 0.050 0.1211 0.9739 not sig. 
CM3 0.8026 4.4471 0.005 0.8622 30.3890 0.005 
       
Intention AVE = 0.741 AVE = 0.670 
INS1 0.9399 8.9477 0.005 0.8883 95.6698 0.005 
INS2 0.7746 7.7608 0.005 0.7907 30.8406 0.005 
INS3R 0.8597 8.6790 0.005 0.7721 30.2272 0.005 
       
Affective 
attitude 
AVE = 0.738 AVE = 0.711 
AFS1 0.9052 8.8696 0.005 0.9043 78.9188 0.005 
AFS2 0.8717 8.5753 0.005 0.9034 72.0915 0.005 
AFS3R 0.7967 8.6258 0.005 0.7063 20.7253 0.005 
       
Instrumental 
attitude 
AVE = 0.565  AVE = 0.570 
ISS1 0.7220 5.0835 0.005 0.8943 29.8622 0.005 
ISS2R 0.7801 5.7637 0.005 0.5835 7.1217 0.005 
       
Subjective 
norms 
AVE = 0.595 AVE = 0.642 
SNS1R 0.8129 8.2281 0.005 0.8386 47.8350 0.005 
SNS2 0.8935 8.8298 0.005 0.7443 29.1542 0.005 
SNS3R 0.8732 8.6875 0.005 0.7884 30.7893 0.005 
SNS4 / SNS4R 0.3977 4.0450 0.005 0.8313 44.9107 0.005 
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Perceived 
control 
AVE = 0.581 AVE = 0.533 
PBS1R 0.3181 2.8309 0.005 0.2293 2.9023 0.005 
PBS2 0.7888 7.8373 0.005 0.7672 26.9629 0.005 
PBS3 0.8480 8.6686 0.005 0.7575 23.4037 0.005 
PBS4 0.8829 8.6172 0.005 0.8786 63.8594 0.005 
PBS5 0.8250 8.5912 0.005 0.8236 39.4065 0.005 
* Figures in bold indicate loadings or AVE below 0.6 or 0.5, respectively; while italicised 
items represent items to be deleted. 
 
The re-run test on the remaining indicators indicated better loadings as 
displayed in Table 6.6. In fact, the loadings for all items have increased to 
more than 0.6, except for the „instrumental attitude‟ item (ISS2R) for 
which the loading was stable at 0.58. In addition to this, the AVEs, 
particularly of the four constructs identified earlier, had also improved 
significantly, which satisfied the convergent validity condition (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981).   
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Table 6.6 Reflective Constructs, Indicators and Loadings 
Scenario 2 (Revised Model) 
 
Construct 
and Items 
New Zealand Malaysia 
PLS 
Loadings 
t-
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
PLS 
Loadings 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
       
Exchange 
fairness 
AVE = 0.603 AVE = 0.528 
EF1 0.9169 12.3140 0.005 0.7924 7.9051 0.005 
EF2 0.6047 3.0872 0.005 0.6540 4.8302 0.005 
       
Horizontal 
fairness 
AVE = 0.595 AVE = 0.661 
HF1 0.6109 3.4099 0.005 0.8133 32.3795 0.005 
HF2 0.8082 5.6337 0.005 0.8109 22.1034 0.005 
HF3 0.8703 7.0942 0.005 0.8151 25.3093 0.005 
       
Vertical 
fairness  
AVE = 0.762 AVE = 0.674 
VF1 0.8722 16.0155 0.005 0.8165 27.2260 0.005 
VF2 0.8739 16.8778 0.005 0.8258 25.3514 0.005 
       
Personal 
fairness 
AVE = 0.681 AVE = 0.617 
PF1 0.7015 5.6147 0.005 0.8437 32.5484 0.005 
PF3 0.9330 6.6159 0.005 0.7227 15.9622 0.005 
       
Legal 
knowledge  
AVE = 0.639 AVE = 0.710 
LK1 0.8696 12.0432 0.005 0.7471 18.2436 0.005 
LK2 0.7219 6.7950 0.005 0.9282 65.8648 0.005 
       
Compliance 
complexity 
AVE = 0.711 AVE = 0.798 
CM1 0.7560 9.3553 0.005 0.9201 76.5415 0.005 
CM3 0.9224 6.7889 0.005 0.8658 43.9460 0.005 
       
Intention AVE = 0.760 AVE = 0.670 
INS1 0.9342 95.5884 0.005 0.8884 99.4664 0.005 
INS2 0.8303 21.5070 0.005 0.7921 27.8647 0.005 
INS3R 0.8469 27.4275 0.005 0.7707 27.5944 0.005 
       
Affective 
attitude 
AVE = 0.710 AVE = 0.711 
AFS1 0.8555 22.5390 0.005 0.9055 84.4308 0.005 
AFS2 0.8962 53.2312 0.005 0.9044 81.4470 0.005 
AFS3R 0.7720 20.1922 0.005 0.7038 25.2547 0.005 
       
Instrumental 
attitude 
AVE = 0.591 AVE = 0.570 
ISS1 0.7924 5.9851 0.005 0.8953 35.6605 0.005 
ISS2R 0.7444 5.8530 0.005 0.5818 8.4530 0.005 
       
Subjective 
norms 
AVE = 0.747 AVE = 0.654 
SNS1R 0.7949 18.6877 0.005 0.8492 55.4851 0.005 
SNS2 0.9074 68.8070 0.005 0.7896 40.3286 0.005 
SNS3R 0.8856 35.7852 0.005 0.7866 31.5517 0.005 
       
Perceived 
control 
AVE = 0.682 AVE = 0.676 
PBS2 0.8168 19.7141 0.005 0.7843 37.1882 0.005 
PBS3 0.8441 33.2785 0.005 0.7756 33.2751 0.005 
PBS4 0.8795 35.0175 0.005 0.8898 77.4915 0.005 
PBS5 0.7588 20.9016 0.005 0.8336 42.2967 0.005 
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b. Discriminant Validity 
Discriminant validity demands a strong correlation between an indicator 
and its associated construct but weak correlation with all other constructs 
(Gefen & Straub, 2005). The two procedures used to assess discriminant 
validity are (1) item cross-loadings; and (2) the ratio of the square root of 
the AVE of each construct to the correlations of this construct to all other 
constructs (Gefen & Straub, 2005).  
 
To obtain the cross-loadings correlation matrices were generated (using 
SPSS) by correlating the scores of each latent variable with their respective 
block of indicators and all other items in the model (Chin, 1998b). The 
results are presented in Tables 6.7 to 6.10 for both scenarios applying the 
New Zealand and Malaysian data. Moving across the rows and down the 
columns of the matrix reveals that each item loads higher on its 
corresponding construct than any other construct, providing support that 
the latent component scores predict each indicator in its block better than 
indicators in other blocks (Chin, 1998b). For instance, indicators IND1R, 
IND2 and IND3 have higher loadings in the intention to comply (IND) 
column compared with their loadings in other constructs. This instance 
suggests that IND1R, IND2 and IND3 are the correct measures of intention 
to comply. 
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Table 6.7 Loading and Cross-loading Matrix 
Scenario 1 - New Zealand (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
 IND AFD ISD SND PBD GF* EF HF VF RF* PF AF* GK* LK TK* CT* CM 
IND1R 
.83 .50 .07 .42 -.25 .08 -.01 .06 .02 .13 .11 -.07 .10 .09 .10 .07 .04 
IND2 
.79 .52 .06 .36 -.35 .15 -.05 .10 -.02 .14 .10 -.11 .00 .09 .12 -.00 .05 
IND3 
.86 .64 .06 .43 -.27 .01 -.11 .08 -.04 .20 .07 -.11 .04 .07 .12 -.01 .11 
AFD1 .57 .89 .11 .41 -.38 -.00 -.04 .11 -.05 .14 .01 -.09 -.05 -.08 -.04 .01 .09 
AFD2 
.58 .91 .14 .37 -.36 .05 -.01 .10 -.10 .07 .06 .02 .01 -.01 -.05 .11 .12 
AFD3R 
.58 .77 .14 .50 -.34 .04 .00 .07 .06 .17 .05 -.00 .04 .10 .10 .11 .08 
ISD1R .08 .07 .82 .12 -.19 -.12 -.01 -.05 -.04 -.07 .06 -.15 -.13 -.09 .00 -.01 -.01 
ISD2R 
.03 .17 .64 .14 -.13 -.03 .02 -.08 -.05 -.12 .11 .01 -.09 -.23 -.10 .06 .06 
SND1R .37 .32 .10 .82 -.26 .01 -.03 .07 .01 .13 .05 -.12 .05 .07 .18 .03 .06 
SND2 
.41 .43 .11 .81 -.27 .05 -.03 .13 -.07 .18 .01 -.14 .09 .03 .11 .04 .12 
SND3R 
.44 .49 .21 .87 -.31 .05 -.04 .11 -.02 .12 .06 -.02 .00 .05 .18 .14 .19 
PBD1 -.13 -.26 -.21 -.19 .71 -.01 .05 -.14 .04 .07 .01 .18 .00 .12 .20 .04 .05 
PBD3 
-.31 -.42 -.16 -.29 .84 .01 .02 -.14 -.04 -.02 -.11 .14 -.02 .03 .12 .02 -.02 
PBD4 
-.21 -.27 -.14 -.21 .78 .01 .07 -.17 .03 -.01 -.08 .16 .02 .01 .08 .11 .08 
PBD5 
-.35 -.31 -.16 -.31 .73 -.11 .02 -.01 -.06 -.02 .04 .16 .01 .07 -.07 -.05 .01 
GF1 .09 .02 -.08 .04 -.06 .83 .34 .08 .20 -.01 .21 .07 .23 .09 .13 .23 .13 
GF2 
-.07 .01 .05 .00 -.03 -.10 .21 .07 .10 -.04 .20 .24 .03 .01 -.03 -.01 -.02 
GF3R 
.00 .03 -.06 .03 .00 .61 .39 -.12 .24 -.01 .00 .10 .05 -.01 .11 .25 .09 
EF1 -.10 -.02 .01 -.03 .07 .32 .92 -.01 .33 .03 .09 .28 .28 .08 .04 .32 .14 
EF2 
.03 -.01 -.03 -.03 -.04 .31 .58 .08 .58 .25 .17 .10 .15 .04 .12 .12 -.02 
HF1 .07 .10 -.04 .11 -.07 .06 .10 .70 .18 .15 .21 -.01 .03 .04 -.12 .07 .09 
HF2 
.08 .06 -.11 .16 -.05 -.01 .08 .80 .14 .27 .19 -.01 .17 .15 .07 .04 -.01 
HF3 
.08 .10 -.04 .05 -.17 -.04 -.07 .83 -.03 .11 .17 -.01 .12 .22 -.09 .05 .01 
VF1 -.04 -.04 -.03 -.08 -.03 .19 .43 .05 .85 .12 .09 .03 .19 .03 .02 .04 -.11 
VF2 
.01 -.01 -.07 .01 -.01 .23 .45 .11 .89 .16 .12 .06 .24 .08 .15 .10 .04 
RF2 .18 .14 -.14 .11 .03 .07 .24 .23 .22 .90 .11 .00 .22 .08 .18 .03 .01 
RF3 
-.06 -.04 -.00 -.15 .09 .14 .25 -.01 .10 -.35 .12 .29 .17 .15 -.07 .25 .18 
PF1 .10 .01 .16 .01 -.10 .10 .18 .18 .12 .00 .81 .01 .08 .07 -.11 .08 .07 
PF3 
.08 .07 .03 .08 .01 .07 .06 .21 .08 .08 .85 .02 .17 .07 -.19 .01 -.02 
AF1 -.10 -.06 -.13 -.13 .26 .00 .22 -.02 .01 -.12 .05 .90 .13 .24 .02 .26 .15 
AF2 
-.07 .06 -.01 -.02 -.01 .07 .22 .01 .10 -.05 -.04 .62 .17 .03 -.03 .25 .07 
GK1 .07 .01 -.16 .07 -.01 .20 .29 .15 .25 .14 .15 .17 .99 .31 .00 .17 .10 
GK2R 
.23 .12 -.04 .28 -.15 .08 -.06 .06 .01 .09 -.04 -.11 -.01 .12 .24 .08 .10 
LK1 .09 .01 -.12 .02 .07 .03 .06 .164 .07 .00 .07 .21 .25 .85 -.01 -.02 .07 
LK2 
.06 .00 -.22 .08 .05 .07 .07 .15 .04 .03 .07 .10 .23 .73 .02 .11 .15 
TK1 -.09 -.01 -.08 -.02 -.01 .03 .01 .04 -.06 .03 .18 .08 .09 .17 -.22 .08 .05 
TK2 
-.16 .00 -.10 -.02 .02 -.01 -.05 .11 -.06 -.07 .17 -.01 .11 .09 -.48 -.05 -.01 
TK4R 
.09 .00 -.11 .20 .10 .19 .08 -.02 .09 .21 -.12 .01 .03 .07 .94 .33 .21 
CT2R .03 .10 .10 .08 .01 .24 .20 .03 .03 -.03 -.03 .18 .15 .03 .36 .63 .43 
CT3 
.01 .10 .01 .09 .01 .26 .28 .07 .06 -.06 .09 .31 .14 .05 .14 .90 .44 
CT4R 
.02 -.07 -.05 .01 .06 .18 .14 -.00 .11 -.03 -.01 .14 .03 -.01 .31 .49 .38 
CM1 .02 .02 -.03 .10 .07 .04 .05 .05 -.08 .05 .02 .10 .09 .12 .21 .41 .70 
CM3 
.10 .13 .04 .15 -.00 .18 .11 .01 -.01 -.10 .02 .15 .07 .11 .13 .52 .94 
* = formative constructs, therefore loadings are not interpreted. 
Bolded figures in each block indicate that the constructs are well-measured by their indicators. 
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Table 6.8 Loading and Cross-loading Matrix 
Scenario 1 – Malaysia (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
 IND AFD ISD SND PBD GF* EF HF VF RF* PF AF* GK* LK TK* CT* CM 
IND1R 
.71 .39 .26 .47 -.30 -.14 -.05 -.24 -.01 .02 -.01 -.09 .012 .01 -.10 -.05 .04 
IND2 
.85 .55 .05 .49 -.17 -.02 .10 -.12 .10 .09 .08 .04 .090 .10 .06 .15 .14 
IND3 
.78 .57 .13 .48 -.10 .06 .12 -.11 .13 .22 .22 .12 .178 .20 .14 .21 .15 
AFD1 .52 .85 .12 .36 -.18 .03 .04 -.07 .11 .10 .16 .09 .147 .16 .14 .08 .07 
AFD2 
.58 .88 .16 .44 -.17 .04 .11 -.10 .11 .15 .23 .12 .154 .16 .16 .14 .13 
AFD3R 
.44 .62 .27 .51 -.45 -.10 -.01 -.21 .03 .03 .04 -.08 .028 .05 -.06 -.05 .07 
ISD1R .11 .12 .79 .20 -.35 .07 -.06 .07 -.01 .01 .07 -.01 .010 -.01 -.02 -.04 .01 
ISD2R 
.17 .23 .81 .32 -.43 -.02 -.02 -.05 -.04 .01 .01 -.06 -.060 .01 -.09 -.07 .00 
SND1R .37 .38 .32 .71 -.34 -.08 -.05 -.26 -.01 .12 .02 -.04 .010 .06 -.02 -.03 .01 
SND2 
.53 .42 .08 .75 -.13 .12 .18 -.02 .17 .20 .20 .17 .205 .10 .14 .22 .17 
SND3R 
.44 .42 .38 .77 -.43 -.03 .03 -.15 -.01 .09 .01 -.06 .060 .01 -.04 .01 .06 
PBD1 -.23 -.30 -.45 -.36 .77 -.00 .01 .09 -.01 .03 .00 .02 .081 .07 .09 .04 -.02 
PBD3 
-.08 -.11 -.36 -.18 .75 .04 .14 .08 .09 .11 .10 .11 .146 .16 .13 .16 .08 
PBD4 
-.19 -.25 -.41 -.34 .88 .05 .04 .09 .09 .10 .06 .07 .136 .13 .16 .15 .04 
PBD5 
-.24 -.32 -.37 -.34 .82 .05 .01 .08 -.00 .03 .04 .10 .089 .08 .12 .11 .05 
GF1 .01 .02 .02 .03 -.01 .65 .33 .16 .05 .03 .27 .38 .232 .06 .03 .20 .12 
GF2 
-.04 -.01 .04 .01 .06 .90 .25 .21 .13 .08 .37 .32 .189 .08 .20 .29 .13 
GF3R 
.01 .03 .06 .05 -.02 -.17 -.06 -.11 -.11 -.06 .01 .02 -.002 -.02 -.05 -.07 -.01 
EF1 .06 .05 -.02 .06 -.01 .46 .66 .11 .05 .05 .31 .39 .182 .09 .03 .19 .11 
EF2 
.06 .04 -.04 .06 .08 .08 .78 .14 .49 .18 .24 .13 .157 .19 .20 .14 .05 
HF1 -.16 -.12 -.00 -.17 .10 .17 .11 .82 .05 .01 .10 .16 .050 .02 .08 .10 -.01 
HF2 
-.13 -.12 .01 -.11 .04 .19 .15 .82 .11 .02 .10 .15 .108 .01 .09 .11 -.05 
HF3 
-.18 -.13 .01 -.14 .11 .24 .15 .80 .13 .06 .11 .18 .100 .04 .07 .13 .05 
VF1 .05 .06 -.08 .03 .07 .14 .25 .13 .77 .15 .25 .16 .255 .16 .23 .16 .13 
VF2 
.11 .11 .01 .09 .01 .11 .39 .08 .84 .19 .28 .09 .271 .13 .27 .12 .04 
RF2 .15 .13 .01 .19 .08 .06 .15 .02 .25 .99 .27 .13 .324 .34 .29 .17 .13 
RF3 
.01 .00 .00 .04 .05 .16 .11 .12 .03 .38 .12 .24 .111 .17 .10 .22 .16 
PF1 .13 .18 .04 .10 .05 .38 .25 .05 .17 .20 .85 .26 .332 .24 .24 .26 .22 
PF3 
.07 .11 .05 .07 .04 .21 .36 .17 .39 .24 .71 .29 .230 .16 .22 .24 .12 
AF1 -.01 .02 .02 .03 .05 .25 .23 .13 .12 .10 .24 .48 .106 .14 .11 .16 .17 
AF2 
.05 .06 -.06 .04 .09 .36 .31 .18 .15 .14 .31 .95 .286 .19 .12 .31 .24 
GK1 .15 .16 -.02 .14 .11 .20 .22 .05 .36 .33 .35 .27 .967 .40 .32 .34 .22 
GK2R 
.07 .02 .02 .00 -.10 -.22 -.07 -.20 -.00 -.07 -.11 -.13 -.393 -.14 -.19 -.21 -.10 
LK1 -.01 .01 -.01 .01 .14 .07 .16 .06 .04 .18 .15 .12 .279 .76 .14 .13 .10 
LK2 
.20 .22 .00 .10 .10 .08 .18 .01 .21 .37 .27 .22 .402 .91 .31 .26 .25 
TK1 .11 .16 -.05 .10 .10 .15 .18 .03 .22 .30 .30 .14 .350 .31 .94 .21 .21 
TK2 
-.02 -.00 -.05 -.02 .09 .08 .01 .13 .17 .11 .11 .06 .147 .06 .46 .10 .09 
TK4R 
.20 .19 .09 .18 -.19 -.09 -.03 -.19 -.07 .04 .03 .00 .003 .05 -.14 -.05 .29 
CT2R .09 .09 .14 .16 -.15 -.00 -.00 -.12 -.01 -.01 -.01 .05 .001 -.01 -.09 -.06 .40 
CT3 
.19 .13 -.01 .17 .08 .30 .21 .07 .16 .20 .31 .32 .360 .25 .18 .93 .56 
CT4R 
.17 .17 .12 .13 -.10 -.04 -.02 -.19 .01 .09 .06 .00 .021 .09 -.03 -.04 .38 
CM1 .14 .13 .01 .13 .03 .14 .10 -.01 .14 .14 .23 .26 .246 .22 .17 .35 .92 
CM3 
.11 .08 .00 .08 .05 .14 .09 .01 .03 .10 .16 .21 .162 .17 .08 .39 .862 
* = formative constructs, therefore loadings are not interpreted. 
Bolded figures in each block indicate that the constructs are well-measured by their indicators. 
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Table 6.9 Loading and Cross-loading Matrix 
Scenario 2 - New Zealand (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
 INS AFS ISS SNS PBS GF* EF HF VF RF* PF AF* GK* LK TK* CT* CM 
INS1 
.93 .75 .41 .70 -.50 .11 .18 -.05 .08 .06 .01 .09 .07 .00 -.02 .29 .06 
INS2 
.83 .64 .33 .57 -.47 -.06 -.01 -.02 -.03 -.05 .02 .08 .02 -.07 -.08 .11 -.03 
INS3R 
.84 .65 .30 .63 -.42 .14 .14 .07 .07 .07 .08 .09 .05 .09 .05 .23 .06 
AFS1 .60 .85 .28 .47 -.34 -.04 .07 -.07 .00 .05 .01 .01 .06 -.10 .02 .09 .01 
AFS2 
.69 .89 .33 .54 -.44 .05 .08 -.01 -.01 .05 .02 -.02 -.02 -.09 .08 .17 .01 
AFS3R 
.68 .77 .29 .58 -.40 .08 .04 .06 -.05 .04 .01 .06 .02 .07 -.03 .17 .11 
ISS1 .33 .31 .79 .28 -.40 -.10 .03 .04 -.01 -.01 .08 -.02 -.01 -.15 .09 .07 -.01 
ISS2R 
.28 .24 .74 .22 -.30 -.06 .02 -.13 -.01 .05 -.02 -.07 -.07 -.22 -.10 .09 .10 
SNS1R .51 .41 .12 .79 -.22 .06 .05 .11 .00 .08 .03 .11 .05 .09 -.00 .22 .11 
SNS2 
.75 .68 .44 .90 -.44 .00 .09 .05 .02 .03 .09 .05 -.04 -.05 .02 .18 .03 
SNS3R 
.60 .52 .25 .88 -.34 .07 .10 .10 .04 -.01 -.01 .01 .08 .01 -.05 .23 .12 
PBS2 -.34 -.30 -.40 -.25 .81 .08 .01 -.11 -.04 .13 -.13 .08 -.06 .07 -.13 .05 .06 
PBS3 
-.47 -.42 -.47 -.36 .84 .07 -.03 -.11 .03 .00 -.02 .01 .00 .10 -.11 -.05 .01 
PBS4 
-.42 -.41 -.38 -.32 .87 .04 .01 -.07 -.01 .17 -.05 .11 .02 .18 -.08 .05 .07 
PBS5 
-.51 -.41 -.27 -.36 .75 -.13 -.06 -.03 -.09 .03 .04 .12 -.06 .04 .05 -.06 .01 
GF1 .04 -.01 -.12 .05 -.01 .82 .34 .08 .20 .17 .19 .08 .22 .09 .01 .23 .13 
GF2 
.01 -.09 .01 .03 -.07 -.03 .21 .06 .10 .03 .18 .24 .04 .01 .08 -.01 -.02 
GF3R 
.08 .04 -.01 .03 -.00 .66 .39 -.14 .24 .06 .00 .10 .04 -.01 -.05 .25 .08 
EF1 .11 .11 .05 .12 -.01 .34 .91 -.01 .33 .32 .07 .28 .29 .08 -.01 .32 .13 
EF2 
.08 -.03 -.02 -.00 -.05 .33 .60 .05 .58 .16 .15 .10 .14 .05 -.11 .12 -.02 
HF1 -.01 -.03 .01 .09 -.00 .06 .10 .61 .18 .05 .20 -.01 .03 .04 .09 .07 .09 
HF2 
.01 -.02 -.07 .07 -.09 -.01 .09 .80 .14 .06 .19 -.02 .16 .14 -.01 .04 .00 
HF3 
-.01 .01 -.03 .08 -.08 -.06 -.07 .87 -.03 .10 .17 -.00 .12 .22 .12 .05 .01 
VF1 .05 -.01 -.01 -.01 -.05 .20 .43 .03 .87 .09 .08 .03 .19 .04 -.08 .04 -.11 
VF2 
.04 -.04 -.02 .05 -.01 .24 .46 .09 .87 .22 .11 .06 .23 .08 -.10 .11 .03 
RF2 .15 .15 -.03 .13 .02 .06 .25 .23 .22 .50 .12 .01 .21 .08 -.01 .03 .02 
RF3 
-.03 -.01 .05 -.02 .10 .15 .25 -.00 .09 .89 .11 .31 .18 .15 .16 .25 .18 
PF1 .01 -.00 .09 .02 -.06 .11 .18 .17 .12 .13 .70 .01 .09 .07 .12 .08 .07 
PF3 
.05 .02 .01 .05 -.02 .08 .07 .21 .08 .13 .93 .02 .17 .07 .29 .01 -.02 
AF1 .08 -.01 -.08 .06 .06 .01 .21 -.02 .01 .14 .04 .87 .14 .24 .03 .26 .15 
AF2 
.08 .05 -.00 .04 .10 .08 .22 .01 .10 .33 -.03 .66 .18 .03 .03 .24 .07 
GK1 .08 .03 -.07 .05 -.03 .20 .29 .16 .25 .24 .16 .18 .98 .31 .10 .17 .10 
GK2R 
.12 .08 -.13 .14 -.03 .08 -.06 .05 .01 -.05 -.04 -.11 -.10 .12 -.18 .08 .11 
LK1 -.03 -.07 -.21 -.02 .11 .03 .06 .17 .07 .17 .07 .21 .24 .87 .06 -.02 .07 
LK2 
.06 .00 -.18 .05 .08 .07 .07 .17 .03 .09 .07 .10 .21 .72 .20 .11 .15 
TK1 .07 .04 -.05 .07 -.11 .03 .01 .04 -.06 .13 .19 .08 .09 .17 .76 .08 .05 
TK2 
-.07 .02 .04 -.02 .05 -.01 -.05 .10 -.06 .12 .18 -.01 .12 .09 .66 -.05 -.01 
TK4R 
.12 .03 -.06 .16 .09 .19 .08 -.01 .08 .08 -.13 .01 .01 .06 -.41 .33 .22 
CT2R .17 .13 .03 .09 .04 .24 .20 .03 .03 .15 -.03 .18 .13 .02 -.16 .64 .43 
CT3 
.23 .17 .15 .26 -.04 .26 .28 .07 .06 .20 .08 .31 .15 .04 .06 .90 .44 
CT4R 
.08 .04 -.07 .09 .03 .17 .14 -.01 .10 .15 -.03 .14 .01 -.01 -.23 .51 .39 
CM1 .03 .04 .01 .07 .03 .03 .05 .03 -.08 .12 .01 .10 .08 .11 -.02 .41 .75 
CM3 
.03 .05 .07 .09 .04 .18 .10 .00 -.01 .16 .01 .15 .06 .11 -.02 .52 .92 
* = formative constructs, therefore loadings are not interpreted. 
Bolded figures in each block indicate that the constructs are well-measured by their indicators. 
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Table 6.10 Loading and Cross-loading Matrix 
Scenario 2 – Malaysia (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
 INS AFS ISS SNS PBS GF* EF HF VF RF* PF AF* GK* LK TK* CT* CM 
INS1 
.88 .65 .50 .61 -.34 .21 .15 .05 .02 .07 .10 .16 .06 .01 .01 .15 .08 
INS2 
.79 .55 .40 .47 -.22 .15 .17 .02 .15 .13 .12 .11 .11 .07 .07 .19 .10 
INS3R 
.77 .55 .37 .66 -.47 .04 .06 -.06 .00 .01 .02 .03 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.04 -.00 
AFS1 .62 .90 .44 .50 -.27 .16 .10 .11 .05 .06 .10 .11 .04 .01 .00 .11 .07 
AFS2 
.61 .90 .45 .50 -.29 .13 .12 .12 .04 .06 .08 .13 .06 .01 -.01 .11 .07 
AFS3R 
.57 .70 .34 .60 -.46 .03 .08 -.04 .01 .05 .08 .01 .05 .02 -.02 .00 -.01 
ISS1 .47 .45 .89 .47 -.27 .17 .06 .22 .05 .04 .08 .08 -.02 -.05 .01 .11 -.01 
ISS2R 
.29 .26 .58 .32 -.43 -.01 .01 .05 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.04 -.06 -.11 -.04 -.05 -.07 
SNS1R .59 .50 .40 .84 -.49 .07 .06 .01 -.01 .03 -.02 .02 -.03 -.01 -.05 -.03 -.07 
SNS2 
.62 .55 .51 .79 -.25 .18 .11 .15 .06 .16 .04 .12 .04 .05 .07 .15 .01 
SNS3R 
.52 .46 .36 .78 -.46 -.02 -.01 -.03 -.05 -.01 -.08 -.07 -.08 -.03 -.08 -.07 -.06 
PBS2 -.38 -.33 -.29 -.45 .78 -.08 -.02 .02 .04 .03 .03 -.00 .02 .12 .03 .00 .03 
PBS3 
-.27 -.23 -.34 -.32 .77 -.06 -.01 -.07 .05 .09 .06 -.02 .03 .10 .06 -.00 .06 
PBS4 
-.37 -.35 -.39 -.41 .89 -.08 -.03 -.01 .06 .08 .04 .01 .06 .08 .07 .08 .08 
PBS5 
-.37 -.38 -.35 -.42 .83 -.06 -.05 -.02 .09 .10 .05 .01 .06 .06 .13 .06 .10 
GF1 .17 .17 .12 .11 -.10 .86 .41 .16 .05 .04 .26 .38 .23 .06 .03 .21 .12 
GF2 
.07 .02 .09 .03 -.02 .72 .28 .21 .13 .10 .36 .32 .18 .08 .20 .29 .13 
GF3R 
-.02 .02 -.03 -.01 -.00 -.11 -.04 -.11 -.11 -.07 .01 .02 -.00 -.02 -.04 -.06 -.01 
EF1 .14 .12 .04 .05 -.05 .54 .79 .11 .05 .07 .31 .39 .18 .09 .03 .20 .11 
EF2 
.07 .05 .03 .06 .01 .05 .65 .14 .48 .17 .25 .14 .15 .19 .20 .13 .05 
HF1 .01 .05 .16 .05 -.02 .16 .11 .81 .06 .02 .10 .16 .05 .02 .07 .09 -.01 
HF2 
-.01 .04 .13 .02 -.01 .19 .15 .81 .11 .04 .10 .15 .10 .01 .08 .10 -.05 
HF3 
.01 .09 .19 .06 -.02 .23 .15 .81 .14 .08 .11 .18 .10 .04 .05 .12 .05 
VF1 .08 .05 .02 -.01 .04 .13 .22 .13 .81 .15 .25 .16 .25 .16 .24 .16 .13 
VF2 
.02 .01 -.01 .01 .08 .08 .33 .08 .82 .17 .28 .09 .27 .14 .27 .12 .04 
RF2 .05 .04 -.01 .06 .10 .05 .13 .02 .21 .95 .27 .13 .32 .35 .29 .17 .13 
RF3 
.12 .09 .06 .09 .00 .15 .13 .12 .05 .53 .12 .24 .11 .17 .10 .22 .16 
PF1 .09 .08 -.00 -.03 .05 .36 .27 .05 .19 .20 .84 .27 .33 .24 .25 .26 .22 
PF3 
.05 .08 .06 .01 .04 .20 .35 .17 .34 .24 .72 .29 .23 .16 .21 .23 .12 
AF1 .06 .01 .07 .04 .06 .25 .24 .13 .14 .11 .24 .49 .10 .14 .10 .16 .17 
AF2 
.12 .11 .03 .02 -.02 .39 .35 .18 .12 .18 .31 .95 .28 .19 .12 .31 .24 
GK1 .06 .06 -.07 -.03 .06 .21 .22 .05 .33 .32 .35 .27 .96 .40 .33 .34 .22 
GK2R 
-.02 -.02 -.10 -.02 .00 -.23 -.08 -.20 -.02 -.07 -.11 -.13 -.39 -.14 -.18 -.20 -.10 
LK1 -.02 -.02 -.04 -.02 .04 .06 .15 .06 .08 .19 .15 .12 .27 .74 .14 .13 .10 
LK2 
.04 .03 -.10 .02 .12 .08 .16 .01 .20 .37 .27 .22 .40 .92 .32 .26 .24 
TK1 .06 .02 -.00 .01 .05 .11 .15 .03 .29 .29 .30 .14 .35 .32 .95 .21 .21 
TK2 
-.14 -.09 -.08 -.14 .14 .04 .00 .13 .18 .11 .11 .06 .14 .06 .48 .10 .09 
TK4R 
.05 .04 -.09 .03 -.06 -.08 -.02 -.19 -.01 .03 .03 .00 .00 .05 -.06 -.01 .29 
CT2R .03 -.00 -.07 -.01 -.04 .02 .02 -.12 -.01 -.00 -.01 .05 .00 -.01 -.05 .01 .40 
CT3 
.12 .09 .03 .01 .03 .29 .22 .07 .16 .22 .31 .32 .36 .25 .20 .95 .56 
CT4R 
-.01 .02 -.14 -.02 .01 -.04 -.01 -.19 .02 .08 .06 .00 .02 .09 .01 .01 .38 
CM1 .08 .08 -.03 -.03 .07 .14 .10 -.01 .14 .15 .23 .26 .24 .22 .20 .38 .92 
CM3 
.04 .01 -.05 -.07 .08 .13 .10 .02 .03 .13 .16 .22 .16 .17 .11 .42 .86 
* = formative constructs, therefore loadings are not interpreted. 
Bolded figures in each block indicate that the constructs are well-measured by their indicators. 
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 Another approach to assess discriminant validity is by comparing the 
square root of AVEs with the correlations among the constructs (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). As a rule of thumb, the square root of AVEs of each 
construct should be larger than the correlation of the specific construct with 
any other constructs in the model (Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gefen et al., 
2000; Hair et al., 2006).
96
 The correlation matrixes in Tables 6.11 to 6.14 
reveal that the square roots of AVE are greater than the corresponding 
correlations in the scenarios for both New Zealand and Malaysian data. 
This suggests that each indicator did not measure the different concepts, 
and therefore confirmed the discriminant validity. 
Table 6.11 Correlation of Latent Constructs and the Square Root of AVE 
 Scenario 1 - New Zealand (Overstating Business Expenses) 
* Diagonal elements are square root of average variance extracted. 
# Formative constructs. 
                                                 
96 There are no guidelines about how much larger the square root of AVE should be (Gefen & Straub, 
2005).  
 IND AFD ISD SND PBD GF# EF HF VF RF# PF AF# GK# LK TK# CT# CM 
IND 
0.83*                 
AFD 
0..67 0.86                
ISD 
0.08 0.15 0.74               
SND 
0.48 0.50 0.17 0.83              
PBD 
-0.35 -0.47 
-
0.21 
-
0.34 
0.77             
GF 
0.09 0.03 
-
0.11 
0.04 
-
0.09 
0.60            
EF 
-0.07 -0.02 0.00 
-
0.04 
0.05 0.39 0.77           
HF 
0.10 0.11 
-
0.06 
0.13 
-
0.14 
-
0.01 
0.02 0.78          
VF 
-0.02 -0.03 
-
0.06 
-
0.03 
-
0.02 
0.26 0.50 0.09 0.87         
RF 
0.19 0.15 
-
0.13 
0.17 
-
0.01 
0.00 0.12 0.22 0.16 0.68        
PF 
0.11 0.05 0.11 0.05 
-
0.04 
0.10 0.14 0.24 0.12 0.05 0.83       
AF 
-0.11 -0.02 
-
0.11 
-
0.11 
0.21 0.03 0.27 
-
0.02 
0.05 
-
0.12 
0.02 0.77      
GK 
0.05 0.00 
-
0.16 
0.05 0.00 0.20 0.29 0.15 0.25 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.70     
LK 
0.10 0.01 
-
0.20 
0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.20 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.21 0.30 0.80    
TK 
0.14 0.00 
-
0.05 
0.19 0.09 0.17 0.08 
-
0.05 
0.10 0.20 
-
0.18 
0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.62   
CT 
0.02 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.31 0.31 0.06 0.09 
-
0.07 
0.05 0.32 0.16 0.04 0.29 0.70  
CM 
0.08 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.16 0.10 0.02 
-
0.03 
-
0.06 
0.02 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.56 0.83 
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Table 6.12 Correlation of Latent Constructs and the Square Root of AVE 
Scenario 1 – Malaysia (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
 IND AFD AID SND PBD GF# EF HF VF RF# PF AF# GK# LK TK# CT# CM 
IND 
0.78*                 
AFD 
0.64 0.79                
ISD 
0.11 0.16 0.80               
SND 
0.55 0.50 0.32 0.74              
PBD 
-0.16 -0.22 -0.45 -0.37 0.81             
GF 
-0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.65            
EF 
0.09 0.09 -0.02 0.09 0.07 0.32 0.72           
HF 
-0.16 -0.13 -0.01 -0.19 0.12 0.25 0.17 0.81          
VF 
0.11 0.10 -0.01 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.44 0.12 0.82         
RF 
0.16 0.17 -0.02 0.19 0.12 0.12 0.24 0.05 0.34 0.75        
PF 
0.15 0.20 0.05 0.12 0.09 0.40 0.39 0.13 0.35 0.33 0.78       
AF 
0.08 0.10 -0.07 0.03 0.11 0.40 0.33 0.21 0.16 0.22 0.36 0.75      
GK 
0.15 0.17 -0.06 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.29 0.13 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.33 0.73     
LK 
0.16 0.17 -0.04 0.08 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.04 0.23 0.41 0.31 0.23 0.48 
0.84 
   
TK 
0.11 0.14 -0.08 0.08 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.10 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.19 0.42 
0.38 0.61 
  
CT 
0.17 0.13 -0.09 0.09 0.17 0.33 0.22 0.12 0.17 0.24 0.34 0.33 0.39 
0.30 0.27 
0.54  
CM 
0.16 0.15 -0.02 0.12 0.10 0.17 0.13 -0.01 0.13 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.27 
0.28 0.22 
0.44 0.89 
* Diagonal elements are square root of average variance extracted. 
# Formative constructs. 
 
Table 6.13 Correlation of Latent Constructs and the Square Root of AVE 
Scenario 2 - New Zealand (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
 INS AFS ISS SNS PBS GF# EF HF VF RF# PF AF# GK# LK TK# CT# CM 
INS 
0.87*                 
AFS 
0.77 0.84                
ISS 
0.40 0.34 0.76               
SNS 
0.73 0.63 0.32 0.86              
PBS 
-0.53 -0.48 -0.46 -0.43 0.82             
GF 
0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.06 0.61            
EF 
0.12 0.06 0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.39 0.77           
HF 
0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.00 0.77          
VF 
0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 0.27 0.52 0.11 0.87         
RF 
0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.28 0.13 0.19 0.72        
PF 
0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.27 0.16 0.15 0.82       
AF 
0.08 -0.01 -0.11 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.24 0.02 0.05 0.20 -0.03 0.77      
GK 
0.08 0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.04 0.19 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.27 0.21 0.18 0.70     
LK 
0.00 -0.04 -0.30 -0.00 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.21 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.79    
TK 
-0.02 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 0.12 -0.07 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.16 0.18 0.63   
CT 
0.25 0.16 0.08 0.20 -0.02 0.28 0.26 0.01 0.07 0.20 -0.02 0.28 0.14 0.02 -0.08 0.70  
CM 
0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.15 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.11 -0.04 0.51 0.84 
* Diagonal elements are square root of average variance extracted. 
# Formative constructs. 
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Table 6.14 Correlation of Latent Constructs and the Square Root of AVE 
Scenario 2 – Malaysia (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
 INS AFS ISS SNS PBS GF# EF HF VF RF# PF AF# GK# LK TK# CT# 
 
CM 
INS 
0.81*                
 
AFS 
0.68 0.84               
 
ISS 
0.51 0.47 0.75              
 
SNS 
0.65 0.54 0.50 0.80             
 
PBS 
-0.33 
-
0.28 
-
0.34 
-
0.43 
0.82            
 
GF 
0.20 0.15 0.15 0.08 
-
0.07 
0.65           
 
EF 
0.16 0.12 0.06 0.03 
-
0.04 
0.44 0.72          
 
HF 
0.03 0.07 0.19 0.04 
-
0.01 
0.23 0.17 0.81         
 
VF 
0.04 0.02 
-
0.01 
-
0.03 
0.09 0.10 0.32 0.12 0.82        
 
RF 
0.10 0.08 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.12 0.21 0.06 0.29 0.77       
 
PF 
0.12 0.10 0.04 
-
0.03 
0.06 0.37 0.40 0.13 0.35 0.32 0.78      
 
AF 
0.14 0.11 0.05 
-
0.01 
0.02 0.42 0.39 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.36 0.75     
 
GK 
0.08 0.09 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 
0.09 0.27 0.29 0.13 0.36 0.36 0.40 0.33 0.73    
 
LK 
0.03 0.04 
-
0.09 
-
0.01 
0.14 0.11 0.21 0.03 0.24 0.42 0.32 0.24 0.49 
0.84 
  
 
TK 
0.04 0.01 
-
0.04 
-
0.02 
0.14 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.20 0.42 
0.41 0.62 
 
 
CT 
0.16 0.13 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.30 0.24 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.34 0.34 0.39 
0.31 0.27 
0.55 
 
CM 
0.07 0.06 
-
0.05 
-
0.09 
0.12 0.16 0.14 
-
0.01 
0.13 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.27 
0.30 0.24 
0.48 
0.89 
* Diagonal elements are square root of average variance extracted. 
# Formative constructs. 
 
Overall, the construct validity tests of the measures resulted in the removal 
of 12 items (out of 70 items) consisting of three formative items and nine 
reflective items. This percentage of deletion is considered conservative 
(Barclay et al., 1995; Jackson, 2008),   particularly when it is proven that 
their absence has improved the validity of the measures. At this point it can 
be concluded that the measures used in this study met both content and 
construct validity.  
 
6.3.3   Reliability 
Similar to the validity tests of the constructs, reliability tests of the 
measures also require different approaches for formative and reflective 
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constructs. Formative constructs involve multicollinearity tests, while 
reliability of the reflective constructs depends on the composite reliability 
and the AVE.  
 
6.3.3.1 Formative Constructs 
To determine the reliability of the formative constructs multicollinearity of 
the construct indicators was examined. No presence of multicollinearity 
was expected to confirm the reliability of the measures as high 
multicollinearity suggests an unstable model (Petter et al., 2007). For this 
purpose, a variance inflation factor (VIF) and a condition index were used 
as the reference, with statistics of greater than 3.3 (Diamantopoulos & 
Siguaw, 2006) and 30, respectively, representing a multicollinearity 
problem. In addition to this, the tolerance values were also checked to 
measure directly the multicollinearity problem (Hair et al., 2006). Based on 
the formula, the tolerance values should not fall to 0.3 and below to ensure 
the VIF not exceeding 3.3.
97
 The results in Tables 6.15 to 6.18 reveal that 
the VIF, condition index and tolerance values were below the threshold 
levels, which suggests there is no multicollinearity problem, thereby 
confirming the reliability of the measures.  
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Table 6.15 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Condition Index 
Scenario 1 – New Zealand (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Item Un-standardised  
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Condition 
Index 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t-
value 
Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.000 .066  0.002 0.999   1.000 
GF 0.073 .071 0.073 1.024 0.307 0.860 1.162 1.174 
RF 0.159 .070 0.159 2.278 0.024 0.897 1.115 1.289 
AF -0.113 0.72 -0.113 -1.571 0.118 0.850 1.177 1.313 
GK 0.043 0.70 0.043 0.615 0.539 0.887 1.127 1.385 
TK 0.094 0.72 0.094 1.303 0.194 0.839 1.193 1.717 
CT 0.012 0.78 0.012 0.148 0.882 0.726 1.377 1.849 
 
Table 6.16 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Condition Index 
Scenario 1 – Malaysia (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Item Un-standardised  
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Condition 
Index 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t- 
value 
Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.000 0.034  0.001 0.999   1.000 
GF -0.103 0.038 -0.103 -2.711 0.007 0.783 1.277 1.457 
RF 0.117 0.036 0.117 3.223 0.001 0.848 1.179 1.527 
AF 0.004 0.038 0.004 0.103 0.918 0.773 1.294 1.791 
GK 0.067 0.039 0.067 1.696 0.090 0.727 1.375 1.837 
TK -0.014 0.037 -0.014 -0.389 0.697 0.826 1.210 1.977 
CT 0.132 0.038 0.132 3.453 0.001 0.768 1.303 2.047 
 
Table 6.17 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Condition Index 
Scenario 2 – New Zealand (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Item Un-standardised  
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Condition 
Index 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t- 
value 
Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.000 0.066  0.003 0.998   1.000 
GF -0.004 0.071 -0.004 -0.053 0.958 0.865 1.157 1.286 
RF -0.037 0.072 -0.037 -0.516 0.607 0.847 1.181 1.375 
AF 0.032 0.073 0.032 0.441 0.660 0.834 1.200 1.422 
GK 0.026 0.071 0.026 0.369 0.713 0.884 1.131 1.565 
TK -0.007 0.068 -0.007 -0.098 0.922 0.956 1.046 1.634 
CT 0.245 0.075 0.245 3.254 0.001 0.781 1.281 1.851 
 
Table 6.18 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Condition Index 
Scenario 2 – Malaysia (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Item Un-standardised  
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Condition 
Index 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t- 
value 
Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.000 0.034  0.000 1.000   1.000 
GF 0.127 0.038 0.127 3.309 0.001 0.775 1.290 1.455 
RF 0.065 0.037 0.065 1.763 0.078 0.844 1.185 1.531 
AF 0.049 0.039 0.049 1.271 0.204 0.751 1.332 1.798 
GK -0.013 0.040 -0.013 -0.335 0.738 0.727 1.376 1.845 
TK -0.039 0.037 -0.039 -1.054 0.292 0.832 1.202 2.006 
CT 0.068 0.038 0.068 1.775 0.076 0.772 1.296 2.054 
 
                                                                                                                        
97 Tolerance values are calculated based on the following formula: 1/VIF (Hair et al., 2006). 
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6.3.3.2  Reflective Constructs 
For reflective constructs the reliability of the measures are normally 
illustrated by high Cronbach alpha or internal consistency scores (Petter et 
al., 2007). In this study, internal consistency scores, also known as 
composite reliability, generated by the PLS bootstrapping analysis were 
used as this was considered to be more accurate (Brown & Chin, 2004).
98
 
Referring to Table 6.19, the figures suggest that all constructs met the 
minimum value of 0.7 (Chin, 1998a), except for exchange fairness (in the 
Malaysian sample) with a slightly lower value at 0.690. Other than that 
most constructs had an internal consistency of above 0.8.  
Table 6.19 Internal Consistency of the Constructs 
 
Construct Composite Reliability  
Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
New Zealand Malaysia  New Zealand Malaysia 
Exchange fairness (EF) 0.740 0.690  0.745 0.689 
Horizontal fairness (HF) 0.827 0.855  0.812 0.854 
Vertical fairness (VF) 0.864 0.805  0.865 0.805 
Personal fairness (PF)  0.822 0.761  0.807 0.762 
Legal knowledge (LK) 0.780 0.831  0.778 0.829 
Compliance complexity (CM) 0.820 0.887  0.830 0.888 
Intention (IND/INS) 0.872 0.829  0.904 0.859 
Affective attitude (AFD/AFS) 0.895 0.834  0.880 0.879 
Instrumental attitude (ISD/ISS) 0.708 0.787  0.743 0.717 
Subjective norms (SND/SNS) 0.876 0.792  0.898 0.850 
Perceived behavioural control (PBD/PBS) 0.854 0.885  0.895 0.893 
 
In addition to composite reliability the AVE scales were also used to 
determine the reliability of the measures. The scales should exceed 0.5 
(Fornell & Larcker, 1981) indicating, “50 percent or more variance of the 
indicators should be accounted for” (Chin, 1998b, p. 321). From Table 
                                                 
98 This is on the basis that the measure is not influenced by the number of indicators (Hanlon, 2001).   
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6.20 it can be seen that all the scales performed acceptably on this standard 
and thus confirm the reliability of the measures.  
Table 6.20 Average Variance Extracted of the Constructs 
 
Construct Average Variance Extracted (AVE)  
Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
New Zealand Malaysia  New Zealand Malaysia 
Exchange fairness (EF) 0.600 0.528  0.603 0.528 
Horizontal fairness (HF) 0.616 0.662  0.595 0.661 
Vertical fairness (VF) 0.761 0.674  0.762 0.674 
Personal fairness (PF)  0.699 0.616  0.681 0.617 
Legal knowledge (LK) 0.640 0.713  0.639 0.710 
Compliance complexity (CM) 0.699 0.798  0.711 0.798 
Intention (IND/INS) 0.694 0.618  0.760 0.670 
Affective attitude (AFD/AFS) 0.740 0.631  0.710 0.711 
Instrumental attitude (ISD/ISS) 0.552 0.648  0.591 0.570 
Subjective norms (SND/SNS) 0.702 0.559  0.747 0.654 
Perceived behavioural control (PBD/PBS) 0.596 0.658  0.682 0.676 
 
At this stage the evaluation of the first order measurement model confirms 
that fairness perceptions are multi-dimensional and provides support to 
previous studies (Azmi & Perumal, 2008; Bobek, 1997; Gerbing, 1988; 
Richardson, 2005a; 2005b; 2006b; Tan, 1998). In particular, the results 
suggest that taxpayers in both New Zealand and Malaysia perceived 
fairness perceptions in seven dimensions namely: general fairness; 
exchange fairness; horizontal fairness; vertical fairness; retributive fairness; 
personal fairness; and administrative fairness. Thus, Hypothesis 5, which 
states „New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers perceive fairness of their 
income tax systems as being multi-dimensional‟, is accepted. 
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6.4       Evaluation of the Measurement Model – Second Order Factor     
            Model 
At this point relevant tests to establish the validity and reliability of all 
indicators in the measurement model at the first order level have been 
satisfactorily performed. Conceptually the researcher may proceed with the 
analysis of the structural model to test the hypotheses. However, as 
indicated in Chapter 4, this study defines some of the constructs at a more 
abstract level, which requires the researcher to present the model at the 
second order factor. To do this, the researcher is expected to repeat the 
validity and reliability tests on the second order factor model (Chin, 
1998a). However, at this stage, the model is estimated using the component 
scores instead of the raw item scores. The component scores are the 
weighted average scores of the items measuring each component, with the 
weights estimated in the first order factor model. When the validity and 
reliability of the constructs in the second order factor model are established 
then the hypotheses testing through structural model can be pursued.   
 
In this study, three of the eight constructs in the full model were 
operationalised as second order factors, measured with twelve first order 
components. The constructs are fairness measured with seven components, 
and tax knowledge and tax complexity measured with three and two 
components, respectively. All these constructs are modelled as formative. 
To provide evidence of construct validity, Tables 6.21 and 6.22 
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summarised the path weights of the measures forming the construct, the 
observed t-values from the bootstrap re-sampling procedure and the 
significance level of measure weights for two scenarios under study in both 
New Zealand and Malaysia.  
 
As shown in Table 6.21 (relating to the overstating business expenses 
scenario), general fairness (GF), horizontal fairness (HF) and 
administrative fairness (AF), were significant measures of fairness 
perceptions in New Zealand environment. In addition to this, the PLS 
weights also indicate that taxpayers‟ perceptions on administrative aspects 
contributed most to the fairness perceptions, followed by general fairness 
and horizontal fairness. In Malaysia, general fairness (GF) and exchange 
fairness (EF) were the only dimensions, which were not significant. 
Accordingly, retributive fairness had the highest weight, followed by 
personal fairness and vertical fairness. In terms of tax knowledge, all 
measures were significant in both environments, with general knowledge 
being the most important, followed by technical knowledge and legal 
knowledge. For tax complexity respondents in both countries agreed that 
content complexity gives more weight to their perceptions. Even though 
Malaysian respondents considered compliance complexity as moderately 
important in forming their perceptions New Zealand respondents did not 
perceive compliance complexity as an important measure of tax 
complexity.  
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Table 6.21 Formative Constructs, Indicators and Weights 
Scenario 1 (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Construct and 
Items 
New Zealand Malaysia 
PLS 
Weights 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
PLS 
Weights 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
       
Fairness       
GF 0.5772 3.0130 0.005 0.0702 1.0163 not sig. 
EF 0.1558 0.6569 not sig. 0.0107 0.1667 not sig. 
HF 0.2841 2.1423 0.025 -0.1878 2.5596 0.010 
    VF 0.0828 0.5163 not sig. 0.3065 4.4674 0.005 
RF 0.2234 0.7856 not sig. 0.4643 6.7152 0.005 
PF -0.1108 0.5904 not sig. 0.4309 5.6310 0.005 
AF 0.5827 3.0929 0.005 0.2645 3.8068 0.005 
       
Tax Knowledge       
GK 0.7225 3.5736 0.005 0.5466 9.1649 0.005 
LK 0.3586 1.9273 0.050 0.3543 6.1036 0.005 
TK 0.4482 1.6350 0.100 0.4134 6.7023 0.005 
       
Tax Complexity       
CT 1.0838 4.4951 0.005 0.7981 10.5892 0.005 
CM -0.1650 0.4999 not sig. 0.3567 3.5098 0.005 
 
In the understating income scenario, from seven dimensions of fairness, 
vertical fairness (VF) and personal fairness (PF) were non-significant 
measures of fairness perceptions in New Zealand; while exchange fairness 
(EF) and horizontal fairness (HF) were not significant in Malaysia. In 
terms of rank order (following their weights), the results were comparable 
to Scenario 1. For tax knowledge, however, similar results to Scenario 1 
were reported in the Malaysian sample only. In New Zealand, while 
general knowledge remains as a significant measure of tax knowledge, 
technical knowledge, however, was considered to be non-significant. On 
the other hand taxpayers perceive legal knowledge as substantially forming 
their perceptions on tax knowledge. In terms of tax complexity, the results 
were comparable to Scenario 1, with highest weight placed on content 
complexity. 
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All measures of the fairness perceptions, tax knowledge and tax 
complexity, both significant and non-significant, were retained for 
estimating the PLS model so as to preserve content validity (Bollen & 
Lennox, 1991; Roberts & Thatcher, 2009).  
Table 6.22 Formative Constructs, Indicators and Weights 
Scenario 2 (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Construct and 
Items 
New Zealand Malaysia 
PLS 
Weights 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
PLS 
Weights 
t- 
Statistics 
Significance 
Level 
       
Fairness       
GF 0.4216 2.5185 0.010 0.2360 3.1674 0.005 
EF 0.2967 1.7455 0.050 0.0237 0.3453 not sig. 
HF 0.2764 2.2642 0.025 0.0189 0.2903 not sig. 
    VF 0.0095 0.0573 not sig. 0.2683 3.7280 0.005 
RF 0.2017 1.5250 0.100 0.4280 6.0068 0.005 
PF 0.0225 0.1396 not sig. 0.3330 5.0359 0.005 
AF 0.5130 4.5815 0.005 0.2753 3.9466 0.005 
       
Tax Knowledge       
GK 0.7904 5.2486 0.005 0.5905 8.8228 0.005 
LK 0.4378 2.4534 0.010 0.3267 5.1795 0.005 
TK -0.0592 0.2470 not sig. 0.3845 5.4932 0.005 
       
Tax Complexity       
CT 1.0832 8.0523 0.005 0.8202 10.8699 0.005 
CM -0.1626 0.7243 not sig. 0.3112 3.0162 0.005 
 
In terms of reliability of the measures, Tables 6.23 to 6.26 suggest no 
presence of multicollinearity problem, (with reference to a variance 
inflation factor (VIF) of less than 3.3, a condition index of not exceeding 
30, and tolerance values of more than 0.3).   
Table 6.23 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Condition Index 
Scenario 1 – New Zealand (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Item Un-standardised  
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Condition 
Index 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig.  Tolerance VIF  
Constant 0.000 0.067  -0.002 0.998   1.000 
FAIR -0.020 0.080 -0.020 -0.249 0.804 0.717 1.394 1.319 
KNO 0.158 0.074 0.158 2.120 0.035 0.821 1.218 1.530 
CLX -0.023 0.075 -0.023 -0.313 0.755 0.808 1.238 1.831 
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Table 6.24 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Condition Index 
Scenario 1 – Malaysia (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Item Un-standardised  
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Condition 
Index 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.000 0.033  -0.001 0.999   1.000 
FAIR 0.164 0.042 0.164 3.932 0.000 0.646 1.549 1.385 
KNO 0.010 0.042 0.010 0.251 0.802 0.640 1.563 1.718 
CLX 0.101 0.037 0.101 2.702 0.007 0.795 1.259 2.104 
 
Table 6.25 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Condition Index 
Scenario 2 – New Zealand (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Item Un-standardised  
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Condition 
Index 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.000 0.066  0.001 1.000   1.000 
FAIR 0.008 0.081 0.008 0.093 0.926 0.664 1.506 1.300 
KNO 0.013 0.072 0.013 0.184 0.854 0.834 1.199 1.397 
CLX 0.258 0.075 0.258 3.462 0.001 0.778 1.285 1.946 
 
Table 6.26 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Condition Index 
Scenario 2 – Malaysia (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Item Un-standardised  
Coefficients 
Standardised 
Coefficients 
  Collinearity 
Statistics 
Condition 
Index 
 B Std. 
Error 
Beta t Sig.  Tolerance VIF 
Constant 0.000 0.034  0.000 1.000   1.000 
FAIR 0.177 0.042 0.177 4.170 0.000 0.631 1.584 1.393 
KNO -0.079 0.042 -0.079 -1.901 0.058 0.652 1.534 1.766 
CLX 0.080 0.038 0.080 2.070 0.039 0.770 1.298 2.111 
 
 
The evaluation of the measurement model (both first order factor and 
second order factor) implies that the measures used in this study work 
appropriately in both the New Zealand and Malaysian environments. Thus 
the next step is to test the explanatory power of the entire models in 
explaining tax compliance behaviour.  
 
6.5      Results from the Structural Model 
This section provides the PLS estimates of the Structural Model. The 
Structural Model demonstrates the extent of explained and unexplained 
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variances and specifies the relationship among the constructs. These can be 
assessed with reference to the R-squares (R
2
) and the path coefficients 
generated in PLS-Graph. Figures 6.1 to 6.4 below provide an overview 
result of the Structural Models, while the full PLS graphic outputs are 
presented in Appendix 13. The values beneath the circles are the R
2
, which 
are concisely summarised in Table 6.27, and are discussed in the following 
section of this chapter.  
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Figure 6.1 Structural Model Results 
Scenario 1 – New Zealand (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
TK – Tax knowledge 
TC – Tax complexity 
AFD  – Affective attitude 
FAIR – Fairness perceptions 
ISD – Instrumental attitude 
SND – Subjective norms 
PBD – Perceived behavioural control 
IND – Intention to comply 
a
 significant at the 0.005 level 
b
 significant at the 0.01 level 
c
 significant at the 0.05 level 
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Figure 6.2 Structural Model Results 
Scenario 1 – Malaysia (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
TK – Tax knowledge 
TC – Tax complexity 
AFD  – Affective attitude 
FAIR – Fairness perceptions 
ISD – Instrumental attitude 
SND – Subjective norms 
PBD – Perceived behavioural control 
IND – Intention to comply 
a
 significant at the 0.005 level 
b
 significant at the 0.1 level 
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Figure 6.3 Structural Model Results 
Scenario 2 – New Zealand (Understating Other Income) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
TK – Tax knowledge 
TC – Tax complexity 
AFS  – Affective attitude 
FAIR – Fairness perceptions 
ISS – Instrumental attitude 
SNS – Subjective norms 
PBS – Perceived behavioural control 
INS – Intention to comply 
a
 significant at the 0.005 level 
b
 significant at the 0.1 level 
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Figure 6.4 Structural Model Results 
Scenario 2 – Malaysia (Understating Other Income) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
TK – Tax knowledge 
TC – Tax complexity 
AFS  – Affective attitude 
FAIR – Fairness perceptions 
ISS – Instrumental attitude 
SNS – Subjective norms 
PBS – Perceived behavioural control 
INS – Intention to comply 
a
 significant at the 0.005 level 
b
 significant at the 0.05 level 
c
 significant at the 0.1 level 
 
 
6.5.1   R-squares 
The R
2
 value for the dependent construct is a measure used to assess the 
predictive power of the model. In other words it suggests to what extent the 
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independent constructs help to explain the dependent constructs. Likewise, 
it also provides the total variation in the dependent construct (by 
subtracting the R
2 
values from 1), which cannot be explained by the 
independent constructs. In the case of perfect prediction, R
2 
will be 1 and 
unexplained variation will be zero. Thus, the bigger the R
2
, the more 
predictive power the model possesses.  
 
6.5.1.1 R-squares
 
of Intention to Comply 
The R
2 
values of 0.491 (New Zealand) and 0.526 (Malaysia) for the 
intention to comply (in Scenario 1) indicate that the model accounted for 
49.1 and 52.6 percent, respectively, of the variance of the construct. The 
predictive power of the model is even greater in Scenario 2 with 74.0 and 
65.2 percent in New Zealand and Malaysia, respectively. This suggests that 
there is a significant combined effect of independent constructs on the 
dependent construct in the operational model.  
 
6.5.1.2 R-squares
 
of Fairness Perceptions 
The R
2 
values of fairness perceptions indicate the extent tax knowledge and 
tax complexity help explain the constructs. However, the variances are not 
quite as strong as for intention to comply. Table 6.27 demonstrates that the 
New Zealand models explain 28 percent and 34 percent of the variance in 
fairness perceptions for Scenario 1 and 2, respectively. For the Malaysian 
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sample, the models better explained the variance with 35 percent and 37 
percent for Scenario 1 and 2, respectively.  
Table 6.27 R-Square Values 
 
Construct R2  
Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
New Zealand Malaysia  New Zealand Malaysia 
Fairness perceptions 0.283 0.354  0.336 0.369 
Intention (IND/INS) 0.491 0.526  0.740 0.652 
Affective attitude (AFD/AFS) 0.003 0.053  0.004 0.020 
Instrumental attitude (ISD/ISS) 0.047 0.000  0.005 0.005 
Perceived behavioural control (PBD/PBS) 0.004 0.040  0.002 0.012 
 
 
6.5.1.3 R-squares of Affective Attitude 
The R
2
 of 0.003 (New Zealand) and 0.053 (Malaysia) in Scenario 1 for the 
affective attitude indicates that fairness perceptions accounted for only 3 to 
5 percent of the variance of the construct, respectively. Almost similar 
results (with 0.004 and 0.020 for New Zealand and Malaysia, respectively) 
were documented in Scenario 2. These figures were extremely low and in 
fact do not meet the 10 percent rule suggested by Hanlon (2001) and 
Santosa et al. (2005). These results not only suggest that fairness 
perceptions had a very low influence on affective attitude but also indicate 
that there are other factors that may explain about 95 percent of the 
variance in affective attitude.  
 
6.5.1.4 R-squares of Instrumental Attitude 
Similar to affective attitude, the R
2
 values of instrumental attitude were 
also low with 0.047 (New Zealand) and 0.000 (Malaysia) in Scenario 1, 
and 0.05 in Scenario 2 for both New Zealand and Malaysia. Again these 
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suggest that fairness perceptions account for less than 10 percent of the 
variance of the construct in both data samples.  
 
6.5.1.5 R-squares of Perceived Behavioural Control 
The R
2
 of perceived behavioural control indicates the extent tax knowledge 
and tax complexity help explain the construct. From Table 6.27 it appears 
that the R
2
 values in both scenarios of the environments under study were 
below 0.05, suggesting weak predictive power. In other words, the results 
demonstrate that even though tax knowledge and tax complexity may 
explain the perceived behavioural control, they are only able to do so at 
most for 4 percent of the construct.   
 
6.5.2   Effect Size 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, the effect size is investigated to 
assess the strength of the effect of a particular independent construct on the 
dependent construct (Chin, 1998b). To achieve this, five sub-models were 
generated for each scenario in both New Zealand and Malaysia. Results 
were then interpreted using the criteria set out by Cohen (1992), where f
2 
= 
0.02 as small effect; f
2
 = 0.15 as medium effect and f
2 
= 0.35 as large 
effect. 
 
The effect size of each independent construct on the intention to comply is 
shown in Tables 6.28 to 6.31. In Scenario 1 for the New Zealand sample 
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(Table 6.28) two independent constructs had certain effects on intention to 
comply with tax obligations. In particular affective attitude with an effect 
size of 0.41 has a substantial influence on intention to comply. Likewise, 
the R
2
excluded also dropped when subjective norms were omitted from the 
model, resulting in an effect size of 0.05, implying a small effect from 
subjective norms to intention to comply. However, with reference to the f
2
, 
instrumental attitude, perceived behavioural control and fairness 
perceptions seemed to have no impact on intention to comply.  
Table 6.28 Effect Size in the Intention to Comply 
Scenario 1 – New Zealand (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Construct Excluded R
2
 Excluded  f
2
 Degree of Effect  
Affective attitude 0.281 0.41 Large effect 
Instrumental attitude 0.490 0.00 No effect 
Subjective norms 0.465 0.05 Small effect 
Perceived behavioural control 0.488 0.01 No effect 
Fairness perceptions 0.490 0.00 No effect 
 
Almost similar results were found in the Malaysian environment for 
Scenario 1 where only affective attitude and subjective norms had sizeable 
effects on intention to comply (Table 6.29). While the degrees of effects 
for affective attitude and subjective norms in New Zealand were large and 
small, respectively, their effect sizes for both independent constructs in 
Malaysia were medium. Similar to the New Zealand sample, no impact 
was recorded from instrumental attitude, perceived behavioural control and 
fairness perceptions to intention to comply. 
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Table 6.29 Effect Size in the Intention to Comply 
Scenario 1 – Malaysia (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Construct Excluded R
2
 Excluded  f
2
 Degree of Effect  
Affective attitude 0.382 0.30 Medium effect 
Instrumental attitude 0.525 0.00 No effect 
Subjective norms 0.438 0.19 Medium effect 
Perceived behavioural control 0.525 0.00 No effect 
Fairness perceptions 0.525 0.00 No effect 
 
In Scenario 2 for New Zealand, the results reveal that affective attitude, 
subjective norms, perceived behavioural control and fairness perceptions 
had effects on intention to comply with tax obligations, varying from a 
large effect to a small effect (Table 6.30). In particular, affective attitude, 
with an effect size of 0.44, had a substantial influence on intention to 
comply while the effect size of subjective norms is medium. Likewise 
omitting the perceived behavioural control and fairness perceptions 
constructs from the model had resulted in a small effect.  
Table 6.30 Effect Size in the Intention to Comply 
Scenario 2 – New Zealand (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Construct Excluded R
2
 Excluded  f
2
 Degree of Effect  
Affective attitude 0.625 0.44 Large effect 
Instrumental attitude 0.738 0.00 No effect 
Subjective norms 0.674 0.25 Medium effect 
Perceived behavioural control 0.724 0.06 Small effect 
Fairness perceptions 0.734 0.02 Small effect 
 
When applying the Malaysian data this also results in an effect size for 
three independent constructs (Table 6.31). Affective attitude and subjective 
norms with effect sizes of 0.23 and 0.22, respectively, had medium 
influence on intention to comply with tax obligations. Likewise, R
2
excluded 
also dropped when fairness perceptions were omitted from the model, 
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resulting in an effect size of 0.02, implying a small effect from fairness 
perceptions to intention to comply. Other than that, the remaining 
independent constructs seemed to have no impact on intention to comply.  
Table 6.31 Effect Size in the Intention to Comply 
Scenario 2 – Malaysia (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Construct Excluded R
2
 Excluded  f
2
 Degree of Effect  
Affective attitude 0.571 0.23 Medium effect 
Instrumental attitude 0.647 0.01 No effect 
Subjective norms 0.574 0.22 Medium effect 
Perceived behavioural control 0.650 0.00 No effect 
Fairness  perceptions 0.646 0.02 Small effect 
 
6.5.3   Significant Test of Path Coefficients 
Path coefficients, in the structural model, represent the predictive link 
among constructs. All the path coefficients between the constructs are 
expressed in a standardised form to permit comparison of their relative 
strengths. To assess the statistical significance of the path coefficients, a 
bootstrap analysis was performed. For each model 200 sub-samples (as 
suggested by Chin et al., 2003) were created for the bootstrapping 
procedure. Table 6.32 presents the statistical outcomes, which include path 
coefficient, observed t-statistics and significance level for the „overstating 
business expenses‟ scenario in both environments. Based on these 
statistical outcomes the results of the hypotheses testing in the structural 
model are summarised in Table 6.33.  
 
 
In the „overstating business expenses‟ scenario, fairness perceptions 
seemed to have no significant influence on intention to comply in either 
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country, suggesting rejection of Hypothesis 6, which states that „fairness 
perceptions of the income tax system by New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers significantly influence their tax compliance behaviour.‟ The 
important influence was documented by affective attitude (with path 
coefficients of 0.560 and 0.458) in both countries, while subjective norms 
(path coefficients of 0.192 and 0.388) had a moderate influence. These 
results provide support to Hypotheses 7a (affective attitude towards 
compliance of New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers significantly 
influences their tax compliance behaviour) and 8 (subjective norms of New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers significantly influence their tax 
compliance behaviour), while Hypotheses 7b (instrumental attitude 
towards compliance of New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers significantly 
influences their tax compliance behaviour) and 9 (perceived behavioural 
control of New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers significantly influences 
their tax noncompliance behaviour), which hypothesised the influences of 
instrumental attitude and perceived behavioural control on intention to 
comply, respectively, were rejected.  
 
Hypothesis 10 was tested by examining the path coefficient of tax 
knowledge to the fairness perceptions. The study reveals that respondents 
in both countries commonly agreed that tax knowledge had a significant 
influence on their fairness perceptions. Based on the results, Hypothesis 
10, which assumes that „knowledge of the income tax system significantly 
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influences taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions,‟ was accepted in both 
environments.  
 
Next is Hypothesis 11 which was tested to examine the effect of tax 
complexity on fairness perceptions. The statistical outcomes in Table 6.32 
reveal that similar results were found for Hypothesis 11 in both countries. 
It appears that tax complexity was a significant factor affecting taxpayers‟ 
fairness perceptions resulting in acceptance of the hypothesis which states 
that „complexity of the income tax system significantly influences 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions in New Zealand and Malaysia.‟  
 
Table 6.32 also demonstrates the path coefficient of tax knowledge to 
perceived behavioural control to test Hypothesis 12 which assumes that 
„knowledge of the income tax system significantly influences taxpayers‟ 
perceived behavioural control in New Zealand and Malaysia.‟ The result 
reveals that tax knowledge has no significant influence on perceived 
behavioural control in New Zealand. Hence Hypothesis 12 was rejected. 
The finding was contradictory to Malaysia which documented moderate 
influence of tax knowledge (with path coefficient of 0.163). Hence 
Hypothesis 12 was accepted for Malaysia.  
 
To test the effect of tax complexity on the perceived behavioural control 
Hypothesis 13 which states that „complexity of the income tax system 
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significantly influences taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control in New 
Zealand and Malaysia‟ was examined. Hypothesis 13 was rejected in New 
Zealand suggesting no significant influence of tax complexity on perceived 
behavioural control. On the contrary, moderate influence was documented 
in the Malaysian data (with path coefficient of 0.066) at the 0.10 
significance level, resulting in acceptance of the Hypothesis 13.  
 
Table 6.32 also demonstrates the effects that fairness perceptions had on 
affective attitude to answer Hypothesis 14a which assumes that „fairness 
perceptions on the income tax system significantly influence taxpayers‟ 
affective attitude towards compliance in New Zealand and Malaysia.‟ In 
New Zealand the result suggests that fairness perceptions had no 
significant influence on affective attitude at all. Based on the result 
Hypothesis 14a was rejected. This differs to the result obtained in Malaysia 
where Hypothesis 14a was accepted. Table 6.32 shows that fairness 
perceptions were found to have a moderate influence on affective attitude. 
The path coefficient was significant at the 0.005 level.  
 
In relation to instrumental attitude fairness perceptions were documented 
as the influential external factors in New Zealand. The path coefficient was 
significant at the 0.05 level. The results differed in Malaysia where no 
significant influence was found. This contradictory evidence results in 
acceptance of Hypothesis 14b (fairness perceptions on the income tax 
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system significantly influence taxpayers‟ instrumental attitude towards 
compliance in New Zealand and Malaysia) in New Zealand but not in 
Malaysia.   
Table 6.32 Path Coefficients in the Structural Model 
Scenario 1 (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
  New Zealand Malaysia 
Propositions Path 
Coefficient 
t- 
statistics 
Significance 
Level 
Path 
Coefficient 
t- 
statistics 
Significance 
Level 
Effects on 
Intention to 
Comply 
      
Fairness 
perceptions 
-0.004 0.044 not significant 0.018 0.655 not significant 
Affective attitude 0.560 7.917 0.005 0.458 10.128 0.005 
Instrumental 
attitude 
-0.032 0.512 not significant -0.037 1.087 not significant 
Subjective norms 0.192 2.647 0.005 0.388 9.418 0.005 
Perceived 
behavioural control 
-0.059 1.016 not significant 0.036 1.097 not significant 
Effects on 
Fairness 
Perceptions 
      
Tax knowledge 0.324 3.942 0.005 0.486 16.373 0.005 
Tax complexity 0.346 2.457 0.010 0.199 5.592 0.005 
Effects on 
Affective Attitude 
      
Fairness 
perceptions 
0.059 0.453 not significant 0.230 5.937 0.005 
Effects on 
Instrumental 
Attitude 
      
Fairness 
perceptions 
-0.216 2.190 0.050 0.004 0.099 not significant 
Effects on 
Perceived Beh. 
Control 
      
Tax knowledge 0.062 0.646 not significant 0.163 3.838 0.005 
Tax complexity 0.010 0.101 not significant 0.066 1.397 0.100 
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Table 6.33 Summary of Results of Primary Hypotheses Testing in the 
Structural Model 
Scenario 1 (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
Research Question99 Research Hypotheses Results 
  New Zealand Malaysia 
5. Do New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers perceive 
the fairness of their income tax 
systems as being multi-
dimensional? 
 
Hypothesis 5: New Zealand 
and Malaysian taxpayers 
perceive fairness of their 
income tax systems as being 
multi-dimensional. 
Accept Accept  
6. Do fairness perceptions 
influence taxpayers‟ 
compliance behaviour in New 
Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 6: Fairness 
perceptions of the income tax 
system by New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers 
significantly influence their 
tax compliance behaviour. 
Reject  Reject  
7. Does attitude towards 
compliance influence 
taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 7a: Affective 
attitude towards compliance 
of New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers 
significantly influences their 
tax compliance behaviour.  
Accept Accept 
 Hypothesis 7b: Instrumental 
attitude towards compliance 
of New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers 
significantly influences their 
tax compliance behaviour.  
Reject Reject 
8. Do subjective norms 
influence taxpayers‟ 
compliance behaviour in New 
Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 8: Subjective 
norms of New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers 
significantly influence their 
tax compliance behaviour.  
Accept Accept 
9. Does perceived behavioural 
control influence taxpayers‟ 
noncompliance behaviour in 
New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 9: Perceived 
behavioural control of New 
Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers significantly 
influences their tax 
noncompliance behaviour.  
Reject Reject 
10. Does knowledge of the 
income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions 
in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 10: Knowledge of 
the income tax system 
significantly influences 
taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions in New Zealand 
and Malaysia. 
Accept Accept 
11. Does complexity of the 
income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions 
in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 11: Complexity 
of the income tax system 
significantly influences 
taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions in New Zealand 
and Malaysia. 
Accept  Accept  
12. Does knowledge of the 
income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ perceived 
Hypothesis 12: Knowledge of 
the income tax system 
significantly influences 
Reject Accept 
                                                 
99 The first four research questions were answered with reference to descriptive statistics and the t-test 
analysis in Chapter 5.  
312 
 
behavioural control in New 
Zealand and Malaysia? 
taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in New 
Zealand and Malaysia. 
13. Does complexity of the 
income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in New 
Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 13: Complexity 
of the income tax system 
significantly influences 
taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in New 
Zealand and Malaysia. 
Reject Accept 
14. Do fairness perceptions on 
the income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ attitudes towards 
compliance in New Zealand 
and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 14a: Fairness 
perceptions on the income tax 
system significantly influence 
taxpayers‟ affective attitude 
towards compliance in New 
Zealand and Malaysia. 
Reject  Accept  
 Hypothesis 14b: Fairness 
perceptions on the income tax 
system significantly influence 
taxpayers‟ instrumental 
attitude towards compliance in 
New Zealand and Malaysia. 
Accept  Reject  
 
The statistical results of path coefficients and significance level for the 
„understating other incomes‟ scenario, in both environments, were 
presented in Table 6.34, which is followed by the summary of hypotheses 
testing in Table 6.35.  
 
Hypothesis 6, which examines the influence of fairness perceptions on 
compliance behaviour, was true in both environments. In other words the 
New Zealand respondents were of the opinion that a better perception of 
fairness would motivate them to comply with tax obligations. This opinion 
was shared by the Malaysian sample. Based on the results Hypothesis 6 
which assumes that „fairness perceptions of the income tax system by New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers significantly influence their tax 
compliance behaviour‟ was accepted.  
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A consistent result (with Scenario 1) was found for Hypothesis 7a on the 
effect of affective attitude on intention to comply. In both environments 
taxpayers perceived that affective attitude was an influential factor 
contributing towards compliance behaviour. The path coefficients were 
moderately high at 0.468 and 0.393 in New Zealand and Malaysia, 
respectively. Both coefficients were significant at the 0.005 level. Hence 
Hypothesis 7a, which states „affective attitude towards compliance of New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers significantly influences their tax 
compliance behaviour‟ was accepted.    
 
Hypothesis 7b (instrumental attitude towards compliance of New Zealand 
and Malaysian taxpayers significantly influences their tax compliance 
behaviour), which examined the relationship between instrumental attitude 
and intention to comply, was rejected in New Zealand, suggesting no 
significant influence exists. However, in Malaysia, the presence of 
significant influence was documented at the 0.005 level. Hence this 
hypothesis was accepted. For Hypothesis 8 respondents in both countries 
shared the same belief that subjective norms had a significant influence on 
intention to comply. They believed that a higher motivation to comply with 
their referent groups will result in better compliance behaviour. As a result 
Hypothesis 8, which states „subjective norms of New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers significantly influence their tax compliance 
behaviour,‟ was also accepted. In addition to this a similar opinion was also 
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reported between the New Zealand and Malaysian samples in terms of the 
effect the perceived behavioural control had on the intention to comply. 
The taxpayers under study in both New Zealand and Malaysia perceived 
that perceived behavioural control was an important factor. Thus 
Hypothesis 9 that assumes „perceived behavioural control of New Zealand 
and Malaysian taxpayers significantly influences their tax noncompliance 
behaviour‟ was accepted. The negative coefficients (-0.159 and -0.044 in 
New Zealand and Malaysia, respectively), from the perceived behavioural 
control to the intention to comply, suggest that compliance behaviour will 
be higher when taxpayers have a low control over avoiding and evading 
tax.  
 
The path coefficient from knowledge of income tax to fairness perceptions 
was examined in Hypothesis 10. The path coefficients of 0.346 (New 
Zealand) and 0.460 (Malaysia) were highly significant at the 0.005 level. 
Based on the results Hypothesis 10 which states that „knowledge of the 
income tax system significantly influences taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions,‟ 
was accepted in both environments.  
 
Hypothesis 11 (complexity of the income tax system significantly influences 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions in New Zealand and Malaysia), which tests 
the effects of complexity of the tax system on fairness perceptions, showed 
similar results to Scenario 1. The positive path coefficients, which were 
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significant at the 0.005 level, suggest that the less complex tax system will 
improve taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions. It appears that this construct had a 
consistent influence in both scenarios (overstating business expenses and 
understating other income).  
 
To determine the effect of tax knowledge on the perceived behavioural 
control Hypothesis 12 which assumes that „knowledge of the income tax 
system significantly influences taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control in 
New Zealand and Malaysia‟ was tested. From Table 6.34, Hypothesis 12 
was accepted in Malaysia but not in New Zealand. This suggests that tax 
knowledge was found to have a significant influence on the perceived 
behavioural control in Malaysia. In particular respondents believed that 
higher knowledge of tax will result in higher control of taxpayers to avoid 
compliance.  
 
With regard to Hypothesis 13 Table 6.34 shows that respondents in both 
environments did not consider tax complexity as having an important 
influence on the perceived behavioural control. Hence this hypothesis 
which states that „complexity of the income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control in New Zealand and 
Malaysia‟ was rejected. Similar results were documented for the effects of 
fairness perceptions on affective attitude and instrumental attitude in New 
Zealand, suggesting rejecting Hypotheses 14a (fairness perceptions on the 
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income tax system significantly influence taxpayers‟ affective attitude 
towards compliance in New Zealand and Malaysia) and 14b (fairness 
perceptions on the income tax system significantly influence taxpayers‟ 
instrumental attitude towards compliance in New Zealand and Malaysia). 
Contradictory evidence, however, was reported in Malaysia where path 
coefficients for both dimensions of attitudes were significant at the 0.005 
and 0.100 levels, respectively. The results suggest that better fairness 
perceptions will improve affective attitude and instrumental attitude. Hence 
Hypotheses 14a and 14b were accepted. Chapter 9 will further discuss the 
implications of these results.  
Table 6.34 Path Coefficients in the Structural Model 
Scenario 2 (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
  New Zealand Malaysia 
Propositions Path 
Coefficient 
t-
statistics 
Significance 
Level 
Path 
Coefficient 
t- 
statistics 
Significance 
Level 
Effects on 
Intention to 
Comply 
      
Fairness 
perceptions 
0.071 1.6124 0.100 0.080 3.5314 0.005 
Affective attitude 0.468 8.1173 0.005 0.393 9.5345 0.005 
Instrumental 
attitude 
0.052 1.1731 not significant 0.098 2.8113 0.005 
Subjective norms 0.345 6.7241 0.005 0.394 9.1112 0.005 
Perceived 
behavioural control 
-0.159 2.9396 0.005 -0.044 1.5472 0.100 
Effects on 
Fairness 
Perceptions 
      
Tax knowledge 0.346 5.0569 0.005 0.460 12.9232 0.005 
Tax complexity 0.420 5.2071 0.005 0.251 6.7712 0.005 
Effects on 
Affective Attitude 
      
Fairness 
perceptions 
0.063 0.6592 not significant 0.143 3.4268 0.005 
Effects on 
Instrumental 
Attitude 
      
Fairness 
perceptions 
-0.074 0.6179 not significant 0.067 1.3994 0.100 
Effects on 
Perceived Beh. 
Control 
      
Tax knowledge 0.041 0.4493 not significant 0.094 2.1058 0.050 
Tax complexity -0.029 0.3461 not significant 0.029 0.6265 not significant 
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Table 6.35 Summary of Results of Primary Hypotheses Testing in the 
Structural Model 
Scenario 2 (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
Research Question Research Hypotheses Results 
  New 
Zealand 
Malaysia 
 
Summary on Hypotheses 1 to 4 and Hypothesis 5 is available in Tables 5.32 and 6.33, 
respectively. 
 
6. Do fairness perceptions 
influence taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 6: Fairness perceptions of 
the income tax system by New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers 
significantly influence their tax 
compliance behaviour. 
Accept Accept 
7. Does attitude towards 
compliance influence taxpayers‟ 
compliance behaviour in New 
Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 7a: Affective attitude 
towards compliance of New Zealand 
and Malaysian taxpayers significantly 
influences their tax compliance 
behaviour.  
Accept Accept 
 
 
Hypothesis 7b: Instrumental attitude 
towards compliance of New Zealand 
and Malaysian taxpayers significantly 
influences their tax compliance 
behaviour. 
Reject Accept 
8. Do subjective norms influence 
taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour 
in New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 8: Subjective norms of 
New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers 
significantly influence their tax 
compliance behaviour.  
Accept Accept 
9. Does perceived behavioural 
control influence taxpayers‟ 
noncompliance behaviour in 
New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 9: Perceived behavioural 
control of New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers significantly influences their 
tax noncompliance behaviour.  
Accept Accept 
10. Does knowledge of the 
income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions in 
New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 10: Knowledge of the 
income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. 
Accept Accept 
11. Does complexity of the 
income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions in 
New Zealand and Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 11: Complexity of the 
income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. 
Accept  Accept  
12. Does knowledge of the 
income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural 
control in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 12: Knowledge of the 
income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in New Zealand 
and Malaysia. 
Reject Accept 
13. Does complexity of the 
income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural 
control in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 13: Complexity of the 
income tax system significantly 
influences taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in New Zealand 
and Malaysia. 
Reject Reject 
14. Do fairness perceptions on 
the income tax system influence 
taxpayers‟ attitude towards 
compliance in New Zealand and 
Malaysia? 
Hypothesis 14a: Fairness perceptions 
on the income tax system significantly 
influence taxpayers‟ affective attitude 
towards compliance in New Zealand 
and Malaysia. 
 
Reject  Accept  
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 Hypothesis 14b: Fairness perceptions 
on the income tax system significantly 
influence taxpayers‟ instrumental 
attitude towards compliance in New 
Zealand and Malaysia. 
Reject  Accept 
 
 
6.5.4    Direct and Indirect Effect Analysis 
Direct and indirect effect analysis was adopted to investigate the total 
effects of the independent constructs on the dependent constructs. The total 
effects for each dependent construct can be computed by using the path 
coefficients. For instance, in this study, through affective attitude and 
instrumental attitude, there were indirect effects from fairness perceptions 
to intention to comply. To obtain the indirect effects, the path coefficients 
from fairness perceptions to affective attitude (and instrumental attitude) 
must be multiplied by the path coefficient of affective attitude (and 
instrumental attitude) to intention to comply (Vatanasakdakul, 2007). 
Numerically, the results of direct effect, indirect effect and the total effect 
on intention to comply, affective attitude and instrumental attitude were 
summarised in Tables 6.36 and 6.37.  
 
Due to the intervening effect of affective attitude and instrumental attitude, 
indirect effects from fairness perceptions were added to the dependent 
construct - intention to comply - which subsequently increased the total 
effects. However, the effects did not improve greatly in New Zealand for 
either scenario.  
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In Malaysia, the original rank order for the first three independent 
constructs (based on the path coefficient or direct effect) in both scenarios, 
was the affective attitude, followed by the subjective norms and then 
instrumental attitude. When taking into consideration indirect effects the 
order had changed. Affective attitude and subjective norms were still 
ranked first and second, respectively, while fairness perceptions were now 
ranked third. The results suggested that the total effect of fairness 
perceptions is more transparent in Malaysia compared to New Zealand. 
Table 6.36 Summary of Total Influence on Dependent Constructs 
Scenario 1 (Overstating Business Expenses) 
 
  New Zealand Malaysia 
Propositions Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Effects on Intention to 
Comply 
      
Fairness perceptions -0.004 0.040 0.036 0.018 0.105 0.123 
Affective attitude 0.560 0.000 0.560 0.458 0.000 0.458 
Instrumental attitude -0.032 0.000 -0.032 -0.037 0.000 -0.037 
Subjective norms 0.192 0.000 0.192 0.388 0.000 0.388 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
-0.059 0.000 -0.059 0.036 0.000 0.036 
Effects on Affective 
Attitude 
      
Fairness perceptions 0.059 0.000 0.059 0.230 0.000 0.230 
Effects on Instrumental 
Attitude 
      
Fairness perceptions -0.216 0.000 -0.216 0.004 0.000 0.004 
 
 
Table 6.37 Summary of Total Influence on Dependent Constructs 
Scenario 2 (Understating Other Incomes) 
 
 New Zealand Malaysia 
Propositions Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Direct 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Effect 
Effects on Intention to 
Comply 
      
Fairness perceptions 0.071 0.025 0.096 0.080 0.063 0.143 
Affective attitude 0.468 0.000 0.468 0.393 0.000 0.393 
Instrumental attitude 0.052 0.000 0.052 0.098 0.000 0.098 
Subjective norms 0.345 0.000 0.345 0.394 0.000 0.394 
Perceived behavioural 
control 
-0.159 0.000 -0.159 -0.044 0.000 -0.044 
Effects on Affective 
Attitude 
      
Fairness perceptions 0.063 0.000 0.063 0.143 0.000 0.143 
Effects on Instrumental 
Attitude 
      
Fairness perceptions -0.074 0.000 -0.074 0.067 0.000 0.067 
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In addition to this the direct effect analysis revealed some interesting 
findings on the impacts of tax knowledge and tax complexity on the 
intention to comply. To perform the analysis, the Structural Model was 
extended by including the direct paths from tax knowledge and tax 
complexity to the dependent construct - intention to comply - where direct 
path coefficients were obtained.
100
 The results showed little improvement 
in the R
2
 (refer Table 6.38). With regard to path coefficients, the New 
Zealand sample indicates direct influence of tax knowledge on intention to 
comply at the 0.025 significance level for Scenario 1. The positive 
relationship suggests that having better knowledge of the tax system will 
improve tax compliance. However, no such significant relationship was 
documented for Scenario 2. Similarly in Malaysia the direct influence of 
tax knowledge on intention to comply was not significant in either 
scenario.   
 
Tax complexity seemed to have an impact on the intention to comply in 
Scenario 2 for the New Zealand sample. In Malaysia, the influence of tax 
complexity was significant in both cases (overstating business expenses 
and understating other income). The results demonstrate that low 
complexity of the tax system will motivate taxpayers to comply with their 
tax obligations. Although these direct impacts were not hypothesised 
                                                 
100 These direct paths were tested as previous studies (see for example, Carnes & Cuccia, 1996; Kasipillai 
et al., 2003; Loo, 2006; Loo et al., 2008; 2009; McKerchar, 2001; 2003; Richardson, 2006a) have 
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formally the results reveal the importance of both tax knowledge and tax 
complexity in taxpayers‟ decisions whether to comply or not.  
Table 6.38 Summary of Direct Influence of Tax Knowledge and Tax 
Complexity on Intention to Comply  
 
 Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
 New Zealand Malaysia  New Zealand Malaysia 
Propositions Path 
Coefficient 
Path 
Coefficient 
 Path 
Coefficient 
Path 
Coefficient 
Effects on Intention to 
Comply (R2) 
0.514 (0.491) 0.531 (0.526)  0.745 (0.740) 0.654 (0.652) 
Tax knowledge  0.1610** -0.0290  0.0410 0.0040 
Tax complexity -0.0800 0.0680**  0.0720* 0.0620** 
* significant at the 0.05 level 
** significant at the 0.025 level 
Figures in parentheses are the R
2
 of the existing structural models. 
 
6.6      Summary 
In this chapter, the regression analysis of the survey data was performed 
using PLS. The results confirm that fairness perceptions can take various 
forms namely, general fairness, exchange fairness, horizontal fairness, 
vertical fairness, retributive fairness, personal fairness and administrative 
fairness. PLS analysis was also used to identify the influences of fairness 
perceptions - and other variables under study - on intention to comply. 
Prior to the hypotheses testing, the measures were all tested and verified. 
These procedures were taken to ensure a valid and reliable instrument was 
used in the study.  
 
The R
2
 generated from the PLS analysis indicate that fairness perceptions, 
attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control explain more 
                                                                                                                        
documented significant relationships exist between the variables.  
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than 50 percent of taxpayers‟ decision to comply in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia. This suggests that the choice of applying the TPB in this study 
was appropriate. Tax knowledge and tax complexity explain between 28 
and 37 percent of the variance observed for taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions 
in both New Zealand and Malaysia. Observing the relationships between 
each independent variable and dependent variable indicates consistent 
results in New Zealand and Malaysia. For example, in the „overstating 
business expenses‟ scenario, the results in both countries show that 
intention to comply was significantly influenced by the affective attitude 
and subjective norms. Likewise, respondents had similar perceptions that 
tax knowledge and tax complexity had significant effects on fairness 
perceptions.  
 
Consistent results across countries were documented when applying the 
second scenario on „understating other incomes‟. In this scenario, fairness 
perceptions, affective attitude, subjective norms and perceived behavioural 
control were found as significant factors affecting intention to comply 
among taxpayers in both New Zealand and Malaysia. The effects of tax 
knowledge and tax complexity on fairness perceptions were also 
comparable as in Scenario One. Apparently, fairness perceptions and 
perceived behavioural control had a significant influence on intention to 
comply in this scenario, as opposed to Scenario One. This could be 
attributable to the different types of the scenarios set out in this study.  
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In the first scenario, taxpayers were asked about the possibility of 
overstating business expenses while in the second scenario, understating 
other incomes is the issue of concern. Relatively, taxpayers may feel that 
they have greater flexibility to either comply or not to comply in Scenario 
Two since there is little evidence of the transaction (as they received cash 
income) compared to Scenario One, which involves business documents. 
In this instance, their perceptions on the fairness of the income tax system 
may be important in their decisions. Another possible explanation is the 
variation in the amount stated in the scenarios. In Scenario One, the 
amount was only NZ$2,500 (or MYR2,500 in Malaysia), compared to 
NZ$10,500 (MYR10,500 in Malaysia) in Scenario two. With the greater 
amount at stake, taxpayers may consider fairness perceptions as even more 
important. In other words, fairness perceptions will become a significant 
issue when it involves a sizeable amount of money. In short, the results 
imply that fairness perceptions deeply affect taxpayers‟ compliance 
decisions when there is opportunity to comply (or not comply) and the 
level of wealth involved is large. With regard to the effects of tax 
knowledge and tax complexity on perceived behavioural control, the 
evidence was only significant in Malaysia.  
 
The inconsistent results between the two environments are evident in the 
effect of tax knowledge and tax complexity on respondents‟ perceived 
behavioural control. The Malaysian sample suggests a significant influence 
324 
 
of the variables but no evidence was found in the New Zealand 
environment. The results imply that a high level of tax knowledge and a 
low level of tax complexity in Malaysia (but not in New Zealand) may 
motivate taxpayers to avoid being compliant. One possible explanation for 
this could be due to the different tax systems themselves. In Malaysia, the 
compliance detection strategies may not be as efficient as in New Zealand 
(demonstrated by its IRD Compliance Model) that indirectly enables the 
taxpayers with good knowledge to manipulate the loopholes in the system. 
Moreover, the Malaysian income tax system which is relatively not 
complex compared to the New Zealand income tax system may also 
provide opportunity for taxpayers to avoid or evade tax. Other possible 
explanations could be the cultural differences between the two countries, 
which may affect taxpayers‟ societal norms and their compliance 
behaviour.  
 
To summarise, this study adds to the limited literature in this area. This 
chapter showed that fairness perceptions, apart from the TPB elements, 
played an important role in taxpayers‟ intention to comply with their tax 
obligations. A comparison between the two countries applying two 
different scenarios further provides interesting findings. Nonetheless, in 
interpreting the results, it is important to bear in mind that this study 
involves two different tax jurisdictions with different sample selection. 
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Further, the low response rate in New Zealand data may have potential to 
affect the results.        
 
The next two chapters discuss the results from the interviews with 
taxpayers. Subsequently, Chapter 9 will focus on the implications of this 
research and its key contributions by integrating the findings from both the 
surveys and interviews.   
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Chapter 7 
Analysis and Results of Interview Data: New Zealand 
 
7.1       Introduction 
Taxpayers‟ views are expected to enrich the findings generated from the 
quantitative approach discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. For the sake of clarity, 
the data analysis and the results of the interviews of the two countries are 
discussed in two separate chapters (by country), namely Chapters 7 and 8. 
In this chapter, the qualitative findings derived from telephone interviews 
with taxpayers across New Zealand are presented.
101
 Briefly, this chapter 
explores views and experiences of the taxpayers towards the issues under 
study.
102
 Specifically, the discussion focuses on taxpayers‟ perceptions of 
the fairness of the income tax system, their knowledge and the complexity 
of the income tax system, and the associated impact on compliance 
behaviour. In addition, the effect of tax knowledge and tax complexity on 
fairness perceptions was sought.  
 
7.2       Participants’ Characteristics  
From the invitation made to 2,267 potential participants, 92 filled in the 
consent form indicating their willingness to participate in the telephone 
interviews. With reference to the addresses, the forms received were 
                                                 
101 Data analysis and results from interviews with Malaysian taxpayers are to be discussed in Chapter 8. 
102 Interviews are designed to inform/provide further insights from survey results. 
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divided according to the regions to ensure the interview participants (as far 
as possible) were representative of New Zealand taxpayers. For the 
purpose of this study, 30 participants took part in the interviews. Initially, 
69 potential participants were contacted, but for various reasons 39 
withdrew their consent.
103
 The telephone interviews were conducted in 
November and December 2008.  
 
The demographic description of the participants is presented in Table 7.1. 
The participants comprise 18 males and 12 females, from eight different 
regions in New Zealand. The largest group of participants reside in the 
Auckland region (ten participants), followed by the Canterbury and 
Wellington regions, with seven and five participants, respectively. In terms 
of participants‟ occupations, eleven were salary earners with incomes 
derived from diverse backgrounds. The detail distribution of these eleven 
participants, according to their job descriptions, are:  
(1) three managers;  
(2) two lecturers;  
(3) one software consultant;  
(4) one business analyst;  
(5) one traffic engineer;  
(6) one factory worker;  
                                                 
103 Among the reasons are their busy schedule, hesitation for their telephone conversation to be 
recorded and health issues. 
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(7) one computer operator; and  
(8) one builder inspector.
104
  
 
In addition to the salaried group, twelve participants were retirees with 
various work experiences. For example, the interviewees included a former 
Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank and a former Vice Chancellor of a 
New Zealand university. The other ten participants in this group were:  
(1) two retired school teachers;  
(2) one retired accountant;  
(3) one retired customs officer;  
(4) one retired business person; and  
(5) five others who did not mention their previous occupations.  
The interviews also involved five self-employed persons, one full-time 
student (also working part-time), and an individual receiving government 
benefits. This beneficiary was also earning salary income from his two 
jobs. 
 
Demographically, the taxpayers participating in this study are identified as 
a mix of different occupational backgrounds and regional distribution, 
indicating a reasonably wide range of New Zealand taxpayers. It is 
anticipated that the differences in their social backgrounds would enable 
                                                 
104 One of the managers had experience running a small business while one of the lecturers is currently 
operating her own business.  
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them to present views and arguments from different perspectives as well as 
provide rich information for the study. 
Table 7.1 Demographic Description of the Participants 
     
 Number   Number  
Gender   Region  
Male 18  Auckland 10 
Female 12  Bay of Plenty 1 
 30  Canterbury 7 
Occupation   Hawkes Bay 1 
Retired person 12  Otago 1 
Full-time student 1  Waikato 3 
Self-employed 5  Wanganui 2 
Salary and wage earner 11  Wellington 5 
Beneficiary  1   30 
 30    
     
 
7.3       Data Analysis and Results 
7.3.1 Fairness Perceptions of the Income Tax System 
When performing the step-by-step thematic analysis on the data as 
suggested by Braun and Clarke (2006), it was noticed that participants had 
mixed perceptions on the fairness of the income tax system. While some 
(43 percent) considered the income tax system to be reasonably fair, the 
majority (57 percent) were unhappy. Participants who viewed the income 
tax system to be fair considered the income tax system as a mechanism to 
redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor. In addition, some argued that 
paying tax is fair and not burdensome in the sense that it is part of a social 
responsibility that should not be avoided by any person living in a country. 
Others were satisfied with the income tax system on the basis that it is 
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relatively stable and fairly treats New Zealand society as a whole. For 
example, one respondent observed:  
 
“I think it‟s reasonably fair to the New Zealand society because of 
the fairly recent modifications to it by the current government or the 
intentions of the current government. In other words, I think nobody 
is heavily overtaxed and there doesn‟t seem to be an easy way which 
people can avoid tax, which is a good thing….In that sense, I think 
the tax system is reasonable and yes, right, I think it is a fair tax.” 
(Participant 25, male, retired Vice Chancellor) 
 
Despite the fact that participants were generally happy with the overall 
New Zealand income tax system, from the interviews, it appeared that 
participants were not completely satisfied with aspects of the current 
income tax system. For example:   
 
“I think yeah [the income tax system is fair], but it could always 
possible to fine tune it….The only issue I do have is, I think there is 
some unfairness around penalties…”  
(Participant 1, male, self-employed) 
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I think it‟s fairly fair. I don‟t really have any argument with it. I 
don‟t mind giving the money, but I don‟t expect that the money is 
used properly.” 
(Participant 4, male, retired) 
 
“I‟m happy with the system. I‟m never happy with what they do with 
the money.” 
(Participant 24, male, retired business person) 
 
When probed further on their concerns about the fairness of the income tax 
system, their perceptions can be grouped into several aspects of fairness. 
Participants with negative perceptions on the fairness of the income tax 
system had also given various explanations to justify their views. For 
instance, there was a claim that fairness of the income tax system should be 
determined based on: (1) how tax is collected; and (2) how tax revenue is 
spent. If fairness was defined in this manner, some taxpayers would have 
improved perceptions of the fairness of the income tax system. Otherwise, 
the income tax system would be perceived as not fair according to some 
participants. For example:  
 
“In terms of tax fairness and perceptions or perceptions of fairness, 
whatever, I guess that I see there are two sides of the tax issue: one is 
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the tax government received over tax paid by [taxpayers] and the 
other is the government expenditure, how they spent the tax.” 
(Participant 13, male, retired Deputy Governor) 
 
While the majority of participants agreed with the views that fairness 
perceptions should encompass efficient tax collection and proper 
government spending, their opinions on the fairness of the income tax 
system went far beyond those two aspects of the income tax system. This is 
supported by the analysis performed on taxpayers‟ views on fairness 
perceptions, which subsequently generated five main themes of fairness 
perceptions:  
(1)  general fairness;  
(2)  vertical fairness; 
(3)  retributive fairness;  
(4)  personal fairness; and  
(5)  administrative fairness.        
 
7.3.1.1 General Fairness 
In this study, general fairness is concerned with taxpayers‟ perceptions of 
the broader aspects of the income tax system, such as government spending 
of the tax revenue and the benefits system. The results from the interviews 
indicated very few were satisfied with the government spending of the tax 
revenues, with the majority signalling their great disappointment 
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concerning this issue. These participants firmly believed that tax revenues 
were not being properly spent in desired areas, such as health and 
education, and instead were wasted on government bureaucracy. This has 
led to the violation of trust in the government, as indicated by the following 
comments:  
 
“I guess the key thing is that the question of how the tax has been 
used. That is obviously going to influence people‟s thought[s] about 
the whole tax system. [At] the moment that I would have thought 
that perhaps the tax dollars [tax revenue] have not been necessarily 
used effectively [by the government], (so) that would have 
influenced my [negative] thought[s], I guess.” 
(Participant 8, male, traffic engineer) 
 
“…I don‟t expect that the money is used properly...What people get 
really annoyed about is when they see that money is being used by 
people who don‟t need it, or abuse it, in other words, money which is 
not properly applied by the government.” 
(Participant 4, male, retired) 
 
“I honestly feel that a lot of that money taken by [the] tax office is 
actually wasted and so I believe that can happen with any country in 
the world, but the one thing that does annoy me is that you earn your 
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money, put it away and [the government] just blow them on the 
useless scheme that does not make any sense to me whereas that 
money should be used for example in the health department. The 
money is not actually spent [on] getting nurses, on decent nurses, 
decent doctors into the places; you put it into the administrators; I 
can‟t get along with that.” 
(Participant 24, male, retired business person) 
 
“The government that administers the tax system doesn‟t respect 
taxpayers, my general feelings, the way they waste [money].” 
(Participant 17, male, computer operator) 
 
“…I think too much tax spending has been spent on the bureaucracy, 
government bureaucracy has got too big and a bit inefficient. In 
terms of the main element that they spent, which is social welfare, 
health and education, I don‟t have problem with that…My main 
concern would be that too much of the tax has been spent on 
building up government departments; bureaucracy is too big.” 
(Participant 1, male, self-employed) 
 
“I‟m not really happy with [the] performance of our government. I 
completely oppose to the fact that they‟ve sold a lot of New Zealand 
[assets], you know, the utilities, electrical utilities, you know, we, 
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people‟s taxes bought the railways, people‟s taxes bought the 
electricity companies, built the dams, built the roads to the dams and 
everything like that, and then they get sold. I‟m completely unhappy 
with that situation.  
(Participant 6, male, self-employed)  
 
In relation to government spending, some participants further commented 
on the transparency issue where they claimed that the taxpayers were not 
well-informed on the details of how the tax revenue was spent. They 
expected a full disclosure of the government expenditure allowing them to 
examine the accounts and demonstrating greater government 
accountability. For example:  
 
“…I think there‟s a lot of hidden cost[s], which has not been made 
public or told to the public. I think people should be informed. I 
think everyone has the right to be informed…There should be an 
open book.” 
(Participant 3, female, full-time student) 
 
“The public should be well-informed and there should always be 
accountability for how their tax has been used as well.” 
(Participant 8, male, traffic engineer) 
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“…the problem is all our money just disappears in the black hole 
with people who become very careless on how they use it. While in 
small business if you are not careful with every single cent, you start 
losing everything. I want to see that same level of accountability.” 
(Participant 21, female, self-employed) 
 
With regard to the social welfare/government benefits system, participants 
were generally pleased with the idea of assisting low income taxpayers to 
have sufficient money to live on. However, participants stated that the 
system must be implemented with care to ensure that wealth is distributed 
fairly and only to those genuinely in need. This is essential to avoid the 
misuse of money by those not deserving assistance. The following 
comments indicate participants‟ feelings on this issue: 
 
“…I think the application of fund or benefits to people, I think they 
should be more closely monitored to ensure that they used for great 
purposes.” 
(Participant 4, male, retired) 
 
“Low-income people on benefits - there are times that people 
actually do need those benefits - and there are some people who 
abuse it…” 
(Participant 3, female, full-time student) 
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“Providing benefits is good for those who really deserve it but not to 
those who are simply lazy to find work.” 
(Participant 11, male, retired teacher) 
 
Similarly, participants also expressed their concern with the possibility that 
too much assistance would create an unhealthy expectation that the 
government has the responsibility to provide everything for society. For 
example: 
 
“Providing benefits is good, but you know, it‟s making people 
realise that everybody is entitled to everything and I think we have to 
work for what we get…there are a lot of people who presume that 
the government has to pay everything for them…” 
(Participant 2, male, retired) 
 
“…I think at the moment that the government in New Zealand, 
really for last 100 years, has taken on some responsibilities, an 
increasing responsibility for providing housing for people rather than 
anything they do…” 
(Participant 25, male, retired Vice Chancellor) 
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7.3.1.2 Vertical Fairness 
Vertical fairness suggests that people in different economic situations 
should be taxed differently (Kirchler et al., 2006). Ideally, vertical fairness 
is maintained when people with higher incomes are taxed at higher rates 
than those with lower incomes. This idea of ability to pay is part of 
Distributive Justice Theory (DJT) developed by Leventhal (1976), which 
asserts that the ratio of inputs and outputs need not necessarily be 
equivalent to achieve fairness, but rather it depends on individuals‟ needs. 
This issue has been long considered by the New Zealand income tax 
system where the progressive tax rates currently are as follows (New 
Zealand Inland Revenue, 2010b):  
(1)  10.5 percent on income up to NZD14,000;   
(2)  17.5 percent on income of NZD14,001 to NZD48,000; 
(3)  30 percent on income of NZD48,001 to NZD70,000; 
(4) 33 percent on income of NZD70,001 and above.105  
 
This idea of progressive tax rates was, theoretically at least, agreed by the 
participants when they claimed that it is fair to impose higher tax rates on 
high-income earners rather than low-income earners. However, the 
implementation of the progressive tax rates under the current income tax 
system appeared to be unsuccesful. The results of the interviews indicate 
participants‟ beliefs that vertical fairness was not maintained in the tax 
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system. The majority of participants viewed the current progressive tax 
rates imposed on taxpayers as unfair. Some argued that higher incomes 
were not sufficiently taxed - others condemned the income tax system as 
„oppressing‟ the poor and hence, there was a suggestion to not tax low-
income taxpayers. The following quotes reflect these views:  
 
“Well, I think to some people, it [the tax rate structure] seems 
excessive but I don‟t think it is sufficient for people who make a lot 
of money. I don‟t think they get taxed enough.” 
(Participant 2, female, retired) 
 
“I think that low income people are taxed too much. The higher 
income could be taxed more.” 
(Participant 5, female, retired) 
 
“I think people on low income shouldn‟t pay any tax at all. It should 
be what I call a living wage that if people get below NZD36,000 or 
whatever, they shouldn‟t be paying tax. There‟s school children 
working on delivering phamplets, they get taxed, that‟s mean to me.” 
(Participant 12, male, self-employed) 
 
                                                                                                                        
105 These rates were reduced from 1 October 2010. 
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The issue of vertical (un)fairness is not limited to the inequitable treatment 
between high-income earners and low-income earners but also between 
small business owners, who largely represent the middle-income group, and 
big companies. This was argued by participants who had experience 
running a small business, such that small business operators were not fairly 
treated relative to the big companies, who were entitled to various tax 
breaks. For example: 
 
“…for the small business people, like the huge percentage of the 
country tends to pay, and they are hardest hit with tax; as for big 
companies you get tax transition and things like that…The middle 
[income person], we don‟t get any tax break because we earn too 
much money, so they don‟t give [us] any tax break, and so we are 
the hardest hit to the next one [the higher income person] where they 
are living on million dollars a year, they get [a tax] break as well. A 
middle [income] person which I guess would be 80% of businesses 
in New Zealand or smaller business that I always run, they are the 
one[s], in my perception, they are the one[s] who get hit from both 
sides. So you don‟t get any help at either end, when you‟re in the 
middle.” 
(Participant 20, female, office manager) 
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“…for small businesses especially for business where you don‟t 
have stock, you go to your bank and you certainly ask for business 
finance. Like when I first started my business, I need[ed] to show the 
bank [my] six-month working capital. Number one, the bank puts 
you on the highest possible interest rate; number two, they won‟t get 
someone like me, a person like, so they called the loan 
personal…and they charge you very, very high interest and you can‟t 
get [it] deducted as a business expense because it has been issued as 
a personal loan. While I‟m using it as business capital, it‟s not tax 
deductible, so I end up as a small business person not only having to 
pay high interest to finance my business but I can‟t claim it as tax 
deductible expense. I end up paying more tax which I think is 
ridiculous. Seriously biased.” 
(Participant 21, female, self-employed) 
 
The concept of ability to pay in vertical fairness was also raised with 
respect to secondary tax imposed on a second job. While undertaking a 
second job mostly involved the lower income and middle income groups, 
who intended to improve their financial situations, secondary tax seems to 
be burdening them,
106
 instead of assisting them. This is due to the fact that 
the tax rate on the second job is much higher even though the total income 
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earned may still be within the lowest income bracket (New Zealand Inland 
Revenue, 2010d).
107
 Even though a special tax deduction rate can be 
arranged with the tax authority to suit an individual‟s circumstances, many 
may not be aware of such an arrangement. In this case, the issue of 
communication of the information should be more of concern to Inland 
Revenue in their effort to improve fairness perceptions among the 
taxpayers. Some of the comments from the interviews are as follows: 
 
“…I used to have two jobs, you know, when I first came to New 
Zealand, you know, I worked at night, I worked all day in my 
professional [primary job], then at night time I‟ve done cleaning you 
know, cleaning offices, banks, things  like that, you know. Because I 
have part time job I used to pay high tax you know. So I recommend 
if somebody is prepared to do two jobs, he shouldn‟t be penalised, 
you know. He should pay less tax, not more tax, you know what I 
mean. For the second job, you should be taxed [at] the same rate 
maybe but not the higher rate, you know.” 
   (Participant 16, male, retired) 
 
                                                                                                                        
106 The secondary tax is essentially an interim tax; therefore the financial tax burden may be temporary 
rather than permanent in nature. However, the taxpayers may be burdened with an additional 
responsibility to file the tax return forms in order to obtain the tax refund. 
107 The secondary tax rate for an income up to NZ$48,000 is 22.7 percent.  
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“I earn less than NZ$25,000 a year. Between me and my wife we 
earn, maybe NZ$11,500 each…I‟ve got to pay the secondary tax if I 
go and find a job, doing it part-time…it‟s wrong, because you earned 
under a certain amount, why should you pay for it?...[I‟m] not happy 
with it, because I‟m paying the same as the man who earns 
NZ$45,000 a year, we shop at the same supermarket, we buy the 
same products, only he buys more or he buys a better quality, but he 
probably pays less tax than I do if I had a secondary tax… I‟m still 
earning less than NZ$30,000. That‟s wrong.” 
(Participant 9, male, beneficiary) 
 
The results provide evidence that New Zealand participants place great 
emphasis on vertical fairness in forming their fairness perceptions. Even 
though they were satisfied that progressive tax rates were in place, they had 
great concerns on the equality of the tax rates imposed for various income 
brackets, which includes the issue of secondary tax.    
 
7.3.1.3 Retributive Fairness 
Retributive fairness suggests that, in order to be fair, the penalty imposed 
should match the crime or offence committed. As such, in taxation, various 
punishments, ranging from fines to imprisonment, are available to serve as 
penalties for different degrees of non-compliant behaviour. Such an 
understanding was shared by most of the participants in the study, who 
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claimed the necessity of penalty mechanisms to reinforce tax compliance 
among taxpayers; for example:  
 
“…I know there need[s] to be incentives to do the right thing 
[comply]…” 
(Participant 27, male, software consultant)  
 
Likewise, participants‟ understanding of the concept of retributive fairness 
was implicitly expressed during the interviews where they demanded an 
equitable match of penalties to tax offences. The participants were of the 
opinion that strict penalties should be imposed on taxpayers who were 
deliberately avoiding or evading tax. On the other hand, more flexibility 
was expected from the tax authority when dealing with unintentional non-
compliant taxpayers. This is because participants believed that penalising 
taxpayers for their genuine mistakes is completely unfair. Unfortunately, 
such practices were still taking place, resulting in grievances among 
taxpayers towards the income tax system. The following comments are 
reflective of participants‟ views in these issues:  
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 “I think that people who do tax evasion should be hit heavily. That‟s 
different from people who missed the payment, not to run [away 
from paying tax] but forgetting it [unintentionally]. I think people 
who evade tax, they should be hit with a hard penalty.” 
(Participant 4, male, retired) 
 
“If they are deliberately avoiding the tax, they should be penalised; if 
it‟s a mistake, they shouldn‟t be penalised.” 
(Participant 24, male, retired business person) 
 
“The penalties, I‟m not happy about [them] because some people 
cannot pay in [a] hurry and yet they get penalised.” 
(Participant 11, male, retired teacher) 
 
 “I think there‟s some unfairness around penalties for people who 
might make [a] mistake in calculating their tax and subsequently 
[are] discovered by the IRD that they hadn‟t paid enough… A few 
years ago, I know a number of people who through innocent 
mistakes were pretty well made bankrupt because they could not pay 
the penalties. I think the penalty rate for tax which is either late or 
has not been paid because of a mistake, in my understanding, is too 
burden[some].” 
(Participant 1, male, self-employed) 
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“I received the assessment for my last taxation that was due on 27th 
of October and I received that two days after it was due. 
Immediately, there‟s the tax penalty for the neglect to pay. I don‟t 
have to write the letter saying it‟s my fault that I don‟t pay it but I 
said I don‟t receive the assessment until after the due date. But the 
whole point is they then have the total rights as to whether to charge 
you penalty or not. It wasn‟t my fault. To get things resolved 
towards them, I came back from holiday and I have this assessment 
for NZ$3,500 and I thought I don‟t owe this and the next envelope I 
opened was a demand for immediate payment and I thought what I 
did? …I knew I didn‟t owe it, but I have to sort it out; the only way I 
can sort it out to get them off my back was by paying this NZ$3,500, 
which I did. I then proceeded to prove that I didn‟t owe it. That took 
four months of constant working with the department providing 
them with the information I believe they already had, and filing the 
imputation returns going back to [year] 2000. I have to go back 
[through] all my [relevant documents to] tax. Luckily, I‟ve kept it. 
That all took me a huge amount of time. I had to prove that I didn‟t 
owe it and I didn‟t owe it. But to get the refund back it took me four 
months.” (emphasis added)  
(Participant 12, male, self-employed) 
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Apart from the degree of penalties, some taxpayers viewed retributive 
fairness in terms of the relationship between the tax authority and 
taxpayers in relation to the mistakes made. From the participants‟ 
perspective, to maintain retributive fairness in the income tax system, 
equivalent penalties should be imposed on both the tax authority and the 
taxpayers for their mistakes, without any bias shown. A common example 
of an unfair treatment suggested by participants was the penalty interest 
rate, which was favourably biased towards the tax authority: 
 
“I think it [the penalty] affects them mildly. They [the IRD] can 
make mistakes and they get away with it. If we miss a day or two, 
they come to me like straight away, they are quite ruthless. I think 
the penalties are cruel.” 
(Participant 4, male, retired) 
 
“…the penalty, there are not enough communications. One of those 
things is that if I am owed money, no effort is made to get the money 
to me. If I owed money, you know, penalty, penalty, penalty, but I‟m 
not getting interest for the money they‟re withholding…if I‟m owed 
money, the money should be put in my accounts and I should be 
notified in my last known address, you know, rather than the money 
just sitting until I made the enquiry…when I have to pay it [tax] and 
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if I owe it, they penalised straight away, while if I‟m owed it, I 
should be given that money immediately.” 
(Participant 7, male, builder inspector) 
 
“My greatest thing that angers me is, if you get provisional tax 
wrong, [you] have to pay penalty interest because you underestimate 
and if you‟re over[estimate], you get a miserable amount of tax 
interest back…if you overestimated your tax you get 10 percent 
interest, and if you underestimate you pay 10 percent. Equal. I think 
it‟s 14 percent if they charged you and 6 percent if you overpaid [is] 
unfair.  
(Participant 18, male, retired accountant) 
 
“I know if you pay too much tax, like if you, whatever it is, say 5 
percent, but if you understate, then you‟ll be penalised by say 10 
percent, I don‟t know what the amount is now, because my husband 
used to be self-employed, he doesn‟t work now, but I don‟t think 
that‟s fair. I mean, it should be the same amount.” 
(Participant 28, female, retired) 
 
At this point, the results indicate participants‟ belief that to maintain 
retributive fairness in the income tax system, the tax authority should focus 
on:  
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(1)  comparability between offences and penalties;  
(2)  flexibility in terms of penalising genuine mistakes; and  
(3)  equivalent treatment between taxpayers and the tax authority.  
Fulfilling these three aspects of retributive fairness is expected to improve 
taxpayers‟ perceptions on the retributive fairness of the income tax system.  
 
7.3.1.4 Personal Fairness 
Personal fairness basically deals with taxpayers‟ perceptions as to whether 
the current income tax system is fulfilling their self-interest. From the 
interviews conducted, it appears that participants from all income levels 
tended to focus on tax rates. They were unhappy with the current tax rates 
and wished to have both lower rates and the secondary tax abolished. In 
addition, there were also comments suggesting New Zealand should place 
a greater emphasis on expenditure tax and less emphasis on income tax. A 
selection of participants‟ comments is outlined below:  
 
 “I think people with a young family should have a lower [tax] 
rate…anybody on [a] middle income with young or old 
dependent[s], they should be taxed less.” 
(Participant 6, male, self-employed) 
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“I think married couple[s] pay too much tax and married couple[s] 
with children too.” 
(Participant 17, male, computer operator) 
 
“Well, I think the top income earners are [taxed] far too much, and I 
would like to see the tax rate lowered a little bit.” 
(Participant 14, female, self-employed) 
 
“If you‟re on [a] benefit and you‟re earning NZ$15,000 a year for 
example, and you go and get a job, I would [suggest] abolishing the 
secondary tax and just use the first tax…” 
(Participant 9, male, beneficiary) 
 
“I‟m inclined to think that my personal view is that, I would put 
more on expenditure tax and less on the income tax. I think that 
because it is easier to collect and [is] generally spread across 
[people].” 
(Participant 13, male, retired Deputy Governor) 
 
7.3.1.5 Administrative Fairness 
Administrative fairness is concerned with taxpayers‟ perceptions of how 
the tax authority administers the income tax system. This concept of 
fairness emerged from Procedural Justice Theory (PJT), which asserts that 
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fairness in procedures may lead to fair outcomes. PJT postulates six 
principles underlying fair procedures, namely: consistency, bias-
suppression, accuracy, correctability, representativeness, and ethicality.
108
 
In relation to this study, administrative fairness of the income tax system 
was not only observed in terms of the above-mentioned principles, but also 
with a few other elements. For instance, accessibility to the tax authority 
has been an issue amongst the participants. In fact, there was a claim that 
discrimination has taken place in terms of the accessibility to the tax 
authority, where tax accountants are given „privileges‟ over ordinary 
taxpayers. This statement signals that the bias-suppression principle was 
violated. For instance: 
 
“…it‟s very difficult to get through to the taxation department. I 
have a query, it‟s a long time just getting on to them, and then to 
[have them] actually speak with you.”  
(Participant 4, male, retired) 
 
“…I do know that it is very difficult if you need to make contact 
each time. It is very difficult to get in touch with any of them, if you 
ring you can‟t actually get the person and or you have to hang on for 
a long time. I only tried once and then I went through the process of 
getting on the system where I could do it on the computer but I‟m 
                                                 
108 The details of these principles were discussed in Chapter 2. 
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not sure. I don‟t have a case to use it but I don‟t know how 
satisfactory it would be. I think accountants in that sense, have 
special lines so that they get through to somebody, but the general 
public I think they get pretty frustrated.” 
(Participant 30, female, retired teacher) 
 
Despite the criticisms on the accessibility of the revenue authority, 
participants were quite satisfied with the tax authority when salary and 
wage earners were no longer required to file tax return forms. Such 
simplicity, however, was not enjoyed by the self-employed group, who 
remain burdened with a lot of paperwork. This situation seems to be most 
unsatisfactory as the responsibilities to organise tax matters rests solely 
with the taxpayers. Participants made the following comments:  
 
“I think the administration is quite good because we don‟t have to 
put in tax returns and most people don‟t have to put tax returns in.” 
(Participant 27, male, software consultant) 
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“I think it is the fact there is so much paperwork with the New 
Zealand tax system, so much online work you have to do…their 
administration, when you get through to them, is quite efficient, we 
have found. But the emphasis is on the taxpayer to find the person 
you need, not in the other way around.” 
(Participant 26, female, lecturer) 
 
“GST for businesses has to be completely overhauled. It has too 
much administrative work. Plus you need to collect the tax and then 
reconcile all the banking and you can‟t make a mistake. Not 
everybody is good at maths or anything like that…I mean, it‟s not 
fair to ask all small business people to do that, like if you get 
everything done by an accountant, then it‟s gonna cost you heaps 
more money, like NZ$2,000-NZ$3,000 a quarter or something like 
that…a lot of things that have to be collected now, you have to 
collect for the pension scheme, Kiwi Saver and also the people 
[who] have got student loans. You are liable to collect them, but with 
PAYE, [I have] always done that, and I think that is reasonable. But 
all the other things are too much administration for small business.” 
(Participant 6, male, self-employed) 
 
Another aspect of administrative fairness that participants commented on 
was administering taxes for beneficiaries. Participants claimed that taxing 
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beneficiaries and low income people had actually resulted in huge tax 
administrative costs. Also, participants commented that it seems 
unreasonable for the tax authority to impose tax on benefits which were 
essentially designed to help low income people. In relation to this, 
participants were suggested excluding low income people from the income 
tax system, which would subsequently reduces the number of people 
Inland Revenue has to administer, and associated administration costs. For 
example: 
 
“Things like benefits seem to me like they are [a] waste of money, 
time and effort. People gather tax from people who perhaps 
shouldn‟t be taxed anyway. If you get to give the benefits, why not 
just give the [net] figure. It‟s [a] waste of time, giving them 
something and then taxing it.” 
(Participant 10, male, retired custom officer) 
 
Participants in this study also considered the administrative fairness of the 
income tax system in terms of the moral and ethical standards, which 
includes the friendliness of Inland Revenue staff. The participants claimed 
that this issue of unfriendliness was apparent particularly during a tax audit 
where Inland Revenue staff had the authority to inspect taxpayers‟ 
documents and premises. In this situation where they have so much power, 
participants stated that Inland Revenue staff failed to convey their „good 
355 
 
values‟ through proper communication. Some of the comments offered 
include: 
 
“I suspect that the tax department seems to have powers that other 
departments don‟t have. Well, they can hound people.” 
(Participant 17, male, computer operator) 
 
 “…the humanity side, people actually administering the tax in the 
department, I think they have got so much power. I have seen that 
when I was in business, when they come to check us out, you know; 
I can‟t see how we can change human nature.” 
(Participant 24, male, retired business person) 
 
In order to be perceived as fair, the policy or rules employed by the 
revenue authority must have gone through a decision-making process 
which not only involved the tax authority, and tax experts, but also 
taxpayers. This PJT principle of representativeness suggests that society 
will be more likely to perceive a system to be fair when they have been 
involved in the relevant decision-making. However, the comments 
forwarded by one participant in this study indicates that their opinion was 
not sought prior to the implementation of new tax rules or policy,
109
 hence 
                                                 
109 Since 1995, tax policy has been developed using the Generic Tax Policy Process (GTPP). The process 
allows Inland Revenue to develop more practical options for reform by drawing on information 
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resulting in negative perceptions of the administration of the income tax 
system:  
 
“…you know that there‟s a new regulation regarding the dates for 
provisional tax payments, you know that, what is date is the 15
th
 of 
January? Do you know what‟s wrong with that date? [long holiday]. 
What else do you think happens in 99 percent of businesses in New 
Zealand in January? I can tell you that there‟s a lack of cash because 
people are going [on] holiday, there [is] a lot of money going out and 
a small amount coming in. So what does the department do? They 
say, we are going to have our tax. One, people are going away for a 
holiday; and two, this is on the very worst month of the whole 
financial year. That proves to me that a whole lot of PhDs, and 
highly qualified people make decisions with no idea [of] the impact 
of them, alright? In business, you want to be able to spread your cash 
responsibilities over the whole year, what you‟re trying to avoid is to 
hold a lot of cash bank at one month and a very little cash in the 
bank in the others. So you try to spread your expenses. So, what the 
department has done…the department has decided to put my GST 
                                                                                                                        
provided by the private sector and the people who will be affected.  This is made to ensure a better 
and more effective tax policy development, as well as to increase the opportunity for public 
consultation (see Sawyer, 1996a for details on the phases of GTPP). Thus, arguably taxpayers can be 
involved through the select committee, submission process etc. (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 
2010c). Unfortunately, taxpayers perhaps are not aware of their rights to participate in the process, 
which leads them to have negative perceptions on new policies or rules which are implemented. This 
is again, an issue of communication which requires attention from the IRD.   
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(goods and services tax) and my provisional tax payments, all in the 
same month…” 
(Participant 12, male, self-employed) 
 
The above discussion indicates that from the participants‟ perspective, they 
had concerns about the administration of the income tax system in terms 
of:  
(1)  accessibility to the tax authority;  
(2)  responsibility in administering tax matters;  
(3)  friendliness of the tax authority‟s staff; and  
(4)  the decision-making process; 
all of which subsequently affected their fairness perceptions.  
 
7.3.2   Tax Knowledge 
In this study, the researcher has sought to understand the level of tax 
knowledge among taxpayers, which encompasses general knowledge, 
technical knowledge and legal knowledge (concerning taxation). However, 
during the interviews, participants were generally asked about their 
knowledge of the income tax system without mentioning a specific type of 
knowledge as mentioned above. These types of knowledge only emerged 
while analysing the participants‟ responses to the questions. The results 
indicate that some participants had a general idea of the income tax system 
but not much on the details of the system. They admitted that their 
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knowledge was restricted to a broad knowledge of the income tax such as, 
the objectives of income tax, types of income tax, and tax rates. The 
following are examples of the comments received:    
 
“It [the income tax system] is a progressive system which essentially 
assists with redistributing wealth at a certain stage.”  
(Participant 1, male, self-employed) 
 
“I don‟t [have a good knowledge of tax]. I know that people are 
taxed to pay bills in the country, employment, social security, 
something like that…” 
(Participant 3, female, full-time student) 
 
“Pretty limited, really. I know that there are obviously the goods and 
services tax that the company has to pay for and the employer has to 
deal with the PAYE [Pay As You Earn] and there is things like fuel 
tax.” 
(Participant 8, male, traffic engineer) 
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“I‟m not intimate with the details of some of the taxes. I know what 
they [government] are getting [through taxes]…where they‟re going 
[the government expenditure] and coming from [various sources of 
tax] but I don‟t think that I know all about the tax system…” 
(Participant 10, male, retired custom officer) 
 
“Tax knowledge, obviously with my background, I‟ve got better 
than average, but I certainly wouldn‟t claim to be a tax expert; I [am] 
certainly not at the details level, but much more on a broader policy 
[level].” 
(Participant 13, male, retired Deputy Governor) 
 
The majority of the participants, when asked about their tax knowledge, 
instantly revealed their knowledge of the technical parts of the income tax 
system. This implicitly indicates that technical knowledge is very 
important to them. This does make sense due to the need to have applied 
tax knowledge when meeting their income tax obligations. When taxpayers 
are lacking in technical knowledge of taxation, this is not an issue for 
salary and wage earners (even though all of them admitted to having 
limited knowledge), since they do not have to file tax returns. However, 
such a deficiency is certainly of concern for the self-employed people or 
those with other incomes who are required to file tax return forms. This is 
evidenced from the study where only two participants (both were retirees), 
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claimed to independently prepare their own tax return forms, while the 
remaining participants (with obligations to file the tax return forms) sought 
help from accountants: 
 
“Well, I do all my tax returns [but my knowledge] is still limited, I 
guess.” 
(Participant 4, male, retired) 
 
“I would say, [in terms of tax knowledge] I‟m better than most. I 
used to be an accountant years ago, so I‟ve got a fairly good 
knowledge of it.” 
(Participant 18, male, retired accountant) 
 
“[My tax knowledge is] very limited. I‟ve tried to do it [tax return], 
but it‟s confusing.” 
(Participant 5, female, retired) 
 
“Not that good…I use accountants for my income tax returns. I don‟t 
know too much about it.” 
(Participant 1, male, self-employed)  
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“Average, really. I have a tax accountant. I don‟t personally do my 
income tax returns. I have got my tax accountant to do that.” 
(Participant 14, female, self-employed) 
 
“I would say my knowledge is quite good. I actually prepare the tax 
returns…I have tax accountants that I have to ring for that 
information because I don‟t know it myself…” 
(Participant 12, male, self-employed) 
 
“I have a very good accountant, so I expect my accountant to make 
sure that I‟m informed. I‟ve been a self-employed [person] for a lot 
of years, so yeah, I think I have as much as I need to know.” 
(Participant 20, female, office manager) 
 
From the interviews, very few participants mentioned their knowledge of 
the legal aspects of the income tax system. This could be due to the fact 
that they had little knowledge of it and/or they did not find it to be an 
important aspect of income tax to discuss.  
 
7.3.3   Tax Complexity 
With regard to the complexity of the income tax system, the majority of the 
interview participants claimed that the system is generally too complex for 
taxpayers to understand. This opinion was shared not only by the self-
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employed people but also by the salary and wage earners, retirees and even 
students. While one participant put the blame on the multitude of forms for 
causing the complexity in the income tax system, another claimed that the 
income tax itself is inherently complex. With that in mind, it is therefore 
not surprising that the majority of the participants regarded the income tax 
system as seriously complicated. The following is a sample of views from 
participants:  
 
“It is [complex] for somebody like me. I do try to understand like I 
read about it and I just get lost. [It‟s] not for me. Some people‟s 
brains are very financial and I think my brain is not.” 
(Participant 15, female, factory worker) 
 
“It is complex. I think it could be made more simpler for everybody, 
so everybody truly understands because sometimes they make forms 
and it‟s too much. That needs to be taken out.” 
(Participant 3, female, full–time student) 
 
“I think the tax system is really, really complex. I think it is so in the 
most countries. I think the main reason for the taxation to be so 
complex is that government attempts to use [the system to] firstly, 
redistribute incomes and secondly to achieve other social goals. 
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They are trying to take the tax system and use it for something that 
the tax system is not really designed for.” 
(Participant 13, male, retired Deputy Governor) 
 
“I think it is [complex] for older people, I don‟t know about younger 
people, unless they have a good accountant.” 
(Participant 2, female, retired) 
 
Parallel with the mainstream opinion among participants that the income 
tax system is complex, some participants expressed their concern towards 
the self-employed who need to deal with onerous tax matters. This concern 
makes sense since the self-employed have to deal with various tax matters 
including provisional income tax, PAYE, GST and so on, which is 
expected to result in high compliance costs. For instance, three participants 
commented:  
 
“…how is, you know what they call Mr. Average on the street, going 
to understand this. He‟s not, and so, I feel very sorry for people who 
are trying to start up their business, but compliance costs are huge.” 
(Participant 12, male, self-employed) 
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“…when you start getting into self-employed or when you start 
becoming an employer, [the tax system is] getting quite complex.” 
(Participant 22, male, business analyst) 
 
“…with regard to the sole trader, the small business, those who 
employing less than five people or people who are consulted for 
trying to pay their own tax, I think they get in trouble. I think the 
provisional tax is the one with that problem…” 
(Participant 26, female, lecturer) 
 
Undeniably, there were interview participants who considered the income 
tax not to be complex. However, according to four such participants, this 
view was merely true in the case of salary and wage earners.  It is also 
important to note that the remaining participants, who had a favourable 
opinion on the complexity of the income tax system, were four retirees, 
one salaried person and a self-employed person who had a tax accountant 
to deal with her tax matters. In other words, their comments on the 
complexity of the income tax system may be biased since they had little or 
no experience dealing with tax matters themselves. A selection of 
comments follows: 
 
“It‟s not complex and I don‟t have problem with it.” 
(Participant 11, male, retired teacher) 
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 “As it is at the moment, no, not complex.” 
(Participant 7, male, builder inspector) 
 
“[The income tax system is] relatively easy. 
(Participant 18, male, retired accountant) 
 
“Well, for wage and salary earners, it‟s pretty simple, [it is] deducted 
from your pay. But from an employer‟s point of view, it might be a 
bit different.” 
(Participant 19, male, bank manager) 
 
“I find it quite straight forward because they, you know, IRD just 
send you the information and you can claim for your donation. I 
mean, I think, it‟s a lot more straightforward now even without 
accountant; it‟s more straight forward now too because they can just 
click the IRD website and see what have been paid in terms of 
salary, and what rates have been taxed on, all of those kind of 
things.” 
(Participant 23, female, lecturer) 
 
In relation to the above comments, one participant lent his support to the 
comment that the income tax system is not difficult for salary and wage 
earners as long as there were no other sources of income. In this instance, 
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he shared his experience dealing with foreign income which forced him to 
consult his accountant in preparing tax return forms. He further claimed 
that such complexity had benefited none other than the accountants and 
lawyers. Such a statement provides support to previous studies by White 
(1990) and Sawyer (1996b), who discussed the complexity scenarios 
preferred by various groups of tax professionals. Specifically, this 
participant stated: 
 
“Well, it is not complex if you‟re wage earner, an automatic 
deduction. When there are significant changes in taxation, and there 
have been recently, the tax on overseas investment there‟s actually 
was a blurring and complex introduction. I mean, in my own 
particular case, for the first time ever, I have to use an accountant to 
do my tax return quite simply because I had some modest 
investments overseas and I had to pay tax on them. That, I think, was 
crazy because the only people who really benefit from that are the 
accountants because the tax system is too complex…and the second 
beneficiary is the lawyers.” 
(Participant 25, male, retired Vice Chancellor) 
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7.3.4   Compliance Behaviour 
Based on the literature discussed in Chapter 2,
110
 this study assumes that 
taxpayers were considered to be complying with the income tax system 
when they filed all their required tax return forms within the stipulated time 
frame and these return forms correctly report their tax liabilities in 
accordance with the relevant tax laws (Roth et al., 1989). To capture tax 
compliance behaviour, participants were initially asked about their 
perceptions of taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour in general. Most 
participants implicitly claimed that taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour 
should be observed in terms of their sources of income. For salaried 
taxpayers, where their taxes were deducted at source, their compliance 
behaviour would be undoubtedly high since they have no choice but to 
comply: 
 
“Most people that I‟ve mixed with, I think, pay [a] reasonable 
amount…well, knowing that they have no chance of avoiding it 
because [they are] on a salary, and particularly when you‟ve got 
investment income, again, [whether to comply or not] up to the 
source [of incomes].” 
(Participant 18, male, retired accountant) 
 
                                                 
110 Refer section 2.5.2 for details. 
368 
 
“…well, somebody in my position [salary earner], is in no position 
to do anything about it really, because I don‟t have any control.”  
(Participant 17, male, computer operator) 
 
“Wage and salary earners do [comply]. But I know there are a lot of 
businesses out there that don‟t pay their fair share of taxes. And I 
believe someone protected it, particularly I‟m gonna use the term, 
say Cambodian shop owners who have bakeries, although they work 
very long hours (seven days a week), I know the cash that they 
actually declare is the fraction of what they [are] actually earning, all 
right.” 
(Participant 19, male, bank manager)   
 
Unlike salaried taxpayers, the self-employed have opportunities to decide 
whether to comply or not comply with their tax obligation. Even though 
this view was mainly brought up by salary and wage earners or retirees, 
one participant, who used to be self-employed, admitted to the fact that 
many self-employed people evaded tax. This evasion practice was 
performed by simply adjusting the income and expenses in the business to 
end up with a smaller tax liability. Participants commented as follows: 
 
 “I think that most people, you know, that have [a] small sole trader 
business, are you trying to tell me that the local dairy owner or fruit 
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shop owner [is] paying the tax he should be paying? I‟m saying you 
are having a laugh.” 
(Participant 7, male, builder inspector) 
 
“I would say that the small self-employed businesses, I would have 
thought, may be trying to have a little bit of tax evasion. Doing cash 
jobs for friends and that, but otherwise I think the IRD is pretty hard 
to have not complied with, I would have thought.” 
(Participant 8, male, traffic engineer) 
 
When probed on the reasons for tax non-compliance, various answers were 
given by the participants. The first is that the taxpayers‟ attitude of being 
greedy and no feelings of civic duty to share their incomes with other 
members of the society, as stated in the following comments: 
 
“They‟re just greedy. They just want to keep more money 
themselves.” 
(Participant 4, male, retired) 
 
“…some [people do not comply], I think it‟s just real greed, 
really…I think some people just hold that kind of an attitude to life 
really, and comes into their taxes.” 
(Participant 23, female, lecturer) 
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Another potential reason for non-compliance, from the participants‟ 
perspective, was the taxpayers‟ belief that they could avoid paying tax 
without being caught by Inland Revenue. Such perceived behavioural 
control among taxpayers motivated them to constantly not comply with 
their tax obligations. Some attributed that control to the assistance 
provided by the accountants, while others blamed the loopholes in the tax 
system itself that provided room for manipulation: 
“…because if people can get away with things, they will.” 
(Participant 5, female, retired) 
 
“I think it is possible that they think that for small occasional, say, 
source of income, they probably do things for friends, and they 
might think that they can get away with it enough.” 
(Participant 8, male, traffic engineer) 
 
“I think probably most people would have tried to avoid tax if they 
know they can get away with it.” 
(Participant 13, male, retired Deputy Governor) 
 
Interestingly, one participant, who was formerly a self-employed person, 
claimed that good tax knowledge could also motivate taxpayers to avoid 
(or evade) paying tax. In this instance, this comment suggests that 
taxpayers with good tax knowledge were not necessarily expected to 
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comply with their tax obligations since some may have misused this in 
their attempt to avoid fully complying:  
 
“If you‟ve got good knowledge, you‟ll probably attempt to, well, I 
wouldn‟t say avoid, but yeah, avoid paying as much, paying 
unnecessary tax.” 
(Participant 24, male, retired business person) 
 
Complexity of the income tax system was perceived as another rationale 
for non-compliance among taxpayers. Participants believed that 
complexity of the income tax system compelled taxpayers to not comply, 
either intentionally or unintentionally, for instance: 
 
“…I also think that probably some people don‟t comply strictly 
because the tax system is too complex.” 
(Participant 12, male, self-employed)   
 
“I think, sometimes people try to deliberately avoid doing it [tax 
compliance] because the aid [assistance from the IRD] is painful, 
especially if you‟re a small company and the provisional tax is 
coming…” 
 (Participant 26, female, lecturer) 
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“…I think most people try to be compliant and if they aren‟t, it is 
because it is too complex.” 
(Participant 30, female, retired teacher) 
 
Another significant explanation for non-compliance was the fairness 
perceptions of the income tax system as a whole. Participants clearly 
mentioned that their negative perceptions of the income tax system, 
particularly on the tax rate structures and government spending, had 
motivated them to avoid and evade paying tax:  
 
“I don‟t think we do comply properly because the system is not 
fair…I think that with a fairer tax, I think that we would comply, we 
would be much more happy to comply and we would like; I mean 
most of my [business expenses], in my business dates you know, I 
put back most [expenses] to wages so I don‟t have to pay such a high 
percentage in tax, but if it was a fair amount, I don‟t think we would 
have creative accounting like we do now.”  
(Participant 20, female, office manager) 
 
“And I think in most cases, people will evade it because they feel 
that money has been wasted.” 
(Participant 24, male, retired business person) 
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“I think a lot of [non-compliance behaviour] is down to people‟ 
perceptions of whether they are being treated fairly or not.” 
(Participant 23, female, lecturer) 
 
7.3.5   Tax Knowledge, Tax Complexity and Fairness Perceptions 
During the interviews, participants were also asked about the effects of tax 
knowledge and tax complexity on the fairness perceptions. In relation to 
this, participants‟ views were divided into three groupings where the first 
grouping suggested no influence of either tax knowledge or tax complexity 
on the fairness perceptions. Comments from this perspective include: 
 
“I think I‟ve got reasonably good knowledge, it [my fairness 
perceptions] remains as it is…it [tax knowledge] won‟t affect 
fairness perceptions…” 
(Participant 15, male, self-employed) 
 
“…I think the perception is not of tax [knowledge], doesn‟t matter 
how well we know the tax law, there‟s more business persons like 
myself feel that we are overtaxed anyway, so I don‟t think we 
particularly want to have any more knowledge because what [will] 
happen [is] that the tax number that we have to pay is tax on the 
profit we made, overall is much more relevant than any other issue.” 
(Participant 27, female, salaried person) 
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“I don‟t think it [fairness perception] is due to complexity. I think 
it‟s just the way it‟s [the income tax system as a whole] done.” 
(Participant 22, male, business analyst) 
 
The second grouping, on the other hand, agreed that tax knowledge had 
affected the fairness perceptions to a certain degree, in a positive manner. 
In other words, they were suggesting that taxpayers with good tax 
knowledge may understand more of the income tax system, hence resulting 
in better perceptions of fairness:  
 
“I think if I have information I may well have a different [fairness] 
perception.” 
(Participant 23, female, lecturer) 
 
“Yeah, probably some people haven‟t got sufficient knowledge and 
therefore their perceptions of it [the income tax system], they think 
it‟s unfair.” 
(Participant 30, female, retired teacher) 
 
The third grouping claimed that tax complexity actually had affected their 
fairness perceptions. They claimed that a simpler income tax system would 
result in fairer perceptions among the taxpayers as suggested in the 
following comments:     
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“I think I do [agree that a simpler tax system would improve fairness 
perceptions].” 
(Participant 26, female, lecturer) 
 
“I think it [complexity] probably does [lead to negative fairness 
perceptions].” 
(Participant 30, female, retired teacher) 
 
7.4  Summary 
In this chapter, a thematic analysis of the interviews with a sample of New 
Zealand individual taxpayers was performed. The analysis involves 
identifying important features of the data (coding), collating the features 
into potential themes and reviewing the potential themes. Thereafter, the 
themes were defined, named and analysed. From the analysis, the results 
suggest that New Zealand participants had mixed perceptions on the 
fairness of the income tax system. Specifically they had concerns on five 
aspects of fairness perceptions, namely: general fairness, vertical fairness, 
retributive fairness, personal fairness and administrative fairness. These 
concerns should at least provide a signal to Inland Revenue on the aspects 
of income tax system that need improvements.  
 
When discussing about their knowledge of the income tax system, New 
Zealand participants appeared to have inadequate knowledge on the 
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technical aspects of income tax system. This issue was even critical among 
the self-employed participants who are expected to deal with onerous tax 
matters, such as PAYE, GST, KiwiSaver etc. In dealing with these tax 
affairs, they may have to incur more compliance costs (in terms of time 
and money), which might be the source of their frustrations towards the 
income tax system. 
 
The self-employed participants also perceived the current income tax 
system to be complex. They claimed that while the income tax system 
itself is inherently complex, the huge amount of paperwork to be 
completed in complying with their tax obligations further escalated the 
problem. This is not surprising as the New Zealand income tax system has 
been criticised for being overly complex. Even though tax simplicity 
programme has been continuously undertaken, perhaps the benefits of such 
programme were not yet visible, in the view of the participants.   
 
With regard to their impact on taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour, 
participants generally believed that negative fairness perceptions, attitude, 
inadequate technical knowledge, perceived behavioural control and 
complexity of the income tax system have partly contributed to taxpayers‟ 
noncompliance. In fact, self-employed individuals were perceived to have 
more opportunities (compared to the salaried and wage earners) to avoid or 
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evade paying tax by manipulating their incomes and expenses in the 
business. 
 
In addition to this, a mixed opinion on the effect of tax knowledge and tax 
complexity on fairness perceptions was reported. While some participants 
agreed that tax knowledge and tax complexity has no influence on fairness 
perceptions, others argued that taxpayers with good knowledge of tax, 
coupled with a less complex tax system, may contribute to better fairness 
perceptions.  
 
The second part of data analysis and results of the interviews continues in 
the following chapter. In particular, a discussion on thematic analysis and 
results of the interviews focusing on Malaysian taxpayers will be 
presented.  
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Chapter 8 
Analysis and Results of Interview Data: Malaysia 
 
8.1       Introduction 
A similar approach to analysing the data in Chapter 7 is adapted in this 
chapter. From the analysis, the qualitative findings derived from telephone 
interviews with taxpayers across Malaysia are presented. Briefly, the 
discussion focuses on taxpayers‟ perceptions of the fairness of the income 
tax system, their knowledge and the complexity of the income tax system, 
and the associated impact on compliance behaviour. In addition, the effect 
of tax knowledge and tax complexity on fairness perceptions was sought. 
Finally, a brief discussion comparing the results of the two countries is 
presented.   
 
8.2       Participants’ Characteristics 
Similar procedures to the New Zealand part of the study were carried out in 
Malaysia in order to obtain at least 30 participants for the interviews.  The 
procedures began with an invitation made to 2,267 salaried taxpayers 
across the country, where 137 expressed their written consent to be 
interviewed. From this number, 58 potential participants were contacted 
where eleven telephone calls made were unanswered and another six 
taxpayers withdrew their consent. The remaining 11 taxpayers contacted 
were either on leave or attending long term courses which prevented them 
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from taking part in the interviews. The telephone interviews were 
conducted in May and June 2009.  
 
The interview participants were allowed to communicate either in the 
Malay language (Malaysian national language) or in the English language 
or a combination of the two. However, for the purpose of analysing and 
reporting the results, comments offered in the Malay language were 
carefully translated by the researcher, while the Malay versions are 
attached in Appendix 14 for reference. To distinguish between the 
translated versions from the original version (where the English language 
is used) in the text, the term „non-translated‟ is used for the comments that 
are originally drawn from participants‟ own words (rather than being 
translated), at the end of the comments cited.  
 
The participants‟ characteristics according to gender, employment sector 
and region, are set out in Table 8.1. In terms of gender, more than two-
thirds were male participants and only seven were females. The 
participants were representative of the four regions, with the majority from 
the central part of Peninsular Malaysia. This is followed by the southern 
region and the east coast region, with eight and seven participants, 
respectively.  
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With regard to the employment sector, 21 participants were attached to the 
public sector while the remaining nine participants were in the private 
sector. The distribution of the participants according to their employers in 
the public sector was:  
(1)  four senior executives from the Pilgrimage Fund Board;  
(2)  four senior executives from the Accountant General Department;  
(3)  three officers from the Royal Customs Department;  
(4)  three officers from the Council of Trust for the Indigenous People;  
(5)  three officers from the Employees Provident Fund;  
(6)  two statisticians from the Department of Statistics;  
(7)  one deputy director of the National Registration Department; and  
(8)  one lecturer from a public university.  
The nine participants from the private sector comprise:  
(1)  six executives from Telekom Malaysia Berhad;  
(2)  two bank officers; and  
(3)  one laboratory manager of a private hospital. 
Table 8.1 Demographic Description of the Participants 
     
 Number   Number  
Gender   Region  
Male 23  Northern region 5 
Female 7  Central region 10 
 30  Southern region 8 
   East Coast Region 7 
Employment Sector    30 
Public sector 21    
Private sector 9    
 30    
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8.3       Data Analysis and Results  
8.3.1 Fairness Perceptions of the Income Tax System 
At the initial stage of the interviews participants were asked about their 
general perceptions of the income tax system. Interestingly, all participants 
promptly indicated a favourable response towards it. They believed that the 
income tax system had been reasonably fair to them in meeting a broader 
objective at the national level; that is, to generate revenue for the 
government and redistribute wealth amongst society. For an understanding 
of their perceptions of fairness, participants were probed on several aspects 
of the income tax system that might be of interest to them. The 
conversations led them to reveal several aspects of fairness that were 
important, and these were classified into four main themes:  
(1)  general fairness;  
(2)  vertical fairness;  
(3)  retributive fairness; and  
(4)  administrative fairness.  
 
8.3.1.1  General Fairness 
With regard to general fairness, participants had mainly discussed two 
interrelated issues, namely: (1) an inefficient use of tax revenues by the 
government; and (2) a lack of disclosure of government expenditure.  In 
relation to government spending, participants claimed that taxpayers‟ 
money was wasted as a result of the government‟s incompetency. Despite 
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having promising national plans and a yearly budget in place, the outcomes 
from such national plans were not readily visible to the public. This issue 
of inefficient spending was of more concern when the basic infrastructure, 
such as schools, was not well taken care of. For example: 
 
“…sometimes, we are quite frustrated because sometimes we look at 
the government expenditures, it is not what we expect, too much is 
being wasted.”  
(Participant 9, male, lecturer of a public university) 
 
“I‟m sitting in [the] government sector, I know a lot. Personally, [I 
believe] certainly there is a lot of money being wasted. In terms of 
management, I would say they are incapable, how they manage the 
money, how they allocate the money. Probably in terms of overall 
budget, it seems very good, such as more funds on education, some 
[money] for defence and some for SME (small and medium 
enterprises), but implementation wise, when the money is being 
distributed, at the end of the day, we don‟t see the output…”  
(Participant 14, male, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
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“[The allocation for] education, to me is not enough especially in the 
rural areas, there are still areas with not enough schools to cater for 
their inhabitants…”  
(Participant 19, female, statistician in the Department of Statistics) 
 
“Of course the system and all is there to spend the money [which] 
the income taxpayer is paying, but the way they spent the money is a 
bit unfair, improperly managed, that‟s all, but the system is there. I 
know they‟re going to use the money for whatever development and 
all, but the way they managed the money is questionable…”  (non-
translated) 
(Participant 30, male, bank officer) 
 
Participants who commented on the lack of disclosure issue wanted more 
transparent statistics on the government‟s fund allocation. They argued that 
the lack of information had created negative perceptions among taxpayers 
on the government spending of tax revenues even though the government 
might have spent the money wisely. For instance, one participant (who had 
an intellectually disabled child) claimed that the government had provided 
facilities and assistance to disabled people but such assistance was not 
widely publicised. As such, there was a widespread misconception that the 
government did not care for this group of people.  Thus, full disclosure of 
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the government spending of tax revenue was seen as one way of improving 
fairness perceptions among the taxpayers. For instance: 
 
“…till now, we don‟t exactly know the tax revenue that we pay is 
being used for what [purpose], we don‟t know. [We have] no 
information about that, yet we can see there are poor people and so 
on. What is the role of tax? Is it being channelled to these needy 
people, or just for development? Where it is being used? Where it is 
being invested? We don‟t know, [there is a] lack of information 
about that…I‟m not happy with that…”  
(Participant 24, male, officer in the Employees Provident Fund) 
 
“I think many people do not know that the government has 
[provided] facilities to those who cannot work (e.g. disabled). 
Actually [the government] provides the assistance, the government is 
very concerned, [but] this needs to be publicised.”  
(Participant 4, male, laboratory manager of a private hospital) 
  
“I don‟t know how much money they spend for this [benefits for the 
low-income people], we don‟t know, there‟s no 
information…disclosure is very important, and how much is the 
allocation; then we will be satisfied…”  
(Participant 9, male, lecturer at public university) 
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Despite the above comments, there were a number of participants (27 
percent) who had confidence in the way the government spent the tax 
revenues. They felt that money was allocated efficiently for public 
infrastructure, employment, development and so on. However, proper 
reporting of such statistics had not been made available to the public. For 
example: 
 
“In terms of [government] expenditure, [I believe it is] certainly 
efficient.”   
(Participant 3, male, officer in the Employees Provident Fund) 
 
“I think [government expenditure] is efficient…”  
 (Participant 4, male, laboratory manager of a private hospital) 
 
“In terms of that [government expenditure] is certainly fair…I mean, 
now every taxpayer, including me should at least know what [it is] 
being spent on, how much is being used by the government. Until 
now, we only know the expenditure in general, for infrastructure, for 
education, for whatever, it is not enough, I mean, not clear enough.”  
(Participant 25, male, officer of the Royal Customs Department) 
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“…we are not clear on the details but surely all tax revenues are for 
the country…”  
(Participant 29, male, officer of the Employees Provident Fund) 
 
8.3.1.2  Vertical Fairness 
The implementation of the progressive tax rates (as an indication of 
vertical fairness) in Malaysia has been well accepted by the participants, 
where the majority of them had no adverse opinion on this issue. The 
results suggest not only that taxpayers were happy that high income earners 
were taxed progressively higher than middle income earners but also with 
the tax free threshold set out under the current income tax system. As at the 
year 2010, the Malaysian income tax system had a lowest tax rate of 1 
percent with the highest tax rate being 26 percent. With regard to a taxable 
person, the Inland Revenue Board (IRB) of Malaysia had publicised on its 
website that only individuals who are earning an annual income of 
MYR25,501 (NZ$11,577) (after Employee Provident Fund (EPF) 
deductions of 8 percent) are required to register their tax file and 
consequently file tax return forms (Inland Revenue Board of Malaysia, 
2010). In other words, those earning an annual income lower than the 
amount stated above are not required to pay any income tax at all.  Some of 
the comments from participants were:  
 
387 
 
“…if you earn more income, surely you need to pay more [tax], if  
you earn less, you pay less [tax] and there are certain levels of 
income after taking into account the deductions, are not subject to 
tax…”  
(Participant 2, female, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
“This [income tax] system is fair, where low income earners mostly 
don‟t have to pay tax, high income earners pay more tax, and there is 
a balance between the high incomes and the low incomes.”  
(Participant 3, officer in the Employees Provident Fund) 
 
While the majority were happy with the presence of vertical fairness, the 
only suggestion made by one participant to improve vertical fairness 
perceptions was to reduce the tax rate for the high income earners:   
 
“…for me, I think for individual[s], government shouldn‟t enforce 
the tax rate too high…but they can impose that on the companies…” 
(non-translated) 
(Participant 17, female, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
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8.3.1.3  Retributive Fairness 
In Malaysia, the presence of retributive fairness was viewed as an 
important mechanism to reinforce compliance behaviour. In fact, the 
majority of participants believed that penalties would encourage taxpayers 
to comply with the income tax system. For instance: 
 
“…in terms of penalties, it is reasonable [to penalise] if [taxpayers] 
don‟t want to pay. We need one mechanism to increase their 
awareness of their responsibility to pay.”  
(Participant 18, male, senior executive in the Pilgrimage Fund Board) 
 
“Penalties should be applied to encourage taxpayers to pay on time.”  
(Participant 23, male, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
While agreeing to the imposition of penalties for late payments, one 
participant brought the issue of flexibility where the IRB was expected to 
have some discretion in dealing with taxpayers who genuinely could not 
pay on time. In his comment, he suggested: 
 
“For the late payment, we certainly need to impose a penalty but not 
too burdensome and taxing, perhaps in terms of the figure or the 
terms and conditions should be more flexible. Probably taxpayers 
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have difficulties in paying, so we give some flexibility to them.” 
(non-translated) 
(Participant 16, senior executive of the Pilgrimage Fund Board) 
 
In relation to this issue, another participant suggested a double standard in 
the treatment between taxpayers in the salary and wages group and in the 
business group. Specifically, he suggested abolishing the penalty on salary 
and wage earners while maintaining such a penalty on self-employed 
people. This participant claimed that salaried taxpayers would eventually 
pay their taxes on their incomes upon their retirement where any unpaid 
taxes would be claimed by the IRB before the payment of gratuities was 
made. By contrast, self-employed people might have the chance to get 
away with taxes as long as they were not selected for a tax audit. In other 
words, there is greater possibility for self-employed people to escape 
paying tax permanently even after their retirement if their non compliance 
behaviour was not detected by the IRB in the tax audit:  
 
“…[the IRB] should not impose a penalty on the salaried group 
because eventually they will pay their taxes…but for the other group 
[self-employed], perhaps they should be penalised because they 
don‟t have proper accounting documents [to keep track of  their 
businesses]...”  
(Participant 10, male, officer of the Royal Customs Department) 
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An argument raised by another participant in relation to the retributive 
fairness was the IRB‟s selection of taxpayers for a tax audit or 
investigation. In her opinion, the IRB tended to be more vigilant on 
investigating individual taxpayers rather than on companies that she 
believed were more active in pursuing tax evasion:  
 
“The penalty imposed, I think, for me [it is] okay except that, for the 
companies, they should [be penalised] because usually companies 
are the biggest culprit in terms of late payment and so on, so they 
[the IRB] should go after all those companies instead of going after 
small taxpayers like individuals. What‟s being practiced by IRB now 
is that they focus more on individual[s] rather than the companies.” 
(non-translated) 
(Participant 17, female, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
8.3.1.4 Administrative Fairness 
The analysis of the interviews with participants reveals that they perceived 
administrative fairness of the income tax system, in terms of taxpayers‟ 
burdens concerning compliance, accuracy, ability to correct, duration for 
refunds of tax and friendliness of the IRB staff to be disappointing.   
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It is well-understood under a self-assessment system (SAS) that taxpayers 
are expected to voluntarily prepare and submit their tax return forms to the 
IRB within the stipulated time. However, this shift of responsibility from 
tax officers to taxpayers has created negative perceptions on the 
administration of the income tax system. Participants claimed that the lack 
of tax knowledge among taxpayers and the lack of assistance from the IRB 
staff made filing and submitting the tax return forms burdensome and 
stressful. For instance: 
 
“With the SAS, it requires us to know [how to do tax by] 
ourselves…in the big cities such as Kuala Lumpur, Kuala 
Terengganu, there are people who are educated and some who are 
not, so under the SAS, without the assistance from the IRB staff, 
people will get lost.”  
(Participant 1, male, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
In relation to this issue, another participant voiced her concern about the 
accuracy of the tax return forms submitted by taxpayers. When taxpayers 
were assumed to have insufficient knowledge of the income tax system, 
surely there was a possibility that they made mistakes when filing their tax 
return forms. However, the accuracy of the tax return forms could not be 
assured unless those taxpayers were randomly selected for a tax audit. For 
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other taxpayers who were not audited, the accuracy of their tax return 
forms remains unknown. This situation might create some injustice 
amongst taxpayers if the mistakes were unintentional. However, a negative 
perception might arise when the mistakes in the tax return forms were 
deliberate and the accuracy of the tax returns was not checked. For 
example: 
 
“…when we filled in [the tax return forms via] e-filing, it seems that 
the IRB simply accepts whatever was reported by the taxpayers. 
Whether the figure is correct or not, the IRB did not query…so the 
accuracy is not assured by the IRB.”  
(Participant 2, female, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
Another comment on administrative fairness related to the taxpayers‟ right 
to query and make corrections on the tax returns. Based on their 
experiences, participants argued that with the on-line filing system in place, 
they had lost their rights to enquire concerning any doubts they might have. 
Even if they were aware that they made mistakes when filing the tax return 
forms, they could not correct the error until the tax payment was paid. Such 
experiences led them to perceive the administration of the income tax 
system negatively, as reflected in their comments: 
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“…in terms of fairness, it‟s unfair because whatever is in the system, 
we cannot query, we have to simply follow the system. If we 
calculate manually, sometimes it is not the same as what is being 
assessed but we cannot query on that.”  
(Participant 15, male, statistician in the Department of Statistics) 
 
“…and now with the SAS [e-filing], once we log in and send [the tax 
return form] and there is mistake with the figures, we cannot redo 
them, so if we made a mistake with any one figure, we have to pay 
[the tax] first [then, they will refund]…”  
(Participant 18, male, senior executive in Pilgrimage Fund Board) 
 
Participants in this study also indicated their dissatisfaction with the 
administration of tax refunds. They could not accept the fact that while the 
IRB had been very efficient in collecting tax a similar level of efficiency 
was not maintained when dealing with tax refunds. For example: 
  
“…in terms of [tax] collection, they have improved a lot, but when 
we want to claim back [for a refund], I think it‟s too slow…”  
(Participant 8, male, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
“Dealing with them [the IRB staff], they are helpful in the sense that, 
(although sometimes it is frustrating), because when we tell them 
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that we want to pay tax, they do it promptly because they say money 
is coming in, but if we say, how about my refund, then that will take 
time…” (non-translated) 
(Participant 17, female, senior executive in Accountant General 
Department) 
 
Another aspect of the income tax administration that annoyed the 
participants was the lack of friendliness of the IRB staff. Based on their 
experiences, they claimed that the IRB staff should be more friendly and 
sincere when dealing with taxpayers. Some of their comments in this 
regard are:  
 
“Counter service is not good enough, not excellent but moderate. In 
terms of friendliness, they are not friendly; when we asked 
[questions], they don‟t answer in a friendly manner. Whatever facts 
they have are considered accurate, whatever facts that we bring to 
them, they don‟t want to accept.”  
(Participant 15, male, statistician in the Department of Statistics) 
 
“It [the administration system] is not user-friendly, and sometimes 
we sent [the tax return forms] two or three times but they claimed 
they did not receive it.”  
(Participant 18, male, senior executive in Pilgrimage Fund Board) 
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8.3.2   Tax Knowledge 
When analysing the data it was noticed that participants viewed their 
knowledge of the income tax system in three ways, namely: general 
knowledge, technical knowledge and legal knowledge. These dimensions 
of tax knowledge emerged when participants were asked about their degree 
of knowledge of the income tax system. With regard to their general 
knowledge, participants claimed that they knew their responsibility to pay 
tax every year and the role of income tax in the country, but they did not 
have a good grasp of the technical details of the income tax itself. For 
example:  
 
“I think my knowledge is not that good. I know that I have to fill a 
BE [tax return form for resident individuals without a business 
source] form every year for individual income tax…”   
(Participant 2, female, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
 “It is a responsibility for a Malaysian resident; we have to pay 
income tax as determined by the Government of Malaysia…”  
(Participant 18, male, senior executive in Pilgrimage Fund Board) 
 
In terms of knowledge, it seems that participants were more concerned 
about the ability of self-employed people to comprehend the technical 
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details of the income tax system. They believed that this group of taxpayers 
was very much in need of assistance, particularly from the IRB, to deal 
with their tax matters. With no assistance, the self-employed would be 
unable to comply even though they had every intention to do so: 
 
“Knowledge among the self-employed people, for example, small 
traders, entrepreneurs, lorry driver[s] with [their] own business, from 
that aspect [tax knowledge] they know nothing at all. If no one 
teaches them, they will not do [it]. They will not read [a] tax book, 
they will not read books related to tax filing…they are totally lost.”  
(Participant 1, male, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
In addition to self-employed people, taxpayers with no financial 
background were also seen as having problems with the technical aspects 
of the income tax. For instance, one participant highlighted the situation 
where an engineer might not know how to fill in his own tax return form 
because he had not enough knowledge on the technical details of the 
income tax system. He commented:  
 
“…even in big cities, if we asked an engineer, [he will reply], I don‟t 
know how to fill up the tax return form. He doesn‟t know [about 
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expenditure] that is tax deductible, rebates, insurance, double 
deductions, he doesn‟t know, everything he doesn‟t know.”  
(Participant 1, male, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
For other participants who had an accounting background, whether from 
their tertiary education or work experience, technical knowledge of the 
income tax was not really a problem for them. While they claimed to have 
limited knowledge, they were able to fill in their return forms 
independently. In fact, one participant indicated that the knowledge of 
taxation obtained during her tertiary education had helped her to manage 
her tax affairs efficiently. For instance:  
 
“…not comprehensive, minimal [knowledge], not 100%, but the BE 
form I can do [it myself].”  
(Participant 3, male, officer in the Employees Provident Fund) 
 
 
“My level of knowledge on tax was limited [to individual income 
tax], because I learnt accounting before; I learnt tax, so [I have good] 
knowledge towards individual tax, such as how to minimise…how 
to reduce the tax payment, such as when you pay your zakah 
[Islamic tax], you pay your insurance, something like that, you know 
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something like how to reduce your tax payment, but in a legal way.” 
(non-translated) 
(Participant 6, female, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
In terms of taxpayers‟ knowledge of the legal aspects of the income tax 
system, the majority of the participants claimed that they were aware of the 
penalty mechanism under the current income tax system but not of the 
details of it, such as the penalty rate. This is because they had no 
experience of being penalised under the current income tax system. 
Examples of the comments received are: 
 
“I‟m not really aware of the penalty, how much is the penalty and so 
on because every year I always send [the tax return form] on time 
and so on, so I‟m not aware of the penalty.” (non-translated) 
(Participant 6, female, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
“I‟m not aware of the penalty because I comply [with the income tax 
system]. I have tax deducted through the Scheduler Tax Deduction 
(STD), and then pay [tax] before the deadline, submit the tax return 
forms, so in terms of penalty, I‟m not really aware but I do know that 
there is a penalty.”  
(Participant 14, male, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
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8.3.3   Tax Complexity 
This study also sought to understand taxpayers‟ perceptions on the 
complexity of the income tax system. When interviewed, most of the 
participants claimed that the income tax system was not complex. They 
found it easy to fill and file the tax return forms especially when using the 
e-filing system. For instance:    
 
“…our [income] tax system is simple…not complex.”  
(Participant 1, male, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
“…filling up the form is easy because it is available in the internet, 
we just fill in the blanks and then just follow the procedures. We 
simply fill up whatever information required, and then send, we 
follow instructions, no problem in that sense.”  
(Participant 2, female, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
While agreeing with the comment that the income tax system was simple, 
some participants further argued that it might only be true for salaried 
taxpayers. In other words, they were suggesting that the income tax system 
might be complex for self-employed people who had to deal with a lot of 
tax computations. Their comments were:  
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“It [the income tax system] is not complex actually…for the business 
may be [complex], because for business there a lot of computations, 
like what kind of expenses which are deductible, what expenses to 
add back, for a business probably a little bit difficult.”  
(Participant 6, female, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
“It is not difficult. I think everyone can do it and [is] able to 
understand how to do it especially the salaried group people, we 
have the standard format from our employer, we just follow, unless 
if I have a business, it might be difficult. But for a salaried person 
like me, I think that [tax return form] can be completed in less than 
10 minutes.”  
(Participant 8, male, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
8.3.4   Compliance Behaviour 
When asked about their perceptions on tax compliance behaviour, some 
participants generally viewed taxpayers as opportunistic. They claimed that 
it was human nature to manipulate the tax system if the chances to do so 
were available. However, for some participants, they would hesitate before 
being non-compliant when considering the penalty imposed if they were 
caught: 
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“…in terms of compliance, I think everyone wants to avoid, I mean 
not avoiding legally but illegally, they evade and don‟t want to pay 
[tax], if they can avoid paying, they will. When there are chances to 
manipulate, they will manipulate…”  
(Participant 1, male, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
In discussing taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour, participants tended to split 
taxpayers into two groups, namely salary and wage earners and self-
employed people. In their comments they firmly believed that salary and 
wage earners group was the most compliant group of taxpayers since they 
had little chance to avoid or evade paying tax. This statement is supported 
by the fact that the IRB has complete records on the annual incomes and 
deductions of every single salaried taxpayer provided by their respective 
employers. Thus, the IRB has the ability to trace them easily should they 
try to avoid or evade paying tax. On the other hand, self-employed people 
were perceived to have more ways of avoiding and evading tax due to 
inadequate documentation of the business held by the IRB. A comment 
from participants included: 
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“…we, the salaried people, certainly cannot run away [from paying 
tax], but those who are self-employed or who own businesses, they 
have various means to get away with it…”  
(Participant 8, male, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
To provide evidence of non-compliance among the self-employed, one 
participant highlighted cases of multi-level marketing millionaires who 
escaped paying tax since the IRB failed to trace their annual incomes as a 
result of improper business records. She commented: 
 
“I found that those with no fixed incomes such as entrepreneurs, 
self-employed, the IRB could not trace these people. I‟ve seen 
millionaires, entrepreneurs who did not pay tax, and even if they 
pay, it is not proportionate to what they earned…”  
(Participant 7, female, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
In relation to the non-compliance of self-employed people, one participant 
shared his experience from chatting with self employed taxpayers who 
clearly admitted to have evading tax by manipulating their business 
records. In these two cases, they pointed out how they had overstated their 
business expenses to accommodate their personal life-style and private 
expenditure. He commented: 
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“…my relative, he is a businessman, I asked him why do you buy so 
many [luxury] cars? This is under my company, he said, so I can 
deduct my expenses. So he‟s driving a luxury car but can deduct it 
from his business tax, all big cars, four cars, all are either Mercedes 
or BMWs…we don‟t think it‟s fair to put their money on [luxury 
cars]…he used the cars for personal [purpose] not for business, but 
claimed as company‟s cars…no tax audit…my Chinese neighbour is 
like that too. Vacation; he puts the vacation expenses as business 
expenses to avoid taxes. These are real.”  
(Participant 9, male, lecturer at public university) 
 
When probed further on the possible explanation for the non-compliance 
behaviour among certain taxpayers, participants suggested four reasons 
namely: attitude, perceived behavioural control, tax knowledge and 
fairness perceptions. From the interviews in this study, there was a shared 
belief among the participants that taxpayers‟ attitudes were an influential 
factor to their decision not to comply. Specifically, one participant claimed 
that laziness and a lack of awareness among her friends led them to not 
complying. Further, another participant suggested that some taxpayers 
were very determined not to comply with their tax obligations and such 
attitudes could not be easily altered even with a simpler tax system. 
Participants‟ comments included: 
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“…based on the people around me, my colleagues, they are lazy to 
do the e-filing…a lack of awareness…”  
(Participant 2, female, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
“…most of these people, they are trying to evade tax. It is not 
because of the system, whatever the system you put in, how friendly 
it is, they are still trying not to pay the government [the IRB]…it‟s 
the attitude of the people.” (non-translated) 
(Participant 30, male, bank officer) 
 
Another possible explanation for the non-compliance behaviour suggested 
by the participants was perceived behavioural control. In relation to this, 
participants believed that some taxpayers, particularly business people, had 
a clear ability to avoid or evade tax mainly due to the use and accessibility 
of their tax consultants as indicated in the following comment: 
 
“…the wealthy business owners, it‟s easy for them [to avoid or 
evade tax] because they have their own tax consultants [if] they want 
to adjust the figures here and there…”  
(Participant 2, female, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
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While the purpose of engaging a tax consultant is supposedly to assist 
taxpayers meeting their tax obligations, undeniably, however, there is a 
common belief among participants that some tax consultants have misused 
their knowledge of taxation to facilitate their clients in avoiding and/or 
evading tax. Being aware of the possibility that such practices may grow, if 
no control mechanism is put in place, the IRB has been proactive by 
legislating additional provisions in the Income Tax Act 1967 that both 
taxpayers and tax consultants will be equally responsible and liable for a 
similar penalty in the event of tax avoidance and/or evasion.
111
  In other 
words, these provisions generally require tax consultants to exhibit honesty 
and due care in carrying out their duties.  
 
Tax knowledge had also been discussed as a potential factor contributing to 
non-compliance behaviour. Interestingly, participants had different views 
on how the level of tax knowledge affected taxpayers‟ decisions not to 
comply. From the first perspective, participants argued that limited or 
complete absence of tax knowledge had caused unintentional non-
compliance behaviour, as suggested by the comments: 
 
                                                 
111 Section 121(2) of the Income Tax Act 1967 states that any person who aids, abets or incites another 
person to commit an offence under Section 113, 115, 116 or 118 shall be deemed to have committed 
the same offence and shall be liable to the same penalty. The sections are related to filing incorrect 
returns, leaving Malaysia without payment of tax, obstruction of officers and offences by officials, 
respectively. 
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“… [some taxpayers do not comply but] not so intentionally. It is 
due to the level of their understanding [on the income tax 
knowledge].”  
(Participant 7, female, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
“Their knowledge; [they have] no knowledge about that [tax], that‟s 
why they don‟t pay; they have no knowledge [of the income tax].”  
(Participant 15, male, statistician in the Department of Statistics) 
 
The other perspective suggested was that possessing good knowledge of 
taxation could also motivate taxpayers not to comply. In this case, 
participants argued that knowledgeable taxpayers had the ability to exploit 
whatever loopholes in the income tax system for their financial advantage. 
This opportunity was even made possible with the availability of tax 
advisors at a reasonable cost. In other words, participants were suggesting 
that good knowledge of the income tax would improve taxpayers‟ 
perceived behavioural control over non-complying with their tax 
obligations, which was consequently demonstrated by their deliberate 
unlawful actions.  
 
In short, these comments suggest that taxpayers with either too little or too 
much knowledge would be equally motivated to engage in non-compliance 
behaviour. In this situation, the IRB should be treating the non-compliant 
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taxpayers differently depending on their circumstances. The target group 
that the IRB should really focus on is the deliberate non-compliant 
taxpayers, where appropriate penalties should be imposed. While for the 
unintended non-compliant taxpayers, advice and consultation is more 
appropriate. An example of the comments received is: 
 
“People who know how to get away from tax, they actually have 
good knowledge…they have high incomes but they know the 
loopholes to manipulate and now they can seek advice from the tax 
advisors at reasonable costs…so those with good knowledge will 
evade…”  
(Participant 20, male, officer in the Royal Customs Department) 
 
The other rationale suggested by participants for non-compliance 
behaviour among taxpayers was their negative perceptions on the fairness 
of the income tax system. In the interviews participants repeatedly 
mentioned how taxpayer‟s fairness perceptions, particularly on government 
expenditure, had motivated them to evade paying tax. Even though they 
were aware that tax evasion was illegal, they defended their actions by 
putting the blame on the government that did not manage the tax revenue 
efficiently, as highlighted in their comments:  
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“…why should I give tax when I don‟t know how it is spent…” 
(non-translated) 
(Participant 13, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
“…I think they feel that the income tax system is not being fair to 
them, they think that they are paying too much, they don‟t see they 
get anything out of it, in that sense it might be possible [to not 
comply]…” (non-translated) 
(Participant 17, female, senior executive in the Accountant General 
Department) 
 
“…some people are still trying to evade tax…partly because of the 
way money is being spent and they are not happy with that; why 
should they pay [tax] when money is not properly used…”  
(Participant 30, male, bank officer) 
 
8.3.5   Tax Knowledge, Tax Complexity and Fairness Perceptions 
In the final part of the interviews, participants were probed on the role of 
tax knowledge and tax complexity in taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions. The 
results indicate that some participants agreed that tax knowledge had an 
effect on fairness perceptions. Specifically, they suggested that a lack of 
tax knowledge among taxpayers had caused taxpayers to perceive the 
income tax system as unfair. Such a positive relationship between tax 
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knowledge and fairness perceptions indicated that taxpayers‟ fairness 
perceptions could be improved when they had sufficient knowledge about 
taxation. This can be achieved by disseminating tax knowledge through 
various channels, such as the formal education system, either in schools or 
universities, seminars, and any other possible ways (such as via 
newspapers, advertisements, and the like) of creating awareness among the 
taxpayers. For instance: 
 
“I think it‟s possible for those with no knowledge of tax, they feel 
that this [income tax] is not fair, they think it is difficult.”  
(Participant 6, female, executive in Telekom Malaysia Berhad) 
 
“…income is always defined as our possession, our income, our 
business, our money, so to those with lack of knowledge or little 
knowledge they feel that it is a burden to them because the money 
that they earned needs to be paid back [in terms of tax]…”  
(Participant 20, male, officer in the Royal Customs Department) 
 
Unlike tax knowledge, tax complexity was perceived to have no effect on 
fairness perceptions. As discussed earlier, participants consistently 
believed that the income tax system was simple especially for the salary 
and wage earners group. Thus, they could not associate such simplicity 
with their negative perceptions of the income tax system. In addition, as 
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salaried taxpayers, they had not experienced the complexity of the income 
tax system to enable them to conclude that tax complexity would affect 
their fairness perceptions. In short, the results from interviews indicate that 
Malaysian participants formed their fairness perceptions based on the level 
of tax knowledge but not the complexity of the tax system.  
 
8.4       New Zealand vs. Malaysia 
With reference to thematic analysis of the interviews with New Zealand (as 
discussed in Chapter 7) and Malaysian participants, the results from the 
two countries are then summarised and compared to ascertain if the 
opinions differ.   
 
Relatively, in terms of overall perceptions of fairness of the income tax 
system, the results indicate that Malaysian participants had better 
perceptions compared to New Zealand participants. This situation was 
observed when participants responded to an initial question on their 
perceptions on the income tax system. All participants in Malaysia 
expressed their favourable opinions while there were mixed views offered 
by the New Zealand participants. Such a differing opinion is possibly due 
to the mix of participants in New Zealand, compared to Malaysian 
participants who consist of all salaried taxpayers. While it is arguable that 
the mix of participants might have an impact on their responses in New 
Zealand, and thus the results might not be necessarily compared directly, it 
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is important to note that, in a broader sense, participants in both countries 
are all individual taxpayers, irrespective of their sources of income. In 
addition, unlike in New Zealand, salary and wage earners in Malaysia are 
required to file tax returns. On this basis, participants in both countries 
have considerable exposure to filing tax returns and therefore are believed 
to be capable of providing views on the fairness perceptions and relevant 
topics in this study.  
 
Interestingly, when probed further on their fairness perceptions of the 
income tax system, participants in New Zealand and Malaysia appeared to 
have a common interest in discussing four aspects of fairness perceptions, 
namely: general fairness, vertical fairness, retributive fairness and 
administrative fairness.
112
 With regard to the perceptions of general 
fairness, participants in New Zealand and Malaysia had considerable 
concerns about government spending and disclosure issues. In these 
respects, governments were expected to be more efficient and transparent. 
 
                                                 
112 During the interviews, some of the participants immediately mentioned the areas of concerns on the 
income tax system when a general question of fairness perceptions was asked. This indicates their 
clear understanding of the fairness perceptions of the income tax system. While to other participants, 
who were not clear on the topic of fairness perceptions and needed some guidance, the researcher had 
to brief them on the various aspects of the income tax system (e.g. vertical fairness, administrative 
fairness, etc.) that might be of interest for them to discuss. In doing so, however, participants were 
given full autonomy to independently describe their perceptions to any dimensions of fairness 
perceptions that might be more relevant to them. To minimise the possibility of bias, the researcher, 
before concluding the interview sessions, asked general questions on any suggestions to improve the 
income tax system and any general comments on the income tax system participants may wish to 
make. These questions were posited in order to encourage participants to reiterate their thoughts, 
which indirectly indicated their emphasis on certain aspects of the income tax system. 
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The issue of vertical fairness that were raised by New Zealand participants 
included the inequitable progressive tax rates between the wealthy and the 
poor, the unfair treatment between self-employed people and the large 
corporations, and tax on the secondary employment. In contrast, the 
Malaysian participants appeared to be happy that vertical fairness was 
properly maintained. In terms of retributive fairness, both New Zealand 
and Malaysian participants agreed with the necessity of penalty 
mechanisms to reinforce tax compliance amongst taxpayers. They further 
argued that such punishments would only be fair if the penalty imposed 
matches the committed offences. Having said that, participants desired 
some flexibility from the tax authorities especially when dealing with 
genuine mistakes. In addition, New Zealand participants also desired 
equivalent treatment between taxpayers and tax authority. In this situation, 
participants expected similar penalties for the mistakes regardless of 
whether those mistakes were committed by taxpayers or by the tax 
authority.  
 
The discussion on the administrative fairness among New Zealand 
participants concentrated on the issues of accessibility to the tax authority, 
responsibility to administer tax matters, friendliness of the tax authority 
staff and the decision-making process. New Zealand participants‟ 
criticisms were partly shared with Malaysian participants, who also had 
negative comments on the shift of responsibility from the tax authority to 
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taxpayers in administering the tax matters, and staff friendliness. 
Furthermore, Malaysian participants had expressed their dissatisfaction 
with the administration of the income tax system in terms of ability to 
correct errors and timeliness of tax refunds. In addition to these four 
dimensions of fairness, New Zealand participants were also concerned with 
the personal fairness issue where they were not happy with the current tax 
rates and secondary taxation.  
 
New Zealand and Malaysian participants had similar views when 
discussing their knowledge of the income tax system. In both 
environments, participants had a level of general knowledge about the 
income tax system, such as their responsibility to pay tax, the purpose of 
the income tax and the relevant tax rates. The interviews further 
highlighted the fact that the lack of knowledge of the technical aspects of 
the income tax system mainly worried the self-employed taxpayers, who 
need to deal with a lot of tax computations and forms. The legal aspects of 
the income tax system, however, did not receive much attention in the 
discussion, which is possibly due to inadequate knowledge amongst 
taxpayers or the relatively little significance attributed to the subject by 
participants.  
 
The results of the taxpayers‟ perceptions on complexity of the income tax 
system indicated a consistent opinion between New Zealand and 
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Malaysian participants. In their comments, they believed that the system 
was simple for salary and wage earners who have no other sources of 
income. However, this was not the case for self-employed taxpayers who 
had to deal with the complexity of the income tax system in meeting their 
tax obligations. 
 
A consistent opinion among New Zealand and Malaysian participants was 
also demonstrated with regard to their perceptions of compliance 
behaviour. They commonly agreed that there were non-compliant 
taxpayers, especially among the self-employed people in both countries. 
The contributing factors to non-compliance were: attitude, perceived 
behavioural control, tax knowledge and negative fairness perceptions. New 
Zealand participants also considered tax complexity as an additional factor.   
In the final part of the interviews, participants were asked to comment on 
the possible effects of tax knowledge and tax complexity on fairness 
perceptions. In response, participants in both New Zealand and Malaysia 
indicated a positive relationship between tax knowledge and their fairness 
perceptions, where better knowledge of income tax would improve 
taxpayers‟ perceptions. On the other hand, an inverse relationship between 
the complexity of the income tax and fairness perceptions was only 
reported by New Zealand participants.  
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8.5  Summary 
In this chapter the results from interviews conducted in Malaysia were 
presented and compared with the New Zealand interviews. The results 
suggest that Malaysian participants had concerns on three aspects of 
fairness perceptions, namely: general fairness, retributive fairness and 
administrative fairness. In particular, participants were dissatisfied with the 
government spending of tax revenues, a lack of disclosure of government 
expenditure, imposition of penalties on genuine mistakes, taxpayers‟ right 
to query and make corrections, administration of tax refunds and 
friendliness of the IRB staff.   
 
In terms of their knowledge of the income tax system, Malaysian 
participants appeared to have limited knowledge on the technical aspects of 
income tax system. Yet, they found it easy to fill and file their tax return 
forms. This is possible with the availability of the e-filing which 
automatically calculate taxpayers‟ tax liability. By using e-filing, taxpayers 
are only required to fill in the relevant figures (based on the summary of 
incomes and deductions provided by their employers) in electronic forms. 
However, participants did express their concern over the ability of self-
employed taxpayers and taxpayers with no financial background (such as 
engineers) to comprehend the technical details of the income tax system.  
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In terms of complexity of the income tax system, participants argued that 
the system was simple for salaried taxpayers but not for the self-employed 
group who had to deal with a lot of tax computations. For instance, without 
the knowledge on taxable incomes and expenses which are eligible for 
deductions, it would be difficult for the self-employed to compute their 
own tax liability. 
 
With regard to compliance behaviour, participants viewed taxpayers as 
opportunistic, especially self-employed people who had more chances to 
avoid or evade paying tax. This is particularly true when the IRB had 
inadequate documentation of the business as in the case of multi-level 
marketing millionaires. Among the possible explanations for non-
compliance behaviour expressed in the interviews, were attitude, perceived 
behavioural control, tax knowledge and fairness perceptions.     
 
Subsequently, in the final section of the chapter, the results from both New 
Zealand and Malaysia were compared. Key topics identified include 
fairness perceptions, tax knowledge, tax complexity and compliance 
behaviour. From the discussion, it appeared that participants generally had 
similar views on certain issues, such as perceptions on general fairness, 
administrative fairness and their effects on compliance behaviour. In the 
next chapter, a comprehensive discussion integrating the results from both 
the survey and interview data will be presented.    
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Chapter 9 
Discussions and Implications of the Study 
 
9.1      Introduction  
This chapter presents a detailed discussion of the factors under study by 
integrating the results from both the New Zealand and Malaysian surveys 
and interviews. It begins with a discussion of the preliminary hypotheses to 
investigate whether any differing perceptions exist between New Zealand 
and Malaysian taxpayers.
113
 This is followed by a discussion of the 
primary hypotheses which were developed to understand the role of 
fairness perceptions and other relevant variables on taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of 
the study.  
 
9.2      Discussion on the Preliminary Hypotheses 
This section presents a discussion on how taxpayers in New Zealand and 
Malaysia perceive the fairness of their income tax systems, their tax 
knowledge, the complexity of their respective income tax system and their 
compliance behaviour. The discussion, which is essentially drawn from the 
survey results in Chapter 5 (refer section 5.3.3 on the t-test analysis) and 
the interview results, intend to assist in understanding whether there are 
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any differing opinions between the taxpayers in their respective 
environments. Furthermore, by integrating the two approaches, it allows 
the researcher to better evaluate and explain the findings so as to 
consequently be able to answer the relevant research questions in the 
study.   
 
9.2.1   Fairness Perceptions 
The results from the t-test analysis (in Chapter 5, section 5.3.3.1), 
comparing the fairness perceptions between New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers, indicate that they had significantly different levels of 
perceptions. The findings provide support for the previous studies which 
documented various levels of fairness perceptions across countries (for 
example, Etzioni, 1986; McKerchar, 2003; Richardson, 2005a; 2005b; 
2006b; Verboon & Dijke, 2007). Relatively, Malaysian taxpayers who 
perceived their income tax system as moderately fair in every 
dimension,
114
 appear to have better perceptions compared to their New 
Zealand counterparts, except in the case of retributive fairness and 
horizontal fairness. For retributive fairness, almost similar perceptions 
were held by taxpayers in New Zealand and Malaysia. In relation to 
horizontal fairness, the results suggest that New Zealand taxpayers were 
                                                                                                                        
113 It is important to note that the term ‘taxpayers’ in this study reflect a sample of more diverse groups 
of individual taxpayers in New Zealand and a sample of salaried and wage earners in Malaysia. Also, 
the taxpayers were compared based on their perceptions on their own income tax system.  
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more convinced than Malaysian taxpayers that taxpayers in similar 
economic positions are taxed similarly. This may be explained that, unlike 
in New Zealand, the income tax system in Malaysia provides taxpayers 
with relief, rebates and tax credits, before arriving at their final tax 
liability. Thus, they might perceive that taxpayers in similar economic 
positions might not be taxed at similar rates due to the availability of such 
deductions. Such perceptions reflect the reality of the income tax system 
where the rule of horizontal fairness is breached in order to achieve social 
goals (Holmes, 2001). Furthermore, Holmes (2001) suggests that it is 
common for each income tax system in the world to compromise 
horizontal fairness to some degree with other prevailing objectives or 
principles.  
 
Contrary to the findings reported in Hasseldine et al. (1994), that the New 
Zealand income tax system is perceived as almost completely unfair, the 
present study suggests that taxpayers‟ perceptions on horizontal fairness, 
vertical fairness, retributive fairness and personal fairness were generally 
favourable. These contrasting results should be anticipated as the New 
Zealand income tax system has changed appreciably since 1994 when the 
previous study was conducted. However, New Zealand taxpayers were 
found to have negative perceptions concerning general fairness, exchange 
                                                                                                                        
114 The findings extend the evidence in Azmi and Perumal (2008) who claim that Malaysian taxpayers 
perceive the tax system as fair with respect to general fairness, tax structure and self-interest.  
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fairness and administrative fairness. In particular, taxpayers were not 
happy with the government‟s spending of the tax revenue and their share 
of tax burden (general fairness), benefits received in return for their tax 
paid (exchange fairness), and the administration of the tax system by the 
tax authority (administrative fairness).  This is generally consistent with 
Tan (1998) who concludes that taxpayers had positive perceptions on 
personal fairness but not on their share of the tax burden.  
 
The findings from the interviews further explain that Malaysian taxpayers 
had better perceptions of their income tax system compared to New 
Zealand taxpayers. In particular, New Zealand taxpayers seemed to be 
more frustrated with their income tax system compared to Malaysian 
taxpayers when discussing their concerns about vertical fairness, 
retributive fairness and personal fairness. Likewise, New Zealand 
taxpayers also criticised several aspects of administrative fairness – 
criticisms were partly shared with Malaysian taxpayers. The only 
dimension of fairness that both New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers 
appeared to commonly agree was general fairness, where taxpayers in both 
countries considered government expenditure of tax revenues and the 
transparency of government spending to be disappointing. Their 
perceptions of horizontal fairness and exchange fairness, however, could 
not be clearly drawn from the interviews since taxpayers in both countries 
were silent on these issues. Logically, this might indicate that taxpayers 
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were generally happy with these two aspects of fairness, and therefore did 
not feel the need to comment.  
 
The results from the surveys suggest that New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers had significantly different levels of fairness perceptions of their 
income tax systems. The findings answer the first research question: „Do 
taxpayers in both New Zealand and Malaysia have the same level of 
fairness perceptions of their current income tax systems?‟ in the negative. 
Additionally, explanations given during the interviews provide valuable 
information for this study on the detailed aspects of each dimension of 
fairness that had been the interviewees‟ source of frustration.  
 
9.2.2   Tax Knowledge 
The results from the survey presented in Chapter 5 suggest that both New 
Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers had good levels of knowledge of their 
respective income tax systems. With respect to the Malaysian 
environment, the results are consistent with Kamaluddin and Madi (2005), 
and Madi et al. (2010), but contrary to Loo and Ho (2005). Relatively, 
New Zealand taxpayers appeared to be significantly more knowledgeable 
on all aspects (general, technical and legal) of their income tax system 
compared with Malaysian taxpayers. The possible explanation for these 
findings is that respondents in Malaysia comprised solely salaried 
taxpayers where their tax filing is relatively simple, compared to those 
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with business incomes and other investment incomes. Furthermore, 
information on annual income, deductions and the like are provided by 
their employers prior to filing their tax return forms. This is even made 
easier with the e-filing (online electronic filing) where the taxpayers are 
simply required to fill in the information relating to their incomes and 
possible deductions, and the computation of the tax liability is 
automatically performed by the system. In that respect, perhaps, 
respondents felt that their limited knowledge of tax is adequate for them to 
comply with their tax obligations, and therefore were less likely to seek 
more information on the income tax system. In New Zealand, on the other 
hand, some of the respondents were self-employed or earned investment 
incomes which require them to have more knowledge of the income tax 
system in the process of filing their tax return forms. Even in the case of 
salaried taxpayers, they are probably in need of more knowledge of tax to 
ascertain if they have an entitlement to tax refunds.  
 
The findings from interviews provide detailed information to the results 
obtained from the surveys. For instance, taxpayers in both New Zealand 
and Malaysia who claimed to have a good level of general knowledge of 
their income tax systems were actually referring to their knowledge about 
responsibility to pay tax, the purpose of tax and the tax rate(s).  
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With regard to technical knowledge, a number of taxpayers in both 
countries expressed their concern that the lack of knowledge among self-
employed taxpayers caused difficulty for them to deal with tax matters. In 
Malaysia, such a lack of knowledge was also evident among salary and 
wage taxpayers who had no financial background knowledge. This reflects 
a lower level of knowledge among Malaysian taxpayers compared to their 
New Zealand counterparts as indicated in the survey. In terms of the legal 
aspects of the income tax system, taxpayers seemed to be generally aware 
of the penalty mechanisms but not so much of the details, especially so in 
Malaysia. At this point, it can be concluded that the surveys (supplemented 
by the interviews) provide evidence of different levels of knowledge 
among taxpayers in New Zealand and Malaysia, and therefore this answers 
the second research question expressed as: „Do taxpayers in both New 
Zealand and Malaysia have the same levels of tax knowledge of their 
current income tax systems?‟, in the negative.  
 
9.2.3   Tax Complexity  
The surveys of New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers indicates that New 
Zealand taxpayers perceived the income tax system as significantly more 
complex than Malaysian taxpayers, particularly in terms of content 
complexity. While the results suggest that Malaysian taxpayers also have 
concerns with the complexity of the content of the tax law and provide 
support for Mustafa‟s findings (1996), New Zealand taxpayers appeared to 
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be more discontented with this issue. The findings do not suggest that the 
tax simplification and rewrite programme (which had been actively 
undertaken in New Zealand) is ineffective, but perhaps, the benefits from 
such programmes are not yet well absorbed, as suggested by Sawyer 
(2007). Contrary to the problem in understanding the tax law (content 
complexity), taxpayers in both countries commonly agreed that complying 
with their obligations is relatively less complex.  
 
While such results might be inconsistent, the interview results are able to 
provide some explanation to why that happens. From the interviews, it 
appears that taxpayers discussed the complexity of the tax system in 
respect of their sources of incomes. While complying with the tax law is 
not difficult for salaried taxpayers, it is clearly complex among self-
employed taxpayers and those earning investment incomes. These groups, 
especially the self-employed, have to deal with onerous tax matters in 
meeting their tax obligations. Thus, the claim that complying with the tax 
law is relatively easy (as demonstrated in the surveys) might only hold true 
in the case of the salaried group. In sum, these findings provide evidence 
of tax complexity in New Zealand and Malaysia, which differ to some 
extent, and thus positively answers the third research question: „Do 
taxpayers in both New Zealand and Malaysia have the same levels of 
perceptions of the complexity of their current income tax systems?‟, in the 
negative. 
425 
 
9.2.4   Compliance Behaviour 
Overall the descriptive analysis performed in Chapter 5 on the TPB 
elements to measure compliance behaviour signals a reasonable degree of 
compliance among taxpayers in both countries. Relatively, New Zealand 
taxpayers are more compliant, compared to Malaysian taxpayers, in both 
scenarios under study.  
 
To restate, this study investigates taxpayers‟ compliance in the „overstating 
business expenses‟ and „understating other incomes‟ scenarios. Even 
though the measures used are different, the results provide support to 
Belkaoui‟s (2004) comparative work, which suggests that New Zealand is 
the second most compliant nation after Singapore. In his study, Malaysia 
was ranked eighth out of 30 countries. Notwithstanding such a different 
level of compliance, taxpayers in both environments shared similar views 
such that the salaried taxpayers are more compliant than the self-employed 
taxpayers, because they have no choice but to comply. The self-employed 
taxpayers, on the other hand, appeared to have more opportunity to avoid 
or evade paying tax by manipulating their incomes and expenses related to 
their business. This is made easier when the revenue authority has not 
received adequate documentation of the business activities. Collectively, 
the findings from the survey and interviews answer the fourth research 
question: „Do taxpayers in both New Zealand and Malaysia have the same 
levels of perceptions in relation to the TPB elements?‟, in the negative. 
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9.3      Discussion on the Primary Hypotheses 
With reference to the results from the structural model, this section 
presents a discussion on the factors affecting taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour in New Zealand and Malaysia. In addition, a discussion on the 
impact of tax knowledge and tax complexity on fairness perceptions and 
taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control are also presented. This is 
followed by a discussion on the effect of fairness perceptions on attitudes 
towards compliance. The discussions on the surveys are integrated with the 
interview results to enable the researcher to provide a comprehensive 
evidence to review the research questions.  
 
9.3.1   Fairness Perceptions are Multi-dimensional 
The evaluation of the first order factor Measurement Model in Chapter 6 
(refer section 6.3) confirms that New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers 
perceived the fairness of their income tax system from various dimensions. 
The findings substantiate the previous exploratory studies on fairness 
perceptions undertaken across countries (for example, Azmi & Perumal, 
2008; Christensen et al., 1994; Gerbing, 1988; Richardson, 2005a; 2005b; 
2006b; Tan, 1998). Through rigorous validity and reliability tests 
recommended in the Partial Least Squares (PLS), the multi-dimensional 
perceptions of fairness were analysed under both tax compliance scenarios. 
The results jointly suggest that general fairness, exchange fairness, 
horizontal fairness, retributive fairness, and administrative fairness, are the 
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dimensions that were significantly important to New Zealand taxpayers in 
forming their fairness perceptions. Less attention, however, was given to 
vertical fairness and personal fairness. In Malaysia, all dimensions of 
fairness were significant with the exception of exchange fairness. While 
taxpayers‟ opinions on the dimensionality of fairness perceptions were not 
directly sought during the interviews, their concerns on various aspects of 
the income tax system (such as on tax administration and penalty 
mechanisms) indicate the presence of multi-dimensional perceptions in 
both countries. Thus, notwithstanding the slight differences between 
countries, the results imply that New Zealand and Malaysian taxpayers 
viewed fairness perceptions as multi-dimensional, and consequently this 
provides support to Hypothesis 5 which states: „New Zealand and 
Malaysian taxpayers perceive fairness of their income tax systems as being 
multi-dimensional.‟  
 
9.3.2   Factors Affecting Compliance Behaviour 
Referring to the conceptual framework developed and validated in Chapter 
3 (see Figure 3.1), this study argues that taxpayers‟ decisions whether to 
comply or not are the results of their fairness perceptions, attitudes toward 
compliance, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control. These 
relationships were tested in Hypotheses 6, 7 (both 7a and 7b), 8 and 9, 
respectively. Considering the predictive power of the structural model 
tested in the „overstating business expenses‟ scenario presented in Chapter 
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6, the R
2 
were 0.491 and 0.526 for New Zealand and Malaysia, 
respectively.
115
 The values indicate that all these factors explained 49.1 
and 52.6 percent of the compliance behaviour in New Zealand and 
Malaysia, respectively.  
 
Interestingly, the results were consistent across countries, where affective 
attitude and subjective norms were found to be the only two factors which 
significantly affect taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. These results provide 
support to Hypotheses 7a (affective attitude) and 8 (subjective norms) 
only. The positive path coefficient between affective attitude and 
compliance behaviour implies that a stronger affective attitude towards 
compliance results in better compliance behaviour. Similarly, higher 
subjective norms among taxpayers also result in better compliance 
behaviour. Referring to the path coefficient values, affective attitude 
(0.560 and 0.458 for New Zealand and Malaysia, respectively) had a much 
stronger influence on compliance behaviour than subjective norms (0.192 
and 0.388 for New Zealand and Malaysia, respectively) in both 
environments.  
 
These findings were confirmed by the results of the analysis of effect size 
(as discussed in Chapter 6, section 6.5.2). From the analysis, it appears that 
                                                 
115 It is important to note that the results were indirectly compared as the structural model was not tested 
simultaneously but independently for each environment.  
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the omission of affective attitude in the New Zealand environment resulted 
in the decrease of the predictive power from 49.1 percent to 28.1 percent, 
which is considered to be a large effect. The omission of subjective norms, 
on the other hand, only had a small effect in decreasing the predictive 
power from 49.1 percent to 46.5 percent. A similar trend was documented 
in Malaysia where the omission of affective attitude appeared to have 
higher impact on the predictive power of the model (reducing from 52.6 
percent to 38.2 percent), compared to subjective norms (reducing from 
52.6 percent to 43.8 percent). Applying the degree of effect suggested by 
Cohen (1992), both factors were considered to have a medium effect on 
the predictive power of the structural model.  
 
As this study investigates taxpayers‟ compliance in two different scenarios, 
similar hypotheses (Hypotheses 6 to 9) were re-tested using the same 
compliance structural model but in the „understating other incomes‟ 
scenario. The analysis shows some interesting results. The predictive 
power of the structural model is greater in this scenario with 74.0 and 65.2 
in New Zealand and Malaysia, respectively. Similar to the „overstating 
business expenses‟ scenario, the results were very consistent between 
countries. All factors were found to significantly affect compliance 
behaviour except for instrumental attitude in New Zealand, which showed 
a non-significant impact, suggesting acceptance of Hypotheses 6, 7 (7a in 
New Zealand, and both 7a and 7b in Malaysia), 8 and 9.  
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The positive path coefficient between fairness perceptions and compliance 
behaviour implies that improved fairness perceptions result in higher 
compliance behaviour. Similarly, stronger affective attitude, instrumental 
attitude (particularly in Malaysia), and subjective norms would also result 
in higher compliance. On the other hand, a negative path coefficient 
between perceived behavioural control and compliance behaviour suggests 
that having a high control over avoiding or evading tax results in lower 
compliance behaviour among taxpayers in both environments.  
 
Referring to the path coefficient values, affective attitude and subjective 
norms were considered the most important factors in both countries, 
followed by perceived behavioural control (in New Zealand), and fairness 
perceptions (in Malaysia) as the third important contributing factor. The 
analysis of effect size was used to confirm the strength of each factor in the 
structural model, where affective attitude was found to have a large effect 
on the structural model in New Zealand. The omission of affective attitude 
in the structural model results in decreasing the predictive power by 11.5 
percent. While excluding the subjective norms from the structural model 
had a medium effect on the predictive power of the model, the omission of 
either perceived behavioural control or fairness perceptions had a small 
effect.  
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In Malaysia, similar findings were reported as for the „overstating business 
expenses‟ scenario, where the omission of either affective attitude or 
subjective norms would result in medium effect on the predictive power of 
the structural model. In addition, the exclusion of fairness perceptions also 
had an effect but to a small degree. While instrumental attitude was found 
to be significant in the complete structural model, the effect size analysis 
indicates no material effect if that factor was taken out of the model.  
 
This situation perhaps could be explained by the fact that in this study, 
instrumental attitude was treated as a moderating variable between fairness 
perceptions and compliance behaviour. In the complete structural model, 
fairness perceptions might have influenced instrumental attitude, which 
consequently affected compliance behaviour. However, when instrumental 
attitude was omitted from the structural model (in the effect size analysis), 
fairness perceptions still had both a direct and an indirect effect (through 
affective attitude) on compliance behaviour. Thus, the omission of 
instrumental attitude alone had no material effect on the explanatory power 
of the structural model. In other words, the study‟s results suggest that, 
without the effect of fairness perceptions, instrumental attitude might not 
be an important factor affecting compliance behaviour.  
 
Similar to instrumental attitude, perceived behavioural control was also a 
significant contributing factor to compliance behaviour, but its omission 
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from the structural model (in the effect size analysis) indicates no material 
effect. Possible explanations for such findings are the low value in path 
coefficient and also the low degree of significance which only applies at 
the 0.1 levels.     
 
Comparing the two scenarios under study suggests that the compliance 
structural model developed in this study fits the compliance situations in 
both New Zealand and Malaysia, with considerably high predictive power 
(especially in Scenario 2), compared to previous studies (for example, 
Bobek, 1997; Hanno & Violette, 1996; Trivedi et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
the results indicate that taxpayers in both New Zealand and Malaysia 
generally had similar views with regard to the factors affecting their 
compliance behaviour. Notwithstanding their differences in perceptions of 
fairness, tax knowledge, and complexity of the income tax system, the two 
groups of taxpayers commonly believed that affective attitude and 
subjective norms were the important reasons why people comply. Such 
understanding is consistent irrespective of the compliance situation the 
taxpayers encountered. This is consistent with previous studies undertaken 
overseas (for example, Bobek, 1997; Hanno & Violette, 1996; Trivedi et 
al., 2005).  
 
Interestingly, more explanations of the influential factors to compliance 
behaviour were offered in the „understating other incomes‟ scenario. In 
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particular, the results imply that fairness perceptions and perceived 
behavioural control had a significant impact on compliance behaviour in 
both countries. In addition, Malaysian taxpayers also considered 
instrumental attitude to be significant.  
 
A possible reason that might explain such different findings is the distinct 
nature of the scenarios, where the first scenario is concerned with 
„overstating business expenses‟, while the second scenario concerns 
„understating other income‟. Logically, comparing the two scenarios, the 
„understating other incomes‟ scenario placed taxpayers in more flexible 
positions to either comply or not comply with their tax obligation than the 
„overstating business expenses‟ scenario. Also in this scenario, other 
incomes are in the form of cash receipts, for which insufficient 
documentation is available for the tax authority to trace in the event of a 
tax audit. Thus, taxpayers appeared to have more options and were more 
likely to transform their fairness perceptions into (non)compliance 
behaviour. In the „overstating business expenses‟ scenario, taxpayers were 
positioned in a more difficult situation where they were asked whether 
they would claim the private expenses as business expenses for tax 
deduction purposes. This situation may, to a certain extent, put these 
taxpayers in a much riskier position if they wanted to avoid or evade 
paying tax, compared to the other scenario, if they were selected for tax 
audit. In other words, in this situation, taxpayers were more compelled to 
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comply. Thus, their perceptions of fairness might not be such an important 
factor in this situation.  
 
Likewise, the different amount of monetary values used in the scenarios 
might also contribute to different views on fairness. In the „overstating 
business expenses‟ scenario, a smaller value of $2,500 was used compared 
to $10,500 in the „understating incomes expenses‟ scenario. Such an effect 
was apparent in Malaysia, where taxpayers in the latter scenario (with the 
larger amount), reported a positive association between an instrumental 
attitude and compliance behaviour. In contrast to the „overstating business 
expenses‟ scenario, where a relatively smaller amount of money was used, 
this scenario appeared not to be sufficiently appealing to taxpayers in their 
compliance decision-making. The different results documented in the two 
scenarios provide support to Jones‟ (1991) proposition that human beings 
respond differentially to issues depending on the magnitude of 
consequences of the issues in questions.   
 
Another potential explanation is that the „understating other incomes‟ 
scenario might be more relevant to more respondents (especially in 
Malaysia), than the „overstating business expenses‟ scenario, therefore 
making it easier for them to report their opinions (and to relate to the 
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scenario).
116
 Additionally, taxpayers were found to have more control over 
„avoiding‟ compliance in the „understating other incomes‟ scenario than 
the „overstating business expenses‟ scenario, as indicated in the descriptive 
analysis. Possibly, this also relates to the lack of documentation in the 
„understating other incomes‟ scenario, compared to the „overstating 
business expenses‟ scenario. This situation therefore provides more 
opportunity for the taxpayers in both countries to avoid compliance as 
documented in the structural model results.  
 
In short, given the two different scenarios in hand, undoubtedly taxpayers 
in both countries had different opinions regarding their compliance 
behaviour. In the „overstating business expenses‟ scenario, where 
taxpayers were more „obliged‟ to comply, this reveals that fairness 
perceptions, instrumental attitude and perceived behavioural control were 
not significant in taxpayers decisions whether to comply or not to comply. 
On the contrary, in the „understating other incomes‟ scenario, all factors 
were important except for instrumental attitude in the New Zealand 
environment.  
 
The interviews conducted in both New Zealand and Malaysia further 
explained the potential factors contributing to (non)compliance behaviour. 
                                                 
116 On the negative side, such familiarity with the scenario may also encourage taxpayers to conceal their 
true intention whether or not to comply, to avoid their actual non-compliance behaviour being 
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Among the factors highlighted were taxpayers‟ attitude, their perceived 
behavioural control and fairness perceptions. The results imply that 
taxpayers‟ attitude largely influenced their tax (non)compliance decision-
making. Perceived behavioural control over non-complying was associated 
with both taxpayers‟ good knowledge of tax and accessibility to tax 
consultants. In fact, some taxpayers argued that easy access to tax 
consultants among wealthy people helped them to successfully avoid or 
evade paying tax. While taxpayers were expecting a fair income tax 
system, negative perceptions on the fairness of the income tax system led 
them to not comply with the income tax system. They claimed that acts of 
non-compliance were performed to restore the fairness of the income tax 
system.  
 
In addition, tax knowledge was also considered to be an important 
determinant of taxpayers‟ (non)compliance behaviour in both countries. 
Interestingly, while limited tax knowledge was considered to be a potential 
factor related to unintentional non-compliance behaviour, possessing good 
knowledge could not guarantee compliant behaviour. In fact, taxpayers in 
both countries agreed that having good tax knowledge might also motivate 
taxpayers to not comply. This might trigger the question of what is an 
appropriate level of tax knowledge to ensure total compliance. However, 
                                                                                                                        
detected. This may consequently lead to misleading results.   
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this question is not addressed in this study and therefore should be 
explored in future research. 
 
Another determinant of (non)compliance behaviour is complexity of the 
tax system. This was an issue in New Zealand (but not in Malaysia) where 
the high level of complexity compelled taxpayers to not comply with their 
tax obligations either intentionally or unintentionally. The findings provide 
a signal to the New Zealand tax authority and to the government to 
increase their efforts in reducing the complexity of the tax system to 
improve taxpayers‟ compliance.  
 
9.3.3   The Impact of Tax Knowledge and Tax Complexity on Fairness  
           Perceptions 
To gain a better understanding of fairness perceptions in both countries, 
the structural model incorporates tax knowledge and tax complexity in 
order to investigate how these variables affect fairness perceptions. These 
relationships were tested in Hypotheses 10 and 11, respectively. The 
results indicate that these factors explained 28.3 and 35.4 percent of the 
fairness perceptions in New Zealand and Malaysia, respectively, in the 
„overstating business expenses‟ scenario. The predictive power was even 
greater in the „understating incomes scenario‟ with 33.6 and 36.9 percent 
in New Zealand and Malaysia, respectively. Irrespective of the scenarios 
tested, the results reveal that both variables had significant positive path 
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coefficients with fairness perceptions in New Zealand and Malaysia. 
Specifically, the findings suggest that an increase in tax knowledge would 
significantly improve fairness perceptions. While the findings provide 
support to  most of the prior studies (Christensen et al., 2000; Eriksen & 
Fallan, 1996; Fallan, 1999; Harris, 1989; Maroney et al., 2002; Schisler, 
1995), they are inconsistent with Loo et al. (2008), and Tan and Chin-Fatt 
(2000) (involving the Malaysian and New Zealand environments, 
respectively).  
 
With regard to the impact of tax complexity on fairness perceptions, the 
significant positive coefficient between the variables suggests that a less 
complex tax system would significantly improve fairness perceptions. The 
findings indicate that taxpayers in both countries preferred a less complex 
tax system which were then translated into their fairness perceptions. The 
findings provide support to Carnes and Cuccia (1996), Carroll (1987), 
Cialdini (1989), Kirchler et al. (2006), and Milliron (1985).  
 
The survey findings on the impact of tax knowledge on fairness 
perceptions were further explained by the interview results in both New 
Zealand and Malaysia. Taxpayers in both countries agreed that lack of 
knowledge contributed to negative perceptions on the income tax system, 
thus, suggesting to tax authorities the need to provide more information to 
taxpayers, which consequently would improve their fairness perceptions. 
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Similarly, the complexity of the income tax system in New Zealand was 
also perceived as a contributing factor to negative perceptions on the 
fairness of the income tax system. This explains the findings obtained from 
the New Zealand survey results. Similar views were not expressed for 
Malaysia, notwithstanding taxpayers‟ perceptions that a less complex tax 
system would improve fairness perceptions (as indicated in the survey). 
This is probably due to the fact that the Malaysian income tax system was 
perceived as relatively uncomplex.    
 
9.3.4   The Impact of Tax Knowledge and Tax Complexity on 
Perceived Behavioural Control 
While perceived behavioural control is normally associated with skills, 
opportunities, barriers and obstacles, this study speculates that tax 
knowledge and tax complexity might influence taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control. However, the results of this study did not reveal any 
statistical significance effect in New Zealand, thus suggesting rejection of 
Hypotheses 12 and 13, respectively. Notwithstanding, the findings could 
contribute to the existing knowledge of compliance behaviour, especially 
in the New Zealand context. To the researcher‟s knowledge, there is no 
empirical study addressing the impact of tax knowledge and tax 
complexity on taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control. On the contrary, 
the effect of tax knowledge on perceived behavioural control over non-
compliance was evidenced in Malaysia.  
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The results also suggest that an increase in tax knowledge among 
Malaysian taxpayers would improve their perceived behavioural control 
over non-complying with tax law. Although tax complexity was also found 
to be significant in the „overstating business expenses‟ scenario, the 
coefficient was very low and at a significance level of 0.1 is considered 
minimal. In fact, the analysis in the „understating other incomes‟ scenario 
suggests that the factor was not significant. The findings suggest 
acceptance of Hypothesis 12 but not Hypothesis 13.  
 
The differing results between the two countries gives rise to speculation 
that the effect of tax knowledge on the perceived behavioural control over 
non-compliance may vary across countries. The possible explanations 
would be the different taxpayer compliance models and penalty 
mechanisms adopted in the countries. In the case of New Zealand, the tax 
authority appeared to have a more systematic approach of detecting non-
compliance and subsequently improving compliance through Inland 
Revenue‟s Compliance Model (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2007), than 
is the case for Malaysia. Similarly, the penalty regime in New Zealand is 
more stringent compared to that in Malaysia. Having said that, New 
Zealand taxpayers might perceive themselves to be knowledgeable but still 
have less control over non-compliance with their tax obligations, as was 
demonstrated in the survey results. 
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While the interview results did not specifically inquire into the effect of tax 
knowledge and tax complexity on perceived behavioural control over non-
complying, taxpayers in both countries indirectly indicated that possessing 
good knowledge and the availability of tax consultants assisted some of 
them to successfully avoid or evade paying tax. On the other hand, none of 
the interviewees mentioned the possibility that tax complexity may affect 
taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control. 
 
9.3.5   The Impact of Fairness Perceptions on Attitude towards 
Compliance 
The analysis of the structural model on the impact of fairness perceptions 
on attitude towards compliance (as tested in Hypotheses 14a and 14b) 
generally indicates that fairness perceptions could not clearly explain how 
taxpayers formed their attitude towards compliance. This is drawn from 
the R
2
 values, which were extremely low in both countries at less than 10 
percent. While the results undoubtedly suggest that taxpayers‟ attitude 
towards compliance may be influenced by other factors not included in this 
study,
117
 it is important to note the path coefficients between the 
investigated variables provide some preliminary evidence for undertaking 
future research.  
 
                                                 
117 The possible factors are trust, pride, culture, education and personal identity (Hasseldine & 
Bebbington, 1991; Torgler & Schneider, 2004; 2005). 
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The findings indicate no significant effect between fairness perceptions 
and affective attitude in New Zealand. On the contrary, such an effect was 
visible in Malaysia. The positive path coefficient suggests that Malaysian 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions had significantly improved their affective 
attitude towards compliance. This finding provides support to Devos 
(2009) and Roberts (1994). The effect of fairness perceptions on affective 
attitude seemed to be consistent in both scenarios tested. However, such 
consistency was not demonstrated in the case of instrumental attitude. For 
instance, while New Zealand taxpayers appeared to demonstrate a 
significant impact from their fairness perceptions on the instrumental 
attitude in the „overstating business expenses‟ scenario, a similar result 
was not exhibited in the „understating other incomes‟ scenario. The 
significant effect in the first scenario suggests that an improvement in 
taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions would lower their instrumental attitude 
towards compliance. One possible explanation for this association was that 
taxpayers viewed the income tax system to be fairer as a consequence of 
their negative attitude towards compliance, rather than the reverse effect.  
 
In Malaysia, the significant effect of fairness perceptions on the 
instrumental attitude was documented in the „understating other incomes‟ 
scenario only. The positive path coefficient suggests that better perceptions 
of the fairness of the income tax system would improve taxpayers‟ 
instrumental attitude towards compliance. Clearly, the analysis of the 
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effect of fairness perceptions on attitude towards compliance revealed 
different results across the two countries. Such differing results suggest 
that taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions might influence their attitude towards 
compliance but at a different level. Possibly, other potential factors 
affecting attitude towards compliance (particularly with regard to locality 
attributes of the taxpayers), together with fairness perceptions, need to be 
investigated. In the interviews, none of the participants explicitly 
commented on the possibility that fairness perceptions might affect (or not 
affect) their attitude towards compliance. Instead, they were more 
concerned that fairness perceptions would influence their (non)compliant 
behaviour. Since attitude towards compliance was closely associated with 
(non)compliant behaviour, it was not possible to implicitly conclude that 
fairness perceptions did not influence taxpayers‟ attitudes.  
 
9.4       Implications of the Study 
In the researcher‟s view, the results of this study have made contributions 
to the tax literature as well as to tax authorities in New Zealand and 
Malaysia. The contributions are discussed in this section. 
 
9.4.1 To the Literature 
This study contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this 
cross-cultural study of New Zealand and Malaysia adds to the limited 
literature available in these countries. Most of the prior studies have been 
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undertaken in other parts of the world, such as the United States (US), 
Europe and Australia. As indicated earlier, there were only two major 
studies on fairness perceptions undertaken in the New Zealand 
environment, that is by Hasseldine et al. (1994) and Tan (1998). These 
studies which focused on limited dimensions of fairness suggest that 
taxpayers had negative perceptions on the fairness of the tax burden, 
fairness of the tax rate structure (Tan, 1998) and fairness of the overall 
income tax system (Hasseldine et al., 1994). The only dimension which 
was moderately perceived as fair was personal fairness (Tan, 1994).  
 
While their findings may still be relevant, the findings from the present 
study which extends the dimensions of fairness would provide an 
important update to the available literature. In particular, the findings of 
this study which suggest that taxpayers appeared to have positive 
perceptions on horizontal fairness, vertical fairness, retributive fairness and 
personal fairness may at least provide an indication that taxpayers‟ 
perceptions may have improved over time.
118
 In addition, the study also 
provides information on the negative perceptions that taxpayers had on 
general fairness, exchange fairness and administrative fairness of the 
current income tax system.  
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Similarly, the findings on a positive relationship between the fairness 
perceptions and compliance behaviour, particularly in the case of 
„understating other income‟ scenario indicate the importance of fairness 
perceptions in compliance behaviour. Although the results appear to be 
contradicting with the findings offered in Hasseldine et al.‟s (1994) study, 
they are consistent with Efebera et al. (2004), Roth et al. (1989) and 
Turman (1995). 
  
In Malaysia, the findings indicating that taxpayers have favourable fairness 
perceptions do not only provide support to the existing evidence in Azmi 
and Perumal‟s study (2008), but also extends the dimensions of fairness 
reported to date. In that study, the authors replicated Gerbing‟s (1988) 
work to explore individual taxpayers‟ perceptions on the fairness of the 
income tax system. While that exploratory study provides preliminary 
findings in Malaysian environment, this study through the confirmatory 
analysis (using PLS) suggests that taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions may go 
beyond general fairness, fairness of the tax rate structure and self-interest. 
Further, the findings on the effect of fairness perceptions on taxpayers‟ 
compliance behaviour provide additional information to the tax literature 
in Malaysia. It is anticipated that the findings documented in this study 
will be a „stepping stone‟ for more studies in the future.    
                                                                                                                        
118 However, it is important to note that the difference in findings may be due to other factors such as 
sample selection, measures of fairness and the implementation of the income tax system at that time 
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Second, the findings suggest that taxpayers‟ decisions in compliance 
behaviour are generally common across the two countries under study. 
Although New Zealand is referred to as a developed economy, and 
Malaysia is an example of a developing economy, in terms of tax 
compliance behaviour, taxpayers in the two countries are indifferent with 
respect to their tax compliance behavioural perceptions. Interestingly, their 
cultural differences which may affect their societal norms and personal 
norms also appear to be making no difference in taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour.   
 
Third, the mixed-method approach undertaken in this study provides 
complementary views from different perspectives. While the survey results 
emphasise the predictive power and significance level of the analysis, the 
interviews enhance the findings by providing more detailed explanations. 
For instance, while the survey results suggest that a relationship between 
fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour exists, the interview 
participants further explain their concerns with the income tax systems that 
reflect their negative perceptions of fairness. This approach is consistent 
with gradual development of taxation studies incorporating both 
quantitative and qualitative orientations (e.g. Loo, 2006; McKerchar, 
2003). 
 
                                                                                                                        
(which is prior to the self assessment system). 
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Fourth, the fact that this study applies a confirmatory technique (through 
the use of PLS) provides a new dimension to the existing literature. This 
approach differs from most of studies on fairness perceptions undertaken 
so far (Azmi & Perumal, 2008; Gerbing, 1988; Gilligan & Richardson, 
2005; Hasseldine et al., 1994; Richardson, 2005b; Tan, 1998) which were 
exploratory in nature. The use of confirmatory analysis is deemed 
appropriate at this stage given that the preliminary evidence of fairness 
perceptions already exist in addition to the availability of the established 
theories.  
 
Fifth, this study has developed a new set of measures of fairness 
perceptions, providing an alternative to the one offered by Gerbing (1988). 
This new instrument perhaps would be useful for future researchers 
intending to undertake the studies of fairness in other countries. Also, the 
new measures for tax knowledge, tax complexity and compliance 
behaviour may be useful for future studies. These measures which are all 
represented by more than one items and specifically tested in the context of 
tax compliance behaviour, are believed to be more reliable and valid.  
 
Finally, the integration of Equity Theory, the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB), and the two external variables (tax knowledge and tax complexity), 
not only prove that TPB appears to be useful in explaining tax compliance 
behaviour but also extend the well-established TPB. In fact, the structural 
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model has been more successful in explaining the phenomenon, compared 
to previous studies (which adopted the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) 
or the TPB) (Bobek, 1997; Trivedi et al., 2005). This newly developed can 
be replicated and tested to other parts of the world so as to be able to 
generalise the findings in this study as well as to allow a more 
comprehensive comparison among the countries in the future.    
 
9.4.2 To Tax Authorities  
In addition to advancing academic and knowledge in the taxation area, this 
study also has its practical implications. First, the information pertaining to 
various dimensions of fairness will be useful to the tax authorities to 
improve the areas which have led to negative attitudes on the tax system 
among taxpayers. For instance, being aware that taxpayers in both 
countries were dissatisfied with government spending and disclosure 
issues would assist the tax authorities in encouraging the governments 
improve the efficiency of government expenditure and the level of 
transparency. Perhaps public advertisement on how the tax money was 
spent could be a helpful mechanism. Additionally, the information that 
fairness perceptions are positively associated with compliance behaviour, 
particularly in the „understating income scenario‟ may assist the tax 
authorities to develop appropriate strategies to improve compliance. For 
instance, they may consider applying withholding tax on various types of 
additional incomes.  
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Second, the information obtained in this study on taxpayers‟ knowledge of 
tax, (which is generally quite limited, especially in Malaysia), would also 
be useful for tax authorities to develop an appropriate education 
programme. A more consistent, rather than seasonal campaign through the 
public media, could be an effective way to communicate tax matters to the 
general public. Incorporating tax education in the secondary schools 
curriculum may also help for early exposure to tax.  
 
Third, the information on taxpayers‟ perceived complexity of the income 
tax system provides a signal to the tax authorities, especially in New 
Zealand, to increase their efforts in providing a more user-friendly income 
tax system. While the income tax system has undoubtedly gone through a 
simplification programme, the benefits of such a programme are still vague 
in the view of taxpayers. Perhaps more assistance should be offered to 
taxpayers, especially the self-employed, to deal with their tax obligations 
at the early stages of their business activities.
119
 
 
Fourth, this study provides evidence that taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour, 
irrespective of the income tax system and environment, generally depends 
on their attitude towards compliance, subjective norms, fairness 
                                                 
119 The Inland Revenue Department (IRD) has a special unit to help new businesses by providing free 
tax education and advice relating to tax matters (New Zealand Inland Revenue, 2010a). However, the 
numbers of self-employed who are aware of the services offered and consequently seek the IRD’s 
assistance is not known. Notwithstanding the availability of such assistance, probably, greater issue 
with the self-employed is the ongoing compliance costs.  
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perceptions and perceived behavioural control. Thus tax authorities should 
be focusing on these aspects if they wish to increase taxpayers‟ 
compliance. Although it may be possible for the tax authorities to 
encourage a more positive attitude towards compliance and subjective 
norms among taxpayers, this may be difficult and require persistence. 
Also, it is unlikely that everyone would ever have a positive attitude 
towards compliance. This is because attitudes towards compliance and 
subjective norms are normally associated with taxpayers‟ personal identity, 
inner values and the associated environments (such as friends, work place 
and economic background), areas where the tax authorities might have less 
control.  
 
A relatively easier way to improve compliance is to focus on the fairness 
perceptions and perceived behavioural control. These two factors are 
generally within the control of tax authorities. For instance, fairness 
perceptions could be improved by addressing the issues of concern 
highlighted in this study. Furthermore, this study also highlighted that 
fairness perceptions could be influenced by tax knowledge and tax 
complexity. Hence, tax authorities should concentrate on educating 
taxpayers on their responsibility to pay tax and the way tax revenues are 
spent while at the same time offering a more user-friendly income tax 
system. If they follow this approach, it would be more likely that taxpayers 
will comply with their tax obligations.   
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With regard to taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control, this study 
suggests that having adequate control over the decision to comply or not 
would result in low compliance. Taxpayers‟ perceived behavioural control 
over non-complying, in turn, depends on good tax knowledge and a less 
complex tax system. This information is important in cautioning tax 
authorities that taxpayers possessing good knowledge in a simple tax 
system may be motivated to avoid or evade paying tax. This does not mean 
that the tax authorities should limit disseminating knowledge to taxpayers 
and maintain a complex tax system. Rather, in this instance, the tax 
authorities should actively undertake tax audit activities to detect these 
intentional non-compliant taxpayers. 
 
9.5       Summary  
This chapter discusses the results obtained from both the surveys and 
interviews. The discussion is predominantly drawn from Chapters 5 to 8. 
From the discussion, it appears that, notwithstanding the differences 
between the countries, generally taxpayers in New Zealand and Malaysia 
agreed on the factors contributing to their compliance behaviour. 
Interestingly, the role of fairness perceptions in compliance behaviour was 
evidenced in both countries, confirming Equity Theory and prior studies. 
This chapter concluded with a discussion of the implications of the study 
where both practical and more academic and theoretical contributions were 
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discussed. In the next chapter, the overall conclusions, limitations of the 
study and future directions for research will be discussed.  
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Chapter 10 
Conclusions, Limitations and Future Directions for Research 
 
10.1     Conclusions 
A few cross-cultural studies on tax compliance have been undertaken to 
date to understand the motivating factors behind taxpayers‟ 
(non)compliance behaviour. Examples of the studies are Bobek et al. 
(2007), Cummings et al. (2001), and Richardson (2005b; 2006). However, 
none of these studies consider either the New Zealand or Malaysian 
income tax systems; rather they focus more on the United States (US) and 
Australia. Thus, the researcher believes that it is timely to undertake this 
cross-cultural study between New Zealand and Malaysia to serve as a 
preliminary step towards investigating further taxpayers‟ motivations to 
comply with their respective income tax systems.  
 
Furthermore, comparing Malaysia with New Zealand, which has been 
recognised as the second most compliant nation by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Belkaoui, 2004), is 
essential to provide empirical evidence of similarities or differences in 
taxpayers‟ compliance behaviours between the two jurisdictions.120 Also, 
this study answers the call made by Richardson and Sawyer (2001) for 
greater cross-cultural research on taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. While 
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the differences between New Zealand and Malaysia in terms of cultures, 
economies and ethnicities are obvious, do they matter with regard to 
taxpayers‟ compliance decision-making?  
 
To understand this issue of compliance behaviour, this study narrows its 
scope to the role of fairness perceptions. Fairness perceptions, which are 
derived from Equity Theory, have been established as an important 
element in individuals‟ lives (Zhiyong & Qingyang, 2007), including in 
making their political evaluations (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Rasinski & Tyler, 
1988). In taxation, a number of studies have been undertaken on the 
relationship between fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour, 
which provide inconclusive results.  
 
In New Zealand and Malaysia, limited studies are available, thus requiring 
more research in this area. In New Zealand, a study by Hasseldine et al. 
(1994) on overall fairness perceptions among individual taxpayers reveals 
that they perceived the income tax system at that time to be unfair. 
However, such negative perceptions do not correlate with their 
noncompliance behaviour. Another study by Tan (1998), on the other 
hand, indicates an improvement in taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions. While 
these two major studies provide important empirical evidence in the 
                                                                                                                        
120 In that study, Malaysia was ranked eighth after the US.  
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literature, they were both conducted prior to the formal implementation of 
the current self assessment system in New Zealand.  
 
To date, there have been two major studies on fairness perceptions 
undertaken in Malaysia (Azmi & Perumal, 2008; Mustafa, 1996). Mustafa 
(1996) only focused on the limited dimensions of tax fairness but does not 
comment on the determinants of such judgments. Azmi and Perumal 
(2008) attempted to identify the fairness dimensions among Malaysian 
taxpayers by replicating Gerbing‟s (1988) questionnaire. In her study, 
Gerbing (1988) performs a factor analysis on the 21 self-developed 
measures of fairness perceptions to finally come up with four underlying 
dimensions of fairness.   
 
Having reviewed prior overseas studies, and those in New Zealand as well 
as Malaysia, the researcher has identified a research gap that needs to be 
investigated, which includes the current state of fairness perceptions, the 
role of fairness perceptions in taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour, and the 
factors contributing to fairness perceptions. Realising that fairness 
perceptions are only one possible factor in taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour, there is a need to examine other relevant factors motivating 
taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour. A dominant theory in behavioural 
decision-making, namely the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), was 
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adopted and integrated with Equity Theory, and consequently a new 
compliance model is developed in this study.   
 
This identified research gap leads to the formation of five objectives in this 
study. The first objective is to observe taxpayers‟ (both in New Zealand 
and Malaysia) levels of fairness perceptions, tax knowledge, perceived 
complexity of the income tax systems and their compliance behaviour. To 
answer this objective, taxpayers‟ responses in the survey questionnaires 
were analysed using descriptive analysis through SPSS. The results suggest 
that New Zealand taxpayers viewed the income tax system as reasonably 
fair in terms of horizontal fairness, personal fairness and retributive 
fairness, but not administrative fairness, exchange fairness and general 
fairness. In Malaysia, positive perceptions of various fairness perceptions 
were demonstrated but at different levels. Accordingly, a t-test analysis 
was conducted and it appears that Malaysian taxpayers have significantly 
better fairness perceptions on their current income tax system compared to 
New Zealand taxpayers.  
 
In relation to tax knowledge, while both New Zealanders and Malaysians 
viewed themselves as having good knowledge of their respective income 
tax systems, in relative terms New Zealand taxpayers are „better off‟. In 
terms of their perceived complexity of the income tax system, New 
Zealand taxpayers viewed their income tax system as more complex 
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relative to Malaysian taxpayers. In terms of compliance behaviour, New 
Zealand taxpayers generally had better levels of compliance than their 
Malaysian counterparts. These results were generally supported by the 
interviews conducted among the taxpayers in both countries. This 
information relating to taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions, tax knowledge, 
perceived complexity of the income tax systems and compliance 
behaviour, is essential for tax authorities. For instance, the information that 
taxpayers have negative perceptions on the administrative aspects of the 
income tax system may encourage the New Zealand Inland Revenue to 
improve the services they provide to taxpayers. Similarly, the negative 
perceptions of general fairness may provide the necessary information for 
the tax authority to lobby the government to spend tax revenue more 
efficiently and to provide more information to taxpayers on government 
expenditures.  
 
The second objective addressed in this study is to confirm the multi-
dimensional perceptions of fairness. In order to achieve this, a 
confirmatory factor analysis was conducted using PLS software. The 
results from the analysis indicate that both New Zealand and Malaysian 
taxpayers have multi-dimensional perceptions of the fairness of their 
respective income tax systems. A similar indication was provided in the 
interviews from the discussion on various aspects of fairness perceptions. 
The findings from both approaches provide support, not only to the 
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premises under Equity Theory, but also to the existing literature on fairness 
perceptions, particularly in New Zealand and Malaysia.  
 
The third objective of this study is to understand the role of fairness 
perceptions, together with the TPB elements in taxpayers‟ compliance 
behaviour. To investigate this relationship, the results from Partial Least 
Squares (PLS) analysis was analysed in two different scenarios, that is, 
„overstating business expenses‟ and „understating other incomes‟. The 
model, which was found to have good predictive power in both countries, 
shows that the researcher‟s attempt to integrate Equity Theory and the TPB 
to explain taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour has been successful. The 
results suggest that affective attitude and subjective norms are the most 
important factors contributing to taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour across 
the two countries.  
 
Interestingly, fairness perceptions and perceived behavioural control 
appear to be important only in the „understating other incomes‟ scenario in 
both New Zealand and Malaysia. These findings suggest that, in relation to 
fairness perceptions and perceived behavioural control, taxpayers‟ 
compliance behaviour varies depending on the situations taxpayers 
encounter. In this instance, it appears that fairness perceptions and 
perceived behavioural control will play a role in (non)compliant decision-
making depending on the amount at stake and the level of difficulty of 
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(non)complying.
121
 Accordingly, the positive perceptions of fairness will 
only motivate taxpayers to comply if the amount at stake is large. In 
relation to perceived behavioural control, taxpayers‟ high control over the 
tax situation will motivate them to avoid being compliant. Consistent 
results (except for subjective norms) were demonstrated through the 
interview results, where attitude, fairness perceptions and perceived 
behavioural control were considered important in taxpayers‟ compliance 
decision-making.  
 
While taxpayers‟ attitude and subjective norms are generally difficult for 
tax authorities to control, their focus should be on improving taxpayers‟ 
fairness perceptions in an effort to encourage voluntary compliance. In 
relation to the negative association between perceived behavioural control 
and compliance behaviour in the „understating other incomes‟ scenario, 
this information should be useful for tax authorities when  refining their tax 
audit activities.  
 
While understanding the role of fairness perceptions is important, this 
study also addressed the factors contributing to those perceptions, namely 
                                                 
121 An amount of NZ$2,500 (MYR2,500 in Malaysia) was used in the ‘overstating business expenses’ 
scenario, whereas NZ$10,500 (MYR10,500 in Malaysia) was used in the ‘understating other incomes’ 
scenario. In the ‘overstating business expenses’ scenario, receipts of the business expenses would be 
required to provide evidence that NZ$2,500 (MYR2,500) was for business purposes. Whereas in the 
‘understating other incomes’ scenario, as it merely considered cash jobs between friends that required 
no receipts, little evidence is available in the event of tax audit. In these two scenarios, the amounts 
used are in their respective currencies with no exchange rate equivalents.   
460 
 
tax knowledge and tax complexity. The results indicate that having more 
knowledge of the income tax system and a less complex tax system 
improves taxpayers‟ fairness perceptions in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia. Similar indications were provided in the interviews, especially in 
New Zealand. This empirical evidence suggests that tax authorities should 
focus on increasing taxpayers‟ knowledge and simplifying the income tax 
system in order to improve fairness perceptions among taxpayers, and 
consequently encourage taxpayers to comply voluntarily.  
 
In addition to the effect of fairness perceptions, the Malaysian results also 
indicate that tax knowledge has an influence on taxpayers‟ perceived 
behavioural control in avoiding compliance. The Malaysian results, 
however, differ from their New Zealand counterparts. Notwithstanding 
better knowledge demonstrated amongst the New Zealand taxpayers, 
compared to the Malaysian taxpayers, the New Zealand taxpayers did not 
believe that their good knowledge would enable them to avoid or evade 
paying tax. This perhaps indicates that the New Zealand Inland Revenue 
has a more systematic approach of detecting non-compliance and its 
penalty regime in New Zealand is more stringent compared to that in 
Malaysia. Alternatively, it is probably due to a very complex tax system in 
place and that a greater knowledge was required to enable them to avoid or 
evade tax.  
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To answer the fifth objective, this study also establishes that fairness 
perceptions influence taxpayers‟ attitudes in both New Zealand and 
Malaysia to a certain degree. In other words, the results suggest that 
taxpayers‟ positive perceptions of the fairness of the income tax system 
will help shape their positive attitudes towards compliance.  
 
In sum, combining Equity Theory and the TPB, and applying a mixed-
method approach in investigating the role of fairness perceptions and other 
relevant variables in taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour in New Zealand and 
Malaysia, has been rewarding. Significant contributions, both theoretical 
and practical, have been made.  Interestingly, these results are largely 
universal across the two countries, notwithstanding the differences in 
respect of their cultures, economics and ethnicities.  
 
10.2    Limitations of the Research 
Notwithstanding the significant contributions of this study, it also has a 
number of limitations. The first is the inherent weaknesses with the survey 
approach itself, such as non-response bias, respondents‟ representativeness, 
and the respondents‟ differing interpretation of the questions. With respect 
to non-response bias and respondents‟ representativeness, the researcher 
has taken reasonable measures to reduce the problem. Furthermore, the t-
test analysis verifies that there is no problem of response bias in both New 
Zealand and Malaysia. Similarly, the t-test analysis also indicates that 
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responses in both countries are representative of their total populations to a 
reasonable degree. It is, however, acknowledged that these weaknesses 
may remain to some extent. For example, while the analysis provides an 
indication of non-response bias in New Zealand sample, it can still be a 
problem considering the low response rate achieved.  The low response 
rate may also affect the representativeness of the New Zealand population. 
In Malaysia, the use of salaried and wage earners as the sample in the study 
also limit its representativeness to that group of taxpayers, not to the 
broader population of individual taxpayers. In terms of the different 
interpretation of the questions by respondents, the researcher has made 
reasonable efforts to ensure the wording and sentences were 
straightforward and precise. Furthermore, pre-testing of the survey was 
also conducted prior to distribution of the final questionnaire to the sample 
populations.  
 
Second, the use of a self-report survey using hypothetical scenarios might 
also create bias. However, this approach is considered appropriate to 
capture taxpayers‟ (non)compliance behaviour as the act of 
(non)complying is considered to be a sensitive issue. In this instance, 
asking taxpayers for their actual compliance behaviour may not be suitable 
as potential respondents may be hesitant to provide such information. 
Furthermore, this is a common approach adopted in prior studies (for 
example, Bobek, 1997; Trivedi et al., 2005).  
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Third, the survey response rate of 10 percent in New Zealand is considered 
low by comparison to previous studies. However, with an absolute number 
of 229 responses, the number is sufficient to provide the basis for thorough 
statistical analysis.  
 
Fourth, the convergent validity analysis on the constructs indicates lower 
item loadings than the recommended threshold of 0.7 for some of the 
items. Notwithstanding the low loadings, the items are still considered 
acceptable for further analysis (Chin, 1998b). 
 
In terms of the interview approach, the main weakness is probably the use 
of similar samples for the survey. In this study, participants for the 
interviews were invited to participate via the survey. Thus, it is more likely 
that the sixty participants (comprising thirty interviewees each, in New 
Zealand and Malaysia) have also expressed their opinions in the survey. 
While it may be preferable to have the interview participants drawn from 
other groups of taxpayers, the use of similar samples enables further 
explanations of the survey results and consequently enriches the findings.  
 
Another limitation is that this study only uses individual taxpayers. Thus, 
caution should be taken when generalising to other groups of taxpayers. 
Also, there are slight differences in the characteristics of individual 
taxpayers in New Zealand and Malaysia. In New Zealand, the respondents 
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are a mix of self-employed taxpayers, salary and wage earners and those 
who earned investment income. In Malaysia, the respondents comprised 
salary and wage taxpayers only. Notwithstanding these differences, the 
respondents are all taxpayers in their respective countries and therefore 
their perceptions on their income tax systems are important.  
 
10.3    Future Directions for Research 
The compliance model developed in this study has been shown to offer a 
good explanation of taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour in both New Zealand 
and Malaysia. Thus replication of this model to other parts of the world is 
important so as to be able to generalise the findings in this study. 
Furthermore, this would allow a more comprehensive comparison among 
countries in the future.  
 
In addition, future research should continue to extend the compliance 
model, possibly by decomposing the TPB variables (such as subjective 
norms and perceived behavioural control) to gain a better insight into the 
determining factors. Another way of extending the model is by including 
other potential variables such as penalty regimes. As taxation lies in a 
legislative environment, penalty regimes might be an important 
contributing factor to taxpayers‟ (non)compliance behaviour. In this 
respect, penalty regimes might have either a direct influence on taxpayers‟ 
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compliance behaviour, or an indirect influence through taxpayers‟ 
perceived behavioural control, or both.  
 
As indicated earlier, this study is limited to individual taxpayers of two 
different types (the more diverse groups of taxpayers in New Zealand and 
salaried and wage earners in Malaysia). It would be interesting if future 
research could select the samples of taxpayers of the same like for 
comparison purpose. Extending this study to other groups of taxpayers and 
to tax professionals would also be interesting. While other groups of 
taxpayers may generally share similar views with individual taxpayers, tax 
professionals‟ perceptions are unknown.122 In addition, the focus on actual 
non-compliant taxpayers, if possible, would provide a further picture of the 
role of fairness perceptions in taxpayers‟ non-compliance behaviour.  Such 
an extension to this study could be undertaken with the assistance of the 
tax authority.   
 
10.4    Concluding Remarks 
Taxpayers‟ compliance behaviour has been a major focus for both tax 
authorities and researchers around the world. While it is essential to 
maintain high levels of compliance among taxpayers, the contributing 
                                                 
122 This is based on differing opinions of the complexity of the income tax system where taxpayers 
prefer a simple tax system (for example, Kirchler et al., 2006;  McKerchar, 2005; Richardson, 2006a) 
while tax professionals may prefer a complex one (Sawyer, 1996b; White, 1990). In other words, 
taxpayers’ opinions cannot be simply generalised to tax professionals due to their different positions 
and self-interest.     
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factors to encouraging such high levels of compliance are not well 
understood, although fairness perceptions could be one such factor, as 
highlighted in this study. Thus, it is hoped that the findings in this study 
will be useful for tax authorities and governments to improve their income 
tax systems and consequently motivate taxpayers to be more compliant.             
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Appendix 5 
 
Model Constructs and Measures 
    
Constructs  Component 
Measures 
Item Measures  Item 
Codes 
Fairness 
Perceptions 
(FAIR) 
General Fairness 
(GF) 
I believe the government utilizes a reasonable 
amount of tax revenue to achieve social goals, 
such as the provision of benefits for low income 
families. 
 
GF1 
I believe everyone pays their fair share of income 
tax under the current income tax system 
GF2 
I think the government spends too much tax 
revenue on unnecessary welfare assistance. 
GF3R 
Exchange Fairness 
(EF) 
I receive fair value from the government in return 
for my income tax paid (e.g. benefits)  
EF1 
 It is fair that low-income earners receive more 
benefits from the government compared to high-
income earners. 
 
EF2 
The income taxes that I have to pay are high 
considering the benefits I receive from the 
government. 
EF3R 
Horizontal 
Fairness (HF) 
It is fair for individuals with similar amounts of 
income to pay a similar amount of income tax. 
HF1 
I believe it is fair for me to pay a similar share of 
income tax compared with other taxpayers 
earning an equivalent amount of income. 
 
HF2 
It is fair that „equals before tax are equals after 
tax‟. For example, if a person earning $100,000 
before tax pays $20,000 tax, everyone earning 
$100,000 income before tax should be left with 
$80,000 after tax. 
 
HF3 
Vertical Fairness 
(VF)* 
It is fair that high-income earners are subject to 
tax at progressively higher tax rates than low-
income earners. 
VF1 
It is fair that low-income earners are taxed at a 
lower rate than middle-income earners. 
VF2 
The share of the total income taxes paid by high-
income earners is much too high.  
VF3R 
Retributive 
Fairness (RF) 
It is fair that individuals who deliberately evade 
paying their taxes should be penalised with the 
same amount of penalty regardless of the amount 
of tax evaded.  
 
RF1R 
To be fair, the degree of punishment for evading 
tax should depend on the degree of non-
compliance.  
RF2 
I believe the initial late payment penalty on the 
unpaid tax, imposed on non-compliant taxpayers 
under the current tax system, is fair.  
 
RF3 
Personal Fairness 
(PF) 
I believe that I pay my fair share of the tax burden 
under the current income tax system. 
PF1 
Compared to other taxpayers, I pay more than my 
fair share of income tax.  
PF2R 
Middle-income earners pay their fair share of 
income tax. 
 
 
 
 
PF3 
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Administrative 
Fairness (AF) 
There are a number of ways available to me to 
correct errors in the calculation of my tax 
liability, if necessary, at no additional cost.  
 
AF1 
The administration of the income tax system by 
the Inland Revenue Department is consistent 
across years and taxpayers. 
 
AF2 
    
Tax 
Knowledge 
(KNOWL) 
General 
Knowledge (GK) 
The income tax system is a legitimate way for the 
government to collect revenue to manage an 
economy. 
GK1 
To my knowledge, individuals are subject to a 
single flat rate of income tax under the current tax 
system.  
GK2R 
Legal Knowledge 
(LK) 
As far as I am aware, non-compliant taxpayers 
can be imprisoned, if found guilty of evading tax. 
LK1 
Similar to other criminal offences, I believe that 
individuals can also be prosecuted for not 
complying with the Income Tax Act. 
 
LK2 
I believe that I do not have to abide by the 
deadline for the submission of tax return form (s) 
(in case of having other income such as rental and 
business income), as the deadline is only a 
guideline and does not result in penalties. 
 
 
LK3R 
Technical 
Knowledge 
(TK)** 
As far as I am aware, everyone who earns income 
sourced in this country is taxable, regardless of 
whether that person is resident or not. 
 
TK1 
I am sure that I am not required to file a tax return 
on interest income that I earn from money 
deposited in a bank account in New Zealand as it 
will be subject to income tax at source. 
 
TK2 
To my knowledge, I can deduct all personal 
expenses in calculating my tax liability. 
TK3R 
I have little idea about the deductions that I can 
claim as a taxpayer in the computation of my tax 
liability. 
TK4R 
Tax 
Complexity 
(COMPLX) 
Content 
Complexity (CT) 
I think the term used in tax publications (eg. IRD 
guide books) and in tax return forms are difficult 
for people like me to understand. 
 
CT1R 
The sentences and wording in the Individual 
Income Tax Return Guide (IR3G) are lengthy and 
not user-friendly. 
 
CT2R 
The rules related to individual income tax are 
clear. 
CT3 
Most of the time I need to refer to others for 
assistance in dealing with tax matters. 
CT4R 
Compliance 
Complexity (CM) 
I do not have a problem with completing and 
filing the tax return form(s), if they are required. 
CM1 
I find it tedious to maintain all my relevant 
records for the whole year for tax purposes (if I 
have to complete the tax return form(s)). 
 
CM2R 
I do not have to make a lot of effort to understand 
the explanations given in Inland Revenue 
Department guide books and other similar 
explanatory material. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CM3 
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Intention to 
Comply 
(IND) 
 I would claim the full deduction of $11,500, 
including the amount paid for my family trip. 
IND1R 
I would not attempt to overstate the business 
expenses by $2,500. 
IND2 
I would only claim a deduction for the actual 
amount spent for business purposes. 
IND3 
Affective 
Attitude 
(AFD) 
 I would be upset if I overstated the business 
expenses by $2,500.  
AFD1 
I would feel guilty if I overstated the business 
expenses by $2,500. 
AFD2 
I would feel pleased if I overstated the business 
expenses by $2,500. 
AFD3R 
Instrumental 
Attitude 
(ISD) 
 The likelihood of being audited by the Inland 
Revenue Department is low.  
 
ISD1R 
It would be financially beneficial for me to 
overstate the business expenses by $2,500. 
ISD2R 
Subjective 
Norms 
(SND) 
 My family and peers would think that I should 
overstate the business expenses by $2,500. 
SND1R 
My family and peers would think that I should 
only claim the actual business expenses. 
SND2 
My family and peers would approve of my 
decision to overstate the business expenses by 
$2,500. 
SND3R 
My family and peers would not overstate the 
business expenses if faced with a similar 
situation.  
SND4 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control 
(PBD) 
 With my tax knowledge, skills and resources, it 
would be very easy for me to overstate the 
business expenses by $2,500 successfully. 
 
PBD1 
Due to my limited tax knowledge, skills and 
resources, it is hard for me to overstate the 
business expenses by $2,500 successfully. 
 
PBD2R 
I would successfully overstate the business 
expenses in my tax return form if I wanted to.  
PBD3 
With my tax knowledge, skills and resources, I 
would have no difficulty in overstating the 
business expenses by $2,500 successfully. 
 
PBD4 
There are no barriers that would prevent me from 
overstating the business expenses by $2,500 
successfully. 
 
PBD5 
Intention to 
Comply 
(INS) 
 I would report my income fully, including the 
amount of $10,500 from the sales of handicrafts. 
INS1 
I would not attempt to cheat by omitting to report 
the extra amount of $10,500 in my tax return 
form. 
INS2 
I would not declare the $10,500 because that 
amount arises from trading goods with friends 
and neighbours. 
 
INS3R 
Affective 
Attitude 
(AFS) 
 I would be upset if I did not declare the extra 
amount of $10,500. 
AFS1 
I would feel guilty if I did not declare that extra 
amount of $10,500. 
AFS2 
I would feel pleased if I did not declare the extra 
amount of $10,500. 
AFS3R 
Instrumental 
Attitude 
(ISS) 
 The likelihood of being audited by the Inland 
Revenue Department is high. 
ISS1 
It would be financially beneficial for me not to 
declare the extra amount of $10,500.  
ISS2R 
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Subjective 
Norms 
(SNS) 
 My family and peers would think that I should 
not declare the extra $10,500. 
SNS1R 
My family and peers would think that I should 
declare the extra $10,500. 
SNS2 
My family and peers would approve of my 
decision to understate my income by $10,500. 
SNS3R 
My family and peers would not understate the 
income if faced with a similar situation.  
 
 
 
 
SNS4 
Perceived 
Behavioural 
Control 
(PBS) 
 Due to my limited knowledge, skills and 
resources, it is hard for me to omit the $10,500 in 
my tax return form successfully. 
 
PBS1R 
With my tax knowledge, skills and resources, it 
would be definitely easy for me to not declare the 
extra amount of $10,500 in my tax return form 
successfully. 
 
PBS2 
I would successfully omit the extra amount of 
$10,500 in my tax return form if I wanted to.  
PBS3 
With my tax knowledge, skills and resources, I 
would have no difficulty to omit the extra 
$10,500 in my tax return form successfully.  
 
PBS4 
There are no barriers that would prevent me from 
understating my income by $10,500 successfully.  
 
PBS5 
    
*There are slight differences in items VF1 and VF2 between New Zealand and the 
Malaysian counterpart. In Malaysia, the term „middle-income‟ is used (instead of „low-
income‟ as in New Zealand), since low-income earners are not subject to tax in Malaysia.  
**There is slight difference in item TK1 between New Zealand and the Malaysian 
counterpart. The change was made to the Malaysian scenario to accommodate the 
differences between the two environments. 
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Appendix 6 
 
List of interview questions 
1. What do you think of the current income tax system? 
2. Is it fair/unfair? Could you please elaborate on the aspects that you think it is 
fair/unfair. 
3. If you‟re given a chance to improve the current tax system, which aspect 
would you focus on? 
4. About compliance behaviour, do you believe that generally taxpayers from 
every level of income comply? 
5. Do you think that compliance behaviour is affected by people‟s perceptions 
on the fairness of the income tax system? 
6. How do you rate your current knowledge of tax? Which aspect of tax 
knowledge that you think that you are lacking of? Do you think that taxpayers 
have at least average level of tax knowledge?  
7. Do you think that if you have sufficient knowledge, your perception on 
fairness would be different? In your opinion, how does knowledge of taxation 
affect one‟s perception on the tax system and compliance behaviour? 
8. How do you perceive the complexity of the tax system? Does the level of 
complexity lead to fairness perceptions and compliance behaviour? 
9. Do you believe that a simpler tax system would improve fairness perceptions 
and compliance behaviour? 
10. Do you think the middle-income earners are being treated fairly under the 
current tax system? 
11. What is your opinion about the belief that high-income earners can easily 
evade tax with the help from tax consultants? 
12. Do you agree that the low-income earners receive a lot of benefits despite of 
the low tax paid? 
13. Any other comments? 
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Appendix 7 
 
A Sample of Accompanying Letter to Questionnaires – New Zealand  
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Appendix 8 
 
A Sample of Accompanying Letter to Questionnaires – Malaysia 
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Appendix 9 
Full Results of the Non-response Bias Test – New Zealand 
  Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F 
Sig. 
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
GF1 Equal variances assumed 1.498 .225 .381 78 .704 .125 
  Equal variances not assumed     .381 77.328 .704 .125 
GF2 Equal variances assumed 1.015 .317 .734 77 .465 .247 
  Equal variances not assumed     .735 76.879 .465 .247 
GF3R Equal variances assumed .455 .502 1.536 78 .129 .700 
  Equal variances not assumed     1.536 77.878 .129 .700 
EF1 Equal variances assumed .177 .675 2.341 78 .022 .900 
  Equal variances not assumed     2.341 77.474 .022 .900 
EF2 Equal variances assumed 2.020 .159 -.066 78 .947 -.025 
  Equal variances not assumed     -.066 76.730 .947 -.025 
EF3R Equal variances assumed .060 .807 2.020 76 .047 .718 
  Equal variances not assumed     2.020 75.812 .047 .718 
HF1 Equal variances assumed .492 .485 .220 78 .827 .075 
  Equal variances not assumed     .220 77.998 .827 .075 
HF2 Equal variances assumed .798 .374 .832 78 .408 .250 
  Equal variances not assumed     .832 77.902 .408 .250 
HF3 Equal variances assumed 1.072 .304 -.417 77 .678 -.152 
  Equal variances not assumed     -.416 74.133 .678 -.152 
VF1 Equal variances assumed 1.211 .274 .875 78 .384 .350 
  Equal variances not assumed     .875 76.791 .384 .350 
VF2 Equal variances assumed .959 .330 1.403 78 .165 .525 
  Equal variances not assumed     1.403 77.661 .165 .525 
VF3R Equal variances assumed .733 .394 .192 78 .848 .075 
  Equal variances not assumed     .192 77.303 .848 .075 
RF1R Equal variances assumed 1.121 .293 -.788 78 .433 -.375 
  Equal variances not assumed     -.788 77.116 .433 -.375 
RF2 Equal variances assumed 1.032 .313 -.590 78 .557 -.200 
  Equal variances not assumed     -.590 74.376 .557 -.200 
RF3 Equal variances assumed 2.439 .122 .408 78 .685 .125 
  Equal variances not assumed     .408 73.416 .685 .125 
PF1 Equal variances assumed 1.105 .296 .624 78 .534 .225 
  Equal variances not assumed     .624 76.028 .535 .225 
PF2R Equal variances assumed .903 .345 1.788 77 .078 .675 
  Equal variances not assumed     1.789 76.884 .078 .675 
PF3 Equal variances assumed 4.380 .040 -.332 77 .740 -.107 
  Equal variances not assumed     -.332 73.175 .741 -.107 
AF1 Equal variances assumed 2.944 .090 .747 78 .457 .225 
  Equal variances not assumed     .747 74.912 .457 .225 
AF2 Equal variances assumed 2.125 .149 -.836 78 .406 -.250 
  Equal variances not assumed     -.836 77.602 .406 -.250 
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Appendix 10 
Full Results of the Non-Response Bias Test – Malaysia 
  Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F 
 
Sig. 
t df 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
GF1 Equal variances assumed 1.321 .254 -.779 78 .438 -.275 
  Equal variances not assumed   -.779 74.955 .438 -.275 
GF2 Equal variances assumed 6.286 .014 -.226 78 .822 -.075 
  Equal variances not assumed   -.226 70.400 .822 -.075 
GF3R Equal variances assumed 5.004 .028 .362 77 .718 .137 
  Equal variances not assumed   .363 72.625 .718 .137 
EF1 Equal variances assumed 5.157 .026 -1.235 78 .220 -.400 
  Equal variances not assumed     -1.235 67.760 .221 -.400 
EF2 Equal variances assumed 2.487 .119 1.844 74 .069 .553 
  Equal variances not assumed     1.844 68.517 .069 .553 
EF3R Equal variances assumed 6.559 .012 -.882 75 .381 -.279 
  Equal variances not assumed     -.879 68.713 .383 -.279 
HF1 Equal variances assumed 3.014 .087 -.325 77 .746 -.147 
  Equal variances not assumed     -.326 75.883 .746 -.147 
HF2 Equal variances assumed 5.981 .017 -1.764 75 .082 -.642 
  Equal variances not assumed     -1.756 65.823 .084 -.642 
HF3 Equal variances assumed 2.056 .156 1.970 78 .052 .700 
  Equal variances not assumed     1.970 76.583 .052 .700 
VF1 Equal variances assumed .000 1.000 1.562 78 .122 .450 
  Equal variances not assumed     1.562 77.949 .122 .450 
VF2 Equal variances assumed 1.115 .294 .600 75 .551 .177 
  Equal variances not assumed     .598 69.741 .552 .177 
VF3R Equal variances assumed 25.613 .000 2.058 75 .043 .711 
  Equal variances not assumed     2.043 55.060 .046 .711 
RF1R Equal variances assumed 5.855 .018 .572 74 .569 .224 
  Equal variances not assumed     .567 63.958 .573 .224 
RF2 Equal variances assumed .016 .899 2.245 75 .028 .534 
  Equal variances not assumed     2.245 74.988 .028 .534 
RF3 Equal variances assumed .042 .839 .184 75 .854 .068 
  Equal variances not assumed     .184 74.574 .855 .068 
PF1 Equal variances assumed .190 .664 3.140 78 .002 .875 
  Equal variances not assumed     3.140 77.898 .002 .875 
PF2R Equal variances assumed .788 .378 .703 77 .484 .246 
  Equal variances not assumed     .701 73.206 .486 .246 
PF3 Equal variances assumed 4.462 .038 -.806 75 .423 -.246 
  Equal variances not assumed   -.803 65.988 .425 -.246 
AF1 Equal variances assumed .006 .941 .252 74 .802 .079 
  Equal variances not assumed     .252 73.928 .802 .079 
AF2 Equal variances assumed .180 .673 1.269 75 .208 .455 
  Equal variances not assumed     1.269 74.949 .208 .455 
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Appendix 11 
Full Results of the t-test Analysis between Public Sector and Private 
Sector in Malaysia 
  Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
  
F 
Sig. 
t df 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
GF Equal variances assumed 1.841 .175 2.654 836 .008 .19014 
  Equal variances not assumed   2.719 572.322 .007 .19014 
EF Equal variances assumed .008 .931 6.807 836 .000 .41564 
  Equal variances not assumed   6.812 538.767 .000 .41564 
HF Equal variances assumed 5.765 .017 -.111 836 .911 -.01197 
  Equal variances not assumed   -.116 597.057 .908 -.01197 
VF Equal variances assumed .002 .967 3.163 836 .002 .22357 
  Equal variances not assumed   3.118 518.481 .002 .22357 
RF Equal variances assumed .000 .987 1.289 836 .198 .08717 
  Equal variances not assumed   1.294 542.457 .196 .08717 
PF Equal variances assumed 1.554 .213 4.511 836 .000 .28477 
  Equal variances not assumed   4.576 558.013 .000 .28477 
AF Equal variances assumed 0.190 .663 2.280 836 .023 .17650 
  Equal variances not assumed   2.254 522.356 .025 .17650 
GK Equal variances assumed 1.279 .258 1.440 836 .150 .11697 
  Equal variances not assumed   1.504 601.497 .133 .11697 
LK Equal variances assumed 1.288 .257 3.100 836 .002 .24511 
  Equal variances not assumed   3.138 555.270 .002 .24511 
TK Equal variances assumed 1.813 .179 .072 836 .942 .00475 
  Equal variances not assumed   .070 504.340 .944 .00475 
CT Equal variances assumed .149 .700 -.175 836 .861 -.01466 
  Equal variances not assumed   -.178 555.843 .859 -.01466 
CM Equal variances assumed 9.497 .002 .983 836 .326 .08180 
  Equal variances not assumed   1.045 631.109 .296 .08180 
IND Equal variances assumed .039 .844 1.112 836 .266 .10623 
  Equal variances not assumed   1.106 530.562 .269 .10623 
AFD Equal variances assumed 6.856 .009 1.879 836 .061 .17605 
  Equal variances not assumed   1.931 577.296 .054 .17605 
ISD Equal variances assumed .080 .777 .159 836 .874 .01421 
  Equal variances not assumed   .160 543.582 .873 .01421 
SND Equal variances assumed .124 .725 .862 836 .389 .06641 
  Equal variances not assumed   .850 518.853 .396 .06641 
PBD Equal variances assumed .289 .591 .631 836 .528 .05105 
  Equal variances not assumed   .623 520.300 .534 .05105 
INS Equal variances assumed .796 .373 3.223 836 .001 .31885 
  Equal variances not assumed   3.239 544.940 .001 .31885 
AFS Equal variances assumed 8.232 .004 2.712 836 .007 .27282 
  Equal variances not assumed   2.826 598.880 .005 .27282 
ISS Equal variances assumed 6.796 .009 .058 836 .953 .00513 
520 
 
  Equal variances not assumed   .062 616.307 .951 .00513 
SNS Equal variances assumed .302 .583 1.131 836 .259 .10327 
 Equal variances not assumed   1.150 562.267 .251 .10327 
PBS Equal variances assumed .359 .549 -.090 836 .929 -.00712 
 Equal variances not assumed   -.090 545.911 .928 -.00712 
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Appendix 12 
 
Full Results of the t-test Analysis between New Zealand and Malaysia  
Fairness Perceptions 
 
        
  Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
   
F 
 
Sig. 
 
t 
 
df 
Sig.    
(2-tailed) 
Mean  
difference 
GF Equal variances assumed 13.557 .000 -8.195 1069 .000 -.623 
  Equal variances not assumed   -7.466 304.584 .000 -.623 
EF Equal variances assumed 47.860 .000 -10.993 1069 .000 -.774 
  Equal variances not assumed   -9.026 277.078 .000 -.774 
HF Equal variances assumed 14.183 .000 12.826 1069 .000 1.356 
  Equal variances not assumed   14.600 410.557 .000 1.356 
VF Equal variances assumed 31.921 .000 -9.882 1069 .000 -.784 
  Equal variances not assumed   -8.248 280.825 .000 -.784 
RF Equal variances assumed 5.708 .017 -.391 1069 .696 -.028 
  Equal variances not assumed   -.365 312.543 .716 -.028 
PF Equal variances assumed 14.083 .000 -3.171 1069 .002 -.218 
  Equal variances not assumed   -2.818 297.146 .005 -.218 
AF Equal variances assumed .046 .830 -9.433 1069 .000 -.760 
  Equal variances not assumed   -9.176 327.433 .000 -.760 
        
 
Perceptions of Tax Knowledge and Tax Complexity 
          Levene’s Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
   
F 
 
Sig. 
 
t 
 
df 
Sig.    
(2-tailed) 
Mean  
difference 
GK Equal variances assumed 4.272 .039 14.984 1069 .000 1.242 
  Equal variances not assumed   15.241 346.277 .000 1.242 
LK Equal variances assumed 10.393 .001 7.992 1069 .000 .633 
  Equal variances not assumed   8.818 389.825 .000 .633 
TK Equal variances assumed .000 .993 3.399 1069 .001 .228 
  Equal variances not assumed   3.411 340.247 .001 .228 
CT Equal variances assumed 4.015 .045 -2.493 1069 .013 -.217 
  Equal variances not assumed   -2.352 316.099 .019 -.217 
CM Equal variances assumed 1.491 .222 -1.471 1069 .142 -.127 
  Equal variances not assumed   -1.415 323.177 .158 -.127 
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Perceptions of Compliance Behaviour (Scenario 1) 
        
  Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
   
F 
 
Sig. 
 
t 
 
df 
Sig.    
(2-tailed) 
Mean  
difference 
IND Equal variances assumed 1.789 .181 11.674 1069 .000 1.156 
  Equal variances not assumed   11.315 326.008 .000 1.156 
AFD Equal variances assumed 10.599 .001 9.635 1069 .000 .948 
  Equal variances not assumed   8.984 312.070 .000 .948 
ISD Equal variances assumed 3.006 .083 -4.546 1069 .000 -.417 
  Equal variances not assumed   -4.475 332.203 .000 -.417 
SND Equal variances assumed 48.064 .000 8.700 1069 .000 .733 
  Equal variances not assumed   7.436 286.620 .000 .733 
PBD Equal variances assumed 20.602 .000 -11.534 1069 .000 -.996 
  Equal variances not assumed   -10.341 299.683 .000 -.996 
        
 
Perceptions of Compliance Behaviour (Scenario 2) 
          Levene’s Test 
for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
   
F 
 
Sig. 
 
t 
 
df 
Sig.    
(2-tailed) 
Mean  
difference 
INS Equal variances assumed 50.255 .000 4.337 1069 .000 .471 
  Equal variances not assumed   3.718 287.376 .000 .471 
AFS Equal variances assumed 22.342 .000 4.766 1069 .000 .511 
  Equal variances not assumed   4.326 303.404 .000 .511 
ISS Equal variances assumed 8.878 .003 -7.005 1069 .000 -.645 
  Equal variances not assumed   -6.529 311.928 .000 -.645 
SNS Equal variances assumed 13.675 .000 4.677 1069 .000 .451 
  Equal variances not assumed   4.295 307.101 .000 .451 
PBS Equal variances assumed 43.873 .000 -2.668 1069 .008 -.232 
  Equal variances not assumed   -2.269 285.437 .024 -.232 
        
 
 
 
523 
 
Appendix 13 
 
Full Results of the PLS Structural Models 
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Appendix 14 
 
Malay Version of Translated Comments Cited in the Thesis 
 
 
General fairness 
 
Participant 9 
“Itu yang kadang-kadang tu kita quite frustrated juga sebab kita tengok 
sometimes expenditures yang government belanja tu tak macam yang kita 
expect la, faham, yang dia buat kebanyakan kita rasa pembaziran…” 
 
Participant 14 
“saya duduk dalam jabatan kerajaan, saya tau banyak la kan. Kalau 
personally memang banyak pembaziran la, kemudian dari segi, apa nama 
pengurusan tu memang kalau nak ikut cakap, incapable pun ada, how they 
manage the money, how they allocate duit tu kan, mungkin kalau dari segi 
keseluruhan budget tu, nampak bagus la pendidikan dilebihkan, kemudian 
ada pertahanan sikit, kemudian ada SME, perlaksanaan tu, bila duit 
diagihkan, at the end of the day, kita tak nampak apa dia kan…” 
 
Participant 19 
“pendidikan bagi saya belum mencukupi la especially di luar bandar kan, 
masih terdapat kawasan-kawasan yang masih, bagi saya la, keadaan 
sekolah tu masih belum mencukupi untuk menampung semua…” 
 
Participant 24 
“setakat ni kan kita tak tahu la apa yang kita pendapatan yang kita bayar tu 
digunakan untuk apa, itu je yang kita tak tahu lah. Tak ada yang 
dimaklumkan kat mana-mana kan, sedangkan kita tengok ada juga rakyat 
kita yang daif dan sebagainya, apa peranan cukai tu, adakah disalurkan 
jugak kepada orang yang kurang mampu ni, ataupun untuk kemajuan je ke, 
di mana dia gunakan cukai yang kita bayar tu, dekat mana dia gunakan, 
dimana dia laburkan ke, di mana, kita tak tahu la, itu kurang info tentang 
tu…saya tak puas hati…” 
 
Participant 4 
“saya rasa ramai yang tak tahu yang kerajaan ada kemudahan macam 
golongan yang tak boleh kerja apa semua. Sebenarnya dia ada punya 
bantuan dia, kerajaan kat situ cukup prihatin, perlu diwar-warkan.” 
 
Participant 9 
“saya tak tau how much money they spend untuk yang itu [membantu 
golongan miskin], kita tak tau, mana ada, tak tau how much money they 
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spend untuk tu…disclosure tu amat penting, how much dia allocate from 
income tax, kita rasa puas hati la kan…” 
Participant 3 
“Dari segi kegunaan [wang cukai pendapatan] tu memang efisien la.” 
 
Participant 4 
“Saya rasa dari segi keefisienan [penggunaan cukai] tu [memang] ada…” 
 
Participant 25 
“Dari satu segi memang adil…I mean sekarang ni kan, setiap pembayar 
cukai at least termasuk I mesti tahu apa yang dibelanjakan, apa yang 
digunakan oleh pihak government. Setakat ni kita tahu secara umum lah, 
untuk pendidikan, untuk whatever ka. Ini tak cukup, bukan tak cukup, I 
mean tak jelas la.” 
 
Participant 29 
“Secara terperinci kita tak jelas kan, kita tak jelas secara terperinci kan tapi 
memang la keseluruhan pendapatan tu untuk negara kan…” 
 
 
Vertical fairness 
 
Participant 2 
“…kalau you punya gaji mahal, memang patut la you dikenakan cukai, 
kalau gaji kurang, cukai dia kurang la dan ada certain level gaji selepas 
ditolak deduction, ada yang tak kena [cukai]…” 
 
Participant 3 
“System ni memang adil la, maknanya kalau pendapatan rendah tu 
kebanyakannya tak kena cukai, pendapatan yang tinggi tu cukainya lebih 
la, maknanya diseimbangkan antara pendapatan yang besar dan pendapatan 
yang sedikit tu…” 
 
 
Retributive fairness 
 
Participant 18 
“…dari segi penalti, wajar la kalau seseorang tu tak nak bayar, memang 
kita buat satu mechanism la untuk bagi pembayar tu aware tanggungjawab 
dia…” 
 
Participant 23 
“Penalti boleh diterima pakai untuk menggalakkan orang membayar pada 
masa yang ditetapkan.” 
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Participant 16 
“Yang lambat bayar ni memang patut la pun kita kenakan dia satu penalty 
tapi tak la sampai membebankan dan menyusahkan mereka la, maknanya 
mungkin dari segi figure dia ataupun dia punya term and condition kena 
flexible sikit la. Mungkin diaorang pun ada masalah nak bayar, jadi kita 
bagi sedikit kelonggaran kepada diaorang.” 
 
Participant 10 
“…sebenarnya untuk salaried group, dia buat payment on time tapi ada la 
ketikanya dia lewat sedikit…jadi jangan la kenakan penalty sebab lambat 
laun pun dia akan settle kan jugak…tapi untuk other group, itu mungkin 
kenakan penalty sebab diaorang tak ada proper accounting documents…” 
 
 
Administrative fairness 
 
Participant 1 
“Kita tengok STS ni dia let kita yang nak tahu sendiri. Maknanya, kalau 
dibandar-bandar besar contohnya Bandar besar macam Kuala Lumpur, 
Kuala Terengganu pun tak semua la, maknanya ada yang educated ada 
yang tak educated, so maknanya dari segi STS ni kalau LHDN tak push, 
tak turun padang diaorang memang akan lost macam tu.” 
 
Participant 2 
“…kita isi borang melalui e-filing kat sini, jadi kita isi, macam LHDN 
pakai terima je apa yang diisi oleh pembayar-pembayar cukai tu. Dari segi 
betul ke tak betul ke figure yang diaorang masuk tu, so LHDN tak query 
la…jadi ketepatan tu tak dipastikan oleh LHDN la.” 
 
Participant 15 
“Dari segi adil tu kurang adil la, sebab apa yang ada dalam sistem tu kita 
tak boleh nak query, kita kena ikut saja sistem tu, kalau kita kira dengan 
cara manual kadang-kadang tak sama dengan apa yang ditaksirkan, jadi itu 
kita tak boleh nak query.” 
 
Participant 18 
“…dan sekarang ni dia ada STS tu, once kita log in semua dan send, dia 
tak boleh, kalau ada pembetulan kesilapan figure kan, kita tak boleh redo, 
maksudnya kalau kata kita ada salah satu figure kat belakang tu, kita kena 
bayar dulu.” 
 
Participant 8 
“…cuma dari segi mungkin dari segi pungutan tu diaorang dah banyak 
improve tapi kalau kita nak claim balik, itu saya rasa lambat sangat la…” 
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Participant 15 
“Servis di kaunter tak boleh sampai cukup baik la, belum excellent, tapi 
sederhana la. Dari segi friendly, dia tak friendly la, bila kita tanya tu, dia 
tak jawab dengan friendly la…whatever fakta yang ada pada dia, dia kira 
betul la, fakta yang kita bawa dia tak nak terima.” 
 
Participant 18 
“Dia (sistem pentadbiran] tak user-friendly, and dia kadang-kadang tu kita 
hantar dua tiga kali pun, dia cakap tak dapat, tak dapat…” 
 
 
Tax knowledge 
 
Participant 2 
“Saya rasa saya tak berpengetahuan sangat la. Saya tahu saya kena isi BE 
form every year untuk cukai pendapatan individu.” 
 
Participant 18 
“Bagi saya la, menjadi satu tanggungjawab sebagai rakyat Malaysia kan, 
kita memang kena bayar la cukai pendapatan yang telah ditetapkan oleh 
Kerajaan Malaysia…” 
 
Participant 1 
 “Knowledge untuk macam enterprise, macam ada contoh macam peniaga-
peniaga kecil, enterprise, pemandu lori yang bawa lori yang ada perniagaan 
sendiri, dia memang dari segi tu memang out la, memang tak ada langsung. 
So kalau tak tak dak sapa ajar memang dia takkan buat. Dia takkan buka 
buku cukai, dia takkan buka buku fail cukai. Dan dia takkan buat. So 
memang dari segi tu, memang totally lost.”  
 
“…dibandar besar pun, engineer pun, kalau ditanya, saya pun tak tau isi 
borang tax macamana. Yang dia tak tau, apa, elemen-elemen yang boleh 
tolak tax, ada rebate, ada insurance, potongan dua kali, dia tak tau, semua 
tak tau.” 
 
Participant 3 
“…tidak secara keseluruhan, sikit-sikit je la, tidak 100%, borang BE saya 
boleh la.” 
 
Participant 14 
“Saya tak aware tentang penalty tu sebabnya since kita dah boleh comply 
kan. PCB pun potong, lepas tu bayar sebelum tarikh yang ditetapkan, 
submit borang cukai pendapatan tu, jadi dari segi penalty tu, memang saya 
tak ni [tahu] sangat la, tak perasan, tapi tau ada penalty.” 
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Tax complexity 
 
Participant 1 
“…kita punya system cukai simple…memang tak kompleks.” 
 
Participant 2 
“…isi borang tu senang ja sebab dia dalam internet, so kita just fill up the 
blank and then just follow dia punya procedure je la. Kita just isi-isi apa 
yang dia nak, then send, kita follow instructions, tak dak masalah dari segi 
yang tu.” 
 
Participant 6 
“…it‟s [the income tax system] not complex actually…for the business 
may be [complex] la, because untuk business kan banyak pengiraan dia, 
like apa expense yang deductible, apa expense kena add back; for a 
company mungkin a little bit macam payah sikit la.” 
 
Participant 8 
“[sistem cukai pendapatan] memang tak susah. Saya rasa semua orang 
boleh buat dan boleh faham dan boleh buat terutama orang yang makan 
gaji, kita dah ada format daripada majikan tu, kita just ikut je, melainkan 
kalau saya ada business lain ke apa, mungkin susah kan. Tapi untuk orang 
makan gaji macam saya ni, saya rasa benda tu memang tak sampai 10 
minit la boleh siap.” 
 
 
Compliance behaviour 
 
Participant 1 
“…dari segi pematuhan saya rasa, ada elemen, semua orang nak elak, 
maksud saya bukan elak secara betul, elak secara tak betul, dia avoid 
sebenarnya, dia bukan nak bayar, maknanya kalau boleh tak bayar, dia 
takkan bayar la. Maknanya bila boleh manipulate, dia akan manipulate...” 
 
 
Participant 8 
“…macam kitorang yang makan gaji ni memang tak boleh lari tapi orang 
yang macam kerja sendiri atau pun business tu maknanya, diaorang ada 
banyak cara la yang diaorang boleh lepas daripada tindakan...” 
 
Participant 7 
“…saya dapati ada juga golongan-golongan yang bukan berpendapatan 
tetap macam ahli usahawan, perniagaan pasal mereka ni yang masih 
LHDN tak dapat nak mengesan diaorang ni. Nampak di mata saya, 
jutawan-jutawan, usahawan-usahawan yang dia tak bayar cukai, kalau 
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bayar pun tak setimpal dengan apa yang dia dapat, macam tu, maksud 
saya…” 
 
Participant 9 
“…my relative la dia businessman, saya tanya dia why you buy so many 
cars, saya rasa tak adil la, car yang dia beli tu bukannya [murah], luxury 
cars tau, this is under my company dia kata, so I can deduct my expenses, 
jadi dia driving a very luxury car tapi tolak cukai business dia, kereta 
besar-besar, 4 biji, semua kereta Mercedes, BMW…kita rasa tak adil la put 
on their money on…dia guna kereta tu untuk dia, bukan untuk business, 
claim saja kata kereta tu company punya…tak kena audit…saya punya 
neighbour cina pun macam tu. Melancong, kan. Melancong tu dia masuk 
macam dia punya perbelanjaan tau, perbelanjaan under dia deduct nak lari 
cukai. Kisah benar ni tau.” 
 
Participant 2 
“…berdasarkan apa-apa yang ada disekeliling saya ni la kan, kawan-kawan 
yang satu kerja ni, malas nak isi e-filing tu…tak ada kesedaran la 
sebenarnya...” 
 
“…tauke-tauke syarikat ni, dia mudah [elak cukai], dia memang mudah 
jugak la sebab dia ada dia punya tax consultant, dia nak tukar sana sini 
sana sini figure kan…” 
 
Participant 7 
“…mungkin [ada yang tak patuh] bukan sengaja tapi tahap kefahaman 
[berkaitan sistem cukai pendapatan].” 
 
Participant 15 
“Pengetahuan dia, pengetahuan dia tak ada tentang tu [sistem cukai 
pendapatan], tu yang dia selalu lari tu. Pengetahuan dia tak ada la.” 
 
Participant 20 
“Orang yang tahu macamana nak keluar dariapda cengkaman cukai ni dia 
memang ada pengetahuan yang tinggi…pendapatan dia tinggi tapi dia tahu 
ruang-ruang mana yang boleh dielak dan pulak sekarang ni khidmat-
khidmat penasihat pencukaian boleh dapat dengan kos yang 
berpatutan…jadi orang yang ada pengetahuan dia agak culas la untuk 
mengelakkan diri...” 
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Tax knowledge, tax complexity and fairness perceptions 
 
Participant 6 
“Saya rasa it‟s possible for those yang tak ada knowledge on tax, dia akan 
rasa benda ni tak fair, dia akan rasa benda ni macam susah.” 
 
Participant 20 
“…pendapatan biasanya ditakrifkan sebagai hak kita biasanya la, 
pendapatan kita kan, atau pun perniagaan, duit kita, jadi bagi mereka yang 
kurang ataupun sedikit pengetahuan dia, dia merasakan satu bebanan bagi 
mereka sebab duit yang diaorang dapat kena bayar balik [dalam bentuk 
cukai]…” 
 
